



AVOIDING FUTURE TRAGEDIES

IMPROVING INVESTIGATIONS OF MISSING WOMEN

MAY 2012

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Introduction

The Missing Women Commission of Inquiry (MWCI) has invited individuals and organizations to provide submissions to their Policy Forums focusing on two of the MWCI's terms of reference:

- 4c) Recommend changes considered necessary respecting the initiation and conduct of investigations in British Columbia of missing women and suspected multiple homicides; and
- 4d) Recommend changes considered necessary respecting homicide investigations in British Columbia by more than one investigating organization, including the coordination of those investigations.

According to the Policy Forum invitation, the Commission identified four major policy themes arising from its mandate:

- 1) Police protection of vulnerable and marginalized women;
- 2) Structure and organization of the police force in British Columbia, including the issue of regionalization in the Lower Mainland;
- 3) Policies and practices in the investigation of missing persons and suspected multiple homicides; and
- 4) Police relationships with the community and media.

The Commission has also prepared papers regarding:

- 1) Policies and practices in the treatment of vulnerable witnesses; and
- 2) Healing, reconciliation and implementation of recommendations.

As the largest municipal police force in British Columbia (independent or RCMP), it is important for the Vancouver Police Department (VPD) to participate in the MWCI process as fully as possible.

The VPD is dedicated to improving police investigations, reducing the risk of victimization for all individuals in the community, and ensuring that such tragedies are avoided in the future. The VPD has implemented a number of initiatives to improve missing person investigations, and investigations generally, including implementing all of the VPD-specific

recommendations made in its Missing Women Investigation Review (MWIR).¹ There are, however, a number of additional steps which could be taken that would enhance policing in the Metro Vancouver region, and where missing persons investigations are concerned, throughout BC, and these are outlined in this submission.

The VPD has also worked hard to improve communication and collaboration between partner agencies, and to build improved relationships with vulnerable citizens in the Downtown Eastside, particularly marginalized women. The VPD recognizes that it is only in partnership and collaboration with the communities it serves will crime prevention and crime solving be optimized. Improving and deepening communications with members of the Downtown Eastside community is a goal to which the VPD is firmly committed.

This report outlines proposals with respect to the four major policy themes outlined above, and also addresses the two additional papers.

¹ See Appendices A – C to this submission, comprising the recommendations from the report, the epilogue from the report outlining the changes that have been made, and an August 2011 update of changes made. The VPD continues to support and endorse the recommendations made to the City, the Province and non-VPD police agencies.

I. Police protection of vulnerable and marginalized women

People may be vulnerable due to a wide range of factors, including: their age, such as with children and the elderly; their physical or mental condition, which may involve a disability or an addiction; poverty, which may mean they are homeless or live in insecure housing; their work, particularly if they are in the sex trade; or their lack of connections within a community. From a law enforcement and public safety perspective, the VPD is committed to protecting persons who are vulnerable due to these and other factors through a variety of initiatives. The submissions here will focus on the protection of vulnerable and marginalized women.

The Commission's discussion report entitled "Police Protection of Vulnerable and Marginalized Women" (hereinafter the "Police Protection Report") identifies seven broad policy options for the improvement of police protection of vulnerable and marginalized women:

- Systemic reviews and audits;
- Explicit recognition of the duty of non-discrimination in policing standards;
- Targeted protocols and strategies;
- Stronger police-community relations;
- Enhanced community policing model and methods;
- Effective deployment of diverse police personnel; and
- Training.

The submissions in this section will address the VPD's practices with respect to each of these themes, identifying current practices as well as possible avenues for future improvement. In addition, the VPD suggests that the following two policy options are also essential to the proper protection of vulnerable persons:

- Communication with and warnings to the public; and
- Monitoring of high-risk offenders.

These submissions will also address these two themes.

Systemic Reviews and Audits

Introduction

The VPD believes strongly in the value of regular reviews and audits. The VPD is committed to being a best-practices learning organization, and it regards reviews and audits as an important element in the learning process and in ensuring the VPD is performing at a high level. It is hoped that the Commission recognizes the VPD's significant efforts in this regard since 2002, and in particular recognizes that the VPD's approach has been anything but an attempt to justify, "spin" or "window dress" its performance, as some participants have suggested. The record clearly shows otherwise.

Present Practices

The VPD engages in systemic reviews and audits of its performance so that possibilities for improvement may be identified and implemented. The VPD has a full-time civilian-staffed Audit Unit which conducts audits in a variety of administrative and operational areas. In addition to the work of the full-time Audit Unit, on an as-needed basis the VPD conducts extraordinary audits and reviews to address particular issues or areas of concern. One example of this, which is noted in the Commission's Police Protection Report, is the VPD's 2004 internal review of the Missing Persons Unit² completed by retired Inspector John Schouten. Inspector Schouten interviewed past and present members of the MPU, reviewed the guiding policies, examined the filing and data systems employed by the unit, consulted with outside agencies, and conducted further observation and review. He ultimately made 50 recommendations for change. The VPD considered each of these recommendations and addressed all of them.³ The MPU now has an extremely high solve rate.⁴

As the Commission has noted in the Police Protection Report and as it has examined at length in the hearings, DCC LePard also conducted a very extensive internal review of the missing women investigations (the "LePard Report"). The LePard Report is perhaps the clearest example of the VPD's commitment to learning and transparency. The LePard Report is unflinching in its analysis of errors and missed opportunities in the VPD's investigation of the missing women. As Dr. Rossmo testified, the LePard Report "does not pull any punches." Indeed, Dr. Rossmo testified that such a critical self-examination is rare for a police organization, and he has referred the LePard Report to other police agencies as

² See Appendix D.

³ See Appendices E and F (Spreadsheet of implementation of recommendations from the Schouten Report and a report from Sgt Fairweather to DC LePard dated May 26, 2006 regarding implementation of the recommendations from the Schouten Report).

⁴ See Appendix G (Missing Person Files – Female (2002-2010)).

“an exemplar of how you can do an internal autopsy and try to figure out what went wrong so that it won’t happen again in the future.”⁵

The VPD has also partnered with the community to improve the response to missing and murdered women. For example, in June 2011, the SisterWatch Project released its report entitled “The Tragedy of Missing and Murdered Aboriginal Women in Canada”.⁶ SisterWatch is comprised of representatives of the VPD and the Women’s Memorial March Committee. SisterWatch has implemented a number of initiatives since its formation in the fall of 2010, including the installation of rugged 911-only phones in the DTES, town hall meetings, a speakers’ bureau, a telephone tip line and a web site. Information brought forward through SisterWatch has resulted in several major investigations targeting predators in the DTES. The SisterWatch report serves as a partial external review in that it reviewed and considered issues relating to policing and Aboriginal women and made a number of further recommendations with respect to policing across Canada, many of which have been identified and reiterated in the Commission’s paper titled Policies and Practices in the Investigation of Missing Persons and Suspected Multiple Homicides.

The VPD also provided information to the Coordinating Committee of Senior Officials (Criminal) Missing Women Working Group as part of the work leading to its “Report and Recommendations on Issues Related to the High Number of Murdered and Missing Women in Canada”, released in January of 2012.

In addition, the VPD called for this Inquiry and has sought to assist it in reaching a full and accurate understanding of what went wrong in the police investigations and to formulate meaningful and useful recommendations for the future.

The VPD has also engaged in a number of audits, reviews and studies of police responses, practices and issues that are not directly related to the issue of missing women, but further demonstrate the VPD’s commitment to internal and external reviews and analysis of its performance and exploration of ways policing can be improved. In recent years these include the following:

- a) Independent external evaluation of the Vancouver Police Department’s City-Wide Enforcement Team Initiative (2004) by Professor Curt Griffiths and others;
- b) University College of the Fraser Valley’s Review of the Vancouver Police Department’s Staffing Requirements (2005), Professor Curt Griffiths, et al;
- c) “Civilianization in the VPD” (2006): an analysis of possibilities for utilizing more civilians in policing functions, Professor Curt Griffiths and others;

⁵ Transcript, January 25, 2012, p. 41, l. 8 – p. 42, l. 11 (Dr. Rossmo in cross by Mr. Dickson).

⁶ See Appendix H – the SisterWatch Report.

- d) VPD Patrol Deployment Study (2007), Professor Curt Griffiths, et al;
- e) VPD Operational Review Phase 2 Report: An Examination of Investigative and Administrative Deployment (2007), Professor Curt Griffiths, et al;
- f) “Assessing Sentencing Across Criminal Careers: An Examination of VPD’s Chronic Offenders” (2008): a study of sentencing patterns for offenders within the VPD’s Chronic Offenders Program;
- g) “Lost in Transition” (2008): an examination of the lack of capacity in the mental health system and the impact of such on the mentally ill and on police resources;
- h) “Project Lockstep” (2009): a study proposing greater coordination among government agencies and service providers toward improving the lives of the most vulnerable and marginalized persons in the DTES;
- i) “Report on Sexual Assault Incidents” (2010): an analysis in trends on reports of sexual assaults, from January to August of 2008 to 2010;
- j) “Lost in Transition – Part Two” (2010; draft): a follow-up to the 2008 report.
- k) “Evaluation of Vancouver Police Department’s Beach Patrol Program” (2010): a review of new techniques employed in patrolling the City’s beaches;
- l) Review of the Crime Data Analysis Process (2010), VPD Audit Unit; and
- m) “2011 Stanley Cup Riot Review” (2011): an evaluation of the causes of the riot and of the VPD’s response.

The VPD also conducts surveys to assess the level of public satisfaction with the VPD. The surveys were conducted bi-annually prior to 2009; since then, they have been conducted annually.

Potential Improvements

The Commission’s Police Protection Report states at p. 16 that “[t]he experience in other jurisdictions suggests that a systemic review or audit may be more effective when carried out by an external agency and/or with community involvement.” The third question for discussion set out in that report asks: “Are independent reviews or audits of police services required in order to ascertain the systemic barriers to the investigation of cases of missing and murdered women and to the effective protection of vulnerable and marginalized women? If so, how should these be carried out?”

As a general matter, the VPD believes that the utility of an audit or review can in some circumstances be increased by being conducted by an independent agency, as opposed to internally. Some of the advantages of an external review include:

- a) In theory, an independent review may be more pointed in its criticisms of the police; and
- b) Due to that theory, the review may have greater credibility among some sectors of the community, particularly where there has been criticism of the police from the community.

However, there are also disadvantages to an external review, including:

- a) An external agency may have less knowledge of the practices of the police force under review, such that the review is more superficial and less grounded in actual practices; and
- b) While an external review may have more credibility among the community, an internal review may have more credibility among the police force, such that recommendations from an internal review are more fully implemented.

Greater access to external reviews could be beneficial, although there are time, cost and expertise considerations which can limit the practical availability of external reviews. The potential for securing greater access to external reviewers for police forces in British Columbia is something that should be considered and discussed with appropriate agencies including the BC Association of Municipal Chiefs of Police, the RCMP and the Police Services Division of the BC Ministry of Justice.

Explicit recognition of the duty of non-discrimination in policing standards

Introduction

The VPD agrees that it is important to explicitly recognize the responsibility of police to fulfill their duties and exercise their powers in a non-discriminatory manner.

Present Practices

At present, that duty is made clear to VPD members in a number of ways.

First, the Police Oath contains the following wording:⁷

- I will be faithful and bear true allegiance to Her Majesty Queen Elizabeth the Second, Queen of Canada, Her Heirs and Successors;

⁷ Police Oath/Solemn Affirmation Regulation, B.C. Reg 2004/98.

- I will, to the best of my power, cause the peace to be kept and prevent all offences against the persons and properties of Her Majesty's subjects;
- I will faithfully, honestly and impartially perform my duties as [an officer].

Second, the VPD's Code of Ethics, which is derived from the British Columbia Police Code of Ethics⁸, states the following:

Fundamental Principles

Police Officers in the Province of British Columbia, along with their respective organizations and agencies, embrace the following Fundamental Principles, which underpin the Guiding Values, Primary Responsibilities and Decision-Making framework.

- democracy & the rule of law
- justice & equality
- protection of life & property
- safeguarding the public trust
- that the police are the public and the public are the police
- the principles of the Constitution of Canada
- the rights enshrined in the Charter of Rights & Freedoms

Guiding Values

Police Officers in the Province of British Columbia, along with their respective organizations and agencies, look to the following Guiding Values, which should direct all our decisions. Moreover, we recognize that our decisions will be judged according to how well they correspond to these values.

- citizenship
- courage
- fairness
- impartiality
- integrity
- loyalty
- public service

⁸ VPD *Regulations and Procedures Manual*, s. 4.1.2,

- respect

Primary Responsibilities

Police Officers in the Province of British Columbia, along with their respective organizations and agencies, affirm the following Primary Responsibilities, which are defined in terms of three key relationships. First, there is the Public, for whom we serve. Next there are Professional Partners, with whom we work, and ourselves personally, to whom we must be true. Moreover, we recognize that responsibility occurs personally and collectively, and that accountability must accompany responsibility for it to be effectual.

(i) The Public

Our basic policing duties are to protect lives and property, preserve peace and good order, prevent crime, detect and apprehend offenders and enforce the law, while at the same time protecting the rights and freedoms of all persons as guaranteed in our Charter of Rights and Freedoms. In fulfilling these duties, we must strive for excellence, which includes the exercise of professional discretion and judgment in a manner consistent with our Fundamental Principles and Guiding Values. Recognizing, however, that the ability of the police to perform their duties is dependent upon public approval, support and willing cooperation, we must also provide open, responsive, impartial and accessible service. In other words, to safeguard the public trust, we will be responsible to the public and accountable publicly for what we do.

* * *

Policing is serious work and there are important issues at stake. It requires not only technical competence but also a willingness to take difficult action in trying times. As well, it requires a recognition that we must act with a concerted commitment to serve and protect using democratic principles in the service of the law while honouring human dignity in the pursuit of justice. And it is this commitment to principled policing that distinguishes us as professionals, both to ourselves and to the public

[Emphasis added]

Third, the VPD's Strategic Plan contains a statement of values, which is encapsulated in the acronym "IPAR":

- Integrity: "We stand for truth and honesty in all circumstances";
- Professionalism: "We will pursue the highest standards in policing";
- Accountability: "We will maintain the highest ethical and legal standards"; and
- Respect: "We will be compassionate and respectful in all our actions".

In addition, the VPD Strategic Plan (2012-2016) also contains a statement on the VPD's Principles:

JUSTIFICATION – Police actions shall be necessary, legitimate, and legally justifiable

PROPORTIONALITY – The risk and impact of police actions shall be proportional to the priority and the severity of the situation in need of intervention

INTRUSIVENESS – Police actions should be the least intrusive required to ensure public safety

Fourth, since 2002 the VPD has a history of progressive decision-making regarding the vulnerable, such as developing a collaborative policing plan in support of the Supervised Injection Site opened in August 2003; participation in the development of the “Four Pillars” policy; creating a VPD drug enforcement policy that recognized addiction as primarily a health issue;⁹ creating a homeless policy regarding enforcement of the “Assistance to Shelter Act”; and embarking on enforcement projects to target the criminal infrastructure in the Downtown Eastside but protect the vulnerable who are victimized by predators. Most recently, the VPD submitted for approval by the Police Board a policy document titled “Sex Work Enforcement Guidelines”,¹⁰ which were prepared with the assistance of WISH, PIVOT, Susan Davis, PEERS and PACE. The Guidelines set out the VPD's philosophy toward violence against sex workers and the enforcement of sex work-related laws. The Guidelines contain the following statements:

- a) “At all times, the VPD officers will uphold the values of “IPAR”: Integrity, Professionalism, Accountability, and Respect. As articulated in the VPD Strategic Plan, all actions taken by the VPD will be justifiable, proportional and minimally intrusive.”
- b) “The VPD seeks to assertively promote the safety, dignity and well-being of those involved in the sex industry. In addition, in line with our goal to support partnerships and relationships with all members of our community, the VPD will continue to build trust, respect and promote evidence based decision making in order to reduce exploitation and abuse within the sex industry.”
- c) “In all situations, VPD officers will treat those in the sex industry with respect and dignity. It is important to recognize that while some sex workers are involved as a matter of choice; many others are involved in sex work as a survival mechanism, as result of drug addiction or mental health issues, or are otherwise vulnerable and marginalized.”

⁹ <http://vancouver.ca/police/assets/pdf/reports-policies/vpd-policy-drug.pdf>

¹⁰ See Appendix I

- d) “The VPD does not seek to destabilize the safety of sex workers, especially survival sex workers. Therefore, where there are nuisance related complaints against survival sex workers, alternative measures and assistance must be considered with enforcement a last resort.”
- e) “When responding to sex work-related calls or situations, the Vancouver Police Department’s priority is to ensure the safety and security of sex workers. Police calls regarding violence against sex workers are a priority for assessment and response.”
- f) “Where enforcement action is deemed necessary, all reasonable steps will be taken to show respect and dignity for those parties involved. ([F]or example, at the execution of a search warrant, officers should be prepared to supply sex industry workers with blankets or robes to wrap themselves in while in police presence or provide adequate time for the worker to dress).”
- g) “Citizens of Vancouver involved in sex work are entitled to the same level of safety and protection under the law as are all residents of the City.”

Potential Improvements

The VPD believes that collectively the statements above make it clear to VPD members that they are required and expected to fulfil their duties and to exercise their powers in a respectful, sensitive and non-discriminatory manner. That message is further underscored by the training VPD members receive. The VPD would fully consider any recommendations for further statements of the duty of non-discrimination, but suggests that such are not necessary in view of the statements presently in place.

Targeted protocols and strategies, stronger police-community relations and enhanced community policing model and methods

Introduction

The VPD believes strongly in community-based policing and is committed to working with communities to develop targeted strategies to increase the safety of vulnerable persons. Among the most vulnerable persons in the city are sex workers, and the VPD is working hard to improve its relationships with sex worker communities to increase communication and collaboration.

The VPD regards the three themes identified in this section – targeted protocols and strategies, stronger police-community relations and enhanced community policing model and methods – as inherently linked and so they will be discussed together. Reducing reporting barriers should also form part of this discussion.

Present Practice

During the time period at issue in this Inquiry (1997-2002), the VPD did make specific efforts to reach out to vulnerable communities in the DTES. For instance, the VPD helped to form the Vancouver Police Native Liaison Society (the “VPNLS”) in the early 1980s, which was complemented on the VPD side by its Native Liaison Unit. Cst. Dave Dickson was dedicated to liaising in the DTES, and devoted much of his time to enhancing communications with sex workers and addressing their safety issues. His outreach efforts were further bolstered by community policing offices in Strathcona and Chinatown. In 1996, the VPD formed the Diversity Advisory Committee, which advised the Chief Constable on diversity issues.

Since 2002, the VPD has added further initiatives to connect and collaborate with marginalized communities. The Diversity Advisory Committee is now housed within the VPD’s Diversity and Aboriginal Policing Section (“DAPS”), which works with Aboriginal and marginalized populations with significant public safety issues, such as the LGBT community (lesbian, gay, bi and transgender). The DAPS currently comprises an inspector, two sergeants, three constables (a hate crimes investigator, an LGBT liaison officer and an Aboriginal liaison officer), a program planner, and an administrative assistant. The DAPS seeks to make real improvements in issues concerning marginalized populations, including addressing the following issues:

- a) over-representation in illegal behaviours;
- b) over-victimization;
- c) under-reporting of crimes;
- d) participation in investigations and in court as victims / witnesses;
- e) involvement in crime prevention activities;
- f) provision of information / intelligence on criminals, crime groups and crimes;
- g) perceptions of safety / fear; and
- h) confidence in the police.

The police officers within the DAPS work directly with the community members to improve their circumstances and provide support.

In addition, the VPD’s Neighbourhood Policing Team for District 2 includes the VPD’s Sex Industry Liaison Officer, Constable Linda Malcolm, about whom there have been very positive comments in the inquiry hearings, and the VPD’s Homelessness Outreach Coordinator, Constable Jodyne Keller.

Further, the VPD supports 10 Community Policing Centres, including the Aboriginal CPC at 875 E. Hastings St. Also, the VPD has an Aboriginal member, Constable Steve Hanuse, assigned fulltime as a liaison officer at Musqueam.

The VPD is actively engaged in outreach efforts to vulnerable communities. A prominent example of this is the SisterWatch program. As discussed in the Commission's Police Protection Report at pages 23 and 24, SisterWatch is a collaboration between the VPD and the Women's Memorial March Committee, which in turn is comprised of advocates for marginalized and Aboriginal women in the Downtown Eastside. The SisterWatch committee meets to discuss in detail the issues affecting the neighbourhood and ways to address them. Open communication has been extremely valuable for identifying criminal activity in the area that targets vulnerable women. For example, as a result of information stemming from SisterWatch, the VPD's "Project Rescue" targeted multiple predatory drug dealers who had been involved in violent assaults on members of the community. Many targets were charged with serious criminal offences including belonging to a criminal organization, the first such charges in the VPD's history.

The benefits of the SisterWatch program are not limited to open communication within that forum itself, however; they also extend to identifying and supporting broader initiatives to reduce barriers to the reporting of crime and to proactively enhance safety. As noted in the Police Protection Report, SisterWatch's 2011 report, *The Tragedy of Missing and Murdered Aboriginal Women in Canada – We Can Do Better*, set out a number of recommendations in this regard, from harmonizing data collection to provincial and national 1-800 numbers.

The SisterWatch program can be seen as embodying two lessons for the VPD to more effectively respond to policing issues within marginalized communities. First, the VPD must strive to build stronger relationships to create open communication. Second, initiatives and policies will be better adapted and more effective if the communities are directly and integrally involved in their development.

The VPD is working to apply both of these lessons with respect to sex workers. With respect to the first, there is now much greater communication between sex workers, those agencies that support them and the VPD than there was in the past. Through the Sex Industry Liaison Officer, the VPD actively participates with sex workers and advocates in a variety of programs and forums which address sex workers' safety concerns and wellbeing.¹¹ Sex worker groups and advocates also have direct access to VPD senior management as issues arise. In her testimony, Susan Davis was very positive about the communication now occurring between the VPD and the sex worker communities, noting of

¹¹ For example, the VPD participates in a program called "Living in Community" which explores ways in which sex workers can function as members of the community without conflict; another is Cst. Linda Malcolm's 911 cell phone project which distributes cell phones to vulnerable or at-risk women and sex workers.

the VPD that “I know that they’re trying really hard.”¹² Ms. Davis testified that she herself emails Chief Constable Chu and Deputy Chief LePard directly, setting out her concerns and issues, and they respond.

The second lesson is that the VPD should engage sex worker communities when framing initiatives and policies in respect of policing issues concerning them. The most recent example is the formulation of the draft Sex Work Enforcement Guidelines that were submitted to the Vancouver Police Board in March 2012. As noted, the Guidelines were formulated with the assistance of WISH, PIVOT, Susan Davis, PEERS and PACE. The Guidelines set out the VPD’s overarching philosophy regarding violence against sex workers and the enforcement of sex work laws, and include more detailed guidance for officers responding to sex work-related calls or situations. Briefly summarized, the Guidelines set out, among other things, that:

- a) The VPD seeks to promote the safety, dignity and well-being of those involved in the sex industry, and will continue to build trust and respect and to promote evidence-based decision-making in order to reduce exploitation and abuse in the sex industry.
- b) The VPD does not seek to destabilize the safety of sex workers, and so, when responding to nuisance-related complaints against survival sex workers, alternative measures and assistance will be considered and enforcement will be a last resort. Sex work involving consenting adults is not an enforcement priority for the VPD.
- c) Police calls regarding violence against sex workers are a priority for assessment and response. All cases of violence or abuse of sex workers are treated as serious criminal matters.
- d) When responding to sex-work related calls or situations, the VPD will take the most effective, least-intrusive approach to effect the desired outcome, and will build rapport with the affected sex workers, involve appropriate community policing officers and the Sex Industry Liaison Officer, and take all reasonable steps to show respect for and preserve the dignity of those involved.
- e) The VPD will enforce all laws against those who abuse or exploit children and youth. The VPD will use all enforcement options available to ensure the removal of youth from unsafe circumstances and will introduce them to support social agencies.
- f) The VPD will actively enforce all laws to target those engaged in human trafficking, organized crime and financial exploitation/avoidance, and will monitor and maintain intelligence report to identify and track potentially violent sex industry consumers.

¹² Transcript, October 31, 2011, p. 152, l. 12 – p. 153, l. 5 (Susan Davis in cross by Mr. Dickson).

The VPD looks forward to receiving this Commission's final report and to considering whether modifications or additions to the Guidelines should be made in light of it.

The VPD has also sought to increase partnerships and collaborations with community organizations and government institutions to improve conditions in the DTES more generally and to provide care for vulnerable persons such as survival sex workers. A very recent example of this is the Downtown Eastside Vancouver Community-Based Women Assault/Sexual Assault Pilot Program, which just had its funding approved on March 28, 2012. This pilot project is headed by Battered Women's Support Services and Atira Women's Resource Society. It aims to deliver education and awareness outreach, mobile crisis response and follow-up to support women survivors of violence in the DTES. The funding application for this project was supported by both the VPD and the SisterWatch committee. Another collaborative effort is advanced by the VPD's Domestic Violence and Criminal Harassment Unit which partners specially trained police officers with "Community Counsellors" employed by Family Services of Greater Vancouver to provide an enhanced response to domestic violence, many of whose victims are vulnerable and marginalized women.

Further, the VPD seeks to work with community organizations and social service providers to improve conditions in the DTES more broadly. The VPD's Project Lockstep is an example. That 2009 discussion paper set out proposals aimed at improving the DTES generally by ensuring that the most marginalized and vulnerable people receive the assistance they require. It proposed a shift away from a "discipline-based approach", where social service, medical and police agencies focus on their own mandates and expertise, to an integrated "client-based service delivery model." Specifically, the study advanced a leadership model in the form of a high level Steering Committee comprised of senior City and Provincial stakeholders, which would employ a "Director for the Most Vulnerable." The Director would be authorized to establish intervention strategies, provide meaningful direction, hold service agencies accountable and coordinate information sharing and cooperation. The Director would facilitate information sharing between agencies, including the VPD, to identify and support those individuals who are most in need, and would foster collaboration between public, private and philanthropic service providers.

The Commission's Police Protection Report's section on "enhanced community policing model and methods" discusses the importance of "ongoing dialogue with the community, taking a collaborative and proactive approach, and identifying community needs." Many of the initiatives discussed above aim to do just that. The Report also discusses the possible benefits of public surveys. As discussed above under the heading "Systemic reviews and audits", the VPD engages in annual surveys to:¹³

¹³ As an example, see the 2011 Residential Survey at <http://vancouver.ca/police/assets/pdf/surveys/vpd-residential-survey-2011.pdf>.

- a) assess Vancouver residents' perceptions of crime and feelings of safety in each of the four VPD Patrol Districts.
- b) determine the prevalence of criminal victimization of residents and the extent to which crimes are reported to the police.
- c) assess perceptions of VPD officers and the extent to which residents see officers actively working to stop crime problems.
- d) assess awareness of VPD policing and crime-reduction initiatives.
- e) assess overall satisfaction with the services provided by the VPD.
- f) solicit recommendations regarding how VPD can improve policing services for residents.

Potential Improvements

While the VPD believes the structural changes it has made to date are vital (e.g., the reorganization of the Missing Persons Unit, training in major case management, investigative experience requirements for Inspectors and supervisors in Major Crime, etc.), it recognizes that it also has to reach out to the community to form meaningful collaborative relationships and to build trust so as to reduce barriers to the reporting of crime. In areas with drugs and gang issues, victims are often at risk of further, often violent, victimization if they report crime to or even speak with police officers. Yet, in cases of sexual assault or missing persons, delays in reporting negatively impact investigations through the loss of time sensitive leads and contribute to the possibility of a perpetrator offending more than once.

As the Commission's own experience has no doubt made clear, building relationships of trust and integrity in the DTES is hard work and takes time. The VPD understands that among more marginalized communities, the police do not enjoy a presumption of trust in policing institutions, so trust must be earned through relationships and building on small successes. That trust can quickly unravel through misunderstandings and misapprehensions, so it has to be complemented with regular, authentic, transparent communication and access to information. The VPD recognizes the importance of this work and the significant benefits for public safety that are realized when police build genuine and positive relationships with the communities they serve.

In developing new initiatives, the VPD has learned that it is extremely important from the outset that such initiatives be developed in close consultation with community members and groups. The VPD's experience is that DTES communities are highly resistant to programs and policies being imposed on them unilaterally. If policies and programs are to achieve the community support that is necessary for success, and if they are to be appropriately tailored to actual needs within the community, then consultation and collaboration are essential.

The VPD hopes that the Study Commission may provide an opportunity for brainstorming and collaboration among diverse elements of the community, and so offers the following comments to add to the discussion.

Voluntary databases. The Police Protection Report contains discussion of the development of voluntary DNA databases for sex workers, which would contain identifying information that could be accessed only in the event of that sex worker going missing. Such databases could be developed on either regional or provincial scales. The VPD is aware that there are deep-rooted concerns on the part of some advocates and sex workers in the Downtown Eastside about the creation of DNA databases and how they would be used, but if substantial support arose in the community for one being created, the VPD would be open to collaborating with advocacy groups toward its development.

Civilian sex industry liaison workers. There has been some discussion in the hearings and in the Police Protection Report about the idea of complementing the VPD's Sex Industry Liaison officer with one or more civilians. A similar concept had been proposed by the now disbanded Sex Industry Worker Safety Action Group, but the group was not able to secure funding. The notion is that a civilian liaison would further help to reduce barriers to crime reporting by offering a non-police portal for reporting. A civilian liaison could also perform other police functions, such as assisting the VPD in gathering information as part of investigations, as well as non-police functions, such as assisting sex workers to access health care, addiction and mental health resources. It might be that the position would work best in partnership with the City and Vancouver Coastal Health.

An initiative such as this could only work if there is substantial support for it from sex worker communities, and if it is designed in collaboration with them. For its part, the VPD is interested in exploring the concept.

Discretion to enforce warrants. On a number of occasions during the inquiry hearings, a concern has been raised that outstanding warrants form a significant barrier to sex trade workers reporting violence against them. This is an important concern, and one that is not within the control of police. While police work does involve the exercise of discretion, including deciding whether to run a CPIC check on a person reporting a crime, police discretion does not extend so far as allowing officers to selectively enforce court warrants if they are known to be outstanding. Providing the police with the discretion not to enforce a warrant in a circumstance where a sex trade worker is attempting to report a violent crime is an issue that the Minister of Justice should consider in consultation with the Provincial Court of British Columbia, as the vast majority of warrants for sex trade workers are issued by the Provincial Court.

Effective deployment of diverse police personnel

Introduction

The VPD seeks to employ officers and civilians who reflect the diversity of the communities they police. One example of its success is that VPD members speak 30 different languages. Of the greatest relevance to this Inquiry are the numbers of female and Aboriginal police officers.

Present Practice

There are currently 325 female police officers within the VPD,¹⁴ out of a total of 1400, which amounts to 23%. That percentage is one of the highest among police forces in Canada. The VPD is seeking to increase the number of female police officers, and the proportion of female officers in the VPD is indeed rising continually.¹⁵

Currently there are 22 officers within the VPD who self-identify as Aboriginal. Those 22 officers represent 1.6% of the VPD's authorized force, whereas Aboriginals make up 1.9% of Vancouver's population according to the latest federal census. The VPD seeks to recruit more Aboriginal officers. In 2004 the VPD entered into an agreement with British Columbia Aboriginal Workforce Strategy and the Province of British Columbia to work together to promote career development opportunities for Aboriginal people within the VPD. One result was the establishment in 2007 of the VPD's Aboriginal Cadet Program, which is aimed at mentoring and coaching Aboriginal youths, aged 19 to 26, who have demonstrated a desire to become VPD officers.¹⁶

The VPD does not believe it is generally appropriate to assign members to particular positions based on personal characteristics like race or gender. There are occasions when such is necessary (such as with a particular undercover operation), but as a general policy the VPD does not believe members should be pigeon-holed in this way. In respect of the positions that particularly engage gender or ethnic dimensions, the VPD takes care to assign members who are sensitive to those issues. Often that sensitivity arises out of a shared ethnicity or gender, but that need not always be the case.

Potential Improvements

As the VPD is already making significant strides toward a diverse police population, the VPD does not believe specific changes are required in this area. The VPD will continue to make efforts to recruit more female and more Aboriginal officers and will endeavour to ensure that women and Aboriginal officers are encouraged and supported to seek advancement so that

¹⁴ The latest class of 14 VPD recruits was sworn in April 19, 2012; half the recruits were women.

¹⁵ See Appendix J – table of diversity among VPD employees

¹⁶ See <http://vancouver.ca/police/recruiting/aboriginal-cadet-program.html>.

they are prepared to be promoted into leadership positions wherever warranted. As a result of its efforts to date, 22% of VPD members at the Inspector rank are female, including one who is Métis.

Training

Introduction

Providing recruits with effective academy training and serving police officers with meaningful continuing education is an ongoing challenge and a responsibility of the VPD, as with any police agency.

Officers are given training in order to function within the law but they also benefit from training to ensure they can manage the people involved in an incident appropriately and with understanding. While officers are trained to deal with individuals of all kinds, certain groups within the community have unique considerations. Those who are suffering from mental illness, for example, may require different types of interventions by police to ensure their safety and that of the public. For those involved in sex work, particularly the survival sex trade, having officers who understand the barriers to reporting and who are able to assist workers in mitigating the risks they face is a real asset to the community and the police agency.

It is important that education be provided to officers as part of basic training to give them an understanding of the challenges faced by those living in the Downtown Eastside and other marginalized communities. These include drug and alcohol addiction, homelessness, poverty, mental health issues, and the context in which they are occurring. Such training will assist officers to be more empathetic and better able to manage any situations which come about in the course of their duties. It will also contribute to positive relationships with the community as a whole through more positive interactions between the public and police. This, in turn, increases reporting and results in better investigations stemming from those reports.

In order to minimize unnecessary conflict between the community and the police, it is important to understand the historical context of a victim or an offender. For example, a disproportionately high number of those in the sex industry suffer from mental health issues and/or addictions and are of Aboriginal descent. It is important for officers to understand the systemic discrimination that lead many to find themselves in these circumstances. For example, the effects of the residential school system continue to impact Aboriginal families who live in the Downtown Eastside of Vancouver and in communities throughout BC.

Present Practice

VPD officers attend the Justice Institute of BC (JIBC) Police Academy for their recruit training as do all municipal officers in British Columbia. There, they receive training on mental health and crisis intervention and some orientation on the challenges faced by sex

workers. They also receive some training about being sensitive to the needs of the diverse population they will police. In addition, the Aboriginal Community Policing Centre has begun work with the JIBC to present an experiential training session on the issues facing the Aboriginal community to help recruits understand the cultural differences that often create barriers, including the impact of the residential school system. The Aboriginal Friendship Centre has also provided cultural training to some District 2 officers in recent years.

Potential Improvements

The VPD is very open to additional opportunities for enhanced training of both new recruits and serving members with respect to marginalized populations. In particular, training could include lectures from those in the sex industry who can inform officers about the services available to sex workers in the community and the language that can build a good rapport with the community.

Communication with and warnings to the public

The previous communications practices of the VPD were clearly deficient with respect to its investigation of the missing women. Since then, there have been significant changes to the VPD's communications practices, but the VPD recognizes that communicating with marginalized populations presents special challenges and improvements can always be made.

Present Practice

To ensure that the public is aware of issues related to public safety, the VPD holds almost daily press conferences, provides media with daily interviews and information, proactively releases police department documents and reports to the public, and communicates with the community directly through social media (Twitter, Facebook, YouTube, and Flickr) and the VPD's Crime Alert and Block Watch programs, among others. The use of multiple modes of communication, including face-to-face contact with the community, helps to make sure that the message is heard by all of those who need to be aware. These communications include investigative successes, VPD apologies and explanations of incidents where the VPD has made a mistake, as well as situations that the public needs to be aware of for their own safety. The relationship between the public and the police, and the trust the public has in the messages put forward by the police, are improved when the VPD accounts for its errors and strives to ensure they do not recur by learning from them and creating systems to prevent them in the future.

It is vital for police to mitigate the risk that an offender may present to the community while considering the impact of such notifications on the offender's privacy and ability to rehabilitate. Notifications of a known dangerous offender are initiated through VPD Public Affairs by the VPD's High Risk Offender Unit, which weighs the risk to the public in relation to the privacy rights of the offender and the authority under the *Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act*. In some cases, the VPD will reach out to the community for more

victims to come forward after an offender has been charged with an offence to build the strongest case possible to present to the courts. Other VPD units, such as the Homicide Unit, will also make decisions about what information to release with the same consideration for balancing the requirements for public safety, the privacy rights of the alleged offender, and the potential positive or negative impact on the investigation.

The VPD also recognizes that the persistence in the DTES of misinformation and sensationalized stories of police conduct and misconduct negatively affect the building of relationships of trust in the community, even where there have been external reviews and reports setting out the true facts. The prevalence of misinformation is demonstrated in some of the statements made to Commission staff in its Downtown Eastside Consultation Report, and the VPD is therefore very open to exploring ways to enhance communication to people in the DTES and elsewhere.

To that end, the VPD appreciates that it must adjust its notification and communication methods to meet the target audience. For example, social media, which requires a computer, is unlikely to be effective in areas like the DTES where poverty limits the use of the internet and computers (there is limited internet access available at shelters, drop-ins and gathering places). For that reason the VPD uses the Aboriginal and Sex Industry Liaison officers, the Homeless Outreach Coordinator, as well as beat officers in the area to communicate safety messages in person or through social service agencies. The Red Light Alert program is one example of a grassroots project started by sex workers for sex workers to communicate information about “bad dates” to each other so that they can make more informed decision in their work. The VPD has been contributing to the information communicated in the notices for safety messaging. Other options used by the VPD are town hall meetings and posting of notices in high traffic areas or delivered door-to-door.

Potential Improvements:

The VPD does not have any specific suggestions for further improvement at this time, but is interested in the Commission’s views as to what additional communications strategies would work for police agencies in BC.

Monitoring high-risk offenders

Monitoring high risk offenders has become an important aspect of modern policing. With advances in technology, new opportunities to monitor such persons are available and should be pursued. Equally important is the role of community members reporting crimes and suspected crimes, and this again raises the importance of establishing and maintaining relationships of trust between communities and police.

Present Practice

Police monitor high risk offenders who have already had interaction with the criminal justice system and are on probation, parole, or other court orders (e.g., Section 810.1 and 810.2 orders) through units like the VPD's High Risk Offender Unit, the RCMP's Behavioural Science Section, and the Integrated Sexual Predator Observation Team.

Systems such as the Violent Crime Linkage Analysis System (ViCLAS) are relied upon by the police to identify patterns and linkages between predatory offences. However, no system is infallible. For example, the VPD has recently been working on a case with Burnaby RCMP where ViCLAS identified no connections, despite a VPD analyst identifying 19 linked offences. This would not have come to light if there had not been information sharing between the Burnaby RCMP and the VPD. Further, if the VPD analyst had not used a variety of methods and systems – including the VPD's "CRIME" system¹⁷ – to identify possible connections, this offender would still be unknown. Situations such as this highlight the need for collaborative working relationships between police agencies as well as the fact that linkage systems are not infallible in identifying predatory offenders.

Moreover, identification of predatory offenders can be exceptionally difficult for police because crimes are not always reported in full or with all details, especially if there is mistrust between the community and the police. For example, police may not be aware that a predator is victimizing sex workers or the frequency or degree to which the predator is operating because not all women will report that they were sexually assaulted. Clearly, the relationships police have with the community, and in particular with those who are at a higher risk of victimization, are essential for effective monitoring, enforcement, and prevention.

Potential Improvements

Once such information is collected, police require a way to effectively share and analyze that information that is consistent across the region. A regional Real-Time Crime Centre ("RTCC") – which is discussed later in this submission – would be beneficial for this purpose. As many offenders are not limited to one jurisdiction in the Metro Vancouver area,

a regional RTCC would also allow police to identify offenders who benefit from the current patchwork of police agencies in Metro Vancouver to their advantage to evade police detection. Certainly, this is a common theme among violent, serial predators: Clifford Olson, Paul Bernardo, and Robert Pickton all benefited from crossing police jurisdictional boundaries in committing their crimes. Consistent analysis of missing person and crime data for the region would improve the likelihood of police identifying and capturing predatory offenders who are not already being monitored. This information further supports the need for enhanced regional information sharing and analysis on an active and proactive basis – as could be accomplished with an RTCC – rather than on a passive basis, such as is the case with access to PRIME.

¹⁷ “CRIME” is an acronym for Consolidated Records Intelligence Mining Environment, a VPD-developed state-of-the-art system for data-mining and analysis.

II. Structure and organization of policing in Metro Vancouver – regionalization

One of the major challenges that influenced the Missing Women’s investigation was the structure of policing in Metro Vancouver. The patchwork of RCMP and municipal forces impairs effective communication and regional decision-making. There are differing investigative priorities, mandates, procedures, training, and even differing guiding legislation. The policing model currently in place in Metro Vancouver has been recognized as being inefficient in many research reports, and no such policing model exists anymore in any other major metropolitan region in Canada. Six municipal forces operate in the Metro Vancouver area (Abbotsford, Delta, New Westminster, Port Moody, Vancouver, and West Vancouver) and the remaining 13 municipalities are policed by nine RCMP detachments.¹⁸ In addition, the South Coast British Columbia Transportation Authority Police Service (Transit Police) is a separate agency responsible for policing the region’s transit system. They are primarily focused on the three SkyTrain lines.

The challenges to effective and efficient policing created by the current policing model and the potential benefits of regionalizing policing in Vancouver were outlined in the VPD’s 2008 report “Options for Service Delivery in the Greater Vancouver Region: A Discussion Paper of the Issues Surrounding the Regionalization of Police Services”.¹⁹

It is no secret that the VPD and RCMP differ on their views of the merits of a regionalized police force. The RCMP appears to consider regionalization a threat to the size of E-Division, which is its largest division in the country, and therefore a threat to the size and strength of the RCMP as a whole. The RCMP’s concern for any deterioration in its numbers may be the reason it promotes what is, in the VPD’s view, an inaccurate characterization of the relevant “region” as being the “Lower Mainland District.” This is a term adopted in the report procured by the Commission titled “Municipal Policing in the Lower Mainland District of British Columbia”, and in the VPD’s view it obscures a proper analysis of regional policing by expanding the boundaries of the region to encompass non-contiguous areas or towns such as Sechelt and Boston Bar. This serves to statistically increase the proportion of RCMP officers and detachments in the “region,” but prevents any useful analysis of the synergies that could be achieved from uniting police forces in the metropolitan area. In addition, the RCMP uses the term “Lower Mainland District Regional Police Service (LMDRPS)”²⁰ to describe itself, despite the fact that there is no regional police service in Metro Vancouver, i.e., a single unified force serving the region. The LMDRPS is merely a collection of RCMP detachments which does not include over one million residents policed by approximately 2,100 non-RCMP officers in the Metro Vancouver area. The LMDRPS

¹⁸ Some municipalities have a “combined” detachment sharing one facility, such as North Vancouver District and North Vancouver City, and Langley City and Langley Township.

¹⁹ Appendix K

²⁰ See, for example, <http://bc.rcmp.ca/ViewPage.action?siteNodeId=196&languageId=1&contentId=-1>.

also doesn't include the largest city or police department in the region – Vancouver. The VPD submits that a more accurate portrait of the present patchwork of police services is set out in its paper titled “Municipal Policing in the Vancouver Census Metropolitan Area.”²¹

While all police agencies in Metro Vancouver have made serious efforts to communicate relevant information, collaborate on investigations, and participate in integrated units throughout Metro Vancouver, there are still serious challenges and barriers to overcome. While municipal police departments and RCMP detachments have individual strategic policing plans, there isn't an overall plan for policing Metro Vancouver. If there were a “clean slate” to design a new policing model for Metro Vancouver, without question, it would not be the model that exists today.

Many types of investigations are impacted by obstacles to effective and efficient collaboration, particularly any serial type of crime and cases which are time sensitive such as missing person reports or kidnappings. There are a number of integrated units that were designed, in part, to mitigate the information-sharing hurdle, but integrated units do not provide for effective regional decision making as there is no regional command structure. Attempts at communicating information are invariably after the fact and lack a single leader to push plans forward. In fact, because there are so many integrated teams, it may result in duplication of efforts resulting in wasted resources. Integrated teams suffer from being independent from all departments that resource them or are tied heavily to the biggest contributors to the unit.

As one example of the lack of effective use of resources, there are approximately 16 surveillance teams in the region reporting to various independent police departments, RCMP detachments, integrated units, and the Combined Forces Special Enforcement Unit (CFSEU). Given that all those teams will move with their targets wherever they go, there are suspects who end up being monitored by more than one police agency, particularly since many suspects are linked to each other. Another example is Emergency Response Teams (ERT). The VPD has four full-time teams to provide around-the-clock coverage. The RCMP also has ERT teams, and other municipal departments participate in a municipal integrated team comprised of mostly part-time members. The teams function completely separately and there is little coordination. If there were an “active shooter” situation at UBC, the RCMP's ERT would be called, necessarily from some considerable distance, while a VPD team would be minutes away. A regional force would help ensure that all areas are serviced appropriate to their level of need. In addition, there would be improved coordination and more efficient use of resources.

Investigations like the one into the 2011 Stanley Cup Riot are particularly relevant to the discussion of a regional police force. An integrated team has been responsible for investigating the rioters; to date 85% of those charged are from communities outside of

²¹ Appendix L

Vancouver. The sheer volume of materials and evidence to be sifted through requires more resources than any police agency in the region could spare without jeopardizing regular operations, making integration with other agencies necessary. Prevention, preparations and responding to the riot itself would all have benefitted from Metro Vancouver having a regional force rather than its current arrangement, as all police resources in the region would have been accountable to one command structure and one set of priorities. While the RCMP has a Lower Mainland District Tactical Troop that combines members from various agencies into one larger unit, it is not a regional unit. Given the number of people in the downtown core of Vancouver and the number of officers eventually deployed to manage the crowds, a regional force would have had far more resources at its disposal to call upon. Furthermore, training and tactics would have been consistent and decision making would have been facilitated by having one command team in charge. Resources would have been more efficiently deployed across the region, balancing areas with minimal needs and those that had need for extra resources, rather than individual communities focusing on their own priorities. While the VPD's requests for assistance once the riot started resulted in a superb response from all police agencies in the region, it was the lack of control over regional police resources prior to the riot that impaired an effective regional response (such as an effective regional liquor interdiction strategy).

While integrated teams generally function well enough, they often mean that some agencies have to sacrifice key people to its detriment. For example, if an agency has only one subject matter expert in some area, and that expert is moved to an integrated team, even for a short time, the agency loses an important resource. A regional police force would have the benefit of multiple experts in all areas, and ensure that there is constant access to those experts when they are needed.

For investigations not involving integrated teams, there are clear benefits to be gained by regionalizing. Serial predators frequently cross jurisdictions and a regional force, which is not limited by those municipal boundaries, would facilitate information sharing as it would be on the same system utilized by the same group of analysts and officers regardless of where they work. A number of serial sexual offenders in particular have been identified as a result of the front-line officers doing significant, time consuming "leg work" to determine if there are similar offences in other jurisdictions. In matters such as witness and victim management, cooperative arrangements between agencies can address issues such as their safety and mental health until the time of trial. This responsibility can be unwieldy for a small investigative team. More formal arrangements would systematically address the stress and reduce confusion for victims and witnesses regarding the criminal court process.

Regionalizing police services also would allow for equipment and resources that would significantly improve investigative capabilities but that are not otherwise affordable or maintainable by any one agency. For example, one area identified in earlier reviews is a regional video and technological crime lab. The start-up costs of such a lab were prohibitive for the VPD; however, as a result of funding from the Province of BC to support the VPD-led Integrated Riot Investigation Team (IRIT), a state-of-the-art forensic video analysis lab now

exists within the VPD. This lab is currently staffed with video analysts from throughout the region as part of IRIT and has also been used to assist on other criminal investigations. When the IRIT investigation is concluded, the lab will continue to be used by the VPD and available as a regional resource by other police agencies.

While fully regionalizing the police forces in Metro Vancouver is not a panacea to address all challenges to successful policing, including effective communications, resource problems or leadership issues, it has the potential to improve dramatically on the current situation. Had there been a regional police force in place during the Missing Women investigation, the breakdowns in communication and the lack of regional prioritization would have been mitigated and lives may have been saved.

Unfortunately, while regionalization of police services in Metro Vancouver has the potential to increase public safety by: reducing structural barriers to effective communication and coordination, enhancing effectiveness, and utilizing expensive police resources more efficiently, the costs and benefits of regionalization have never been fully and properly studied by experts with access to data from across the Metro Vancouver police agencies. Instead, concerns about the potential costs of moving to a regionalized police service and a lack of political consensus at the local level are simply raised by governments as reasons not to do it, despite the lack of any real understanding of whether those concerns are legitimate given all of the efficiencies that could be realized with a regionalized police service. As noted above, the Metro Vancouver area is the only large metropolitan area remaining in Canada that does not have a police service which serves the majority of the census metropolitan region. Although it is a complex, multi-faceted issue, the debate over regionalization can, and should, unfold with reference to empirical data and analysis. What is needed is the appointment of a panel of experts, who are independent of any level of government and independent of the police agencies, to fully study the costs and benefits of regionalization from both financial and public safety perspectives. The VPD submits this is something the Commission should consider recommending to the Provincial Government.

III. Policies and practices in the investigation of missing persons and suspected multiple homicides

Introduction

The Missing Women investigation and the subsequent reviews identified a number of challenges faced by both the VPD and the RCMP which negatively impacted on the quality of the investigations. As a result of the lessons learned from the LePard Report and the Schouten Report, the VPD made many changes to its Missing Persons Unit and advocated for additional changes to be made on a provincial level. The SisterWatch Committee's report identified a number of further changes that should be made on the provincial and national level.

Many of the recommendations made in these documents overlap with the policy options identified in the Commission's report, "Policies and Practices in the Investigation of Missing Persons and Suspected Multiple Homicides" (the "Missing Persons Report"). In general terms, the VPD supports the policy options set out in that report. Many of them the VPD has already implemented, and others the VPD has been advocating. The VPD looks forward to the Commission's recommendations in this regard, and to further improving the investigation of missing persons and multiple homicides in the province.

The submissions that follow in this section first briefly summarize changes that have been made by the VPD in respect of missing persons investigations and major criminal investigations. The submission then turns to discuss some changes that have not been made but which the VPD believes need to be made, which relate to crime on a regional level.

Present practices

Within the VPD, chiefly, the following changes have been made since 2002:

- the creation of a full-time sergeant position in the Missing Persons Unit (MPU);
- a complete turnover in MPU staff with new staff selected on the basis of an improved selection criteria to ensure the necessary qualifications were met;
- a requirement for appropriate investigative experience for sergeants and inspectors for all areas of the Investigation Division, particularly those areas responsible for crimes against people;
- the addition of a staff sergeant position in the Major Crime Section, to provide for additional oversight, including of the Missing Persons Unit;

- policy changes to ensure that missing persons reports are treated as suspicious unless there is evidence that a report is not suspicious, to improve the thoroughness of investigations, and to recognize the increased risk faced by marginalized and Aboriginal people;²²
- representation from the VPD in the BC Police Missing Persons Centre, which was created in 2005 in the RCMP's Behavioural Sciences Group to coordinate missing persons cases when they cross jurisdictions, to recognize anomalous patterns of missing persons, and to promote best practices;
- requiring Major Case Management training for inspectors and sergeants in the Major Crime and Special Investigation Sections;
- promoting provincial accreditation in Major Case Management in the VPD, resulting in numerous accredited Team Commanders, including the three Inspectors in charge of the Major Crimes, Special Investigation and General Investigation Sections;
- significant improvements in frontline and investigative resource levels, including many specially trained civilian crime analysts;
- the implementation of a debriefing and documentation process for major cases;
- the creation of a "Knowledge Database" to electronically store information that promotes investigative excellence, including reviews of failed investigations;
- practices were changed to improve the flow of information from the operational staff up to the VPD Executive, including a daily review of significant overnight occurrences by the Executive; and,
- practices were improved to ensure management accountability.

The VPD now has more trained staff and resources to both proactively and reactively address complex crimes. However, what remains lacking is the ability on a regional basis to quickly analyze data and identify patterns or new details to direct investigations that cross jurisdictional boundaries, given that there is no regional police force in the Vancouver metropolitan area to provide for a more seamless exchange of information.

Potential Improvements

(a) Improved Legislation

²² Appendix M – the VPD's most recent policy for missing persons

As discussed in the SisterWatch report, the VPD strongly supports legislation to provide more tools to police to expedite missing persons investigations. For example, Alberta has passed legislation that allows police, via warrant, rapid access to government databases (e.g., health and social assistance) that would be useful in missing person investigations, but which is often difficult to access, especially intra-provincially. Such legislation requires the support of the Provincial Government and therefore recommendations from the MWCI would be valuable and could contribute to an improved response to challenging missing person reports.

(b) Regional Real Time Crime Centre

In other large jurisdictions, such as New York, Los Angeles, Chicago, Philadelphia, Memphis and Calgary, the police have developed “Real Time Crime Centres” (RTCCs) to facilitate faster access to large amounts of data. An RTCC is a centralized computer facility designed to give front-line officers, detectives, supervisors, and commanders instant access to essential investigative information 24 hours a day, seven days a week. The goal of an RTCC is to help police quickly gather facts, identify crime patterns, solve crimes, and stop criminals before they can commit other crimes and before vital evidence is lost.

How Does an RTCC Work?

An RTCC typically consists of a secure data warehouse with a powerful mainframe computer containing such information as computerized police records, call records, arrest records, jail records, street check data, traffic ticket data, accident data, automated licence plate reader data, global positioning system data, investigative case files, intelligence reports, crime analysis reports, close-circuit television (CCTV) feeds, mapping data and satellite imaging data.

Once the data is stored in the RTCC mainframe, the staff at the RTCC use advanced indexing, analytical, data mining, mapping and search software with integrated search capabilities which enable officers and analysts to quickly query and cross-reference multiple data sources simultaneously. Automated alerts notify frontline officers and detectives when suspicious patterns become apparent or when critical information becomes available. Other tools like linkage analysis software, artificial intelligence programs, 3-D visualization tools, video analysis tools, translation capabilities, text recognition software, fingerprint recognition software and facial recognition software can also be considered. Finally, the RTCC staff members communicate the information identified by the system back to the front line officers.

How Would an RTCC Work in Metro Vancouver?

In BC, sources of data would include databases like PRIME, the Canadian Police Information Centre (CPIC), Police Information Portal (PIP), Canadian Firearms Information System (CFIS), and vehicle insurance and registration data, all of which police in BC already have access to on desktop computers and in on-board laptops in police vehicles. However, the data is not used regionally in the way that an RTCC would make it available to operational police officers at the time of a serious crime occurring, and as specialist detectives arrive, without the delay that occurs now.

For example, when a critical or major incident such as a shooting occurs, a regional RTCC in Metro Vancouver, staffed with police officers and civilian analysts, could immediately begin processing all the relevant details as soon as they become available. This preliminary information can come from officers at the scene, follow-up investigators, jail staff, emergency communications staff, community policing volunteers, remote surveillance cameras or other partners like the fire department, the ambulance service, the hospital, etc. It could include background information on the victim(s), witness information, descriptive information about the suspect(s) and/or their vehicle, forensic evidence, the modus operandi, the location of the incident, and so on.

Based on this information, RTCC staff would query available databases and search for possible investigative leads like possible linkages with other crimes, potential suspects that match witness descriptions, the possible whereabouts of the suspects, or other viable investigative avenues. RTCC staff would then relay all this investigative intelligence back to the police officers at the scene of the crime. All this would happen within seconds or minutes, instead of hours or days, as is often the case now when offences are occurring across jurisdictional boundaries.

The VPD has excellent cross jurisdiction analysis capability as a result of the VPD's state-of-the-art "Consolidated Records Intelligence Mining Environment" (CRIME) system, which accesses PRIME data through the Lower Mainland records server, the Vancouver Island records server and the BC Interior Server. For explanation, PRIME is the provincial Records Management System (RMS) that all police agencies use, while CRIME is a VPD-developed system that uses PRIME and other data for analytical purposes. Other agencies, such as the Criminal Intelligence Service of British Columbia (CISBC) have begun accessing and using the CRIME system to complement their analytical ability.

Building upon this already excellent system would be a cost effective method of moving towards a fully developed regional RTCC. A regional RTCC would be invaluable to all Metro Vancouver police agencies as it would facilitate the coordination of resources, prioritization and linkages between cross jurisdictional crimes. Investigations would become more efficient and effective. However, it would be necessary to have a system to set priorities and assign resources for situations the RTCC identifies as requiring intervention or enforcement.

The VPD is currently in preliminary discussions with other police agencies in Metro Vancouver, including the RCMP, and there is significant support for a regional RTCC,

although obtaining sufficient resources will be a challenge for all involved. This is an initiative that would benefit from the support of the Provincial Government and therefore recommendations from the MWCi would be valuable and could contribute to an improved regional response to multi-jurisdictional crimes. This discussion leads to the next area where improvements in policing in Metro Vancouver could be made.

(c) Regional Crime Fighting

Serious offences such as gang violence, sexual predators and serial robbers often impact public safety across multiple jurisdictions, and a single crime could also have elements that occur in multiple jurisdictions. For instance, in a kidnapping case, the abduction could occur in one jurisdiction but the abducted person could be taken to and held in another jurisdiction. Alternatively, a person(s) could commit multiple acts of the same or a similar crime in various jurisdictions. For example, a serial robber often does not limit his robberies to a single jurisdiction, and may commit his crimes in Vancouver, Burnaby, New Westminster and so forth. The multi-jurisdictional nature of these serious crimes demonstrates the need for police agencies, particularly those of neighbouring jurisdictions, to work together to combat them. While cooperation is good, particularly for “in progress” events, there are many structural barriers to effective and efficient crime fighting.

Police agencies in Metro Vancouver are continually improving front-line efforts to increase information-sharing regarding serious crimes; however, higher level efforts to drive multi-jurisdictional investigations continue to be challenging because of the absence of a formalized regional leadership model to ensure follow-through on workable strategies to prevent and deter further criminal activity. For a number of years now the police community has embraced the ideals of intelligence-led policing but there is a lack of regional consistency. The skills and technical ability to analyze crime trends, suspicious activity, human source information and other forms of intelligence to develop effective strategies are available to police in Metro Vancouver. What is missing is regional priority setting, operationalizing of those priorities, and accountability.

While police leaders in the region meet regularly to discuss policy issues of interest, there currently is no process to meet in a regular, structured forum to focus on developing multi-jurisdictional strategies and solutions to combat serious offences. Current efforts to drive multi-jurisdictional investigations occur on an informal and ad hoc basis. Consequently, coordinated crime fighting efforts and ongoing information-sharing remain a significant challenge. In the absence of a formalized higher-level decision-making regional forum, there will be no regional priorities set to manage and reduce crime. An over-arching protocol or formalized process is required to ensure that these meetings operate routinely, and not only in urgent/crisis situations.

An example of where such regionally prioritized crime fighting was attempted was the Regional Homicide CompStat²³ initiated by the VPD in September 2008. This dealt with an outbreak of gang violence and could be used as the model for all agencies in the region to collaboratively combat multi-jurisdictional serious crimes on an ongoing basis. In this example, police leaders from across the Metro Vancouver region, as well as the leaders of provincial or regional units such as the BC Integrated Gang Task Force (IGTF), the Combined Forces Special Enforcement Unit (CFSEU), federal RCMP, and the Integrated Homicide Investigation Team (IHIT), all participated in the Regional Homicide CompStat.

Under this process, multi-jurisdictional decisions were driven by trend analysis based on a threat assessment matrix. Intelligence analysts were asked to identify which persons or groups were most likely to engage in shootings and murders. The three most violent groups were then divided up among IGTF/IHIT, CFSEU, and the VPD for proactive investigations. The VPD's targets were investigated under the project name "Rebellion," and were believed to be responsible for up to 100 shooting incidents and other acts of violence, primarily in southeast Vancouver. Substantial resources were transferred or refocused from many areas of the VPD to proactively work on the identified targets. These resources included a team of 24 investigators, as well as intelligence analysts, support staff, and significant numbers of staff for covert work. Because it was prioritized regionally, the VPD could allocate resources to their area of responsibility and remove them from the problems being dealt with by the other agencies. These reductions in the duplication of work and better use of resources resulted in significant investigative successes. However, the buy-in from agencies was mixed. One large agency's commitment was described as "lip service". And the seniority of police agency representation ranged from Chiefs and Assistant Commissioner to the Detective Constable rank. Without "someone in charge," compliance with the decisions is essentially voluntary.

Regional CompStats of this type could improve regional information sharing and decision-making in the absence of a regional force. The process would identify serious crime issues and trends that spread over multiple boundaries and where mobility is an impediment to their investigation. The regional CompStat meeting could occur regularly (e.g., six times per year) and would involve senior representatives (e.g., Superintendents to Chief Constables) from every police agency in the region to discuss current crime issues and to ensure effective information exchange, prioritization, and re-allocation of resources. Moreover, specific resources such as the BC Police Missing Persons Centre and the regional RTCC could report up to, and provide relevant information to, the regional CompStat meetings.

²³ CompStat, short for Computer Statistics or Comparative Statistics, is a crime analysis and accountability model pioneered in the New York Police Department by Chief William Bratton in the early 1990s designed to facilitate accountability and effective resource deployment. Its main features are use of accurate and timely intelligence, rapid deployment, effective tactics, and relentless follow-up and assessment. Overall, CompStat attempts to identify crime issues and trends. In 2006, the Vancouver Police Department was the first police agency in Canada to implement CompStat.

Regional CompStat decision-making should be weighted according to the size of the agency; however, it should also ensure that the small agencies' priorities are not ignored. The Metro Vancouver Board is an example of such a decision-making platform. However, this is not an ideal analogy as regional priorities would need financial commitments and the Metro Vancouver Board has authority in limited areas. Some form of a dispute resolution process would need to be developed and perhaps overseen by the Director of the Police Services Division of the Government of British Columbia.

A regional CompStat decision-making body informed by a regional RTCC could strengthen the ability of police in the region to set priorities. Recommendations from the MWCI to the Provincial Government about developing such a formalized system to enhance regional decision-making and accountability could enhance policing in the region and mitigate the structural barriers created by the lack of a regional police force and single unified command structure.

IV. Towards more effective missing women investigations: police relationships with victims' families, the community and the media

The fourth policy theme raised by the Commission is addressed in its paper "Towards more Effective Missing Women Investigations: Police Relationships with Victims' Families, the Community and the Media." The VPD is generally supportive of the principles and concerns expressed in the paper and adds the following comments.

Missing person cases will often involve multiple police jurisdictions and the VPD therefore supports the development of provincial standards for practices and protocols regarding the taking of missing person reports. Standard practices promote consistent public expectations. The VPD would also like to see a provincial organization established to communicate information that would be helpful for families, communities and the media about how missing person cases are handled and how they can help. This is important given that missing persons are often reported by families and friends who are in a different jurisdiction from the place where the missing person was last seen. A website hosted by the provincial agency with links, resources and updates would be very useful. The same agency should host and staff a 1-800 number for reporting missing persons in British Columbia, a proposal that the VPD has supported for a number of years, but which is not presently supported by the RCMP.

The VPD also supports the creation of the National Police Support Centre for Missing Persons to bring together at least the data relating to longer term missing person files as well as the records across the country relating to unidentified human remains. The relatively new BC Police Missing Persons Centre is intended to analyze missing persons data on a provincial level, but if analysis can be usefully performed on a national level, then the VPD supports it.

The extent to which the VPD can provide support services for families of missing persons is limited by the resources available to municipal departments. The VPD does provide information about missing persons investigations and how the families can help, but it may be that can be done more effectively by a provincial agency as discussed above. With respect to more intensive services, such as counselling and financial support, victims of crime are eligible to receive support from Victims Services in the Ministry of Justice, but the Commission should consider whether that model should be expanded so that families of missing persons are supported in the same way as is done for victims of crime.

The VPD's Missing Persons Unit has improved enormously since 2002 and now incorporates many aspects of the values and objectives expressed in the Commission's paper. Improvements can always be made to the handling of these complex investigations, however, and the VPD looks forward to benefitting from the Commission's work on this important subject.

V. Policies and practices in the treatment of vulnerable witnesses

The VPD generally supports the comments made in the discussion portion of this paper, although it does wish to clarify one point. On p. 8, the paper states: “Only 42% of sexual assault complaints to police that are recorded as crimes result in charges, indicating that more than one out of two complainants is either not believed by police or unwilling to proceed with charges; of the cases that are prosecuted, convictions have occurred at a rate of 11% or less since 1994.”

This statement is incorrect. For one thing, insofar as this statement refers to police laying charges, it obviously does not apply in BC, where it is the Crown that approves charges. More centrally, however, the conclusion that the absence of charges in 58% of reported sexual assault complaints is entirely accounted for by either disbelief on the part of police or unwillingness on the part of the complainant is not correct. Regardless of whether the complainant is believed, in a great many cases there is simply not enough evidence to create a substantial likelihood of conviction. Many cases present a “he said/she said” scenario, or raise issues with identity, or with consent. All of these must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Last, it is simply not true that the conviction rate on sexual assault complaints has been only 11% or less since 1994. To the contrary, as is set out in Table 8 of the 2003 Juristat report²⁴ on which the statement is based, the conviction rate between 1994 and 2002 ranged between 31% and 42%, and the acquittal rate over that time period was between 3% and 8%. Of the remaining cases, a substantial percentage that did not proceed to trial resulted in a Stay of Proceedings. This could be because the victim withdrew, or because the matter was dealt with by other means, such as a plea to another charge or by way of a S. 810 Peace Bond.

The VPD also generally supports the potential recommendations identified in the paper beginning at p. 46, subject to the comments identified below. Many of the recommendations relate to Crown Counsel; while the VPD supports these recommendations, it directs its comments mainly to those recommendations pertaining to the police.

- Checklists. The VPD supports the use of checklists to better identify vulnerable victims, and the VPD currently uses them in a variety of contexts, including within missing persons, domestic violence and stalking cases. The VPD is currently engaged in a pilot project with Vancouver Coastal Health that seeks to develop an evaluation scheme to identify vulnerable persons with mental health issues, so as to better divert attention to them.

²⁴ Attached as Appendix N.

- Single points of contact. The VPD agrees. Indeed, every case has a lead investigator, whether that investigator is from the patrol division or is a detective from a specialty squad (such as Robbery, Sex Crimes or Homicide). Victim Services staff and specialized counsellors also work in our Domestic Violence Unit and are there to support victims through to trial. When the case is a major one and is run according to Major Case Management, one investigator is assigned as the victim/witness liaison.
- Interview techniques. The VPD agrees. The VPD has expert interviewers in this field and focuses on this topic a great deal in its interviewing training generally. All of the VPD's detectives in Sexual Offences and Domestic Violence are highly trained in this area.
- Maintaining close contact. The VPD completely agrees.
- Holistic approach to victim support. The VPD agrees.
- Training regarding sexual and gender-based violence. The VPD agrees that this is an important issue in training and it does provide training on this topic.
- Specially trained prosecutors and judges. The VPD has supported the concept of specially trained prosecutors for many years, although it recognizes the challenges to Crown. The VPD supports this recommendation in respect of prosecutors. The VPD would also support the recommendation in respect of judges, so long as it is done in a manner that respects the independence of the judiciary.
- Funding for victim services. The VPD completely agrees that there needs to be more funding for victim services.
- Working with community organizations. The VPD agrees this is very important, and it is continually engaging with and learning from a wide range of community organizations.
- Evaluation process. The VPD agrees.
- Assurance of no retaliation. The VPD agrees that it is very important to develop and implement safety plans for complainants and witnesses, and to assure them as much as possible of their safety. But it is not always possible to honestly "assure" complainants that they will not face any retaliation for participating in trials; in too many cases, particularly involving domestic violence, the complainant returns to his or her abuser and is re-victimized. The VPD agrees that it is important to ensure victims and witnesses are notified when an offender is released. The VPD is very alert to that need when it releases an offender, but when the offender is in the custody of Corrections it is their responsibility to notify the victim/witness. Often

Corrections asks the VPD for help in finding a victim if they do not have current contact information, and in those cases the VPD assists them.

VI. From report to substantive change – healing, reconciliation and implementation

The VPD embraces the goals of effecting substantive change in policing and in other social institutions, and of seeking healing and reconciliation within the community, as set out in this paper. The VPD regards these objectives as being of the highest importance, and it is striving to achieve them.

The VPD has acknowledged the failings of its investigation into the Missing Women and has dedicated itself to learning from them. It committed to an unflinching internal review of the investigation, and it made that review public when the final appeal in the criminal trial was dismissed. It also called for this Inquiry, and has sought to participate in it fully and openly. The VPD looks forward to receiving the Commission's report and reflecting further on opportunities for change and improvement.

The VPD has already implemented a wide range of changes in response to its various internal reviews. The VPD is working hard to achieve progressive and effective change at all levels of the organization, in every area of its operations: from the Missing Persons Unit to the implementation of Major Case Management to a more nuanced and respectful approach to enforcement within the sex trade. The VPD seeks to be a best practices, learning organization in everything it does, and it strives to deliver the best possible policing service to everyone in the city.

The VPD has apologized to the families and to the community for the shortcomings of its investigation into the Missing Women, and for the impact that had on the failed investigation into Pickton as a suspect specifically. Senior Management, including the Chief, made that apology, and counsel for the VPD have in this Inquiry expressed that apology both at large and to family members individually. The VPD acknowledges and accepts that its investigation was inadequate in many respects, and it bears deep regret for the pain and trauma that has caused the families and the community.

The VPD is willing and interested in participating in further steps toward healing and reconciliation with the families and the community. Further steps are being discussed within the SisterWatch Committee, and the VPD looks forward to hearing from it as to what steps would be meaningful and appropriate.

VII. Conclusion

The VPD is committed to learning from the mistakes it made in the Missing Women investigation. The VPD fully understands the gravity of the impact those mistakes had on the families of the missing women and the community, and will continue to strive to provide the best possible policing for the City, and in particular, the Downtown Eastside. The VPD has made many positive improvements to date and is committed to assisting the MWCI in arriving at recommendations that will further enhance the VPD's response to victimization of vulnerable citizens in Vancouver, and to the broader police response in BC. This report is respectfully submitted in support of those objectives.

List of Appendices

- A. Recommendations from DCC LePard's Missing Women Investigation Review (MWIR) (pages 334-337)
- B. Epilogue from the MWIR detailing changes made (pages 338-339)
- C. August 2011 update as to changes made in the VPD (per August 2011)
- D. The 2004 Audit of the VPD's Missing Persons Unit by Ret. Insp Schouten
- E. Spreadsheet of recommendations from the Schouten Report
- F. Report from Sgt. Fairweather summarizing implementation of the recommendations from the Schouten Report
- G. Table showing performance of the re-structured VPD Missing Persons Office regarding reports of missing women (2002-2010)
- H. SisterWatch Report: The Tragedy of Missing and Murdered Aboriginal Women in Canada – We Can Do Better (June 2011)
- I. Sex Work Enforcement Guidelines (2012)
- J. Table of diversity among VPD employees as at 2012
- K. Options for Service Delivery in the Greater Vancouver Region: A Discussion Paper of the Issues Surrounding the Regionalization of Police Services (2008)
- L. Municipal Policing in the Vancouver Census Metropolitan Area (2012)
- M. VPD's Missing Persons Policy (2012)
- N. Kong et al., "Sexual Offences in Canada" (Juristat, Catalogue no. 85-002-XIE, Vol. 23, no. 6 (2003))

APPENDIX A

the most part, did not become engaged and provide her the high-level support she needed.

A thorough analysis of the evidence pointing to Pickton was needed. Had this analysis been available and taken at a high level to the RCMP, to pressure it to aggressively pursue the investigation with an offer of continued assistance, the RCMP may have applied more resources to the Pickton investigation. Unfortunately, because of a variety of circumstances, there was a rapid turnover of managers in the Major Crime Section. Due to their own lack of inquiry, none of them were sufficiently knowledgeable about the Missing Women investigation generally, and the Pickton investigation specifically. This was also true at the Executive level.

The impact of the failed 1999 investigation into Pickton was enormous in many ways, including having a severe emotional impact on the investigators involved – particularly Sergeant Geramy Field, Detective Constable Lori Shenher, and Detective Constable Mark Chernoff.

But the impact on the investigators and the VPD pales in comparison to the tragedy that could potentially have been averted: after August 1999, 13 more sex trade workers went missing, and DNA and other evidence connects eleven of these thirteen women to the Pickton property with multiple related murder charges awaiting trial.

Steps must be taken to eliminate or minimize those barriers that derailed the original Pickton investigation. What is needed is better analysis to provide “triggers” for a major investigation; better communication between RCMP detachments, RCMP “Headquarters,” and municipal departments; and better mechanisms to more quickly create Joint Force Operations run by properly trained major case

managers. Some of these issues have been addressed to some extent recently, such as an RCMP initiative to ensure there is a pool of high level major case managers available in British Columbia, the creation of a provincial missing persons analysis unit, and integration of some homicide units. However, more work is needed to develop specific initiatives to address other systemic barriers identified in this review.

If anything good has come out of the Missing Women investigation, it is that it was a catalyst for an unprecedented Joint Force Operation investigation that has been described as a model of excellence in a number of respects, including inter-agency cooperation. Aggressive steps to improve policing in BC must be taken to ensure that all the harm in the Missing Women case caused to individuals, families and communities leads to more positive changes, and that the deaths of the Missing Women were not in vain.

9. RECOMMENDATIONS

A. REGARDING THE PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT AND THE B.C. ASSOCIATION OF CHIEFS OF POLICE

The VPD should encourage the Provincial Government and the BC Association of Chiefs of Police to:

i. Multi-jurisdictional Investigations

1. Create a protocol or framework for multi-jurisdictional major case investigations to ensure the timely and seamless implementation of multi-agency teams. Reference documents should include this Review, Inspector R.

Gehl's 2001 M.A. thesis on "Multi-Agency Cooperation", and Justice Campbell's Bernardo Investigation Review. The protocol should include specific guidelines, provisions for ongoing liaison between senior police officers, and reporting requirements;

2. Strike a committee to:

- Develop a mechanism for individual police agencies faced with a "major case" with a multi-jurisdictional aspect to seek assistance, including involvement of the Provincial Police;
- Develop specific criteria that set out the circumstances in which a JFO will be created and a process for providing ongoing review and reporting of the JFO's activities;
- Develop an agreement allowing the rapid creation of JFOs when needed; and
- Develop a funding model for extraordinary investigations that are beyond the capacity of a municipal police department's budget for "routine" policing;
- Examine the state of provincial standards for advanced training of police officers in British Columbia.

ii. Regional Policing

3. In light of the negative impact on the Pickton investigation of the current multi-agency policing system in the Lower Mainland, examine the benefits of a regionalized police force in the Lower Mainland;

iii. Major Case Management

4. Examine the work of the 1996 Ontario Major Case Management Committee and give consideration to developing provincial standards for the management of major cases in BC;
5. Support the RCMP developing its accreditation program for high level major case managers, so that a provincial pool of highly trained managers are available to any agency, and that the municipal police departments be encouraged and supported in participating in this initiative;

iv. Electronic Case Management

6. Strike a Provincial committee of key stakeholders to study and make recommendations regarding a single uniform computerized case management system, or suite of systems, for use by police agencies throughout British Columbia;
7. Ensure the selected system is mandatory for use in all serial predator investigations and all major sexual assault and homicide cases that could turn into a serial predator investigation;
8. Develop training to ensure that team commanders, investigators, file coordinators and analysts have sufficient training for their respective roles in using the system, and that this training be upgraded whenever substantive changes are made to the electronic case management system;

9. Ensure that if the Versadex PRIME-BC product is to be used for major case management, then the issue of complementary analytical software be studied, to ensure that all important functions of an electronic case management system are available, and to avoid a multiplicity of locally-developed products being used as is the case in British Columbia now;

v. Missing Persons Investigations

10. Continue to provide the support necessary to ensure the success of the new provincial analysis unit to examine missing persons cases, and that further attention be given to eliminating barriers to making missing persons reports;⁴⁶⁴

B. TO THE VANCOUVER POLICE DEPARTMENT

11. THAT all VPD supervisors and managers in charge of investigative squads receive major case management training appropriate to their responsibilities;
12. THAT the Inspector in charge of the Major Crime Section (and other investigative sections) have a background in criminal investigations;

13. THAT the Executive of the Vancouver Police Department implement a policy requiring briefings at the Executive level on major cases so that adequate resources are applied;⁴⁶⁵
14. THAT whenever a task force is created for the purpose of a major case investigation, the major case management model is followed;
15. THAT a full time supervisor or “Team Commander” is assigned on a full time basis to any major case team;
16. THAT the Team Commander in consultation with the Primary Investigator have the authority to select all team members, and to release any team member who is unable to perform to a reasonable standard, or who is otherwise counterproductive;
17. THAT all major investigations consider the need for a written media strategy as a part of its operational plan, developed by the Team Commander in consultation with the Media Liaison Unit;
18. THAT the media handling protocol set out in the current Canadian Police College’s Major Case Management Manual be used as a reference in major case investigations;
19. THAT the VPD implement a process whereby any replacement officers in a major case investigation team are fully briefed on all facets of the case investigation, including both in-person meetings and via case investigation documentation;

⁴⁶⁴ For example, the author has been advocating with the RCMP to create a 1-800 number that citizens wanting to report a missing person could call anywhere in BC, and a process would be created to ensure the appropriate jurisdiction conducts an investigation, and to ensure information is effectively shared between jurisdictions.

⁴⁶⁵ This recommendation has been addressed with the 2004 creation of the VPD’s “Strategic Plan Alignment Committee”, on which the four Deputy Chiefs sit. The committee is responsible for ensuring resources are aligned with priorities.

20. THAT the VPD continue developing the capacity to incorporate major case management best practices;
21. THAT the current efforts by the VPD to forge improved relationships with the sex trade workers of the Downtown Eastside continue to be strongly supported by VPD management; and

C. REGARDING THE CITY OF VANCOUVER

The VPD should encourage the City of Vancouver to:

22. Continue to support the resource needs of the VPD, both in terms of sworn staff but also civilian support staff, such as the priority positions requested in the 2002, 2003 and 2004 Reports to Council regarding civilian staffing, especially those with technical expertise, so that no future serious investigation is compromised by a lack of sufficient staff and expertise.

APPENDIX B

10. EPILOGUE

This review was substantially completed by 2005; much has happened since then.

On December 9, 2007 Robert Pickton was convicted of second degree murder in the deaths of Sereena Abotsway, Adrea Joesbury, Mona Wilson, Georgina Papin, Brenda Wolfe, and Marnie Frey. He was sentenced to life in prison with no hope for parole for 25 years. The Supreme Court of Canada upheld these convictions. As a result, charges were stayed related to the 20 additional murders of Andrea Borhaven, Heather Bottomley, Heather Chinnock, Wendy Crawford, Sarah Devries, Tiffany Drew, Cara Ellis, Cynthia Feliks, Jennifer Furminger, Inga Hall, Helen Hallmark, Tanya Holyk, Sherry Irving, Angela Jardine, Patricia Johnson, Debra Jones, Kerry Koski, Jacqueline McDonell, Diana Melnick, and Dianne Rock. In addition, DNA from six other Missing Women – Sharon Abraham, Yvonne Boen, **STW139** Dawn Crey, Stephanie Lane, and Jacqueline Murdock – was allegedly found on the Pickton property, but there was insufficient evidence for Crown to approve charges. By any measure, the deaths of these Missing Women was a heart-wrenching tragedy, and one which has many lessons.

Significant improvements have been made in the VPD and in policing in BC since the Missing Women investigation. All of the VPD-relevant recommendations flowing from the Review have been implemented. Supervisors and managers of investigative squads are required to have an appropriate level of investigative experience and receive major case management training. The Inspectors in charge of the three VPD sections that focus on violent crime are all former major crime investigators and supervisors, and all have major case management training. Both the Superintendent

and Deputy Chief who oversee major investigations are experienced investigators and investigative supervisors. Since the Missing Women investigation, six VPD officers have been provincially accredited as Major Case Management Team Commanders. The current Executive has implemented a system in which it is briefed daily on current cases, and is proactive in ensuring it is fully informed and engaged so that it can fulfill its leadership responsibilities. All major case and task force investigations are guided by major case management protocols, including staffing matters and media strategies.

In terms of VPD staffing levels, since the Missing Women investigation, the VPD has received extraordinary support from the City of Vancouver and Vancouver City Council in increasing both sworn and civilian staffing. Sworn staffing has been effectively increased by 243 positions since 2003, while civilian staffing has increased by well over 100 positions over the same time period. Many of the civilian positions are crime analysts, which were severely lacking during the Missing Women investigation.

The VPD has also continued to work at improving relationships with sex trade workers and other marginalized persons via advocacy groups, and has assigned a police officer who is well-respected in the Downtown Eastside, Constable Linda Malcolm, as a full-time sex trade worker liaison.

There have been many improvements in the ability of police in the Lower Mainland to respond to multi-jurisdictional crime, as evidenced by the creation of RCMP-led integrated units such as the Integrated Gang Task Force. To their credit, the Provincial Government has significantly increased funding for such integrated units, expanding the overall policing capacity in the Lower Mainland and elsewhere. In addition, the Province has funded and implemented

province-wide the Police Records Information Management Environment (PRIME) System that the VPD introduced in 2001, so that all police agencies are able to efficiently share information. In addition, major case management training has continued and its principles have become the accepted standard for the conduct of major investigations in B.C.

As noted, a provincial missing persons analysis unit has now been in place since 2005, although more work is needed to ensure it addresses the current gaps in missing persons investigations, particularly when there are multi-jurisdictional issues, and also with respect to barriers to reporting, particularly for marginalized persons.

There are, however, still some outstanding challenges that played a role in the failures in the Missing Women investigation. For example, there is still no provincial standard for electronic case management software to support major investigations and different agencies are using different applications. The VPD continues to advocate for such a system, as its lack prevents seamless multi-jurisdictional investigations, delays the transfer of information, and requires that investigators who move to a multi-jurisdictional unit from a different agency have to adapt to new systems. There should also be more attention paid to provincial standards for training. Some progress in this regard was made in 2008, but there is more work to do.

In addition, the lack of a regional police force in the Lower Mainland means that there are competing priorities, and decisions on regional issues are delayed while consensus is sought. While the level of cooperation is usually good among police leaders in the province, this situation would be enhanced with a better structure that would support police decision-making on a regional basis, rather than the fragmented system that exists now, and which

played a key negative role in the Missing Women investigation. There are times when decision-making on major multi-jurisdictional policing issues must rest with a clear governance and executive authority, supported by a unified and accountable management team. In major multi-jurisdictional cases, decisions must not be diluted or avoided because of a lack of an appropriate structure to support such decision making. While a “Joint Management Team” approach has been adopted in BC to support some integrated units, this approach does not set out a legal or practical basis for strong, rapid, and accountable decision-making that incorporates the issues of the major stakeholders. This problem should be examined by the Ministry of Solicitor General.

APPENDIX C



THE VANCOUVER POLICE DEPARTMENT
Beyond the Call

**Vancouver Police Department Actions Taken Resulting from the
Missing Women Investigation Review**

1. The Missing Persons/Coroner's Liaison Unit

At the time of the Missing Women investigation, there was no full-time supervisor in the Missing Persons Unit. The Unit was managed "off the side of a desk" by a Sergeant with full time responsibilities for a homicide squad. As a result, in 2003 a Sergeant's position was created and filled in the Missing Persons Unit.

There were also a number of problems in the Unit related to staff qualifications, record keeping, investigative practices, policies, etc. As a result, retired Inspector John Schouten (who had not only Homicide Squad experience, but was highly skilled in the audit function) was contracted to conduct a comprehensive audit of the Unit. He completed his extensive audit in 2004, making numerous recommendations with respect to staffing levels, policy, selection criteria for staff, record keeping, use of PRIME, and many others. That audit was provided to the Major Crime Section Inspector, with a requirement for a monthly report as to the progress of the implementation of the recommendations. All of the recommendations have been implemented.

With respect to policy, in 2005 changes to the VPD Regulations and Procedures Manual were recommended and approved by the Police Board. These amendments require that a field supervisor be notified immediately of any missing person reports that E-COMM was proposing not to dispatch a police officer to investigate, to ensure that no time was lost in suspicious circumstances that might not be apparent to E-COMM staff. In addition, our practice for missing persons investigations has shifted to recognize explicitly that in the absence of information that a report of a missing persons is NOT suspicious, it should be treated as suspicious.

Since the Missing Women investigation, there has been a complete turnover of staff in the Missing Persons Unit, allowing new selection criteria to be applied. The Unit has since been functioning at a very high level and has been recognized nationally for its excellence.

In addition to improving the analytical capacity in the Missing Persons Unit by effective use of PRIME and other strategies, the VPD advocated with the RCMP to create a Provincial Missing Persons Analysis Unit within the Behavioural Sciences Group of the RCMP. The VPD also sought support from the BC Association of Municipal Chiefs of Police to fund a municipal police position in this unit. That effort was successful, but fortunately, to its credit, the RCMP subsequently agreed to fund that position as a municipal secondment from the provincial policing budget, as had originally been argued for. This provincial unit was created in 2004 and a VPD member was the successful candidate for the municipal position in the unit at the time. The mandate of this unit is to work to create harmonized policies for missing persons investigations in BC, to create systems to recognize anomalous patterns of missing persons even when they cross jurisdictions, and to ensure this information is acted on, etc.

One of the recommendations of a City of Vancouver committee involving family members of the Missing Women was the creation of a 1-800 number to reduce barriers to reporting missing persons, especially by marginalized persons. There have been discussions with the RCMP but this has not yet occurred due to resource issues.

2. Major Case Management

The Canadian Police College's major case management model, developed in 1994, is the accepted "best practice" for managing serious investigations. Justice Archie Campbell cited it in his review of the Bernardo investigation as "a well-thought out approach to the problems of major serial predator investigations, solidly grounded in Canadian investigative experience and the lessons learned from failures and successes."¹

At the time the VPD's "Missing Women Review Team" investigation began in May 1999, only one member of the Investigation Division had received the Canadian Police College's three-week Major Case Management Program. Since that time, the VPD has ensured that this course has been provided to numerous members. The Inspectors in charge of the Major Crime Section (Homicide, Missing Persons, Robbery/Assault), the Special Investigation Section (Sexual Offence Squad and others), and the Operations Investigation Section (robberies other than financial institutions, property crime) have received Major Case Management training, as have all their Sergeants. In addition, there is a Provincial Accreditation Committee created by the RCMP that exists to evaluate the training and experience of applicants who wish to receive "accredited" status to be eligible for placement in a pool of high-level MCM managers available for major investigations in B.C. The criteria for accreditation is very onerous. The VPD currently has six officers who are provincially accredited Team Commanders, including the Inspector in charge of the Major Crime Section.

¹ Justice Archie Campbell (1996). *Bernardo Investigation Review*, Government of Ontario, p. 271.

3. Selection Criteria for the Major Crime and Special Investigation Sections

With respect to the qualifications of Inspectors and Sergeants in the Major Crime Section and Special Investigation Section, the selection criteria have been changed to ensure that solid investigative experience is required – in addition to the other supervisor/management qualifications – for selection to these Sections. The result has been that the Inspectors in charge of both of these key Sections have extensive investigative experience at the Detective and Sergeant level. In addition, the Sergeants selected for Homicide, Robbery/Assault and Sex Offences since 2003, in every single case, have previous relevant experience as investigators in Homicide, Robbery/Assault, or Sex Offences.

4. Critical Analysis of Investigations

Two key strategies to move towards being a best practice learning organization are to ensure that we critically analyze extraordinary investigations to learn from our successes and failures, and that we then ensure that information is made available to others. To that end, in 2004 a practice of formally debriefing major investigations was instituted in the Investigation Division. These facilitated debriefings involve all the investigators and associated staff, and even Crown counsel where appropriate. The Inspector in charge is then required to write a report summarizing the investigation, the challenges faced, lessons learned, and recommendations for the future.

To ensure this information is easily accessible, in 2004, an Intranet-based “Knowledge Database” was created, on which major case debriefs and other relevant documentation can be made available in electronic form. In 2005, this database was significantly enhanced. It is now highly sophisticated and searchable, and includes numerous documents focused on investigative excellence. There is now a considerable library of literature available to current investigators and those who wish to improve their knowledge of investigations, and to understand the benefit from both practical and academic analyses of investigations. This database has been demonstrated to the Senior Management Team, and other steps have been taken to encourage its use both in the Investigation Division and the VPD generally.

5. Resources

When the VPD Missing Women investigation began in 1998, the VPD had been through a series of annual cuts in authorized strength since 1993 (and which continued to 2000). As a result, resource levels were a major issue. Since then, the VPD’s authorized strength has climbed very significantly due to the support of Vancouver City Council. There are now 243 more authorized sworn positions than there were in 2000, and more than one hundred additional civilian positions, many of those in crime analyst positions, which were notably lacking during the Missing Women investigation. Many of the positions came to the Investigation Division, improving resource levels and capacity.

6. Management Accountability

During the Missing Women Investigation Review, it became clear that some key information possessed by investigators was diluted as it moved up the chain of command, impairing effective decision-making. Steps have been taken to ensure there is effective communication, including senior management meeting daily with Inspectors and Sergeants in charge of investigative squads to be briefed on the status of ongoing investigations and to respond to questioning. A similar process is repeated each morning at 9:15 a.m. in the Chief Constable's office, at which time each Deputy comes similarly prepared to respond to questions from the Chief and from each other as to significant incidents.

The entire Executive examines issues from the point of view of the VPD response required, and resources are moved between Divisions on a short- or long-term basis to meet organizational needs. For example, this occurred in 2004 when resources were permanently moved from the Operations and Operations Support Divisions to address a lack of staff in the Sexual Offence Squad. More recently, resources were moved on a temporary basis from a variety of areas throughout the VPD to "front-end load" key investigations, including homicides.

7. External/Regional Policing Cooperation, Coordination and Collaboration

- Formal cooperation on multi-jurisdictional issues
- PRIME BC
- Integrated Units
- Joint Forces Operations, e.g., planned responses to gang violence; unplanned response to emergent issues, e.g., kidnappings
- Direct lines of communication at investigator, managerial and executive levels among all police agencies

III Conclusion

During the Missing Women investigation, there was an unfortunate "perfect storm" that contributed to failures in the VPD. Factors included the investigative challenges of an unprecedented case, a variety of internal and external problems, and the failure of the Coquitlam RCMP's investigation of Pickton in 1998-2001.

As a result of the Missing Women investigation review, there have been significant changes made to improve the capacity of the VPD to deal with challenging

investigations. These include changes in the Missing Persons Unit regarding staffing and policy; changes in the selection criteria and Major Case Management training for Inspectors and Sergeants in the Major Crime and Special Investigation Sections; the implementation of a debriefing and documentation process for major cases; the creation of a “Knowledge Database” to encourage both learning about and critical analysis of major investigations; changed practices to improve information flow from operational staff up to the Executive; and improved practices to ensure management accountability.

Externally there have been significant improvements in policing capacity in BC, and in cooperation, collaboration and coordination with police in the region on planned and unplanned multi-jurisdictional investigations.

APPENDIX D



Vancouver Police Department

**Investigation Division
Major Crime Section
Missing Person Unit**

Missing Person Unit Review

Report Date:
October 2004

Prepared for:
Doug LePard – Deputy Chief Constable
Commanding Investigation Division

Prepared by
John Schouten - Inspector (Ret.)

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I. PREFACE

This internal review of the VPD Missing Person Unit was conducted at the request of Deputy Chief Constable Doug LePard, Commanding Investigation Division.

The review process consisted of an examination of the structure of the unit, policies, staffing, succession planning, training, and case management, and in particular use of the Vancouver Police Department Versadex Records Management System (RMS). Also included in the scope of this examination are recommendations outlining improved business practises.

The Case Management Review (1992) was used as reference in this analysis.

The objective was to ensure that VPD policies and procedures are harmonized where possible with other agencies, and that all activities related to the handling of missing person cases and files are conducted in accordance with all applicable laws, BC Municipal Police Standards, current Vancouver Police Department policies and procedures, and any other relevant criteria.

II. INTRODUCTION

An effective Missing Person Unit receives reports of missing persons from the public and other agencies, assesses the level of risk, and conducts an investigation based on that risk. They must have sufficient staffing to fulfill their mandate and there must be a level of commitment to the task that provides for analysis, classification of risk, and active investigation rather than just report processing.

Effective supervision and management are crucial to ensure investigative staff is able to cope with tasks within their position profile, and that they are able to obtain assistance when there are indications of foul play and a higher level of investigation is required.

Effective missing person case management provide supervisory officers a basis for reviewing work and assist them in their day to day operations by revealing deficient or improper handling of cases.

Without adequate review, which is an essential element of case management, there exists a potential for loss of prestige and credibility for the Vancouver Police Department, particularly in light of the recent missing women's investigations and media attention that has been focused on these types of cases.

A critical element in missing person cases is the distinction whether an incident is suspicious or not. Despite the overwhelming number of incidents that are non-criminal in nature, there is a high expectation from the public that the police devote adequate resources to locating missing persons. In those cases where suspicious circumstances are involved it is imperative that the police conduct a thorough investigation, at the earliest opportunity, so that no evidence is lost. In those few incidents, the scope and detail of the investigation are comparable to that expected in a homicide.

Statistically, the largest number of missing persons cases reported to the Vancouver Police Department are those involving juveniles runaways. These chronic runaway cases frequently require no follow-up investigation and many are concluded before the incident is first reviewed. This review has addressed this specific issue and made recommendations which may reduce the work load so that scarce resources may be concentrated where the real need exists.

III. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

In response to Executive concerns, the author was requested to conduct an examination of the Missing Person Unit.

Upon interviewing past missing person investigators and reviewing the relevant documentation it was apparent that there are five key areas that need to be addressed in order to ensure that this Department and the Investigation Division, in particular, handles missing persons cases effectively, efficiently, in a manner that withstands public and media scrutiny and foremost protects the safety of those persons who go missing for any reason. These issues revolve primarily around staffing (succession planning), training, file and record management quality control, missing person file and investigation continuity, and effective management of chronic runaways.

Preliminary examination of this Unit identified the following areas as potentially significant:

1. Is there sufficient staff assigned to this function (especially police investigators)? Statistics reveal that the VPD has received 3,847 Missing Person complaints in the past year. Of these, 315 remain unsolved. There appears to be inadequate staffing to investigate the volume of new files and no staffing to investigate historical files.
2. A review of available training and transfer of skills to new investigators (ie: Do we train our sworn and civilian staff adequately?)
3. Selection criteria for Missing Person Unit staff, coaching, mentoring and performance evaluation.
4. Is a VPD missing person file adequately investigated and documented?
5. Are available investigative, technical and public resources used to the best advantage to clear a missing person file (especially chronic runaways and wanderers)?
6. Is VPD able to adequately distinguish possible foul play (especially serial crimes) from the current missing person file investigation process?
7. Is there a consistent method to assign degree of risk to missing person files?
8. The relationship of Missing Person Unit to other MCS components.
9. Level of harmonization of policies of other agencies and jurisdictions (particularly E-Comm, the RCMP and other municipal departments).

The examination's major findings are as follows:

1. The Missing Person Unit's ability to carry out its mandate is compromised by a lack of resources, both through improper deployment of the existing position and a shortage of investigators. A review is recommended to determine proper staffing levels, which appear to be inadequate given the case load, term of assignment, and qualifications for the position;
2. There is insufficient succession/resource planning;
3. There is no formal process of mentoring or performance evaluation in use;
4. There is a need for specific RMS training for Missing Person Unit and Coroner's Liaison Unit staff;
5. Specialist training for new missing person investigators is inadequate;
6. There is an absence of review of missing person cases by a sworn member. The non-sworn Missing Person Coordinator is currently the principal Missing Person Investigator and case manager and is clearly acting beyond the scope of her position profile;
7. There are lapses in record management quality control of the Versadex RMS, and PRIME-BC is not adequately used and maintained. This includes the data entry requirements as set out by Departmental policy, and the supervisory functions meant to track work assignments and incident status;
8. There appears to be insufficient scrutiny of files for potential suspicious missing person cases indicating a need for a risk assessment system/reporting protocol;
9. There is little active investigation of files not cleared within the first 48 hours beyond basic checks of indices such as RMS, CPIC, PIRS and the MHR Welfare database. This is a particularly acute problem if no patrol unit was assigned originally;
10. Investigative steps are not consistently documented in a standard fashion, which causes difficulty in the review process;
11. There is no ongoing organized file review of unsolved missing person cases. Any review that exists is informal and often undocumented;
12. Lack of missing person investigation process continuity;
13. The designated Missing Person Unit investigator has been a secondary Coroners Liaison investigator, an unapproved addition to the designated Coroner Liaison position, to the detriment of missing person investigative needs;
14. There is a need to develop clear guidelines to determine when a suspicious missing person incident becomes a Homicide investigation;
15. There are no formal guidelines for declaring a case inactive, and Departmental policies for case clearance are not adhered to;

16. Use of non-police indices (MHR, ICBC, Immigration, Corrections, Revenue Canada, Financial Institutions) are not consistently re-checked at regular intervals;
17. Presently, as a result of shifting in the Missing Person Unit, there may be no evaluation of new missing person cases by a police supervisor or investigator for up to 84 hours on a three day holiday weekend. This has serious implications if suspicious circumstances are not identified by an E-Comm Call-taker;
18. Despite a review 2 years ago, there is again a need to again review historical incidents given the inadequate review practices employed in past years;
19. There is inadequate coordination between police agencies of found human remains and their identification to outstanding missing person files;
20. Additional investigative information returned on missing person cases submitted to and reviewed by Project Evenhanded is not being entered into RMS consistently. Project Evenhanded is reviewing VPD cases received to determine what additional information should be added to PRIME-BC ;
21. A better process must be found to manage chronic runaways.

The recommendations of this review are:

- 1A.1 Position profiles should be reviewed to ensure they are accurate and current. The audit revealed that almost all investigation and follow-up is being done by a non-sworn member. If this is to continue, the position profile for the Missing Person Unit Coordinator must be reviewed and amended to reflect her true responsibilities. She should be compensated commensurate with these duties;
- 1A.2 One Coroner's Liaison position is authorized but at the time of the review the missing person investigator had been assigned to augment that position. As a priority it must be determined whether the Coroner's Liaison caseload justifies two investigators, particularly as this is detrimental to missing person investigations. A position analysis should review work that is being done for the Coroners Service for which the VPD has no responsibility and is not being compensated;
- 1A.3 Given the size and limited investigative resources of the Unit, an absence of external commitments should be considered as a condition of assignment for future supervisors;
- 1B.1 Historically, the selection process for staff assigned to the Unit appears flawed. It is recommended that the Investigator position not be seen as a light duties or pre-retirement position but that it is filled by a member with demonstrated investigative skills. This is clearly a developmental position that lends itself to evaluating a potential major crimes investigator;
- 1B.2 Tenure should be no less than 18 months and up to 2 years and should be seen as developmental for a senior investigative position;
- 1C.1 Staffing levels for the Unit require Executive review. It appears an increase in investigative staff is justifiable and necessary to meet workload and public expectation;
- 1C.2 Consideration might be given to re-assignment of the Missing Person Investigator(s) to the Vice Unit and transferring the responsibility for these investigations there organizationally. While that has merit, one possible detrimental factor to consider would be the impact of separating the missing person investigators from Coroner Liaison Unit and Major Crime - Homicide Section as the two functions would be in different facilities. Chronic Runaways may be more appropriately processed by Youth Squad;
- 1C.3 The discrepancy in file statistics should be audited by the Information Management Section and Missing Person Coordinator to determine what has become of the (minimum) 49 files recorded that cannot be accounted for;
- 2A.1 Training for Missing Person Unit investigators and supervisors should be reviewed and a formal list of mandatory and desirable training courses developed for the position;
- 2A.2 The Training Officer Advisory Committee should be requested to examine the viability of a specific 3-day training program for missing person investigators, and of including a one-hour block of training to recruits on missing person investigations;

- 2A.3 That the Media Liaison Unit work with the Investigator(s) to ensure a coordinated media plan is established prior to release of information. That might include posters, the Inter and Intranet and established news media sources;
- 2B.1 The Training Unit, PRIME Trainer and the PRIME Coordinator should be requested to evaluate the level of RMS/PRIME skills of Missing Person Unit staff and provide additional training based on that need. Particular attention is required with workflow, case notes, supplementary reports and the conclusion of files;
- 2C.1 The Training Section should include a brief overview of missing person investigations in the indoctrination block presented just prior to new Members being deployed;
- 2D.1 Newly assigned Investigators should be provided with pro-active coaching and mentoring, especially in their first few weeks;
- 2E.1 To ensure staff are completing their responsibilities in an effective manner, in compliance with their position profile, both management and supervisory ranks responsible for the Missing Person Unit should engage in a regular, meaningful performance evaluation and mentoring process for both sworn and non-sworn staff as outlined in the Regulations and Procedures Manual, Section 4;
- 3A.1 That the BCACP appoint a committee to harmonize missing person policies province-wide. Timing for this is ideal given the creation of the new RCMP Rapid-ID Unit. A blending of the existing RCMP policy and Ontario Review appear to be the most comprehensive at this time;
- 3A.2 That TRT or, if TRT is not available, Patrol NCOs review and triage all incoming missing person reports;
- 3A.3 If additional staff is assigned, deployment of staff to cover as many days of the week as possible should be examined. This would reduce the risk of a potentially medium or high risk case being inadvertently overlooked when investigators are on leave;
- 3A.4 That a formalized missing person risk assessment process be implemented to augment, not replace, the professional judgement of the investigator(s) handling of missing person cases. The Indiana Data and Communications System (IDACS) criteria may serve as a guide;
- 3A.5 Creation of a missing person checklist to classify each incident by type and risk. At a glance this sheet could include basic law enforcement indices and non-police agency check boxes to ensure each missing person's history and background is checked consistently. These checklists would be useful for re-checks in the event of an extended investigation as they should be repeated at specific intervals;
- 3A.6 Major Crime Section Management should develop a clear understanding and guidelines to apply when a missing person file is determined to involve suspicious circumstances. If there is a possibility of criminal involvement, the Supervisors of the Missing Person Unit and of the Homicide Units must

- develop a joint investigative plan which clearly outlines when responsibility for an investigation is transferred and who the lead investigator is;
- 3A.7 That the Inspector i/c Major Crime Section ensures trained Major Case Management resources are made available when significant or complex investigations are encountered;
- 3B.1 Paper files maintained at the Missing Person Unit should be reviewed and:
- a. When a case is declared inactive or concluded it should be sent to Information Management Section for storage or archiving;
 - b. Repositories for these paper files should be clearly marked as to content;
- 3B.2 Files sent to Project Evenhanded must be reconciled with the original VPD missing person entry. Information in files on Evenhanded databases must match those on PRIME;
- 3C.1 Departmental case clearance policy must be followed;
- 3C.2 Investigative supervision in the Unit must be brought to a level in keeping with Departmental expectations. This includes a first review of cases by the Sergeant, particularly for possible suspicious circumstances, review of subsequent work, assignment of files and investigative follow-ups, and maintenance of RMS workflow;
- 3C.3 In addition to daily file management, a detailed case overview supplemental report in RMS should be submitted by the assigned investigator no more than 14 days into an outstanding missing person investigation;
This report should refer to details on the missing person's profile and background, any physical evidence, medical evidence, indices checked and the results; reason for suspicion of foul play (or reasons why foul play is not suspected), investigative steps to date and an investigative plan;
- 3C.4 The investigative plan should include proposals on how to continue the investigation;
- 3C.5 The investigator's conclusions should include thoughts and theories on all aspects of the case;
- 3C.6 As per the Departmental Case Management guidelines, conflicts which arise over an investigative plan or any other portion of the overview report should be resolved immediately;
- 3C.7 Any reviews by Unit or Section supervisory staff should be recorded in the RMS;
- 3C.8 Where a missing person incident is deemed suspicious, Homicide case review policies, procedures and schedules should be implemented and the results recorded in RMS. This would include use of the Homicide case binder pre-packaged with the standardized format delineated by subject tabs;
- 3C.9 Unsolved files should be reviewed every 90 days and indices re-checked. The reportee should be contacted for updates and feedback as part of the review process. Results and an updated case assessment should be recorded in RMS;

- 3C.10 Historical incidents, particularly those with suspicious circumstances must be reviewed again and brought up to date. Consideration should be given to entering suspicious case data (where it exists) into RMS using Document Imaging. This will likely require assignment of an additional investigator (preferably with Homicide investigative experience) for 6 to 12 months and would be required to derive a benefit from the Rapid-ID Project;
- 3C.11 A file review should identify cases not yet entered into ViCLAS. Booklets should be completed and submitted;
- 3C.12 There is no complete index of cases submitted to Project Evenhanded. A file review should identify these cases and they should be updated in RMS with any investigative results;
- 3D.1 That the Vancouver Police Department promote ISO 9000 Quality Management Principles as an organizational goal;
- 4.01 The Versadex RMS is our sole repository for investigative documentation. It must be properly used and maintained to be effective. Information not entered, or entered incompletely will not be accessible for follow-up investigators, or to identify trends or possible serial crimes. Therefore,
- a. all investigators and clerical staff who have system access must be properly trained for their specific need;
 - b. all investigative steps must be documented in an approved fashion;
 - c. work must be reviewed by their supervisors; and
 - d. workflow (BFs) must be assigned and completed in a timely fashion.
- 4.02 Reports should be reviewed in workflow by the Unit supervisor who should record in RMS his/her approval or direct the file back to the investigator for further follow-up;
- 4.03 Case information currently stored on 'M' drive should be integrated with the appropriate file on RMS;
- 4.04 The Manager - Information Management Section and the VPD PRIME Coordinator should confirm the definitions for case operational status and integrate them into training;
- 4.05 Files currently assigned to retired investigators and staff no longer assigned to the Missing Person Unit should be re-assigned;
- 5A.1 As many of their subjects appear to be in common, the Missing Person Unit should develop a closer working relationship with the VPD Vice Section in general and the FACES program in particular;
- 5B.1 To address the issue of chronic runaways, the VPD IT Section should be requested to investigate the possibility of adding the direct entry and processing of these cases to VPD Internet Reporting by specific, pre-approved complainants. This would place the responsibility of maintaining these files on the Group Homes and should free time for both E-Comm reports staff, VPD Information Management Section and the Missing Person Unit staff;

- 5C.1 The CPIC Advisory Committee, through our VPD representative (the Inspector i/c Services Liaison Section) and RCMP 'E' Division CPIC Services should be asked to evaluate the addition of at least one additional CPIC category (Youth at Risk) for chronic runaways. In almost all instances these are short term unauthorized absences and not truly missing persons. The system can flag absences in excess of 72 hours for further review;
- 5D.1 The position profile of the Missing Person Coordinator should be evaluated to determine the feasibility of expanding the position to complete routine follow up of chronic missing person files. This involvement would be at the discretion and under supervision of the Sergeant, after evaluation of the circumstances, and would cease if additional investigative steps are indicated that require the skills of a sworn investigator.
- 5D.2 In an effort to free experienced investigators for more serious cases, consideration should be given to appointing a Pre-recruit, under close supervision, for 'routine' follow-up investigations such as chronic runaways;
- 5D.3 Consideration should be given to removing responsibility for chronic juvenile runaway incidents from Missing Person Unit and instead assigning coordination of these files to Youth Squad;
- 5D.4 A legal opinion should be requested to determine the feasibility for the VPD to unilaterally cease to investigate chronic runaway reports and refer them instead to the Ministry. It should evaluate the degree of increased liability and public acceptance. Agreement and representation by the BCACP may be required to transfer this responsibility.
- 5D.5 The Planning and Research Section should be asked to complete a study on alternatives for handling of chronic runaway complaints. This study should include, but would not be restricted to:
- a. Policy;
 - b. Responsibility (is this a police or a social problem?);
 - c. Alternative reporting methods;
 - d. Enforcement options (Halifax Regional Police Force seeks a detention order on chronic runaways).

IV. METHODOLOGY

In order for this review to compile the necessary data for this study, the following research methods were utilized:

1. Interviews

A number of confidential interviews were conducted with past and present members of the Missing Person Unit. Several additional interviews were conducted with staff who support the Missing Person Unit. These include VPD IT, Records Management Section, Communications Section and E-Comm. As well, MCS management and members of the Executive were interviewed.

2. Document and electronic records examination

The Appendix ([Section V](#)) contains a complete list of reference documents.

3. Systems Analysis

The paper and data systems that support the investigative unit were examined.

4. Consultation with, and comparison to outside agencies

These included both police and quasi-investigative resources and private organizations that assist in the location of missing persons.

5. Review of additional material from diverse resources

These include the Internet, Media files.

6. Personal observation

V. DETAILED FINDINGS and OBSERVATIONS

1. STAFFING

A. Recent History

In the 1990's one Detective was assigned to missing person investigations. Because of the increasing number of missing women reported from the Downtown Eastside, a second position was added approximately June 1998. A junior investigator filled that position starting in July 1998, after the third Strike Force Team was stood down in order to fill vacancies in the Division. In the spring of 2002, Planning and Research Section completed a report to Council requesting additional civilian positions and another "increment" of 30 sworn positions, to follow up on the 30 new positions approved in 2001 (pursuant to the 2000 staffing report). Council approved the 30 new sworn positions requested in 2002 and they became effective January 2003.

In late 2002 (then) Inspector LePard, assigned to Planning and Research Section began the missing women investigation review. It was determined that lack of adequate supervision in the Missing Persons Unit was a problem, and that a full-time supervisor should be added to the two authorized investigator positions. This was approved by the Executive of the day and the Sergeant position was created and eventually filled.

In late 2003 the Inspector i/c Major Crime Section determined that with three positions there was more investigative capacity than required in the Missing Person Unit, and moved one of the Constable positions to the Identification Unit as a training position. The second Ident Sergeant position was transferred to Robbery/Assault Unit to provide a second supervisory position there. The Human Resources Section confirms that there is currently one position in the Vancouver Police Department organizational chart for a missing person investigator, supervised by an Investigative Sergeant who is also responsible for Coroner Liaison and Witness Management.

B. Responsibilities

Position profiles were obtained to assist the Audit. The position profile for the Investigator position is brief, but it captures most of the tasks expected of the assignment. The Audit found however that the position shown as the Missing Person Investigator position actually conducts Coroner's Liaison work, supplementing the Coroners Liaison Detective-Constable position, as the incumbent is about to retire.

Two position profiles for the Missing Person Coordinator position were examined, one from Human Resources (HR) Section and one from the Coordinator herself. Although similar, they were different in content. The version obtained from HR was taken as accurate. One particular task of note in the Coordinator's position profile is to 'Review all incoming reports for urgency and notify Missing Persons Detective, and NCO.' While this is not inappropriate, it should not replace the responsibility of the Sergeant to review all new missing person incidents and to make a decision on the appropriate priority for investigation.

In Audit interviews the Sergeant's position was described as one of liaison and file management. The Sergeant conducts some investigation of incidents that are suspicious in nature; however interviews, observed practice and the RMS indicate that

the day-to-day caseload is investigated almost exclusively by the Missing Person Coordinator, a non-sworn clerical position. This may be aggravated by the other commitments of the incumbent who holds a Board position with the Vancouver Police Union and maintains an active role in the VPD Pipe Band, both of which draw him away from his assignment.

The use of the Coordinator in an investigative role contradicts the position profile for that position in which investigation of files is not an included task. The position profile indicates responsibility primarily for administrative and clerical tasks. The role for the Coordinator described in interviews included assessment of risk, assignment of files and management of workflow, visits to potential crime scenes, maintenance of investigative notes and actual investigation. This raises a concern that, despite the dedicated work that was clearly evident, a non-sworn position, without general investigative experience or training, is held accountable for work that is both investigative and supervisory in nature and should be completed by a sworn member. Entries in the Records Management System confirmed the descriptions of the duties related in the interviews. The Coordinator also completes clerical tasks for Coroners Liaison and Witness Management investigators. The incumbent has been so employed for six years with four years of prior relief experience.

When the Coordinator is away sick or on leave, a backlog of files builds. Relief staff is adequately able to process routine files however the issues described above with management of workflow and investigative responsibility are compounded when someone with less experience and training is placed in the position. It was described succinctly in the interviews: "When Emer (the Coordinator) goes away, there is a knowledge gap".

Given that risks of non-sworn staff conducting missing person investigations have been raised prior to the incumbent's placement and found to be unacceptable, it was imperative that the Department address this issue decisively and at the earliest opportunity. For that reason, the foregoing was brought to the attention of Section management prior to the submission of this report. Immediate corrective action was to be taken to re-define staff responsibilities.

Section 1A - Recommendations

- 1A.1 Position profiles should be reviewed to ensure they are accurate and current. The audit revealed that almost all investigation and follow-up is being done by a non-sworn member. If this is to continue, the position profile for the Missing Person Unit Coordinator must be reviewed and amended to reflect her true responsibilities. She should be compensated commensurate with these duties;
- 1A.2 One Coroner's Liaison position is authorized but at the time of the review the missing person investigator had been assigned to augment that position. As a priority it must be determined whether the Coroner's Liaison caseload justifies two investigators, particularly as this is detrimental to missing person investigations. A position analysis should review work that is being done for the Coroners Service for which the VPD has no responsibility and is not being compensated;

- 1A.3 Given the size and limited investigative resources of the Unit, an absence of external commitments should be considered as a condition of assignment for future supervisors.

C. Succession Planning and Selection

Succession planning is a key factor in the long-term success of an organization. The Vancouver Police Department benefits when individuals are provided with skills to assume a new position with a minimum loss of productivity. A frequent turnover of personnel within this position requires that each new person must learn their role and responsibilities, as passed down by their predecessor. They must establish themselves as a credible and trustworthy recipient of information, particularly from the many non-police bodies they rely upon, but which are frequently restricted from sharing such information freely. It is accepted that the majority of the missing person cases are benign in nature but with a high investigator turnover or improper placement, there is an increased likelihood of important issues 'falling through the cracks' through inadvertent mistakes or lack of due diligence and follow through.

Therefore there is a need to review the selection process to fill positions within the Missing Person Unit. Historically, the position has been primarily one for light duties assignment, Constables who neared the end of their career or who have had physical afflictions that prevented them from working Patrol shifts or duties. This has led to the perception that this is a pre-retirement position and one that is not consistently filled by the most qualified investigators.

The Audit noted that there were several instances in recent years when junior investigators were assigned to Missing Person Unit. For example, in 1998 an entire Strike Force Team was reassigned as a result of a redeployment of staff. One of those members was assigned to work an additional position with the Missing Person Unit on the missing women issue that had been identified. Both co-workers and supervisors described that assignment as a period of improved investigation and case management. On another occasion, a Constable in mid-career was placed in the Unit temporarily to review historical files. This member also proved to be 'energetic and hard-working' according to the supervisors.

Conversely, with few exceptions, those assigned in pre-retirement have not been as successful, often with lengthy absences, diminished initiative, sometimes with scant investigative and 'people' skills. Recent years have also seen significant technology additions, with the PRIME Records Management System in particular not well embraced by some senior investigators. This resulted in inconsistencies in investigative documentation and cases where acceptable work quality was not evident.

Development of contacts and investigative skills are critical to the position. Many incidents and many of the analytical and investigative steps to resolve them are routine; however incidents where there is an indication of suspicious circumstances require the same skill set and determination possessed by a successful Major Crime investigator. It is for these reasons that this position would be an ideal proving ground and well-suited to an applicant with aspirations of moving to a more senior investigative unit.

Aside from proven investigative aptitude, the characteristics demonstrated by an applicant should include inter-personal skills and empathy, given that the Investigator will frequently be dealing with average families in turmoil and crisis as a result of a missing loved one, and the investigator will often be the recipient of frequent telephone enquiries about the status of their case and questions of why more is not being done. These cases are overwhelmingly non-criminal and the frustrations of next of kin have resulted in Internal complaints in the past and therefore require a high degree of sensitivity and compassion. They are also emotionally stressful for the investigators.

The length of assignment must be sufficient to build the required expertise. Less than eighteen months would not be sufficient; and two years would appear to be ideal. This would allow movement to another, more senior investigative position. A staggered overlap of the two investigative positions should be implemented to enhance continuity.

Section 1B - Recommendations

- 1B.1 Historically, the selection process for staff assigned to the Unit appears flawed. It is recommended that the Investigator position not be seen as a light duties or pre-retirement position but that it is filled by a member with demonstrated investigative skills. This is clearly a developmental position that lends itself to evaluating a potential major crimes investigator;
- 1B.2 Tenure should be no less than 18 months and up to 2 years and should be seen as developmental for a senior investigative position.

D. Staffing Levels

To examine staffing levels versus caseload, a 'snapshot' of CPIC and RMS was taken on 2004-07-21. On that date, the VPD had 266 missing persons entered on CPIC. Prior to PRIME RMS implementation, 164 were already on the system. Since Prime, 102 additional records were added.

From March 2001, when RMS was implemented, to date there were 14,019 missing persons reported to the VPD. The most recent statistics were for the 12-month period of 03-07-21 until 2004-07-21. The VPD received 3,847 missing person reports of which 3,532 show as cleared although it is not indicated how quickly these were cleared or how many were under active investigation. This either leaves 315 outstanding unsolved cases for investigation during the past year, or missing persons have returned but the reports have not been properly concluded in RMS. If the former is accurate, this averaged at least 1.75 new unsolved cases per working day, conservatively estimating 180 working shifts per investigator per year.

These statistics reveal two troubling possibilities. If VPD has 266 existing CPIC missing person records, of which 164 pre-date PRIME, and 315 outstanding unsolved cases in the past 12 months, what is the status of the (minimum) 49 other persons that make up the difference? Secondly, who is actively investigating these 315 most recent unsolved cases? Optimistically, this inconsistency is due only to a lack of proper file

management in RMS, however even that is an issue of significant concern and it will be difficult to reconcile the disparity in these figures.

When last checked on 2004-10-20, the Missing Person Unit Coordinator showed 82 accumulated unsolved missing person files since 2002-01-29. Retired PC Bolton still has 4 outstanding cases which were never reassigned and retired PC Dickhout has 1 that was assigned but never followed-up.

To address a shortage of investigators, several options may be considered in addition to new positions. The first alternative would be to place more of the responsibility on the primary investigators from Operations Division. It would not be inappropriate for a District unit, with input from the Missing Person Unit Supervisor, to conduct a substantial portion of the investigation themselves, perhaps concluding it with follow-up over several shifts.

Secondly, we may have to be more dynamic on case assignment and willing to consider the priorities, for example, to assign a non-routine missing person file to a senior investigator in Robbery-Assault Squad, or a missing sex trade worker to Vice. There should be no stigma with an important missing person case being assigned elsewhere if there is an opportunity to involve a competent investigator. The key to success where this is done is to maintain accurate workflow in RMS with proper investigative review and supervision.

We might also consider placing the Missing Person Unit elsewhere in the organization if that results in increased investigative resources. An Audit review of other large Canadian Departments' Missing Person Unit staffing provided considerable insight into the different deployment models in place across the country.

The **Halifax Regional Police Force** integrates the function with their Vice Unit. The frequent correlation between missing sex trade workers and teenage females drawn to prostitution allow closer monitoring of missing person files with suspicious or criminal overtones. It is a 12 member unit with a shared caseload and therefore has significant human resources to properly investigate all missing person files, without issues of lack of coverage during absences, as might be the case in smaller units. Training issues are addressed by staggering tenure based on a 3 year term and placing new members with a senior mentor. The positions are coveted and there are no reported performance deficiencies.

The **Regina Police Service** has teamed their Missing Person Investigator with a 'cold-case' MCS detective. The unit has two investigators and a civilian clerk. The length of assignment is from 3 to 5 years and requires previous Detective Office experience. The format is described as effective as many missing person cases remain unsolved for lengthy periods, require regular indices checks and have similar investigative requirements as unsolved homicide cases.

The **Winnipeg Police Service** has just completed a review. They are still analyzing data and have offered to share a copy of their report once it is completed.

The **Calgary Police Service** deployment is similar to our own with one dedicated missing person investigator. Calgary reports similar challenges as we are currently reviewing with an excessive caseload and inability to fully investigate all incidents. No immediate changes are contemplated and there is no formal review to reference.

Given the success reported in Halifax, consideration should be given to re-assignment of the Missing Person Investigator(s) to Vice Unit and transferring the responsibility for these investigations there. This would address the issues of insufficient investigative resources, continuity of training and succession planning. Missing person files could be assigned to individual members of that Unit, and provide close integration with the current Vice Unit mandate as a significant volume of these cases involve missing women, runaway juvenile females and particularly sex trade workers.

A further step may be to segregate chronic runaway files and assign these to Youth Squad, who have the contacts to follow-up these incidents and may have better access to the social agencies that can assist (also see Section 5 – Chronic Runaways)

Documentation has been submitted in the past to justify augmenting the investigative capability of the VPD Missing Person Unit. The earliest report found dates from 1995 and was written by Detective Jim Steinbach, the Missing Person Investigator at the time (see [Additional Manpower - MP](#)). The request was approved as a light duties assignment but was not immediately filled. It appears that after Detective Steinbach left the Unit it was filled by a light duties Member and has been so assigned several subsequent times.

The Coroner Liaison Investigator is now effectively a 2-person position, augmented by the Detective-Constable assigned to missing person investigations. This audit did not investigate the reason for this however information was provided that indicates the Coroner Liaison Unit re-investigates a number of deficient Sudden Death files submitted by patrol Division and that there is a substantial commitment to dealing with deceased's property, work that may be the responsibility of another governmental agency and that is not normally done by other police departments.

Examination of the volume of missing person incidents and the available time to properly investigate them justifies assignment of at least two full-time Investigators supported by a civilian clerk. If the Department deems it prudent to also address outstanding historical cases, a third investigator is justified, probably for a specific term of one to two years. Given the current investigative priorities and staffing shortages Department-wide, it may not be feasible to dedicate these resources however there will be no resolution of the issues identified in this Audit without a significant staffing commitment.

Two areas provide a possibility of creating additional investigative capacity for the Unit. The first requires resolving the issue of chronic runaways (see section 5). The second is an initiative under development by RCMP 'E' Division HQ and the B.C. Association of Chiefs of Police. It is termed the 'Rapid-ID' program and proposes to create a multi-jurisdictional B.C. police missing person coordination centre to catalogue known facts, evidence, DNA and dental information to index missing persons and unidentified found human remains (see [Missing Persons – RCMP TF.pdf](#)). Cases will be drawn from a province-wide list of 300 unsolved cases of which 227 have suspected foul play. The unit will analyze trends, geographic clusters of incidents, patterns, and hotspots with its initial focus the unsolved Highway 16 murders. Rather than being an investigative unit the mandate will be to provide analysis, researching trends and leads to provide investigative advice that will augment individual agency resources.

This project is not yet operational however it has office space co-located with ViCLAS, Behavioural Sciences Group, the Integrated Unsolved Homicide Unit and Provincial Major Crimes. It is currently staffed by one full-time RCMP sworn member and one civilian analyst and an additional (1 year term) analyst will be hired to assist with the initial intake of cases. The request for municipal applicants has been distributed and it is posted for VPD staff. The Unit will become operational on 2005-01-01.

Section 1C - Recommendations

- 1C.1 Staffing levels for the Unit require Executive review. It appears an increase in investigative staff is justifiable and necessary to meet workload and public expectation;
- 1C.2 Consideration might be given to re-assignment of the Missing Person Investigator(s) to the Vice Unit and transferring the responsibility for these investigations there organizationally. While that has merit, one possible detrimental factor to consider would be the impact of separating the missing person investigators from Coroner Liaison Unit and Major Crime - Homicide Section as the two functions would be in different facilities. Chronic Runaways may be more appropriately processed by Youth Squad;
- 1C.3 The discrepancy in file statistics should be audited by the Information Management Section and Missing Person Coordinator to determine what has become of the (minimum) 49 files recorded that cannot be accounted for.

2. TRAINING – MENTORING – PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

A. Courses – Seminars - Conferences

The Audit noted during the interview stage that there are no specific training programs for missing person investigators. Few of the investigators interviewed received any related training at all while some had attended the JIBC Investigator or Major Crime Investigator programs but felt these were inadequate or lacked specificity to their assignment. Feedback indicates that while each of these programs provide valuable skills, neither provide specific skills that would assist new missing person investigators, particularly those without previous Investigation Division experience.

It was confirmed by the three bodies that focus on police training, namely the Justice Institute of British Columbia (JIBC), the RCMP Pacific Regional Training Centre (PRTC) and the Canadian Police College (CPC) that no specific programs exist. Feedback indicated that a particular skill set would be useful to a missing person investigator; in particular, interviewing courses, statement analysis, media liaison, skip tracing and training in major case management were priorities on the list. The Justice Institute of B.C. (JIBC) would be prepared to provide specific training, likely in a 3-day program, if there is a request from police Training Officers.

A list of recommended training courses is included in the [Appendices](#) and would include:

1. Basic Investigators Program – This course would build a foundation for those members who have not been in an Investigation Division assignment;
2. Interviewing Skills (the Reid course) – This training seminar features a discussion of three primary topics: Behaviour Symptom Analysis (the verbal and nonverbal behavioural characteristics which can be used to distinguish a truthful person from a deceptive individual); the Behaviour Analysis Interview (a non-accusatory interview process utilizing both investigative and behaviour provoking questions); and, The Reid Nine Steps of Interrogation. It has been very well received by our Members who have participated in the past;
3. Statement Analysis –Through Statement Analysis the investigator can determine if a person is being truthful or deceptive or obtain additional information from a person's statement;
4. File Management & Coordination – The volume of cases and the complexity of some requires skills to maintain proper notes, logs and folders. Many assigned to this position have not received prior exposure to managing a caseload effectively;
5. Major Case Management – A small percentage of missing person files have suspicious overtones and may be homicides. Occasionally these become major investigations involving many leads and tips. Major case management should be offered once a Missing Person Investigator has become familiar with the

position, particularly if that individual is likely to move to a senior investigative assignment.

6. Developing and managing information sources – missing person investigations rely on development of contacts to access non-law enforcement databanks and records. In many instances these resources would not be available in a criminal investigation without a search warrant but are provided to missing person investigators in confidence for compassionate reasons. Search warrants would be impractical given the need to check the large volume of new cases to determine the status of the missing person's activities. A speedy indication of ongoing activity in a bank card can lead investigators to a person's new location and verify that they are alive therefore indications of activity in bank records, MHR and ICBC files are commonly requested. New investigators are often inexperienced in obtaining needed information and their investigations suffer or are delayed as a result. Training in developing contact building skills was seen as vital for this position.
7. DNA Sampling - A key to a subsequent identification if the missing person is deceased may be DNA. If it is a historical case, family may be difficult to locate. A DNA sample from family should be requested in all instances where there is no information that a missing person is alive if that person has been missing in excess of 90 days.
8. The Hague Convention (parental abductions) & legal issues – There are complex legal procedures when a child is taken out of the country by a parent against the wishes of the other parent, and it is not uncommon. Our investigators have been stymied in the past and have engaged in lengthy processes to determine the proper procedure to follow.
9. Stress Management - Several investigators interviewed commented that their term in Missing Person Unit was the most stressful of their career. They are usually hardened to dealing with a criminal investigation however, the nature of missing person cases can overwhelm their usual coping mechanism when they experience the psychological impacts of dealing with victim families coming to terms with a sudden, unexplained disappearance. It is therefore recommended that the annual Departmental mandatory debriefing program expand to include all Missing Person Unit staff.
10. Victim Services (Customer Relations) – For the same reasons as outlined in #9 above, missing persons' families occasionally make significant demands of the investigator. It is not uncommon for them to question the quality, quantity and direction of the investigation. Unless proper skills are used these can lead to confrontational situations played out in the media and Internal complaints. Training in dealing with victim families was seen as a useful part of a missing person investigative curriculum.
11. Media Liaison – Almost all the investigators interviewed indicated that they had experienced a need to prepare material for the media and, in at least one case, for an 'America's Most Wanted' television production. Media training was seen as important for the position for this purpose, and in dealing with confrontational situations as outlined in #10 above.

12. Skip tracing – Similar to the resources used by private agencies to locate those in debt and particularly in the United States to locate ‘bail jumpers’, there are countless traditional and high-tech methods of tracing a person’s movements. Police investigators are not always familiar with these methods however, in a significant percentage of cases, their missing person file is no different when that person is someone who does not wish to be found.
13. Time Management and Efficiency Training – The volume of cases is excessive and requires careful allocation of investigative time. Time management was seen as a skill that could be improved by formal training.
14. Missing Children Registry - National Missing Children Services provides law enforcement investigative training to national and international police agencies upon request. In 2003, eight training sessions were conducted for approximately 125 law enforcement personnel. The agency also offers:
 - a. Internet Case Assistance: In response to an investigator’s request for assistance, an operational analyst may assist by:
 - checking available data banks to gather information;
 - soliciting border, foreign affairs, immigration and justice services expertise;
 - advising or acting on the information gathered;
 - liaising with Interpol and the investigator in the country where the child is destined;
 - advising the sexual exploitation unit if exploitation is anticipated;
 - providing advice on avenues to conduct searches; and
 - liaising with not-for-profit agencies as required.
 - b. Assistance with the investigation of Internet luring cases.
 - c. Investigative assistance; and
 - d. Photo-Age Progression Service
15. Missing Children Seminars – These are sponsored by various accredited and police supported agencies such as ChildFind. They have been valuable in the past for contact building and general networking within the investigative community.

Section 2A - Recommendations

- 2A.1 Training for Missing Person Unit investigators and supervisors should be reviewed and a formal list of mandatory and desirable training courses developed for the position;
- 2A.2 The Training Officer Advisory Committee should be requested to examine the viability of a specific 3-day training program for missing person investigators, and of including a one-hour block of training to recruits on missing person investigations;

- 2A.3 That the Media Liaison Unit work with the Investigator(s) to ensure a coordinated media plan is established prior to release of information. That might include posters, the Inter and Intranet and established news media sources.

B. DRE and Workflow RMS Training

The issues with inadequate use of the Departmental Records Management System (RMS) are addressed fully in Section 4.

The Audit found from interviews and personal observations that there is a need to provide additional training tailored to the needs of the Missing Person Unit. Currently the Investigator(s) are not fully utilizing the RMS and the Supervisor is delegating workflow management to the non-sworn Coordinator.

The Departmental PRIME Coordinator and the PRIME Trainer are prepared to provide the assistance required to permit the unit to meet the Departmental standard.

Section 2B - Recommendations

- 2B.1 The Training Unit, PRIME Trainer and the PRIME Coordinator should be requested to evaluate the level of RMS/PRIME skills of Missing Person Unit staff and provide additional training based on that need. Particular attention is required with workflow, case notes, supplementary reports and the conclusion of files.

C. Patrol Training

There is currently no training specific to missing person investigations provided to recruits at the JIBC. Mike Trump, Director of Police Training Services acknowledges that it would be advisable to add a one-hour component, subject to the direction of the Training Officer Advisory Committee. This component would focus on the unique issues outlined in this audit.

The VPD Training Section confirmed that there is no specific training provided to new recruits in indoctrination sessions prior to assignment to a team. While such instruction must be prioritized with other needs, in the absence of JIBC training, it would be a prudent to ask an experienced missing person investigator speak on the subject before recruits begin operational duties. In particular there should be a recognition that these incidents are unique, requiring sensitivity and analysis of the facts to determine the degree of risk. Recruits should be encouraged to consult their NCO if a situation appears suspicious, to obtain details of next of kin, friends, associates, and a photo. Their General Occurrence report should be no less detailed than for any other investigation.

Section 2C - Recommendations

- 2C.1 The Training Section should include a brief overview of missing person investigations in the indoctrination block presented just prior to new Members being deployed.

D. Coaching and Mentoring

Investigators, new to that function, who have been assigned to the Unit in the past expressed concern during Audit interviews that they did not receive a meaningful amount of on the job training. In one instance a new Investigator was provided only with a list of contact numbers, mostly out of date. Likely this occurs as a result of little overlap when a new Member is assigned and/or inadequate supervisory involvement. New Investigators expressed a reluctance to ask for help as this may have been interpreted as a sign of incompetence. In the past, the non-sworn Coordinator has been the most consistent source of guidance when new staff are assigned.

The Audit determined that in the past, informal consultations with senior investigators in other units can occur when a missing person investigation reaches an impasse, if the Member reaches out for assistance. The response was described as helpful and informative, assisting the junior investigator with investigative avenues that may not have been immediately apparent.

There is a requirement to ensure mentoring is offered and readily available when a new investigator is assigned.

Section 2D - Recommendations

- 2D.1 Newly assigned Investigators should be provided with pro-active coaching and mentoring, especially in their first few weeks.

E. Performance Evaluation

Performance Development came into effect on for the Vancouver Police Department on 2002-01-01 for all Divisions. The Operations Division went live with the electronic format on 2004-01-01 and the remainder of the VPD will go live with the electronic version effective 2005-01-01.

According to Section 4 of the VPD Regulations and Procedures manual (RPM), the Performance Development Process is designed to define and clarify work role expectations and performance standards while creating a link between individual and organizational goals and objectives. It is also meant to establish a developmental partnership encouraging open and frank communication between members, their Supervisors and Managers. The process is included in its entirety in the Appendix as [Section 4 RPM - Performance Development](#).

Audit feedback received during the interview process disclosed an absence of formal evaluative measures and no written records. Performance evaluation could have brought to light some of the issues revealed by this audit sooner, so that remedial measures could be implemented.

Section 2E - Recommendations

- 2E.1 To ensure staff are completing their responsibilities in an effective manner, in compliance with their position profile, both management and supervisory ranks responsible for the Missing Person Unit should engage in a regular, meaningful performance evaluation and mentoring process for both sworn and non-sworn staff as outlined in the Regulations and Procedures Manual, Section 4.

3. CASE MANAGEMENT

The Audit examined case management practises in use by the Unit during the fact finding phase. The results show the practices in use do not follow Departmental guidelines and require attention. Case management was examined under several categories as follows:

1. General practises
2. PRIME-BC
3. Documentary files
4. Storage and archiving
5. Case review

A. General Practises

The Audit took note on several occasions that the Missing Person Unit function treads a fine line between the genuine need for a police investigation and the abuse of process that might result were it to become known that the VPD is prepared to apply its resources and fully investigate any reported disappearance. There is a risk that the police become a Salvation Army style family location service. The key to this is the application of a set of guidelines that assesses the risk and nature of each case consistently, and assigns the appropriate level of response. This is not unlike the solvability factors currently applied to criminal investigations.

The missing person policies of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP), various Municipal Departments and the Province of Ontario were reviewed (see Appendix: [Missing Person Policy](#)). It would be ideal if there was harmonization of policies of other agencies (E-Comm) and jurisdictions (RCMP and other municipal departments) throughout British Columbia. Unfortunately that is not yet the case. There are still incidents when a reportee of a missing person is refused due to jurisdictional boundaries. The RCMP have the most complete set of policies that were reviewed. They, and the Ontario Review, would serve as an appropriate model for a universal missing person policy that might be adopted through the BC Association of Chiefs of Police (BCACP).

The Audit also examined the call taking process. The lack of experience of some E-Comm call-taking staff and the possibility that an incident might not be investigated for days is cause for concern. To manage this risk, there should be an assumption that a missing person incident is suspicious, unless it clearly is not. This requires re-examination of the responsibilities in the missing person call handling process.

E-Comm's Role

The majority of missing person cases are entered by E-Comm staff, first onto a paper form, then keyed into RMS by other staff (this process will become more seamless through direct report entry with Versaterm CAD in 2005).

It became apparent during the interview and fact finding stages of the audit that the process of taking a missing person call through E-Comm was unnecessarily complex. The Audit met with the stakeholders from both E-Comm and VPD and the process was amended to eliminate duplication of efforts and paper between the two agencies entirely. The new procedure became effective early in October and is apparently successful.

E-Comm takes the position that they are providing a call taking and dispatch service for the VPD and that their staff should not be making operational decisions. Due to high staff turnover, call-taking staff are frequently inexperienced and the risk is high that critical information may be inadvertently missed. It is only when there are extenuating circumstances that were provided to them in training, such as age, infirmity, or factors that arouse an obvious suspicion, that a Patrol Supervisor is notified and a unit may be assigned. On a holiday weekend, a missing person call may not be assessed by an investigator for up to 84 hours, and perhaps longer. The majority of incidents are entered in RMS (not on CAD unless dispatched), are routed to Transcription, which is a quality control step at VPD Information Management Section, and then entered automatically on CPIC. They are also forwarded through routing rules to the Missing Person Unit handle, where they remain until accessed by VPD staff.

The Telephone Response Team (TRT) is staffed by Operations Division. TRT has a presence on the E-Comm dispatch floor and conducts preliminary investigations on a range of non-emergency calls. As they are primarily light-duties assignments, the level and continuity of staffing is variable, and there is not a 7/24 presence. Despite this, these Members may be an appropriate first level of risk evaluation of missing person reports after they are entered by a call-taker. The report can be routed to TRT, who can make an assessment and either forward the call to Dispatch for assignment to a unit, suggest it be further evaluated by the area NCO, or process it as routine without assignment for follow up by Missing Person Unit in due course.

If TRT is not available to triage a missing person incident, the next available resource is a Patrol NCO

The Patrol Function

Few missing person reports are investigated by Patrol under the current procedure. Mindful of the call load that Patrol already handles, there are benefits to having all missing person incidents evaluated by a trained police Member. Where TRT has not been available to do this, it is recommended that NCOs be notified when any missing person is reported in their area, not necessarily to assign a unit but as a level of call triage and risk management. The NCO can consider factors such as: age; mental and physical condition of the subject; weather; time of day, circumstances and length of absence in their determination of the appropriate response. A unit may be assigned or not depending on that assessment. Where no unit is assigned, the incident would be reviewed by the Missing Person Unit on their next working shift.

It should be noted however that there is currently no checksheet to consistently show how the call-taker, investigator or Patrol NCO determines what level of risk should be applied to each individual case. Missing person cases are almost always non-criminal investigations and the usual solvability factors are not present. Still, the Audit

indicates it is desirable to have a set of measures to prioritize the large volume of new incidents received each day.

While one cannot easily categorize all missing person cases, they generally fall into four categories:

1. Planned disappearance (chronic runaways, outstanding debt and other);
2. Medical or suicidal;
3. Accidental or misadventure; and
4. Suspicious (parental abduction and foul play)

It may be prudent to expand the foregoing to adopt the six categories of missing person investigations described in the Indiana Data and Communications System (IDACS) policy (see [Indiana Data and Communications System - MP policy](#)).

To assist the triage process, it may be of assistance to also create a series of criteria to assign a level of risk to missing person calls. These could include:

Low Risk = there is no apparent threat of danger to either the subject or the public; including chronic and habitual runaways and persons known to be avoiding family, legal processes or debt collectors.

Medium Risk = the risk posed is likely to place the subject in danger or they are a threat to themselves or others; the behaviour is completely out of character.

High Risk = the risk posed is immediate and there are substantial grounds for believing that the subject is in danger through evidence of suspicious circumstances, vulnerability or mental state, suicidal tendencies, or the risk posed is immediate and there are substantial grounds for believing that the public is in danger through the subject's mental state. High risk would also include incidents where there is a likelihood of misadventure, such as a lost hiker.

This type of analysis would provide for a uniform, consistent, transparent and recordable set of criteria that articulates the rationale behind the risk management decision making process and the resources required.

Follow-up Investigation – The Missing Person Unit

The Audit found that, despite the overwhelming number of new missing person incidents reported each day, the absence of supervisory case management and the lack of investigation of many of those files beyond basic indices checks, the Coordinator handles an impressive workload. A system has evolved whereby all new files are methodically checked against CAD, RMS, voice mail messages, faxes and e-mail. Each file is printed, notes are made in the margins and CAD and RMS are updated with information from the other sources. In the majority of cases, clearance is achieved within 48 hours.

The remaining incidents are assessed by the Coordinator and any that arouse her suspicion are forwarded to the Sergeant for review. Acting upon instruction from the Sergeant, the Coordinator performs follow-up activity such as conducting indices checks, checks of financial institutions for account activity and follow-up interviews.

Based on information obtained, basic information is added to RMS and in many instances that is the extent of the investigation (see [Indices Checksheet](#)). Notwithstanding public expectations and the Police Department's responsibility to investigate complaints, lack of active follow-up investigation has the potential to embarrass the Vancouver Police Department and could possibly result in civil liability. In at least one instance, ChildFind located a young missing girl using a private investigator (see [04-057284 Findeison](#)).

As a result of a lack of active investigation, and the significant caseload, the electronic records management system is not used, or not used effectively to maintain case progress (see Section 4 - PRIME).

Section 3A - Recommendations

- 3A.1 That the BCACP appoint a committee to harmonize missing person policies province-wide. Timing for this is ideal given the creation of the new RCMP Rapid-ID Unit. A blending of the existing RCMP policy and Ontario Review appear to be the most comprehensive at this time;
- 3A.2 That TRT or, if TRT is not available, Patrol NCOs review and triage all incoming missing person reports;
- 3A.3 If additional staff is assigned, deployment of staff to cover as many days of the week as possible should be examined. This would reduce the risk of a potentially medium or high risk case being inadvertently overlooked when investigators are on leave;
- 3A.4 That a formalized missing person risk assessment process be implemented to augment, not replace, the professional judgement of the investigator(s) handling of missing person cases. The Indiana Data and Communications System (IDACS) criteria may serve as a guide;
- 3A.5 Creation of a missing person checksheet to classify each incident by type and risk. At a glance this sheet could include basic law enforcement indices and non-police agency check boxes to ensure each missing person's history and background is checked consistently. These checksheets would be useful for re-checks in the event of an extended investigation as they should be repeated at specific intervals;
- 3A.6 Major Crime Section Management should develop a clear understanding and guidelines to apply when a missing person file is determined to involve suspicious circumstances. If there is a possibility of criminal involvement, the Supervisors of the Missing Person Unit and of the Homicide Units must develop a joint investigative plan which clearly outlines when responsibility for an investigation is transferred and who the lead investigator is;
- 3A.7 That the Inspector i/c Major Crime Section ensures trained Major Case Management resources are made available when significant or complex investigations are encountered.

B. Documentary Files

In 1992, the Vancouver Police Department Audit Unit conducted a review of case management in the major Crime Section (see [Case Management Review](#)). That document was used as a reference to determine the level of maintenance, documentation and review that would be expected in an investigative file. While the vast majority of missing person files do not require the level of detail of a major crime, there are a substantial number that are suspicious in nature, and require significant follow-up. Particularly if unsolved for an extended time, a proper record of the investigation, complete with reports, printouts, investigators' logs and notes, must be available.

Today, the Vancouver Police Department relies on the PRIME-BC RMS to store documentary information and all reports and text attachments must be entered. Paper 'working' files can, and do exist but must not differ from PRIME content. All other attachments must be stored for safekeeping or evidence.

The Audit reviewed a number of missing person files from RMS and a representative sampling of documents. The files stored in the Missing Person Unit are primarily composed of printouts and checksheets of indices consulted. Occasionally there is additional material such as newspaper clippings and photographs.

Historical files are kept in binders dating back decades. Some are much more complete than others but many have missing information and are not in keeping with an investigation that may involve suspicious circumstance, foul play and death. Were it not for the absence of a corpse, some would undoubtedly be homicides, and a more detailed binder of documentation would be expected.

Files sent to Project Evenhanded by the Missing Person Unit were not indexed. This made it difficult to determine which Vancouver files had been sent for further review. Investigators at Project Evenhanded were able to eliminate some missing person cases and consider others as likely associated because they had the resources to do so and it was in keeping with their investigation. Despite extensive reporting on the files at the Project offices in non-PRIME systems, it was difficult to determine which files had been returned to VPD with results or additional information and no instances could be found where the updated information had been entered in PRIME-RMS.

Generally the VPD files lacked information on:

- Detailed results of interviews with the reportee, family, landlord, or employer;
- Whether any evidence is stored; and
- Documentation outlining an investigative review, update or plan.

In keeping with Departmental reporting guidelines and the case management review, there is a need to improve the report format and follow-up consistency. These may include:

- A record of indices checked, results, and a BF date for re-check;
- A complete synopsis update after 14 days, and thereafter on a set schedule;

- A DNA request from next of kin no later than 30 days from the reported absence (or immediate if suspicious, this would match the RCMP 30 day policy). DNA can be difficult to obtain at a later date if the victim's family cannot be located;
- Entry into ViCLAS for all missing persons, where the circumstances indicate a strong possibility of foul play and the victim is still missing and for all non-parental abduction and attempted abductions.;
- An index of files sent to Project Evenhanded for review and entry in RMS of the updated case status when the Evenhanded investigator reports back.

The Case Management Review (1992) recommended a specific format for MCS binders. This would be useful for significant missing person files and would provide the investigator with a template of steps to complete.

Storage and Archiving

The Information Management Section (IMS) has the mandate and expertise to categorize, archive and store files. Where files are retained by the investigative sections, uniform Departmental guidelines for file storage cannot easily be maintained. Increasingly storage is in electronic format and data based. Versadex Document Imaging will result in all documents being scanned and attached to the appropriate incident. They are then available to any workstation or investigator that may need to draw from them or add information that might assist the investigation. Police agencies also have imposed guidelines for purging files. If documentation is not centralized, these schedules cannot be maintained.

The Audit found that the Missing Person Unit has a number of long-term files in storage which are open but inactive. These should be processed by IMS to ensure no content is lost.

Section 3B - Recommendations

- 3B.1 Paper files maintained at the Missing Person Unit should be reviewed and:
 - c. When a case is declared inactive or concluded it should be sent to Information Management Section for storage or archiving;
 - d. Repositories for these paper files should be clearly marked as to content;
- 3B.2 Files sent to Project Evenhanded must be reconciled with the original VPD missing person entry. Information in files on Evenhanded databases must match those on PRIME.

C. File Review

The Audit received information that some reports arrive with omissions. When an incomplete report is submitted by an E-Comm Call-taker or by a Patrol Member, the Supervisor in the Missing Person Unit should provide feedback to the author on the quality of a deficient report and assign a BF on RMS.

A complete report should refer to details on the missing person's profile and background, any physical evidence, medical evidence, indices checked and the results; reason for suspicion of foul play (or reasons why foul play is not suspected), witnesses or resources interviewed and the investigative steps to date.

The follow-up investigator should formulate an investigative plan based on the GO report. None of the files reviewed described an investigative plan for an unsolved case.

- a. The investigative plan should include written proposals on how to continue the investigation; and
- b. The investigator's conclusions should include thoughts and theories on all aspects of the case.

A supervisory file review should be conducted on a regular basis to ascertain that investigators have made correct and complete investigations. A formal file review is an integral component of good case management. This process is not completed in the Missing Person Unit other than informal discussion of a case and the round-tableing of incidents of note at the weekly NCO meeting.

The conclusions drawn by the Case Management Review (1992) regarding regular case reviews are applicable today to ensure potentially serious incidents are not overlooked and that they are properly investigated. Many of these earlier findings are echoed by this Audit in that:

- Investigations are not monitored for time, and no BF dates are set;
- There is no formal review (and no record) of quality or quantity of work, accuracy or completeness; and
- There is minimal supervisory involvement in missing person investigations.

Unique in the Missing Person Unit, and with rare exception, cases are not reviewed by a supervisor and are not assigned to sworn investigators.

At minimum, the Supervisor should:

- Assess and evaluate all new incidents;
- Maintain RMS Workflow;
- Supervise and participate in setting investigative priorities;
- Set new review and BF dates for additional investigative work; and
- Sign-off observations on investigative conduct in RMS.

In 2002 a review of unsolved suspicious cases was completed and recommendations were made on solvability factors in several investigations. No follow up has been undertaken on these files, likely due to a shortage of staff. These files are retained at the Missing Person Unit on open shelves. They date from the 1930s to the present day. There is no consistency to the format of these binders and some are in significant disarray. The audit was told that at least 20-25% are missing information. It would be reasonable to presume that many will never be solved given the age of the missing person and of the potential witnesses, however, some are likely solvable. Efforts should be made to organize these files to a Major Crime standard, archive their information, copy them to the Rapid-ID program and prioritize their assignment for follow-up.

The audit was advised that VPD currently has approximately 200 cases that require DNA sampling. Some may be solvable through DNA testing but that the BC Coroners' office has placed a limit on funds to provide these tests. A review would be able to isolate these incidents and demonstrate the need to test DNA based on the findings.

Section 3C - Recommendations

- 3C.1 Departmental case clearance policy must be followed;
- 3C.2 Investigative supervision in the Unit must be brought to a level in keeping with Departmental expectations. This includes a first review of cases by the Sergeant, particularly for possible suspicious circumstances, review of subsequent work, assignment of files and investigative follow-ups, and maintenance of RMS workflow;
- 3C.3 In addition to daily file management, a detailed case overview supplemental report in RMS should be submitted by the assigned investigator no more than 14 days into an outstanding missing person investigation;
This report should refer to details on the missing person's profile and background, any physical evidence, medical evidence, indices checked and the results; reason for suspicion of foul play (or reasons why foul play is not suspected), investigative steps to date and an investigative plan;
- 3C.4 The investigative plan should include proposals on how to continue the investigation;
- 3C.5 The investigator's conclusions should include thoughts and theories on all aspects of the case;
- 3C.6 As per the Departmental Case Management guidelines, conflicts which arise over an investigative plan or any other portion of the overview report should be resolved immediately;
- 3C.7 Any reviews by Unit or Section supervisory staff should be recorded in the RMS;
- 3C.8 Where a missing person incident is deemed suspicious, Homicide case review policies, procedures and schedules should be implemented and the results recorded in RMS. This would include use of the Homicide case binder pre-packaged with the standardized format delineated by subject tabs;
- 3C.9 Unsolved files should be reviewed every 90 days and indices re-checked. The reportee should be contacted for updates and feedback as part of the review process. Results and an updated case assessment should be recorded in RMS;
- 3C.10 Historical incidents, particularly those with suspicious circumstances must be reviewed again and brought up to date. Consideration should be given to entering suspicious case data (where it exists) into RMS using Document Imaging. This will likely require assignment of an additional investigator (preferably with Homicide investigative experience) for 6 to 12 months and would be required to derive a benefit from the Rapid-ID Project;

3C.11 A file review should identify cases not yet entered into ViCLAS. Booklets should be completed and submitted;

3C.12 There is no complete index of cases submitted to Project Evenhanded. A file review should identify these cases and they should be updated in RMS with any investigative results.

D. ISO 9000 Principles

The Vancouver Police Department may wish to promote quality management as an organizational goal. There is a set of guidelines collectively known as the ISO 9000 Principles that may assist. The ISO (International Organization for Standardization) publishes formal international standards for a variety of disciplines. The need for a standard is usually expressed by an industry sector, which communicates this need to a national member body. The latter proposes the new work item to ISO as a whole. Once the need for an International Standard has been recognized and formally agreed, the first phase involves definition of the technical scope of the future standard. This phase is usually carried out in working groups which comprise technical experts from countries interested in the subject matter.

ISO 9000 refers to quality management principles (see [ISO 9000 Principles](#)) and list the following primary considerations:

1. Focus on your customers
2. Provide leadership
3. Involve your people
4. Use a process approach
5. Take a systems approach
6. Encourage continual improvement
7. Get the facts before you decide
8. Work with your suppliers

While the standard primarily addresses industry concerns, they nevertheless have application in policing where effectiveness, efficiency and quality of client service are no less important.

Section 3D - Recommendations

- 3D.1 That the Vancouver Police Department promote ISO 9000 Quality Management Principles as an organizational goal.

4. RMS AND PRIME-BC

The Versadex RMS became operational in March 2001. From that time, all investigative reports, case logs, notes and Crown Counsel reports were to have been entered electronically in the system. The organization made it a Departmental priority that the system would be fully deployed and embraced as our only record management system.

The audit found that in many instances very basic facts without accompanying circumstances are recorded in RMS. This data would be difficult to interpret for a follow-up investigator and would not be useful for analysis in a serial incident. Additionally, some files are stored on the Departmental 'M' network drive that should be integrated with the applicable investigation.

The calibre of RMS (PRIME) entry is substantially lower than in some other investigative units and workflow maintenance is incomplete. The Audit interview process, supported by personal observation disclosed that, with some exceptions, those assigned to the Investigative and Supervisory position have not developed sufficient skill to function competently in the environment and delegated many of their responsibilities to the Coordinator. This may be because many have not used the system 'on the road' where the basics become a daily routine.

Departmentally, the degree of compliance is generally determined by familiarity with the system by Supervisors, who exercise a frontline quality control function for investigations. Managers are the overseers of compliance, particularly in Workflow, and must be comfortable enough with RMS to exercise their level of quality control.

To be an effective case management tool, all investigative reports, notes and logs must be entered into the system. This assists other investigators within the VPD and now, with the introduction of the Law Enforcement Information Portal (LEIP), permits access by other agencies. Storage of paper files and silos of information that is not entered decreases the effectiveness of the system and will not provide the required data needed for analysis or follow-up if a serial crime is committed.

With the arrival of LEIP, better quality control becomes increasingly necessary. Outside investigators will have access to VPD reports and attachments. Although tools for release tracking are provided in the system, incident records in RMS must be kept current or civil liability will increase. For example, if an outside agency investigator acts on outdated or incomplete information in a VPD PRIME record and that later becomes an issue, the VPD could be held liable. At the present time, Missing Person Unit records would not meet the standard of a system audit.

Ensuring that the best data is entered by all who use the PRIME system is critical to its success. Training for Investigators and Supervisors is available on request and can be tailored to match the needs of the Missing Person Unit.

VPD RMS/PRIME-BC

Document Imaging

Late in 2004, a new component of the Versaterm RMS will be activated. Known as Document Imaging, it provides for a means to scan paper documents such as photos, drawings, letters, statements directly into the RMS so that they form part of the overall case file. When a user accesses the system to retrieve a record, the entire file with reports and attachments is presented on the computer screen or printer. This new tool is ideal for Missing Person Unit as they deal with a variety of information not entered via keyboard. It is also a means to capture data from historical cases that are presently on file on paper in the Unit. The contents may be quickly scanned into the RMS for secure storage, with access by any system user. This will be an improvement over the current storage method whereby some unsolved files have been culled over the years to create additional storage space.

Workflow

Workflow is a powerful, flexible component of the RMS that enables the automated, and semi-automated movement of cases, BF's and follow-up assignments throughout the Department. Workflow is 'electronic paper flow' and has replaced traditional paper-based tracking methods and improved existing computer-based processes, by giving PRIME agencies the ability to automatically route cases anywhere within the agency, and track them at every step of the way, from initial entry to final disposition. It allows VPD to quickly and efficiently process the large number of routine cases we deal with on a daily basis, as well as correctly route large, complex cases with several investigators and numerous follow-up assignments. When Workflow is fully implemented and used correctly, fewer resources are consumed by administrative tasks, freeing up more resources for actual police work.

Workflow's biggest advantages are efficiency and accountability. Workflow is the key RMS component for reducing or eliminating paper and moving toward a more efficient, paperless environment. Workflow is also the key RMS component for tracking officer and investigator assignments.

Workflow can also be thought of as "information sharing within the agency" because each case in Workflow remains connected to all involved personnel. A change made to a case by any user immediately generates an update to each of the involved personnel, insuring that they are kept up to date as a case develops. Agency personnel no longer have to rely on memory alone when it comes to keeping coworkers informed of the latest developments with specific cases.

When Workflow is not completed or is done incorrectly, the information ceases to reach the intended recipient, assignment supervision is lost and deficient investigations result. Because it is computer based and therefore unforgiving, and so radically different than the previous paper-based methods, it has been one of the more challenging concepts for our Supervisors and Managers to grasp since PRIME RMS go-live. Even Units with minimal staff must maintain their RMS Workflow, even if the assignment of follow-ups is to one's self.

A number of problems were evident when the Workflow for Missing Person Unit was examined. For example, the tilde (~) character signifies that an addition has been made to the file but that it has not yet been accessed by the investigator. Numerous instances were found where this was the case. This indicates that workflow is not regularly updated or verified and that the investigator is not accessing that new information.

The synopsis is a concise overview of the nature of the incident. The synopsis is first entered when the G.O. is completed. Through investigation, the synopsis frequently changes. When this occurs, the synopsis should be updated to reflect the latest known circumstances. If this is not done and the G.O. is accessed, especially by an external agency through the law Enforcement Information Portal (LEIP), outdated information could result in another investigator taking investigative steps not based on fact, which could lead to civil liability. Of the RMS incidents reviewed, no instances of updated synopsis were evident. This was identified as a training issue.

There was confusion about the appropriate operational and CCJS status of G.O. reports in RMS, even with our Departmental experts. Operational status may be 'open', 'closed' or inactive. Closed is used when a file has been closed to any further investigation or is solved. Open reflects a file under active investigation. Inactive status of a file indicates it is not closed but is not being actively investigated. The Audit found that there was some disagreement even among the Information Management Section experts in our Department when the status should change.

One example of error in the status of a file is incident [#02-76751](#) which indicates the missing person fit the profile of Project Evenhanded. The file was forwarded there and further investigation took place. In May 2004, the Evenhanded investigator concluded his involvement and found the victim did not match the profile of the DES missing women. The victim however is still missing. This file should therefore be 'Inactive' or 'Open'; however the operational status is shown as 'Closed' on RMS. Other, similar examples were found in the Audit examination.

The Canadian Centre for Justice Statistics (CCJS) tracks reported crime and police clearance rates across Canada. CCJS status is not applicable to missing person cases unless they have criminal involvement. However, if a status error is made, the Audit found that it could lead to confusion and unintentional purging of the file from our records.

A descriptive conclusion block is required, especially in G.O. reports submitted by E-Comm and Patrol. While most concluded files gave some indication, the remarks were frequently so brief that they left questions unanswered, for example 'person returned home' is a typical conclusion. In the event of a repeat occurrence, concluding information could shed light on the whereabouts of the subject and thereby assist the investigator. If there was a requirement for a follow-up, or a review, brief remarks provide little assistance or explanation of investigative steps.

The Audit found that there were few (if any) investigative notes in randomly selected RMS files. Infrequently these are augmented by documents on the Departmental 'M' drive or in a paper file folder but that is usually not the case. Overall the standards of documentation and record keeping do not meet expectations. All electronic information should be included on the RMS. Case management suffers and there is an

inadequate trail for subsequent investigators to resume an investigation should new information arise. While it is appropriate for an investigator to maintain a paper 'working file', the content of that file must be included in RMS along with the log of investigative steps taken as the investigation progresses and must be up to date when the file is concluded by whatever means.

Where the investigator was transferred or retired, it appears that open files were not reassigned in RMS. This leads to a concern that investigative leads that could have been pursued were abandoned and continuity of the investigation is lost.

Upon reviewing a sampling of missing person cases, the Audit found a number of instances of incorrect or missing data within the RMS. These findings were verified by the VPD PRIME Coordinator, Sgt. (WSE) Colin McEwen.

The Audit therefore finds that, as a result of a lack of active investigation, and the significant caseload, the electronic records management system is not used, or not used effectively to maintain case progress.

Section 4 - Recommendations

General case management recommendations are listed in Section 4 but dovetail with the following.

- 4.1 The Versadex RMS is our sole repository for investigative documentation. It must be properly used and maintained to be effective. Information not entered, or entered incompletely will not be accessible for follow-up investigators, or to identify trends or possible serial crimes. Therefore,
 - a. all investigators and clerical staff who have system access must be properly trained for their specific need;
 - b. all investigative steps must be documented in an approved fashion;
 - c. work must be reviewed by their supervisors; and
 - d. workflow (BFs) must be assigned and completed in a timely fashion.
- 4.2 Reports should be reviewed in workflow by the Unit supervisor who should record in RMS his/her approval or direct the file back to the investigator for further follow-up;
- 4.3 Case information currently stored on 'M' drive should be integrated with the appropriate file on RMS;
- 4.4 The Manager - Information Management Section and the VPD PRIME Coordinator should confirm the definitions for case operational status and integrate them into training
- 4.5 Files currently assigned to retired investigators and staff no longer assigned to the Missing Person Unit should be re-assigned.

5. CHRONIC RUNAWAYS

This report would be incomplete without analysis and discussion about the primary source of reported incidents for the Missing Person Unit. Repetitive runaways, commonly referred to as 'chronic', account for the largest percentage of missing person files received. These originate primarily from group homes operated by the Provincial Ministry of Human Resources.

The majority of missing persons are youth runaways (chronic from group homes). They are usually located within hours and rarely exceed 72 hours.

As an example, for a six month period from July to Dec., 2003, there were 120 missing reports linked to one youth - one report every 1½ days. On several instances, this fellow was reported missing twice in one day, often missing for only a few hours each time. On other occasions he was missing for up to two days. The situation is not uncommon and there are thirty individual chronic runaway youths with frequent absences in the same six month period.

The Coordinator spends 2-3 hours of her daily shift routinely processing these files. The problem results in staff frustration, dealing with same individuals, the same Group Homes and the wasted time processing their incidents.

A. FACES

'FACES' is a tool currently employed by the Vice Unit, to specifically identify children and adolescents in the sex trade. The acronym stands for **Fight Against Child Exploitation**, and directly involves parents of these young persons in efforts to locate and rescue them from the street. Photos of children who are missing and suspected of being recruited for prostitution are obtained from parents or social workers. They are reproduced and circulated to police members who patrol neighbourhood strolls. The same photos and profiles also go to other agencies who work with "at risk" adolescents. Properly identifying children on the street is often the first step in arranging for their recovery.

Without a close working relationship with the Missing Person Unit, FACES is unable to carry out their mandate as effectively as possible. The Audit heard that FACES is concerned with the lack of investigation of missing person files and the apparent lack of resources. This gives the impression that there is no 'real' concern for these incidents. FACES would like to have access to a current list of missing persons, particularly juvenile missing females, and would prefer to see a photo included as a requirement in all missing person cases.

Section 5A - Recommendations

- 5A.1 As many of their subjects appear to be in common, the Missing Person Unit should develop a closer working relationship with the VPD Vice Section in general and the FACES program in particular.

B. Group Home Fax System

Approximately ten years ago, a fax system was set up specifically to reduce the administrative burden and to permit group homes to report runaways more efficiently. Group Homes that participate in the system pre-fill a report and fax them to E-Comm. There the reports are keyed into PRIME RMS, added to CPIC and, in RMS Workflow, forwarded to the Missing Person Unit. The Group Home is also responsible to notify E-Comm when the individual returns. E-Comm continued this role from the former VPD Communications Centre. Given we now have fewer call-taking staff than prior to the E-Comm transition, fewer resources are available to process other calls. 9-1-1 operators are needlessly diverted and the waiting time on non-emergency lines can be quite significant.

Internet reporting was implemented shortly after PRIME RMS became operational. Initially the system could not directly ingest reports entered by this means and Public Service Counter staff was given the responsibility to key the information from the Internet report into RMS. In 2003 Enhanced Internet Reporting was initiated. This permitted the public to enter certain classes of reports electronically from any Internet connection, directly into the RMS, in effect completing their own data entry. The process has worked well.

It is feasible to expand this process to selected and pre-approved entities such as Group Homes to replace the fax system. As the majority of these entries are routine, the risk is not substantially increased but it would reduce staff workload and free E-Comm operators for other calls. VPD-IT has submitted a report on the cost and feasibility of this and other secure Internet reporting requests (see [Generic Internet Reporting](#)).

Section 5B - Recommendations

- 5B.1 To address the issue of chronic runaways, the VPD IT Section should be requested to investigate the possibility of adding the direct entry and processing of these cases to VPD Internet Reporting by specific, pre-approved complainants. This would place the responsibility of maintaining these files on the Group Homes and should free time for both E-Comm reports staff, VPD Information Management Section and the Missing Person Unit staff;

C. CPIC

Presently, chronic runaways are entered on CPIC in the same category as all other missing persons. This may result in critical files involving persons potentially at risk becoming lost in the volume of other, less critical files. The State of Indiana Data and Communications System (IDACS) has addressed this issue by creating a series of definitions for categories of missing person entries, as follows:

A missing person record shall be entered into IDACS and NCIC for the following reasons:

- a. **Disability.** A person of any age who is missing and under proven physical/mental disability or is senile, thereby subjecting himself/herself or others to personal and immediate danger.
- b. **Endangered.** A person of any age who is missing and in the company of another person under circumstances indicating that his/her physical safety is in danger.
- c. **Involuntary.** A person of any age who is missing under circumstances indicating that the disappearance was not voluntary, i.e., abduction or kidnapping.
- d. **Juvenile.** A person who is missing and declared un-emancipated as defined by the laws of his/her state of residence and does not meet any of the entry criteria set forth in a, b, c, or e.
- e. **Catastrophe Victim.** A person of any age who is missing after a catastrophe.
- f. **Miscellaneous.** A person above the age of emancipation who is missing and does not meet any of the criteria in a, b, c, or d can be entered into IDACS Files only.

These criteria are easily understood and followed and serve as a basis for consideration of recommended changes to CPIC.

While it is unlikely that the governing body for CPIC would embrace six categories as outlined above, it is proposed that the VPD lobby the CPIC Triumvirate for at least one new CPIC category such as 'Youth at Risk' that would be designated for chronic runaways and other juveniles who may be at risk. As a precaution, and as most absences are short term, a 72-hour flag can be generated by the CPIC system if the youth has not returned and at that point further investigation may be warranted.

Another less complex (and less descriptive) amendment to CPIC is entry of chronic runaways under the existing SIP category as a 'person of interest to police', with a description of the reason. Use of the SIP category for this purpose would have to be authorized and would require an amendment to the CPIC manual.

Section 5C - Recommendations

- 5C.1 The CPIC Advisory Committee, through our VPD representative (the Inspector i/c Services Liaison Section) and RCMP 'E' Division CPIC Services should be asked to evaluate the addition of at least one additional CPIC category (Youth at Risk) for chronic runaways. In almost all instances these are short term unauthorized absences and not truly missing persons. The system can flag absences in excess of 72 hours for further review.

D. Abandonment of Chronic Missing Person Investigations

The Audit heard representations that the VPD should unilaterally cease to investigate chronic runaway reports unless there are mitigating factors, and refer them instead to the Ministry, as they are fundamentally a social problem. That option requires careful analysis, further study and a legal opinion as it may leave the Department open to criticism and liability in the unlikely event that a chronic runaway is a victim of foul play as a result of their absence.

In the interim, and while this report has previously outlined the use of the Coordinator position outside the scope of her position profile, re-examination of that role may justify formally expanding the job description to include basic follow-up of chronic runaway files, once reviewed and assigned by the Sergeant, to free the investigators for more serious cases.

A second option would be the creation of a 3-6 month pre-recruit position to follow-up chronic runaway cases, under close supervision of the Sergeant. Training would be minimal and would provide for development of the individual, likely with increased initiative, and at lesser cost than a senior sworn position. A similar program undertaken at Document Services Unit has proven very successful.

A third option is to loan Patrol members on temporary light duties and during pregnancy to Missing Person Unit, similar to the current reassignment program in place for TRT. There is an advantage to using these Members as they have Patrol experience. This is a scarce resource and would compete with other staffing requests.

The final alternative is to segregate all juvenile runaway files from other missing person incidents. These files could be assigned to Youth Squad to take advantage of their additional resources (see also Section 1 - Staffing [c. Staffing Levels])

The issues outlined are among the most significant identified by this audit and would justify further examination by the Departmental Planning and Research Section as a project.

Section 5D Recommendations

- 5D.1 The position profile of the Missing Person Coordinator should be evaluated to determine the feasibility of expanding the position to complete routine follow up of chronic missing person files. This involvement would be at the discretion and under supervision of the Sergeant, after evaluation of the

- circumstances, and would cease if additional investigative steps are indicated that require the skills of a sworn investigator.
- 5D.2 In an effort to free experienced investigators for more serious cases, consideration should be given to appointing a Pre-recruit, under close supervision, for 'routine' follow-up investigations such as chronic runaways;
- 5D.3 Consideration should be given to removing responsibility for chronic juvenile runaway incidents from Missing Person Unit and instead assigning coordination of these files to Youth Squad (see also Recommendation 1.8);
- 5D.4 A legal opinion should be requested to determine the feasibility for the VPD to unilaterally cease to investigate chronic runaway reports and refer them instead to the Ministry. It should evaluate the degree of increased liability and public acceptance. Agreement and representation by the BCACP may be required to transfer this responsibility.
- 5D.5 The Planning and Research Section should be asked to complete a study on alternatives for handling of chronic runaway complaints. This study should include, but would not be restricted to:
- a. Policy;
 - b. Responsibility (is this a police or a social problem?);
 - c. Alternative reporting methods;
 - d. Enforcement options (Halifax Regional Police Force seeks a detention order on chronic runaways).

VI. LIST OF APPENDICES

A. Resource Material - Internal

Nº	Source	Attachment
1	Insp. Laidler	Inter-Departmental Memo outlining perceived issues in Missing Person investigations
2	VPD P&R	Existing Procedure re: VPD RPM Sec 28.01 – Incident Reporting
3	VPD P&R	Draft amendments re: VPD RPM Sec 28.01 – Incident Reporting
4	VPD IMS	PRIME entries for Missing Persons instructions; Missing Person – Survey Code; and Two attached e-mails with implementation instructions to E-Comm
5	VPD P&R	Case Management Review (1989)
6	VPD P&R	Working Guide of Audit Recommendations (1992)
7	VPD R&P Manual	Policy on completion of investigations
8	VPD HR – A. Humayun	Position Profile: Missing Persons Investigator
9		Position Profile: Missing Person Coordinator
10	VPD HR – J. Kerr	Missing Person Coordinator Posting
11	VPD MP Unit Clerk	Missing Person Coordinator daily tasks
12	PC 1161 Dean Wells	Wells 1161 - Review Summary.doc
13	PC 1161 Dean Wells	Wells 1161 - Review Summary Update.doc
14	Det (Ret) Steinbach	MP Paper Trail

15	Det (Ret) Steinbach	Additional Manpower - MP
16	Det (Ret) Steinbach	MP Reports
17	MP Unit	Existing MP Report Form
18	MP Unit	Existing Juvenile MP Fax Report Form
19	VPD Missing Person Unit Files	Sample PRI ME Report - Front Page
20	VPD Missing Person Unit Files	MP Unit Workflow - Sample CPIC Message
21	VPD Missing Person Unit Files	MP Unit Workflow - Sample E-mail
22	VPD Missing Person Unit Files	MP Unit Workflow - Log Book Sample Pages
23	VPD Missing Person Unit Files	MP Unit Workflow - VPD MP Website & Log sheet sample - Active & Historical cases
24	VPD Missing Person Unit Files	MP Unit Workflow - 04-182678 Chang - MP PRI ME Report
25	VPD Missing Person Unit Files	MP Unit Workflow - 04-182524 Lowe - MP PRI ME Report
26	VPD Missing Person Unit Files	MP Unit Workflow - 03-311068 Lee - Debrief minutes
27	MP Daily workflow analysis	MP Workflow Analysis
28	MP PRI ME Workflow Analysis	MP PRI ME Workflow Analysis
29	MP PRI ME Workflow PowerPoint	MP PRI ME Workflow PowerPoint Slides
30	FACES Program overview	FACES
31	Internet Reporting Update	Internet Reporting - Chronic Runaways

B. Resource material - External

Nº	Source	Attachment
1	E-Comm: Ms. K. Hay	Cover letter for MP Processes E-Comm – Present Missing Persons Process at E-Comm Present Mper process explanation table with costing
2	Victoria PD	Missing Persons Investigations/Case Management Status
3	RCMP 'E' Div HQ	Missing Person Procedures
4	Ontario	Generic Policy Review (excerpt)
5	CPC Library Ms. Tonita Murray	Library Introduction CPC Library Missing person Investigation Resource List CPC Library Internet Page
6	RCMP 'E' Div HQ	Description of proposed BC MPERS Coordination Centre
7	MWTF – McKnight	MWTF Detail report sample
8	Sgt Lemieux	RCMP PRTC Course availability
9	Kevin Begg	Cover Letter BC Police Standards – Policy on MP investigations and excerpts from municipal Departmental R&P manuals: Abbotsford Central Saanich Delta Nelson New Westminster Oak Bay Port Moody Saanich Victoria West Vancouver
10	Al MacIntyre Chief Supt., RCMP	BCACP Missing Person Coord Centre
11	Jim McKnight (MWTF)	MWTF Report Sample (E&R)

12	Emer Fitzgerald – MP Unit	Vancouver Hospital – MP/Elopee Report Form
13	ISO 9000 Principles	ISO 9000 Principles
14	Halifax PD Website extract	Halifax Regional Police - MPERS page
15	Abbotsford PD Website extract	APD Online -Missing Persons
16	Regina PD Org Chart	Regina PS Org Chart
17	Calgary PD Org Chart	Calgary PS Org Chart
18	Toronto PS Procedures	Toronto Procedures
19	Revised E-Comm MP Policy/Workflow re: CPI C and RMS	VPD Missing Person proposed procedure change - E-Comm
20	Amnesty Intl Report - Missing Women	Amnesty Intl Report - Missing Women

C. Media

Nº	Source	Attachment
1	http://fyilondon.com	Special report: "It's too late for Mistie" Byline: "Anne Murray may change the way Ontario police investigate missing children, but reform will come too late to save her daughter, Mistie."
2	www.canada.com/vancouver/theprovince/index.html (2004-05-02)	Article Page A16-A17: "Could body on beach solve mystery of Randal Gary?" Byline: "Family of the missing cruise-ship passenger hopes its him, but as many as 20 other missing men could have ended up on that beach."
3	www.canoe.ca	Columnist Kerry Diotte, Edmonton Sun: "Claims a Disservice" Opposes group's claim that alleges Edmonton police treat first nations missing women investigations differently than those involving Caucasian women.
4	www.canoe.ca	Article: "Federal Solicitor General considering DNA bank to help track missing persons" Ottawa may expand national DNA data bank to help track missing persons.
5	www.childcybersearch.org/media/news/ott_sun.shtml2004-10-0808:54:06	Article: "Kid search hits Internet" The RCMP are hitting the information highway in a bid to find some of Canada's 50,000 missing children.

APPENDIX E

MISSING PERSONS REVIEW RECOMMENDATIONS

TASK #	RECOMMENDATIONS	RESPONSE	RESPONSIBILITY	COMPLETION DATE
1 (P1)	Review of Position Profiles	MPU NCO has been directed to upgrade his PRIME skills so that all cases are reviewed by the NCO, assigned by the NCO or the A/NCO in his absence, and PRIME requirements are met. Only police personnel will "investigate" cases. The Coordinator will conduct indices checks and contact partner agencies, but will no longer "investigate" cases.	Insp. I/c MCS NCO I/c MPU	
	Dec. 15, 2004	The MPU NCO, Sgt Dragani, has received PRIME training and has "cleared away" historical material on the MPU handle. He reviews PRIME daily and assigns cases to MPU police officers as necessary. The MPU Coordinator conducts indices checks on incoming files. Position Profiles are being reviewed by the MPU NCO.	Insp. I/c MCS	
	Jan. 27, 2005	Ongoing	Insp. I/c MCS	
	Feb. 28, 2005	Ongoing	Insp. I/c MCS	
	Mar. 31, 2005	Ongoing	Insp. I/c MCS	
	Apr. 29, 2005	Ongoing	Insp. I/c MCS	
Status	Ma 30, 2005	Position profiles have just been reviewed, amended, and submitted to Sergeant Weeks, in Human Resources Section.	Insp. I/c MCS	Concluded May 30/05
2 (P2)	Coroner Liaison Staffing Levels	The MPU NCO will provide a report as to the volume of work required of this position, as well as the necessity of that work for the organization.	NCO I/c MPU	
	Dec. 15, 2004	The Coroners Liaison position staffing should be reviewed to determine the caseload in particular whether two full-time investigators are required. This review should include work that is being done for the Coroners Service for which the VPD has no responsibility and is not being compensated.	Insp. I/c MCS	
	Jan. 27, 2005	Ongoing	Insp. I/c MCS	
	Feb. 28, 2005	Ongoing	Insp. I/c MCS	
	Mar. 31, 2005	Ongoing	Insp. I/c MCS	
	Apr. 29, 2005	Ongoing	Insp. I/c MCS	
	Ma 30, 2005	Ongoing	Insp. I/c MCS	

Status	July 7 2005	Acting Sergeant MPU Forshaw has discussed the findings in Mr. Schouten's report with the current MPU staff. The Coroner's Liaison position is not "...effectively a two person position augmented by the D/Cst assigned to the Missing Persons Unit" as suggested by Mr. Schouten. In fact, the opposite is true. When time allows, or on a priority basis, the current incumbent, D/Cst Traversy, is assigned Missing Persons cases. This sharing of responsibility works quite well and is a necessity given our staffing. There is additional sharing of responsibilities to ensure coverage Monday through Friday, but it does not impact A/Sgt. Forshaw has discussed the workload issue with D/Cst Traversy and is assured that he does not exceed our expectations with regard to assistance provided to the Coroner's Service. D/Cst. Traversy does confirm there are many occasions where the follow-up necessary is the result of deficient Operations' Division members investigations (or reports). Notification, or at least identification, of next-of-kin is often left to D/Cst Traversy as a "default" responsibility, as are many of the property issues described by Schouten. Thus, much of the work in this position is "created" by the VPD, not the Coroner's Service. At the current time, the Coroner's Liaison position is appropriately staffed.	Insp. I/c MCS	Concluded July 7/05
3 (P1)	External Commitments of Supervisors	Given the size and limited investigative resources of the Unit, an absence of external commitments should be considered as a condition of assignment for future supervisors.	This recommendation will be included as advice in any future selection process	Insp. I/c MCS
Status	Dec. 15, 2004	The current MPU NCO has been advised that external commitments must be reduced so that adequate focus on MPU responsibilities is maintained. Adequate focus on MPU responsibilities, and the absence of external commitments, will form part of future NCO selection processes.	Insp. I/c MCS	Concluded Dec 15/04
4 (P1)	Investigator Qualities	Historically, the selection process for staff assigned to the Unit appears flawed. It is recommended that the Investigator position not be seen as a light duties or pre-retirement position but that it is filled by a member with demonstrated investigative skills. This is clearly a developmental position that lends itself to evaluating a potential major crimes investigator	While it is not possible to address historical values, future selection processes will emphasize the "developmental" aspect of MPU Investigator positions.	Insp. I/c MCS NCO I/c MPU
Status	Dec. 15, 2004	Two officers, Det/Cst Mark Forshaw and Det/Cst Cal Traversy, have been added to MPU since the audit findings were received. Det/Cst Forshaw had been assigned to the Sexual Offence Squad prior, while Det/Cst Traversy, who is in the Coroner's Liaison position, was formerly with Project Evenhanded. Both officers have prior investigative experience, and this played a pivotal role in their selection. Both have several years of service remaining prior to being eligible for retirement (pension without penalty). Prior, proven investigative experience will form part of all future selection processes in MPU.	Insp. I/c MCS	Concluded Dec 15/04
5 (P1)	Tenure	Tenure should be no less than 18 months and up to 2 years and should be seen as developmental for a senior investigative position.	During all future selection processes, candidates will be advised that the expected minimum tenure is 2 years.	NCO I/c MPU

Status	Dec. 15, 2004	Det/Cst Traversy has been advised that his tenure in MPU will be at least 18 months. Det/Cst Ralla, the current MPU investigator, will remain in MPU for at least 18 months. Det/Cst Forshaw will eventually move to a Homicide Unit in MCS, and may do so in about one year, but his primary role is to address a number of issues raised by this audit, versus an operational role.	Insp. I/c MCS	Concluded Dec 15/04
6 (P2) Staffing Levels		Staffing levels for the unit require Executive review. It appears an increase in investigative staff is justifiable and necessary to meet workload and public expectation.	The Insp. I/c MCS will monitor the MPU workload closely and provide a report to the DCC Cmdg. Investigative Division as to any changes recommended in the MPU. Given the likelihood that two positions currently dedicated to Witness Protection reside in MCS, and that they will no longer be required in the near future, one or both of these positions can be re-assigned to MPU if there is a need.	Insp. I/c MCS
	Dec. 15, 2004	Ongoing	Insp. I/c MCS	
	Jan. 27, 2005	Ongoing	Insp. I/c MCS	
	Feb. 28, 2005	Ongoing	Insp. I/c MCS	
	Mar. 31, 2005	Ongoing	Insp. I/c MCS	
	Apr. 29, 2005	Ongoing	Insp. I/c MCS	
	Ma 30, 2005	Ongoing	Insp. I/c MCS	
		Other initiatives have resulted in the elimination of one (or two) Witness Protection Unit positions. The officer assigned to the remaining position will assist with Missing Persons investigations at the MPU NCO's discretion.		Concluded May 30/05
Status	Mar. 6, 2006	AMENDMENT: In September, 2005, two VPD members were seconded to the Provincial Witness Protection Unit under the RCMP's Support Services branch. One VPD Witness Management position was then eliminated and converted to an additional full-time Missing Persons Investigator position.	Insp. I/c MCS	Concluded Mar. 6/06
	Dec. 15, 2004	Ongoing	Insp. I/c MCS	
	Jan. 27, 2005	Ongoing	Insp. I/c MCS	
	Feb. 28, 2005	Ongoing	Insp. I/c MCS	
	Mar. 31, 2005	Ongoing	Insp. I/c MCS	
	Apr. 29, 2005	Ongoing	Insp. I/c MCS	
	Ma 30, 2005	Ongoing	Insp. I/c MCS	
	July 7 2005	Ongoing	Insp. I/c MCS	Ongoing

Status	Feb. 10, 2006	This issue has been discussed and the Missing Persons/Coroner's Liaison Unit will remain under the Major Crime Section. Sergeant Ron Fairweather is currently working with E-Comm and BCMPC to deal with and rectify the reporting issues regarding chronic and habitual youth runaways. Liaising with Youth Services Unit will continue.		Insp. I/c MCS	Concluded Feb. 10/06
8 (P1)	File Stat Audit by Information Management Section	The discrepancy in file statistics should be audited by the Information Management Section and Missing Persons Coordinator to determine what has become of the (minimum) 49 files recorded that cannot be accounted for.	The NCO I/c MPU will ensure the discrepancy is investigated, and will provide a report to the Insp. I/c MCS outlining those findings. Further, if such a discrepancy does exist, the NCO I/c MPU will outline the steps taken to address the outstanding files. The Insp. i/c MCS will provide a report to the DCC Cmdg. Investigative Division addressing this issue upon receipt of the NCO's report.	Insp. I/c MCS	
	Dec. 15, 2004	The MPU NCO has contacted Mr. J. Schouten in order to determine which 49 files he refers to in his report. To date, Det/Cst Forshaw has reviewed 12 Missing Persons - Open Files" and has found that, in 6 of these 12 cases, the person has been located, but remains on CPIC as missing. Thus, in half of the cases reviewed to date, an administrative error has been made, but is easily remedied. We hope to confirm that Mr. Schouten's methodology in the near future.		Insp. I/c MCS	
	Jan. 27, 2005	Det/Cst Forshaw has reviewed the status of all "open" Missing Persons files reported 2003-07-21 to 2004-07-21. There were 7 files and all have been reviewed by Sgt. Dragani. Det/Cst Forshaw discovered a recurring error in over 300 General Occurrence Reports that led to Mr. Shouten's concern about outstanding unsolved cases. The source of the error is at E-Comm and Sgt. McEwen has been engaged to assist with the elimination of this problem.		Insp. I/c MCS	
	Feb. 28, 2005	Det/Cst Forshaw has completed an extensive report documenting problems with MP details pages and the resulting erroneous conclusions. Mr. Schouten has been contacted and was satisfied with the result. There are no missing files from the 20030721 to 200407, only missing detail pages. Sgt. McEwen has been advised of this problem and is taking steps to correct them for G.O.'s outside the timeframe and for any new files being created.		Insp. I/c MCS	
Status	Mar. 31, 2005	There are no missing files as reported - only missing "Details" pages. This has been remedied and Sgt McEwen is correcting the Prime problem.		Insp. I/c MCS	Concluded Mar 31/05
9 (P2)	Training Review	Training for Missing Person Unit investigators and supervisors should be reviewed and a formal list of mandatory and desirable training courses developed for the position.	The NCO I/c MPU will review available training and develop a list of mandatory and desirable courses. This list will be included in the position profile (see recommendation 1).	NCO I/c MPU	
	Dec. 15, 2004	Ongoing		Insp. I/c MCS	
	Jan. 27, 2005	Ongoing		Insp. I/c MCS	
	Feb. 28, 2005	Ongoing		Insp. I/c MCS	

Status	Mar. 31, 2005	Ongoing	A thorough review of the available courses suggested by Mr. Schouten has not been conducted and an additional three months needs to be allocated for this task. As noted, there is not a course designed specifically for Missing Persons investigations (and Schouten suggests one is to be created). The creation of such a course would hopefully confirm all of the criteria mentioned in Schouten's report and make this task redundant. In general, some of the training suggested by Mr. Schouten is covered (or at least mentioned) in the curriculum of the Major Crime Investigative Techniques provided at the CPC or in the General Investigators Course at the JIBC, and these courses should be made mandatory for members in this position or that are being considered for this position. Forshaw agrees with Schouten in regard to the noted courses and their content for the Missing Person's detectives, or inclusion in a specific Missing Persons course and prioritizes them as follows: <u>Mandatory:</u> The General Investigator's Course at the JIBC; Forensic Interviewing (Level I); Major Crime Investigator's Techniques (CPC) *the replacement for the MCM course relating to investigators. <u>Desirable:</u> File Management and Coordination; Reid Technique for Interviewing / Interrogation or Forensic Interviewing (Level II); Statement Analysis; Developing and Managing Information Sources; DNA Sampling; Victim Services Training; Media Liaison Training; "Skip Tracing"; Time Management and Efficiency; Missing Child seminars that include information on the Hague convention and the Missing Children's Registry.	Insp. I/c MCS Insp. I/c MCS Insp. I/c MCS Insp. I/c MCS	Ongoing	
	Apr. 29, 2005	Ongoing				
	Ma 30, 2005	Ongoing				
	July 7 2005					
Status	Feb. 10, 2006	Training courses for members in the Missing Persons Unit were identified by Mr. John Schouten in his review and were acknowledged by A/Sgt Mark Forshaw. A/Sgt Forshaw further prioritized numerous courses as MANDATORY and DESIRABLE as indicated in the status update remarks of July 7th, 2005. There is a current position posting for a vacancy in the Missing Persons/Coroner's Liaison Unit. The notice on the VPD Intranet will include that applicants have completed the General Investigators Course & Forensic Interviewing (Level 1).			Insp. I/c MCS	Concluded Feb. 10/06
10 (P3)	3-day Training Program	The Training Officer Advisory Committee should be requested to examine the viability of a specific 3-day training program for missing person investigators, and of including a one-hour block of training to recruits on missing person investigations.	The NCO I/c MPU will examine the viability of a specific training program for MPU investigators, as well as preparing a one-hour training package for recruits on missing person investigations. This will be done in conjunction with the Training Officer Advisory Committee.	NCO I/c MPU		
	Dec. 15, 2004	Ongoing		Insp. I/c MCS		
	Jan. 27, 2005	Ongoing		Insp. I/c MCS		
	Feb. 28, 2005	Ongoing		Insp. I/c MCS		
	Mar. 31, 2005	Ongoing		Insp. I/c MCS		
	Apr. 29, 2005	Ongoing		Insp. I/c MCS		
	Ma 30, 2005	Ongoing		Insp. I/c MCS		
	July 7 2005	Ongoing		Insp. I/c MCS		

Status	Feb. 10, 2006	Det/Cst Kate Caprarie provided a report to A/Sgt Mark Forshaw on Sept. 8/05 indicating that she had met with the Mr. Steve Watt, Director of the JIBC and also with Sgt. Jeff Danroth i/c Recruit Training, regarding the issue of core-specific Missing Persons Investigations training. Although there is no current training curriculum for this topic, Sgt Danroth agreed to develop and institute a 2-3 hour training block for recruits. This training program will be conducted by JIBC Police Academy instructors.	Insp. I/c MCS	Concluded Feb. 10/06
11 (P2)	Media Liaison Unit	That the Media Liaison Unit work with the Investigator(s) to ensure a coordinated media plan is established prior to release of information. That might include posters, the Inter- and Intranet and established news media sources.	The NCO I/c MPU will develop a mutual protocol for coordinated media releases with respect to missing person investigations.	NCO I/c MPU
	Dec. 15, 2004	Ongoing	Insp. I/c MCS	
	Jan. 27, 2005	Ongoing	Insp. I/c MCS	
	Feb. 28, 2005	Ongoing	Insp. I/c MCS	
	Mar. 31, 2005	Ongoing	Insp. I/c MCS	
	Apr. 29, 2005	Ongoing	Insp. I/c MCS	
	Ma 30, 2005	Ongoing	Insp. I/c MCS	
	July 7 2005	Ongoing	Insp. I/c MCS	
Status	Feb. 10, 2006	Sgt. Ron Fairweather came into the unit at the beginning of December 2005. He has 10 years media experience, completed the CPC Media Communications Course at the CPC in Ottawa in 1997, as well as other independent media training courses. He has been a relief Media Liaison member for the Department since 1996. Sgt. Fairweather has already been involved in a number of press conferences, media releases and interviews, in relation to active missing persons files. A systematic process with the current Media Liaison officers and the Missing Persons Unit is now in place and avenues of communication are well established.	Insp. I/c MCS	Concluded Feb. 10/06
12 (P1)	Training - Prime/RMS	The Training Unit, PRIME Trainer and the PRIME Coordinator should be requested to evaluate the level of RMC/PRIME skills of Missing Person Unit staff and provide additional training based on that need. Particular attention is required with workflow, case notes, supplementary reports and the conclusions of files.	The Insp. I/c MCS will ensure that all current MPU staff have adequate PRIME skills. Any new staff will be assessed upon their assignment to MPU. If any deficiencies are noted, the Insp. I/c MCS will ensure the appropriate training is provided.	Insp. I/c MCS
	Dec. 15, 2004	Ongoing	Insp. I/c MCS	
	Jan. 27, 2005	Ongoing	Insp. I/c MCS	
	Feb. 28, 2005	Ongoing	Insp. I/c MCS	
	Mar. 31, 2005	Ongoing	Insp. I/c MCS	
	Apr. 29, 2005	Ongoing	Insp. I/c MCS	
Status	Ma 30, 2005	All MPU members have received PRIME Training, and more is scheduled for later this year.	Insp. I/c MCS	Concluded May 30/05

13 (P2)	MPU Overview to Training Unit	The Training Section should include a brief overview of missing person investigations in the indoctrination block presented just prior to new members being deployed.	The NCO I/c MPU will provide the requisite information for the Training Section on missing persons investigations so that new officers can be given this information during their one week indoctrination. (see recommendation 10).	NCO I/c MPU	
	Dec. 15, 2004	Ongoing		Insp. I/c MCS	
	Jan. 27, 2005	Sgt. Dragani is in discussion with the Training Section and the Planning and Research Section in order to develop a recruit training package.		Insp. I/c MCS	
	Feb. 28, 2005	Ongoing		Insp. I/c MCS	
	Mar. 31, 2005	Ongoing		Insp. I/c MCS	
	Apr. 29, 2005	Ongoing		Insp. I/c MCS	
	Ma 30, 2005	Ongoing		Insp. I/c MCS	
	July 7 2005	The indoctrination package has not been completed and three more months need to be allocated to this task.		Insp. I/c MCS	
Status	Feb 10 2006	This task is in relation to recommending a brief one-hour interview during the indoctrination week of recruit training. During this week, the newly sworn-in recruits undergo a tremendous number of presentations from various facets of the Department encompassed with Departmental policy, procedure and protocol. Recruit training for Missing Persons investigations is more aptly suited during the Block One curriculum. This task can therefore be cross-referenced with Task #10.		Insp. I/c MCS	Concluded Feb 10/06
14 (P1)	Newly Assigned Investigators	Newly assigned Investigators should be provided with pro-active coaching and mentoring, especially in their first few weeks.	The NCO I/c MPU will ensure that newly assigned members are receiving the requisite training and assistance. This will include a weekly review meeting during each new MPU member's first three months. These meetings will be documented as part of the member's performance appraisal.	NCO I/c MPU	
	Dec. 15, 2004	Det/Cst Traversy is being mentored by Det/Cst Ralla, primarily around the former's duties in the Coroner's Liaison position, but also the work done by the Missing Persons Investigator.		Insp. I/c MCS	
	Jan. 27, 2005	Ongoing		Insp. I/c MCS	
	Feb. 28, 2005	Ongoing		Insp. I/c MCS	
Status	Mar. 31, 2005	Det/Cst. Traversy has been cross-trained in the MP role and is capable of assisting in Det/Cst. Ralla's absence.		Insp. I/c MCS	Concluded Mar 31/05

15	(P1)	Performance Evaluations & Mentoring	To ensure staff are completing their responsibilities in an effective manner in compliance with their position profile, both management and supervisory ranks responsible for the Missing Persons Unit should engage in regular meaningful performance evaluation and mentoring process for both sworn and non-sworn staff as outlined in the Regulations and Procedures Manual, Section 4.	The Insp. I/c MCS will meet with the NCO I/c MPU weekly to discuss operational and administrative issues, and document these meetings as part of the NCO's performance appraisal.	Insp. I/c MCS NCO I/c MPU	
		Dec. 15, 2004	The Inspector I/c MCS met with the MPU NCO, as well as Det/Cst Forshaw, on 04-12-14 to review the MPU Audit recommendations, and to ensure that all understood one another's responsibilities. A meeting with all MPU staff will be held shortly to review the same material. The Insp I/c MCS and the MPU NCO attended an SAP Performance Evaluation training session in December 2004 in preparation for 2005 evaluations.		Insp. I/c MCS	
		Jan. 27, 2005	Det/Cst Forshaw continues to address issues raised in the MPU Audit and is making significant progress (See Item 8).		Insp. I/c MCS	
		Feb. 28, 2005	Ongoing		Insp. I/c MCS	
		Mar. 31, 2005	Ongoing		Insp. I/c MCS	
		Apr. 29, 2005	Ongoing		Insp. I/c MCS	
		Ma 30, 2005	A/Sgt Forshaw continues to address remaining audit issues.		Insp. I/c MCS	
		July 7 2005	Ongoing		Insp. I/c MCS	
Status		Feb 10 2006	Performance Evaluations under the current SAP system as implemented by the Human Resources Section will continue, with the Sergeant making appropriate entries throughout the year*. Current members are highly skilled investigators and will be involved in the mentoring process for future candidates coming into the Unit.		Insp. I/c MCS	Concluded Feb 10/06
* NOTE: A revised SAP for Performance Evaluations will be implemented in late February 2006						
16	(P3)	Province-wide Policies	That the BCACP appoint a committee to harmonize missing person policies province-wide. Timing for this is ideal given the creation of the new RCMP Rapid-ID Unit. A blending of the existing RCMP policy and Ontario Review appear to be the most comprehensive at this time.	The Insp. I/c MPU will provide any assistance requested to assist the BCACP with this objective. (Insp. D. Dureau is currently working on such a proposal with the BCACP.	Insp. I/c MCS	
		Dec. 15, 2004	Ongoing		Insp. I/c MCS	
		Jan. 27, 2005	Ongoing		Insp. I/c MCS	
		Feb. 28, 2005	Ongoing		Insp. I/c MCS	
		Mar. 31, 2005	Ongoing		Insp. I/c MCS	
Status		Ma 30, 2005	A Provincial unit has been formed, and the VPD has seconded a member, Det/Cst Kate Caprarie, to that unit.		Insp. I/c MCS	Concluded May 30/05

17 (P3) TRT

That TRT, or if TRT is not available, Patrol NCOs review and triage all incoming missing persons reports.

The NCO I/c MPU will develop and conduct a training program for TRT members and field NCOs so that they are familiar with missing person investigations, and so they can better assess the urgency accompanying some missing person reports (see recommendation)

NCO I/c MPU

Dec. 15, 2004
Jan. 27, 2005
Feb. 28, 2005
Mar. 31, 2005
Apr. 29, 2005
Ma 30, 2005
July 7 2005

Ongoing
Ongoing
Ongoing
Ongoing
Ongoing
Ongoing

The current "draft document" created by the BCMPC includes strict guidelines that all Missing Persons are to be regarded as "at risk" until there is significant evidence to the contrary. All Missing Persons cases are to be identified as belonging to one of five categories and there is a checklist to be followed that corresponds with each one of these categories to determine risk assessment. The Policy includes that all Missing Persons reports are to be referred to a Police Supervisor and clearly directs what that Supervisor needs to do upon receiving the report. In TRT, only a substantive or Acting NCO would be able to deal with these calls and in a very limited capacity. Completing this and other related Tasks should not be undertaken until such time as the final recommendation to the BCACP is approved.

Insp. I/c MCS
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Status Feb 10 2006

The Regulations and Procedure Manual, Section 34.06 Missing Persons / Children has been revised and posted on the Intranet as of December 19th, 2005. The enhanced process ensures that the patrol supervisors are made aware of all Missing Persons reports received by E-Comm. The Patrol supervisor, upon assessing the information will determine whether or not a Missing Persons report is assigned to a patrol unit for investigation and follow-up. Appropriate CAD and G.O. entries are required. This revised process is in line with the "draft document" that the BCMPC is currently refining.

Insp. I/c MCS

Concluded Feb 10/06

18 (P3) 7-Day Workweek

If additional staff is assigned, the deployment of staff on a 7-day per week basis should be examined. This would reduce the risk of a potentially medium or high risk case being inadvertently overlooked when investigators are on leave.

Part of the training included in recommendation 17 will involve the advice to contact the Duty Officer if MPU personnel ought to be called out when investigators are normally on leave. (see recommendation 17).

NCO I/c MPU

Dec. 15, 2004
Jan. 27, 2005
Feb. 28, 2005
Mar. 31, 2005
Apr. 29, 2005
Ma 30, 2005
July 7 2005

Ongoing
Ongoing
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Status	Feb 10 2006	The Unit is currently staffed Monday through Friday with the Detective Constables working a 4/10 shift and the civilian coordinator working a 5/8 shift pattern. Procedures for after-hours and weekends are in place with the Duty Officer and the Inspector in charge of the Investigation Division to contact and/or callout the Unit Sergeant and investigators 24/7. Seven day a week coverage is not being considered and is not necessary with the enhanced screening process as outlined in Section 34.06 of the RPM.	Insp. I/c MCS	Concluded Feb 10/06
19 (P3)	Formalized Risk Assessment Process	That a formalized missing person risk assessment process be implemented to augment, not replace, the professional judgement of the investigator(s) handling of missing person cases. The Indiana Data and Communications System (IDACS) criteria may serve as a guide.	The NCO I/c MPU will obtain a copy of the Indiana Data and Communications System. The NCO will examine our current R&P Manual guidelines with respect to missing person investigations with a view to formalizing our risk assessment process. The NCO I/c MPU will provide a written report to the Insp. I/c MCS, who will forward same, with appropriate comments to the DCC Cmdg. Investigation Division.	NCO I/c MPU
	Dec. 15, 2004	Ongoing	Insp. I/c MCS	
	Jan. 27, 2005	Ongoing	Insp. I/c MCS	
	Feb. 28, 2005	Ongoing	Insp. I/c MCS	
	Mar. 31, 2005	Ongoing	Insp. I/c MCS	
	Apr. 29, 2005	Ongoing	Insp. I/c MCS	
	Ma 30, 2005	Ongoing	Insp. I/c MCS	
	July 7 2005	The current "draft document" created by the BCMPC includes strict guidelines that all Missing Persons are to be regarded as "at risk" until there is significant evidence to the contrary. All Missing Persons cases are to be identified as belonging to one of five categories and there is a checklist to be followed that corresponds with each one of these categories. Although the document is only a draft, it appears that the final direction from the BCACP will include a "risk assessment" complete with a specific checklist and that this process will form part of the VPD's RPM at some point. This task should not be undertaken until such time as the final recommendation to the BCACP is approved.	Insp. I/c MCS	
	Feb 10 2006	Ongoing	Insp. I/c MCS	
Status	Apr 20 2006	<i>A formal risk assessment process is currently being developed by the BCPMPC and will form part of the overall Missing Person protocol and procedures mandated to all police agencies Province-wide. This task can therefore be deemed concluded as it falls within the responsibility of the BCPMPC.</i>		Insp. I/c MCS Concluded Apr 20/06

20	(P3)	Missing Person Checksheet	Creation of a missing person checksheet to classify each incident by type and risk. At a glance, this sheet could include basic law enforcement indices and non-police agency check boxes to ensure each missing person's history and background is checked consistently. These checksheets would be useful for re-checks in the event of an extended investigation as they should be repeated at specific intervals.	The NCO I/c MPU will create a checklist for use in missing person investigations in order to assist in classifying the type and risk involved in individual cases.	NCO I/c MPU	
			Dec. 15, 2004	The MPU NCO has forwarded a draft Missing Person checklist to Planning & Research Section for evaluation. This checklist is intended for use by primary and first contact officers.	Insp. I/c MCS	
			Jan. 27, 2005	Ongoing	Insp. I/c MCS	
			Feb. 28, 2005	Ongoing	Insp. I/c MCS	
			Mar. 31, 2005	Ongoing	Insp. I/c MCS	
			Apr. 29, 2005	Ongoing	Insp. I/c MCS	
			Ma 30, 2005	Ongoing	Insp. I/c MCS	
			July 7 2005	(See Task #19 for classifying by type and associated risk) Indices checks and background will be a common practice when deciding if there is significant evidence to the contrary that the file should be investigated as "at-risk" and therefore this task appears to be redundant and should not be undertaken until such time as the final recommendation to the BCACP is approved.	Insp. I/c MCS	
			Feb 10 2006	Ongoing	Insp. I/c MCS	
			Status	Mar 6., 2006	This issue, as noted July 7, 2005, is redundant as it is covered by Task #19. The BCPMPC is in the process of developing Provincial policies and protocol which will include standardized check sheets.	Insp. I/c MCS
21	(P2)	MCS Management Involvement	The Major Crime Section Management should develop a clear understanding and guidelines to apply when a missing person file is determined to involve suspicious circumstances. If there is a possibility of criminal involvement, the Supervisors of the MPU and of the Homicide Units must develop a joint investigative plan which clearly outlines when responsibility for an investigation is being transferred and who the lead investigator is.	The Insp. I/c MCS will develop written guidelines for re-classifying missing persons investigations as homicide investigations, and will ensure the guidelines are distributed to all MCS NCOs.	Insp. I/c MCS	
			Dec. 15, 2004	Ongoing	Insp. I/c MCS	
			Jan. 27, 2005	Ongoing	Insp. I/c MCS	
			Feb. 28, 2005	Ongoing	Insp. I/c MCS	
			Mar. 31, 2005	Ongoing	Insp. I/c MCS	

	Apr. 29, 2005	Ongoing		Insp. I/c MCS	
	Ma 30, 2005	Ongoing		Insp. I/c MCS	
	July 7 2005	Ongoing		Insp. I/c MCS	
	Feb 10 2006	Ongoing		Insp. I/c MCS	
Status	Mar 6., 2006	When the course of a Missing Persons investigation where the circumstances are suspicious in nature and appear to indicate criminal involvement, the assigned MPU investigator with the MPU NCO will consult with both the Sergeant and Inspector of MCS for further direction.		Insp. I/c MCS	Concluded Mar 6/06
22 (P2)	Major Case Management Resources.	That the Insp. I/c MCS ensures trained Major Case Management resources are made available when significant or complex investigations are encountered.	The Insp. I/c MCS will ensure Major Case Management training forms part of the required training for the MPU NCO and Investigator. (see recommendation 9).	Insp. I/c MCS	
	Dec. 15, 2004	Ongoing		Insp. I/c MCS	
	Jan. 27, 2005	Ongoing		Insp. I/c MCS	
	Feb. 28, 2005	Ongoing		Insp. I/c MCS	
	Mar. 31, 2005	Ongoing		Insp. I/c MCS	
	Apr. 29, 2005	Ongoing		Insp. I/c MCS	
	Ma 30, 2005	Ongoing		Insp. I/c MCS	
	Feb 10 2006	Ongoing		Insp. I/c MCS	
Status	Mar 6., 2006	Investigator members and the NCO in the Missing Persons / Coroner's Liaison Unit will be scheduled as vacancies permit for the Major Case Management Training Course.		Insp. I/c MCS	Concluded Mar 6/06
23 (P3)	Review of Paper Files	Paper files maintained at the Missing Person Unit should be reviewed and: a) When a case is declared inactive or concluded, it should be sent to Information Management Section for storage or archiving; b) Repositories for these paper files should be clearly marked as to content.	The NCO I/c MPU will ensure all outstanding MPU files are reviewed, and any that are concluded are stored in archives.	NCO I/c MPU	
	Dec. 15, 2004	The MPU NCO has begun reviewing all paper copy files held in the MPU office. Any files not concluded will be forwarded to Det/Cst Forshaw for follow-up and conclusion.		Insp. I/c MCS	
	Jan. 27, 2005	Ongoing		Insp. I/c MCS	
	Feb. 28, 2005	Ongoing		Insp. I/c MCS	
	Mar. 31, 2005	Ongoing		Insp. I/c MCS	
	Apr. 29, 2005	Ongoing		Insp. I/c MCS	
	Ma 30, 2005	Ongoing		Insp. I/c MCS	
	July 7 2005	Ongoing		Insp. I/c MCS	
	Feb 10 2006	Ongoing		Insp. I/c MCS	
Status	Mar 6., 2006	Historical Missing Persons files are currently being reviewed and entered on Prime. Appropriate follow up will be conducted and upon conclusion / closure, the original files will be sent to Archives for storage.		Insp. I/c MCS	Concluded March 6/06

24 (P2)	Files to Project Evenhanded - Reconciliation	Files sent to Project Evenhanded must be reconciled with the original VPD missing person entry. Information in files on Evenhanded databases must match those on PRIME.	The NCO I/c MPU will ensure that MPU files shared with Project Evenhanded are logged, and that the requisite PRIME entries are made for each of these files.	NCO I/c MPU	
	Dec. 15, 2004	Ongoing		Insp. I/c MCS	
	Jan. 27, 2005	Ongoing		Insp. I/c MCS	
	Feb. 28, 2005	Det/Cst Forshaw has identified 117 files that are currently at the MWTF. He has developed methodology to create a necessary index in PRIME and to accommodate transfer of information. Sgt. Sullivan and Sgt. Mulder at MWTF are assisting. Approximately 85 files are available for transfer of documentation. The remaining 32 are SUI or charged by Evenhanded and can be tracked by Task number.		Insp. I/c MCS	
	Mar. 31, 2005	Det/Cst. Forshaw is in the process of indexing all the files held by Project Evenhanded. A temporary employee did data entry for 3 days in order to complete the initial phase, but a number of files still require updating. All of the 119 files at Project Evenhanded will be dealt with on a newly created handle: HISTMP, "Historical Missing Persons." A file will only be removed from this handle after conclusion and review.		Insp. I/c MCS	
	Apr. 29, 2005	The reconciling of the files that require transfer of ALL electronic data will be ongoing for some time as there are issues with availability of staff, equipment, etc at Evenhanded. Discussion has occurred relating to the number of files that are being "returned" to VPD. As a result, only 13 files will require full transfer of documentation and Evenhanded will retain the responsibility for further investigation on all other open files. Sgt. Sullivan is establishing a protocol at Evenhanded to ensure any "new" files are created and/or updated in PRIME immediately to eliminate any reoccurrence of this problem.		Insp. I/c MCS	
	Ma 30, 2005	Ongoing		Insp. I/c MCS	
	July 7 2005	An extensive report has been submitted by Sgt Forshaw in regard to the methodology used to identify, create and update these files into PRIME. Eleven files have been identified as returning to the VPD that did not match the MWTF profile and are in the process of being downloaded onto disk for transfer of the information into PRIME. The final determination in regard to the transfer of the and files remains an outstanding issue. An additional three months needs to be allocated for this task.		Insp. I/c MCS	
	Feb 10 2006	Ongoing		Insp. I/c MCS	
Status	Mar 6., 2006	Copies of all VPD files sent to Project Evenhanded Task Force have been returned to the Missing Persons / Coroner's Liaison Unit (Prime entered). Evenhanded CD attached to files. and historical files will be assigned to MPU investigators for follow up and conclusion / closure.		Insp. I/c MCS	Concluded Mar 6/06

25 (P3)	Case Clearance Policies.	Departmental case clearance policy must be followed.	The NCO I/c MPU will ensure all outstanding MPU files are reviewed and conclude any appropriate, according to departmental policy. <u>Also</u> , the NCO I/c MPU will ensure that a ViCLAS booklet completed for all outstanding MPU files, as required.	NCO I/c MPU	
	Dec. 15, 2004	Ongoing		Insp. I/c MCS	
	Jan. 27, 2005	Ongoing		Insp. I/c MCS	
	Feb. 28, 2005	Ongoing		Insp. I/c MCS	
	Mar. 31, 2005	Ongoing		Insp. I/c MCS	

	Apr. 29, 2005	Ongoing		Insp. I/c MCS	
	Ma 30, 2005	Ongoing		Insp. I/c MCS	
	July 7 2005	Ongoing		Insp. I/c MCS	
Status	Mar 6., 2006	The Missing Persons / Coroner's Liaison Unit adheres to Departmental case clearance policies. ViCLAS books are completed and submitted when appropriate and a strong working relationship is in place with the ViCLAS coordinator. The MPU NCO is actively monitoring all aspects in relation to case clearance.		Insp. I/c MCS	Concluded Mar 6/06
26 (P1)	Investigative Supervision	Investigative supervision in the Unit must be brought to a level in keeping with Departmental expectations. This includes a first review of cases by the Sergeant, particularly for possible suspicious circumstances, review of subsequent work, assignment of files and investigative follow-ups, and maintenance of the RMS workflow.	The NCO I/c MPU will review all incoming cases, as well as all outstanding cases, and assign the appropriate follow-up. This will include the management of RMS workflow and subsequent entries. In addition, the NCO I/c MPU, or the A/NCO in his absence, will attend the weekly MCS NCOs' meeting where significant cases are discussed. Finally, on a random monthly basis, the Insp. I/c MCS will review the RMS workflow to ensure cases are being assigned efficiently, and that follow-up work is clearly outlined.	Insp. I/c MCS NCO I/c MPU	
	Dec. 15, 2004	The MPU NCO is reviewing all incoming PRIME reports on a daily basis. The historical material has been cleared away and the PRIME handle now contains an average of 40 files - an acceptable level.		Insp. I/c MCS	
	Jan. 27, 2005	Sgt. Dragani continues to review all Missing Persons reports submitted and prioritizes them for immediate follow-up or longer term investigation.		Insp. I/c MCS	
	Feb. 28, 2005	Ongoing		Insp. I/c MCS	
	Mar. 31, 2005	Ongoing		Insp. I/c MCS	
	Apr. 29, 2005	Ongoing		Insp. I/c MCS	
Status	Ma 30, 2005	The HMPERS handle is reviewed regularly by the MPU NCO and an entry made on every report reviewed.		Insp. I/c MCS	Concluded May 30/05
27 (P1)	File Supplemental Reports	In addition to daily file management, a detailed case overview supplemental report in RMS should be submitted by the assigned investigator no more than 14 days into an outstanding missing persons investigation. This report should refer to details on missing person's profile and background, any physical evidence, medical evidence, induces checked and the results - reason for suspicion of foul play (or reasons why foul play is not suspected), investigative steps to date and an investigative plan.	The NCO will ensure all cases outstanding for 15 days are reviewed and any additional relevant information is added to the file. The NCO I/c MPU will ensure ViCLAS booklets are completed as required (see recommendation 35)	NCO I/c MPU	
	Dec. 15, 2004	Ongoing		Insp. I/c MCS	
	Jan. 27, 2005	Ongoing		Insp. I/c MCS	
	Feb. 28, 2005	Ongoing		Insp. I/c MCS	

	Mar. 31, 2005	Ongoing		Insp. I/c MCS	
	Apr. 29, 2005	Ongoing		Insp. I/c MCS	
	Ma 30, 2005	Ongoing		Insp. I/c MCS	
Status	July 7 2005	Sgt Forshaw has created business rules that reflect the need to fully document the investigators' actions in the G.O. no later than fourteen days into the investigation and that the report also contains an "Investigative Plan" for review by the NCO. Any report submitted for conclusion as "inactive pending further information" should contain all of the thoughts and theories on all aspects of the case and the need to submit a ViCLAS booklet as required.		Insp. I/c MCS	Concluded July 7/05

28 (P1)	Investigative Plan		The Investigative Plan should include proposals on how to continue the investigation.	The NCO will ensure all cases outstanding for 15 days are reviewed and any additional relevant information is added to the file. <u>The NCO</u> I/c MPU will ensure ViCLAS booklets are completed as required (see recommendation 35)	NCO I/c MPU
	Dec. 15, 2004	Ongoing		Insp. I/c MCS	
	Jan. 27, 2005	Ongoing		Insp. I/c MCS	
	Feb. 28, 2005	Ongoing		Insp. I/c MCS	
	Mar. 31, 2005	Ongoing		Insp. I/c MCS	
	Apr. 29, 2005	Ongoing		Insp. I/c MCS	
	Ma 30, 2005	Ongoing		Insp. I/c MCS	
Status	July 7 2005	Sgt Forshaw has created business rules that reflect the need to fully document the investigators' actions in the G.O. no later than fourteen days into the investigation and that the report also contains an "Investigative Plan" for review by the NCO. Any report submitted for conclusion as "inactive pending further information" should contain all of the thoughts and theories on all aspects of the case and the need to submit a ViCLAS booklet as required.		Insp. I/c MCS	Concluded July 7/05

29 (P1)	Investigator's Conclusions		The investigators conclusions should include thoughts and theories on all aspects of the case.	The NCO will ensure all cases outstanding for 15 days are reviewed and any additional relevant information is added to the file. <u>The NCO</u> I/c MPU will ensure ViCLAS booklets are completed as required (see recommendation 35)	NCO I/c MPU
	Dec. 15, 2004	Ongoing		Insp. I/c MCS	
	Jan. 27, 2005	Ongoing		Insp. I/c MCS	
	Feb. 28, 2005	Ongoing		Insp. I/c MCS	
	Mar. 31, 2005	Ongoing		Insp. I/c MCS	
	Apr. 29, 2005	Ongoing		Insp. I/c MCS	
	Ma 30, 2005	Ongoing		Insp. I/c MCS	
Status	July 7 2005	Sgt Forshaw has created business rules that reflect the need to fully document the investigators' actions in the G.O. no later than fourteen days into the investigation and that the report also contains an "Investigative Plan" for review by the NCO. Any report submitted for conclusion as "inactive pending further information" should contain all of the thoughts and theories on all aspects of the case and the need to submit a ViCLAS booklet as required.		Insp. I/c MCS	Conclude July 7/05

30	(P1' Conflicts	As per the Departmental Case Management guidelines, conflicts which arise over an investigative plan or any other portion of the overview report should be resolved immediately.	The Insp. I/c MCS will advise the MPU NCO and Homicide Squad NCOs that disputes about the investigative plan are to be resolved immediately. If needed, the Insp. I/c MCS will resolve the conflict.	Insp. I/c MCS	
		Status Dec. 15, 2004	The Inspector I/c MCS has advised both Homicide Unit NCOs as well as the MPU NCO that he will resolve any conflicts that arise and cannot be resolved by them around an investigative plan.	Insp. I/c MCS	Concluded Dec 15/04
31	(P1' Reviews	Any reviews by Unit or Section supervisory staff should be recorded in the RMS	The NCO I/c MPU will ensure all information regarding periodic reviews are recorded in RMS.	NCO I/c MPU	
		Dec. 15, 2004	The MPU NCO has recorded notes on all PRIME reports reviewed thus far.	Insp. I/c MCS	
		Jan. 27, 2005	Ongoing	Insp. I/c MCS	
		Feb. 28, 2005	Ongoing	Insp. I/c MCS	
		Mar. 31, 2005	Ongoing	Insp. I/c MCS	
		Apr. 29, 2005	Ongoing	Insp. I/c MCS	
		Ma 30, 2005	Ongoing	Insp. I/c MCS	
		Status July 7 2005	Sgt Forshaw reviews incoming files on a regular basis and includes text in PRIME document the review. This will remain standard practice in the MPU.	Insp. I/c MCS	Concluded July 7/05
32	(P2' Suspicious Missing Files	Where a missing person incident is deemed suspicious, Homicide case review policies, procedures and schedules should be implemented and the results recorded in RMS. This would include use of the Homicide case binder pre-packaged with the standardized form at delineated by subject tabs.	Same as recommendation 21.	Insp. I/c MCS	
		Dec. 15, 2004	Ongoing	Insp. I/c MCS	
		Jan. 27, 2005	Ongoing	Insp. I/c MCS	
		Feb. 28, 2005	Ongoing	Insp. I/c MCS	
		Mar. 31, 2005	Ongoing	Insp. I/c MCS	
		Apr. 29, 2005	Ongoing	Insp. I/c MCS	
		Ma 30, 2005	Ongoing	Insp. I/c MCS	
		July 7 2005	Ongoing	Insp. I/c MCS	
		Feb 10 2006	Ongoing	Insp. I/c MCS	
		Status Mar 6., 2006	This task response may be cross-referenced with the recommendation response indicated for Task #21	Insp. I/c MCS	Concluded March 6/06

33	(P1', Unsolved Files	Unsolved files should be reviewed every 90 days and indices re-checked. The reportee should be contacted for Status and feedback as part of the review process. Results in an Status case assessment should be recorded in RMS.	The NCO I/c MPU will ensure all unsolved files are reviewed not less than every 90 days, including all indices being re-checked and the original reportee being contacted. <u>The review</u> , as well as the results, will be recorded in RMS.	NCO I/c MPU	
		Dec. 15, 2004	Ongoing	Insp. I/c MCS	
		Jan. 27, 2005	Ongoing	Insp. I/c MCS	
		Feb. 28, 2005	Ongoing	Insp. I/c MCS	
		Status Mar. 31, 2005	Unsolved files are reviewed every 90 days by the MPU NCO and an entry is made on the file to that effect. As well, files are noted as inactive pending further information when no other information is forthcoming.	Insp. I/c MCS	Concluded Mar 31/05
34	(P3', Review of Historical Files	Historical incidents, particularly those with suspicious circumstances to be reviewed again and brought up to date. Consideration should be given to entering suspicious case data (where it exists) into RMS using Document Imaging. This will likely require assignment of an additional investigator (preferably with Homicide investigative experience) for 6-12 months and would be required to derive a benefit from the Rapid-ID Project.	The NCO I/c MPU will assign an investigator to review all outstanding VPD missing persons files and catalogue same. As part of this review, the investigator will check all indices and contact the original reportee (where possible). The results of this review will be reported to the Insp. I/c MCS on an ongoing, monthly basis by the NCO I/c MPU.	Insp. I/c MCS	
		Dec. 15, 2004	Det/Cst Forshaw has begun his review.	Insp. I/c MCS	
		Jan. 27, 2005	Ongoing	Insp. I/c MCS	
		Feb. 28, 2005	Ongoing	Insp. I/c MCS	
		Mar. 31, 2005	Ongoing	Insp. I/c MCS	
		Apr. 29, 2005	Ongoing	Insp. I/c MCS	
		Ma 30, 2005	Ongoing	Insp. I/c MCS	
		July 7 2005	Ongoing	Insp. I/c MCS	
		Feb 10 2006	Ongoing	Insp. I/c MCS	
		Status Mar 6., 2006	Primary information from original Historical files is currently being entered on Prime and forwarded to the MPU NCO for assignment to MPU investigators. Follow up investigations are currently being shared amongst investigators. Files will be concluded and closed with ViCLAS booklets submitted when appropriate. Monthly results will be reported to the MCS Inspector by the MPU NCO.	Insp. I/c MCS	Concluded Mar 6/06
35	(P3', ViCLAS Booklets	A file review should identify cases not yet entered into ViCLAS. Booklets should be completed and submitted.	See recommendations 25, 27 and 34.	Insp. I/c MCS	
		Dec. 15, 2004	Ongoing	Insp. I/c MCS	
		Jan. 27, 2005	Ongoing	Insp. I/c MCS	
		Feb. 28, 2005	Ongoing	Insp. I/c MCS	
		Mar. 31, 2005	Ongoing	Insp. I/c MCS	

	Apr. 29, 2005	Ongoing		Insp. I/c MCS	
	Ma 30, 2005	Ongoing		Insp. I/c MCS	
	July 7 2005	Ongoing		Insp. I/c MCS	
	Feb 10 2006	Ongoing		Insp. I/c MCS	
Status	Mar 6., 2006	Historical files continue to be assigned and reviewed by MPU investigators. ViCLAS booklets are being completed and submitted for files, meeting the appropriate criteria. The MPU continues to liaise regularly with the ViCLAS coordinator.		Insp. I/c MCS	Concluded Mar 6/06
36 (P2)	Files to Project Evenhanded	There is no complete index of cases submitted to Project Evenhanded. A file review should identify these cases and they should be Status in RMS with any investigative results.	The NCO I/c MPU will determine all the files sent to Project Evenhanded, index them, and ensure any information is recorded in RMS.	NCO I/c MPU	
	Dec. 15, 2004	Det/Cst Forshaw will be meeting with Sgt R. Mulder, Project Evenhanded, in the near future in order to assess and review the files currently held there, and to establish an acceptable reporting process with Project Evenhanded personnel.		Insp. I/c MCS	
	Jan. 27, 2005	Ongoing		Insp. I/c MCS	
	Feb. 28, 2005	Det/Cst Forshaw has identified 117 files that are currently at the MWTF. He has developed methodology to create a necessary index in PRIME and to accommodate transfer of information. Sgt. Sullivan and Sgt. Mulder at MWTF are assisting. Approximately 85 files are available for transfer of documentation. The remaining 32 are SUI or charged by Evenhanded and can be tracked by Task number.		Insp. I/c MCS	
	Mar. 31, 2005	Det/Cst. Forshaw is in the process of indexing all the files held by Project Evenhanded. A temporary employee did data entry for 3 days in order to complete the initial phase, but a number of files still require updating. All of the 119 files at Project Evenhanded will be dealt with on a newly created handle: HISTMP, "Historical Missing Persons." A file will only be removed from this handle after conclusion and review.		Insp. I/c MCS	
	Apr. 29, 2005	A/Sgt Forshaw has now completed the index of all 199 files into PRIME and a full report will be submitted in the near future.		Insp. I/c MCS	
	Ma 30, 2005	Ongoing		Insp. I/c MCS	
Status	July 7 2005	On May 4, 2005, Sgt Forshaw submitted an extensive report outlining the Methodology used to create a thorough index in PRIME that included all of the files investigated at the MWTF. (This task is related to Task #24, which deals with the actual transfer of responsibility and electronic data to be entered into PRIME.)		Insp. I/c MCS	Concluded July 7/05
37 (P2)	ISO 9000 Quality Mgmt Principles	That the Vancouver Police Department promote ISO 9000 Quality Management Principles as an organizational goal.	The Insp. I/c MCS will obtain a copy of the ISO 9000 Quality Management Principles and discuss them with MPU staff.	Insp. I/c MCS	
	Dec. 15, 2004	Ongoing		Insp. I/c MCS	
	Jan. 27, 2005	Ongoing		Insp. I/c MCS	
	Feb. 28, 2005	Ongoing		Insp. I/c MCS	
	Mar. 31, 2005	Ongoing		Insp. I/c MCS	
	Apr. 29, 2005	Ongoing		Insp. I/c MCS	
	Ma 30, 2005	Ongoing		Insp. I/c MCS	

	July 7 2005	Ongoing		Insp. I/c MCS	
	Feb 10 2006	Ongoing		Insp. I/c MCS	
Status	Apr 20 2006	<i>The Missing Persons Unit currently operates within a highly efficient, effective and accountable framework. The International Organization for Standardization (ISO 9000-1) would be a level of quality management principles set for, measured and maintained by the entire VPD. Enacting ISO 9000 for the VPD would be decided upon by the senior executive members of the department and not within the Missing Persons Unit itself. This recommendation will therefore not be acted upon.</i>			<i>Insp. I/c MCS</i>
					<i>Concluded Apr 20/06</i>
38 (P1)	Versadex RMS	The Versadex RMS is our sole repository of investigative documentation. It must be properly used and maintained to be effective. Information not entered, or entered incompletely will not be accessible for follow-up investigators, or to identify trends or possible serial crimes. Therefore: a) all investigators and clerical staff who have system access must be properly trained for their specific need; b) all investigative steps must be documented in an approved fashion; c) work must be reviewed by their supervisors; and d) workflow (BF's) must be assigned and completed in a timely fashion.	The Insp. I/c MCS will ensure all MPU staff are adequately trained in RMS and will conduct periodic reviews to ensure compliance with departmental standards. (see recommendation 26).	Insp. I/c MCS	
	Dec. 15, 2004	Ongoing		Insp. I/c MCS	
	Jan. 27, 2005	Ongoing		Insp. I/c MCS	
	Feb. 28, 2005	Ongoing		Insp. I/c MCS	
	Mar. 31, 2005	Ongoing		Insp. I/c MCS	
	Apr. 29, 2005	Ongoing		Insp. I/c MCS	
	Ma 30, 2005	Ongoing		Insp. I/c MCS	
	July 7 2005	All investigators, clerical staff and the NCO now have adequate PRIME skills for their specific needs. Business rules have been established which clearly define the need for entry of all investigative steps into PRIME in a timely manner. Investigators' work is regularly and consistently reviewed by the NCO utilizing the "Workflow" for assignment, review, approval and disposition of files. Additionally, all "details" pages (back to May 2001) have recently been updated in PRIME and statistics are now readily available on files that are "open" but not actively being investigated (i.e. inactive pending further information). The need for accuracy on the "details" pages has been identified as a priority at E-Comm and for the MPU file coordinator.		Insp. I/c MCS	
	Feb 10 2006	Ongoing		Insp. I/c MCS	
Status	Apr 20 2006	<i>All members of the Missing Persons / Coroner's Liaison Unit process all reports and follow-ups in the PRIME Records Management System (RMS). A comprehensive Enhanced Investigation Training Program in RMS has now been set and all members of the Missing Persons / Coroner's Liaison Unit and Witness Protection Unit will participate in the mandatory training from May 2nd - 4th, 2006.</i>			<i>Insp. I/c MCS</i>
					<i>Concluded Apr 20/06</i>

39	(P1)	Reports to be reviewed	Reports should be reviewed in workflow by the Unit supervisor who should record in RMS his/her approval or direct the file back to the investigator for further follow-up.	Same as recommendations 26 and 38.	Insp. I/c MCS	
		Dec. 15, 2004	See Recommendation 26.		Insp. I/c MCS	
		Jan. 27, 2005	Ongoing		Insp. I/c MCS	
		Feb. 28, 2005	Ongoing		Insp. I/c MCS	
		Mar. 31, 2005	Ongoing		Insp. I/c MCS	
		Ma 30, 2005	Business rules are being established to standardize the conclusion of files, the documentation of the investigation and the existence of a hardcopy file or any attachments. These rules also deal with criteria to conclude a file as "inactive pending further information" and include discussion with the NCO, a roundtable between MPU members, and review and approval by the NCO in PRIME.		Insp. I/c MCS	
		July 7 2005	Ongoing		Insp. I/c MCS	
		Feb 10 2006	Ongoing		Insp. I/c MCS	
Status	Apr 20 2006	<i>An agreed upon process is now in place for the NCO to review files in the workflow of both Missing Persons and Coroner Liaison "handles." Many day-to-day files do not require signing off by the NCO (including chronic youth runaway reports) as they are concluded by the Unit Coordinator. Historical and long-term assigned files that are to be concluded or closed, include a "remarks" page in the General Occurrence Report with investigative comments by the MPU NCO.</i>			Insp. I/c MCS	Concluded Apr 20/06
40	(P3)	Case Info on M-Drive	Case information currently stored on 'M' drive should be integrated with the appropriate file on RMS.	The NCO I/c MPU will ensure any information currently stored on 'M' drive is integrated on RMS.	NCO I/c MPU	
		Dec. 15, 2004	Ongoing		Insp. I/c MCS	
		Jan. 27, 2005	Ongoing		Insp. I/c MCS	
		Feb. 28, 2005	Ongoing		Insp. I/c MCS	
		Mar. 31, 2005	Ongoing		Insp. I/c MCS	
		Apr. 29, 2005	Ongoing		Insp. I/c MCS	
		Ma 30, 2005	Ongoing		Insp. I/c MCS	
		July 7 2005	Ongoing		Insp. I/c MCS	
		Feb 10 2006	Ongoing		Insp. I/c MCS	
		Feb 10 2006	Ongoing		Insp. I/c MCS	
Status	Apr 20 2006	<i>M-Drive material (filed under MCS/Missing) contains administrative documents, and poster / bulletin formatting templates. M-drive does not contain information or documentation requiring integration to PRIME RMS.</i>			Insp. I/c MCS	Concluded Apr 20/06
41	(P3)	Case Operational Status Definitions	The Manager - Information Management Section and the VPD PRIME Coordinator should confirm the definitions for case operational status and integrate them into training.	The Insp. I/c RMS will request that the IMS Manager and PRIME Coordinator confirm the definitions for case operational status and integrate them into training.	Insp. I/c MCS	
		Dec. 15, 2004	Ongoing		Insp. I/c MCS	
		Jan. 27, 2005	Ongoing		Insp. I/c MCS	

	Feb. 28, 2005	Ongoing		Insp. I/c MCS	
	Mar. 31, 2005	Ongoing		Insp. I/c MCS	
	Apr. 29, 2005	Ongoing		Insp. I/c MCS	
	Ma 30, 2005	Ongoing		Insp. I/c MCS	
Status	July 7 2005	Sgt Forshaw has canvassed the case operational status definitions with Colin McEwen at E-Comm. Ruth Boyd and Cathy Yasul agree that Missing Persons files that are "inactive pending further information" should have an operational status of "A" for closed (including a completed conclusion block), that the "details" page exhibits an "o" for open case status and "e" for entered on CPIC (to allow for browsing and identification of these files) and that a "concluding remarks" text page describes the files as "inactive pending further information." This definition has been used to implement and establish the business rules described in Task #38.		Insp. I/c MCS	Concluded July 7/05
42 (P1)	File Re-Assignment	Files currently assigned to retired investigators and staff no longer assigned to the Missing Person Unit should be re-assigned.	The NCO I/c MPU will assign a current investigator to any files still assigned to a retired member.	NCO I/c MPU	
	Dec. 15, 2004	Ongoing		Insp. I/c MCS	
	Jan. 27, 2005	Ongoing		Insp. I/c MCS	
	Feb. 28, 2005	Ongoing		Insp. I/c MCS	
	Status	Mar. 31, 2005	All files have been re-assigned to serving members.		Insp. I/c MCS
43 (P3)	Working Relationship with Vice and FACES	As many of their subjects appear to be in common, the Missing Person Unit should develop a closer working relationship with the VPD Vice Section in general and the FACES program in particular.	The NCO I/c MPU, along with MPU staff, will meet with VPD Vice staff on a quarterly basis to review common files.	NCO I/c MPU	
	Dec. 15, 2004	Ongoing		Insp. I/c MCS	
	Jan. 27, 2005	Ongoing		Insp. I/c MCS	
	Feb. 28, 2005	Ongoing		Insp. I/c MCS	
	Mar. 31, 2005	Ongoing		Insp. I/c MCS	
	Apr. 29, 2005	Ongoing		Insp. I/c MCS	
	Ma 30, 2005	Ongoing		Insp. I/c MCS	
	July 7 2005	Ongoing		Insp. I/c MCS	
	Feb 10 2006	Ongoing		Insp. I/c MCS	
	Status	Apr 20 2006	The MPU NCO will meet with Vice NCO's as necessary. Open avenues of communication and assistance are in place.		Insp. I/c MCS

44 (P3) Chronic Runaway Files

To address the issue of chronic runaways, the VPD IT Section should be requested to investigate the possibility of adding the direct entry and processing of these cases to VPD Internet Reporting by specific, pre-approved complainants. This would place the responsibility of maintaining these files on the Group Homes and should free time for both E-Comm reports staff, VPD Information Management Section and the Missing Person Unit staff.

The NCO I/c MPU will invite the VPD IT section to examine the possibility of direct reporting on the VPD Internet for specific reportees.

NCO I/c MPU

Dec. 15, 2004
Jan. 27, 2005
Feb. 28, 2005
Mar. 31, 2005
Apr. 29, 2005
Ma 30, 2005
July 7 2005

Ongoing
Ongoing
Ongoing
Ongoing
Ongoing
Ongoing

(See Task #19) The BCMCP "draft document" does not distinguish between chronic runaways and any other category of missing person. Any Internet reporting will have to be established at E-Comm, a G.O. created and assessed for risk and type but still treated as "high risk" until there is significant information to the contrary. This task should not be undertaken until such time as the final recommendation to the BCACP is approved.

Insp. I/c MCS
Insp. I/c MCS
Insp. I/c MCS
Insp. I/c MCS
Insp. I/c MCS
Insp. I/c MCS
Insp. I/c MCS

Feb 10 2006

Ongoing

Insp. I/c MCS

Chronic youth runaways account for almost 95% of the Missing Persons reports filed annually. The MPU NCO has conducted meetings with various stakeholders - those with the MCFD, E-Comm, VPD's High Risk Youth Car (Car 20) and the BCPMPC.

It is the intention of the MPU to eliminate the fax-in program currently being used (and abused) by the guardians and caregivers of group homes and foster homes. A revised report procedure will be implemented in concert with appropriate training.

Status Apr 20 2006

The intention is to shift the responsibility of ""resolving"" the situation of the AWOL youth back to the caregiver. They must commit to a level of due diligence by attempting to locate the ""wayward"" youth to the same extent as any other cautious and prudent parent or guardian. It is unacceptable that a ""missing persons"" report is faxed to E-Comm simply because the youth has failed to return within the terms of their curfew. The MPU NCO will continue to move this initiative forward and therefore the ""recommendation"" as articulated in the Audit can be deemed concluded."

Insp. I/c MCS

Concluded Apr 20/06

45	(P3)	CPIC Categories for Chronic Runaways	The CPIC Advisory Committee, through our VPD representative (the Insp. I/c Services Liaison Section) and RCMP 'E' Division CPIC Services should be asked to evaluate the addition of at least one additional CPIC category (Youth at Risk) for chronic runaways. In almost all instances, these are short-term unauthorized absences and not truly missing persons. The system can flag absences in excess of 72 hours for further reviews.	The Insp. I/c MCS will request the VPD Insp. I/c Services Liaison Section to examine the creation of a new CPIC category for chronic runaways.	Insp. I/c MCS	
		Dec. 15, 2004	Ongoing		Insp. I/c MCS	
		Jan. 27, 2005	Ongoing		Insp. I/c MCS	
		Feb. 28, 2005	Ongoing		Insp. I/c MCS	
		Mar. 31, 2005	Ongoing		Insp. I/c MCS	
		Apr. 29, 2005	Ongoing		Insp. I/c MCS	
		Ma 30, 2005	Ongoing		Insp. I/c MCS	
		July 7 2005	Ongoing		Insp. I/c MCS	
		Feb 10 2006	Ongoing		Insp. I/c MCS	
Status	Apr 20 2006	The MPU NCO is currently working in collaboration with Ms. Lynne Coates, CPIC Supervisor for the VPD regarding the issue of chronic youth runaways. Although the idea of entering chronic runaways on CPIC as Special Interest to Police (SIP) was discussed, it would involve a considerable proposal to the CPIC Advisory Committee. This is a long process which, if accepted, would not be voted upon until November 2006. The planned changes to the "reporting"			Insp. I/c MCS	Concluded Apr 20/06
46	(P3)	Missing Person Coordinator Reevaluation	The position profile of the Missing Person Coordinator should be evaluated to determine the feasibility of expanding the position to complete routine follow-up of chronic missing person files. This involvement would be at the discretion and under supervision of the Sergeant, after evaluation of the circumstances, and would cease if additional investigative steps are indicated that require the skills of a sworn investigator.	The NCO I/c MPU will ensure a review of the Missing Person Coordinator position is completed, including the expansion of duties so that routine queries around chronic runaways can be done.	NCO I/c MPU	
		Dec. 15, 2004	Ongoing		Insp. I/c MCS	
		Jan. 27, 2005	Ongoing		Insp. I/c MCS	
		Feb. 28, 2005	Ongoing		Insp. I/c MCS	
		Mar. 31, 2005	Ongoing		Insp. I/c MCS	
		Apr. 29, 2005	Ongoing		Insp. I/c MCS	
		Ma 30, 2005	Ongoing		Insp. I/c MCS	

Status	July 7 2005	<p>A complete review of the MPU Coordinator's position has not been completed. The implementation of a Province-wide policy for Missing Persons investigations will greatly impact on the responsibilities of the MPU in general and the Coordinator specifically. Significant changes that affect the Coordinator's position in the MPU have already been initiated:</p> <p>A) A/Sgt Forshaw has good PRIME skills and is able to review, assign and monitor the progress of all investigations sufficiently to ensure PRIME requirements are met.</p> <p>B) Forshaw routinely reviews files and documents this review in PRIME.</p> <p>C) Forshaw is also able to browse in PRIME for necessary statistical data to determine criteria for Benchmark reports for the MPU. A Benchmark report for April 2005 has been submitted which indicates the number of files dealt with in the unit, and</p> <p>D) Forshaw has implemented business rules that allow for assignment and review of cases where the detective recommends the investigation be ""inactive pending further information.""</p> <p>Ms. Fitzgerald does not conduct long-term or "high risk" investigations of any sort. In speaking with her, she contends that the current detectives are extremely active and willing to take on cases at a much earlier stage than previous members deployed in the MPU. She does however continue to assist in the preliminary stages of many investigations, utilizing indices checks, contacts and telephone queries to assist the NCO to assess risk factors of cases. These routine queries often result in the early conclusion of files. Her work is consistently submitted in PRIME reports as an "MPU Coordinator's Update." She continues to maintain a hard copy of files that are open awaiting review and/or assignment (including investigative notes). I believe this is entirely appropriate and within her position profile, specifically that these are general clerical duties.</p> <p>Ms. Fitzgerald does not assign files, manage workflow or attend crime scenes. In short, the Sergeant's or Investigators' responsibilities as outlined in Mr. Schouten's report no longer "default" to the Missing Persons Coordinator and her workload more accurately reflects the position profile.</p>		Insp. I/c MCS	Concluded July 7/05
47 (P3)	Pre-Recruit Appointment	In an effort to free experienced investigators for more serious cases, consideration should be given to appointing a pre-recruit, under close supervision, for 'routine' follow-up investigations such as chronic runaways.	The NCO I/c MPU will contact Human Resources Section staff to advise them that, when available, pre-recruits can be utilized in MPU to do routine follow-up work, under supervision.	NCO I/c MPU	
	Dec. 15, 2004	Ongoing		Insp. I/c MCS	
	Jan. 27, 2005	Ongoing		Insp. I/c MCS	
	Feb. 28, 2005	Ongoing		Insp. I/c MCS	
	Mar. 31, 2005	Ongoing		Insp. I/c MCS	
	Apr. 29, 2005	Human Resources and Training Sections have been advised that MPU can utilize these pre-recruits, under close supervision, whenever one is available.		Insp. I/c MCS	Concluded Apr. 29/05
Status	Ma 30, 2005	Inspector Huston, I/c Recruiting and Training Section, Inspector Schnitzer, I/c Human Resources Section, have been advised of our desire for placement of pre-recruits in MPU.		Insp. I/c MCS	Concluded May 30/05
Status	Ma 30, 2005	<p>UPDATE: Although the conclusion indicated in May of 2005 indicates that the Training Section and Human Resources Section have been advised of the desire for placement of pre-recruits in the MPU, this is no longer the case. The MPU is appropriately staffed and "routine" follow-up investigations are conducted in a coordinated effort with the Unit coordinator, the Investigators and the MPU NCO.</p>		Insp. I/c MCS	Concluded Apr 20/06

48 (P3)	Responsibility of Chronic Runaway Files.	Consideration should be given to removing responsibility for chronic juvenile runaway incidents from Missing Person Unit and instead assigning coordination of these files to Youth Squad (see also Recommendation 1.8)	The Insp. I/c MCS will prepare a report for the DCC Cmdg. Investigation Division addressing this issue (see recommendation 7)	Insp. I/c MCS	
	Dec. 15, 2004	Ongoing		Insp. I/c MCS	
	Jan. 27, 2005	Ongoing		Insp. I/c MCS	
	Feb. 28, 2005	Ongoing		Insp. I/c MCS	
	Mar. 31, 2005	Ongoing		Insp. I/c MCS	
	Apr. 29, 2005	Ongoing		Insp. I/c MCS	
	Ma 30, 2005	Ongoing		Insp. I/c MCS	
	July 7 2005	Ongoing		Insp. I/c MCS	
	Feb 10 2006	Ongoing		Insp. I/c MCS	
Status	Apr 20 2006	<p><i>"The MPU NCO has chaired meetings with various representatives of the MCFD and has met with E-Comm staff and members of the BCPMPC in relation to the issue of chronic youth runaways (as mentioned in Task #44). Proposed changes to the ""reporting"" process - once implemented, should have a positive impact in reducing the number of chronic runaways entered on CPIC.</i></p> <p><i>The responsibility of Chronic Runaway file management will remain with the MPU and will not be assigned to Youth Squad as suggested in the Audit recommendations."</i></p>		Insp. I/c MCS	Concluded Apr 20/06
49 (P3)	Request Legal Opinion	A legal opinion should be requested to determine the feasibility for the VPD to unilaterally cease to investigate chronic runaway reports and refer them instead to the Ministry. It should evaluate the degree of increased liability and public acceptance. Agreement and representation by the BCACP may be required to transfer this responsibility.	The Insp. I/c MCS will obtain a legal opinion about the feasibility of no longer accepting reports of chronic runaways. A report will be prepared for the DCC Cmdg. Investigation Division (see recommendation 50).	Insp. I/c MCS	
	Dec. 15, 2004	Ongoing		Insp. I/c MCS	
	Jan. 27, 2005	Ongoing		Insp. I/c MCS	
	Feb. 28, 2005	Ongoing		Insp. I/c MCS	
	Mar. 31, 2005	Ongoing		Insp. I/c MCS	
	Apr. 29, 2005	Ongoing		Insp. I/c MCS	
	Ma 30, 2005	Ongoing		Insp. I/c MCS	
	July 7/05	(See Task #19) Requesting a legal opinion in regard to the feasibility of no longer accepting reports of chronic runaways would appear contrary to what the BCMPC proposes and should not be undertaken until such time as the final recommendation to the BCAC is approved.		Insp. I/c MCS	
	Feb 10 2006	Ongoing		Insp. I/c MCS	


<i>Status</i>		<i>Apr 20 2006</i>		<i>"It should be completely inappropriate for the VPD unilaterally cease the investigation of chronic youth runaways. Although rebellious, they remain vulnerable to varying degrees. With pending improvements to the reporting process and the increased accountability being shifted back to guardians/caregivers and the MCFD, this task (recommendation) of obtaining a legal opinion is not necessary."</i>	<i>Insp. I/c MCS</i>	<i>Concluded Apr 20/06</i>
50	(P3)	P&R Study on Chronic Runaways	<p>The Planning and Research Section should be asked to complete a study on alternatives for handling of Chronic runaway complaints. This study should include, but would not be restricted to: a) Policy; b) Responsibility (is this a police or a social problem?); c) Alternative reporting methods; and d) Enforcement options (Halifax Regional Police Force seeks a detention order on chronic runaways.)</p> <p>The Insp. I/c MCS will ask the P&R Section to complete a study on alternatives for handling chronic runaway complaints (see recommendation 49).</p>	Insp. I/c MCS		
		Dec. 15, 2004	Ongoing		Insp. I/c MCS	
		Jan. 27, 2005	Ongoing		Insp. I/c MCS	
		Feb. 28, 2005	Ongoing		Insp. I/c MCS	
		Mar. 31, 2005	Ongoing		Insp. I/c MCS	
		Apr. 29, 2005	Ongoing		Insp. I/c MCS	
		Ma 30, 2005	Ongoing		Insp. I/c MCS	
		July 7 2005	Ongoing		Insp. I/c MCS	
		Feb 10 2006	Ongoing		Insp. I/c MCS	
<i>Status</i>		<i>Apr 20 2006</i>		<i>The BCPMPC is in the process of developing policies and procedures for all aspects of "missing persons" from child abductions to institutional walk-aways. P&R has been consulted in relation to the issue of chronic youth runaways however it is not necessary at this time to undertake an in-depth study on alternative methods in dealing with "chronic runaway" complaints.</i>	<i>Insp. I/c MCS</i>	<i>Concluded Apr 20/06</i>

Review Completed April 7, 2011- 04- 07

Sgt. Kirk Star

NCO i/c Missing Persons Unit, Coroners Liaison Unit, Witness Protection Unit

APPENDIX F



VANCOUVER POLICE DEPARTMENT
MAJOR CRIME SECTION
Missing Persons/Coroner's Liaison Unit

17A for
McClelland
Jaworski
22 May 11

May 25th, 2006

To: Deputy Chief Constable Doug LePard, Commanding Investigation Division
Cc: Inspector Tom McCluskie, Commanding Major Crime Section
From: Ron Fairweather, Sergeant I/c Missing Persons/Coroner's Liaison Unit
Subject: **Missing Persons Unit Review – Recommendations Completed**

The 50 recommendations (tasks) identified in the Missing Person Unit Review have now been addressed. The status of the "response actions" can therefore be deemed fully completed.

The Missing Person Unit Review, prepared by John Schouten, Inspector (Ret.) at your request, was received by you in October 2004. The extensive review consisted of an examination of the Unit's structure, policies, staffing and succession planning, training and case management, with particular focus on PRIME Records Management Systems (RMS).

Staffing and Succession Planning

Staffing levels for both the Missing Persons and Coroner's Liaison Unit positions have now been appropriately increased. Presently, there are two full-time Missing Person investigators and one full-time Coroner Liaison Detective Constable. The Unit includes a full-time civilian coordinator. The Unit also includes one investigator from Witness Protection and is supervised by one Sergeant.

Unit investigators work at the same level and calibre of MCS investigators and often are called to assist Homicide and Robbery Assault investigators. Therefore, the tenure has now been approved to be uniformly increased for MPU, Coroner liaison and Witness Protection Unit Investigators to five years.

Training

All members of the Unit currently have General Investigator and Forensic Interview training and are scheduled to take an updated DNA Evidence Collection workshop on June 16th, 2006.

The Unit NCO will further ensure that appropriate training courses are made available to members and will seek to identify workshops, conferences and education opportunities that specifically relate to Missing Persons investigations.

File and Records Management

Members of the Missing Persons/Coroner's Liaison Unit and Witness Protection Unit process all reports in the PRIME Records Management System (RMS). Unit members have also completed the enhanced PRIME training for the Investigation Division.

All reports are reviewed in RMS workflow. Long term 'missing person' files are appropriately assigned to Unit investigators.

The Unit coordinator is currently in the process of entering approximately 200 historical "hand written" files onto PRIME. These files are being assigned to Unit investigators for final review and follow-up. Thirty seven of these files have now been reassigned, investigated and concluded, with no further investigation being warranted. (As per RCMP policy, "Missing Persons" remain on CPIC until they [would] have reached the chronological age of 110 years).

Effective Management of Chronic Youth Runaways

One of the primary duties undertaken by the civilian coordinator is to manage the incoming files involving chronic youth runaways. Chronic youth runaways under the care and supervision of the MCFD and other contracted guardian and caregiver services, account for almost 95% of the "missing person" reports received by the VPD.

Back in 1996, following a review of the work load generated by repeated 9-1-1 calls from caregivers reporting AWOL youths, a "fax-in" process was implemented. The initial program was successful in alleviating the workload of emergency room call takers however, during the past number of years, the program slowly began to erode. Caregivers have fallen into the habit of reporting youths as "missing" that have simply gone past their designated curfew time (some for as little as 20 minutes past curfew).

I have been consistently dealing with the "chronic youth" issue for the past several months in a collaborative approach with E-Comm staff, CPIC, the Ministry of Children and Family Development (MCFD). The "fax-in" program will eventually be rescinded once revised policies and procedures in relation to the handling of "chronic youths" have been drafted, approved and proper training has been provided to caregivers.

Conclusion

The directive that an in-depth examination of the Missing Persons Unit be conducted was very proper, prudent and timely. The audit highlighted many areas that required revision. Since these findings were released in October 2004, all key areas have been addressed. There has been a continual process of enhancement in the coordination and management of missing person investigations. File documentation, record keeping and quality control issues have now been rectified.

The current team is very cohesive, diligent and highly motivated. All Unit members are clearly focused and committed to providing the absolute best service in relation to Missing Person investigations and Coroner Liaison related files.

Note: As of May 28th¹, 2006 the shifting pattern for Unit staff will be enhanced to provide six day per week coverage.

Please find attached the most recent (and concluded) copy of the Missing Persons Review Recommendations.

Sincerely,

Sgt. 1090 Ron Fairweather
Missing Persons/Coroner's Liaison Unit
312 Main Street, Vancouver BC V6A 2T2
604-717-252
ron.fairweather@vpd.ca

APPENDIX G

Missing Person files - Female (2002-2010 YTD)

	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010*	Total
# Missing Cases (Female)	2294	1972	1903	2304	1908	1483	1357	1437	1866	16524
# Solved Cases (of total cases)	2293	1971	1903	2303	1908	1483	1357	1437	1865	16520
% Solved Cases	99.96%	99.95%	100%	99.96%	100%	100%	100.00%	100.00%	100%	99.98%
# Found Alive (of all Solved Cases)	2285	1966	1901	2301	1905	1480	1354	1435	1862	16489
% Found Alive	99.7%	99.7%	99.9%	99.9%	99.8%	99.8%	99.8%	99.9%	99.8%	99.81%
# Found Deceased (of all Solved Cases)	8	5	2	2	3	3	3	2	3	31
% Found Deceased	0.35%	0.25%	0.11%	0.09%	0.16%	0.20%	0.22%	0.14%	0.16%	0.19%
# Open Cases (of total cases)	1	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	4
% Open Cases	0.04%	0.05%	0%	0.04%	0%	0%	0.00%	0.00%	0%	0.02%

From 2002 to 2010, a total of 16524 cases involving missing women were investigated. Of those, 16520 (99.98%) were solved, including 16489 (99.81%) found alive and 31 (0.19%) found deceased. Only 4 (0.02%) missing cases remain open and unsolved.

Statistics presented above are prepared through PRIME queries. Accuracy is dependent upon data entry and discrepancies may exist. PRIME queries conducted on 2010-08-18 for events prior to 2010-08-15. Events post 2010-08-15 queried on 2011-01-18.

APPENDIX H



THE TRAGEDY OF MISSING AND MURDERED ABORIGINAL WOMEN IN CANADA

WE CAN DO BETTER

A POSITION PAPER BY THE SISTERWATCH PROJECT
OF THE VANCOUVER POLICE DEPARTMENT
AND THE WOMEN'S MEMORIAL MARCH COMMITTEE

JUNE 2011



VANCOUVER POLICE DEPARTMENT | *Beyond the Call*





20TH ANNUAL WOMEN'S MEMORIAL MARCH – FEBRUARY 14, 2011

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I have a few family members missing on the Highway of Tears. I have four daughters so it really scares me...We didn't just come down here and decide to be a drug addict or an alcoholic or a prostitute. There are many reasons – usually domestic violence in the community leads a lot of the women to get away from the violence. And then they come down here and they're back into a violent situation again...There's not enough being done when it comes to First Nations women going missing. These are our loved ones, our children, and when they go missing, it tears a piece out of the whole family.

GLADYS RADEK
WALK FOR JUSTICE CO-FOUNDER

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The number of missing and murdered Aboriginal women in Canada is a national tragedy.

- Aboriginal women between 25 and 44 are five times more likely to die a violent death than other women.
- Aboriginal women make up four percent of the female population but the majority of missing and murdered women.
- The Native Women's Association of Canada database includes 582 known cases of missing and murdered Aboriginal women and girls, the majority having occurred between 1990 and 2010.

This report is based on consultations between members of the Women's Memorial March Committee and Vancouver Police officers and outlines the current problems, actions that have been taken in response, and recommendations to address remaining gaps, including a unique police/community collaboration model called SisterWatch.

Aboriginals comprise only four percent of the population in Canada but their numbers are increasing faster than Canada's population overall. Aboriginals are more likely than other Canadians to be marginalized and are consequently significantly over-represented both as victims and suspects in crime. Aboriginal women are disproportionately the victims of violence, including murder. A longstanding concern is that the criminal justice system fails to recognize the customs, values and traditions of Aboriginal people.

Vancouver's Downtown Eastside "Missing Women" case is a tragic example of how marginalized women – including many Aboriginals – can become victims of serious

crime. In this case, the perpetrator was the notorious Robert Pickton, Canada's worst serial killer. Pickton should have been apprehended sooner and the police investigations were initially inadequate. Later on, the police in BC formed a Missing Women Task Force to investigate the disappearances and were successful in obtaining six murder convictions against Pickton. There is also an ongoing BC investigation into missing and murdered women in Northern BC along Highway 16 – also known as the "Highway of Tears." Other provinces, including Alberta and Manitoba, have also formed task forces to focus on missing and murdered women, many of them Aboriginal.

There are many challenges to investigating missing Aboriginal women, including investigative capacity; the mobility of the victims; a lack of coordination between police agencies; delays in reporting; and a lack of police access to useful databases.

In recent years, there have been many initiatives to address the problem of missing and murdered Aboriginal women as set out in this report and in Appendix "A."

There remain, however, gaps in both prevention efforts and police investigative capacity. Some of the most significant challenges in missing women investigations are barriers to reporting across jurisdictions. These barriers can be reduced by creating a "clearing house" model both nationally and provincially, with 1-800 phone numbers to facilitate reporting. While Internet-based reporting and coordination has been introduced in some provinces, it does not exist Canada-wide. Moreover, marginalized people do not have ready access to the Internet and the process to report must be as barrier-free as possible.



More work by all police agencies is required to build better relationships with Aboriginal communities. There is a legacy of mistrust and perceptions of police apathy from the community that must be overcome. In addition, police must proactively target predatory offenders who prey on Aboriginal women. The Vancouver Police Department and the Women's Memorial March Committee have developed a program called "SisterWatch" to address both these issues and encourage other communities to consider a similar program.

This report reiterates recommendations from previous reports on the problem of missing and murdered Aboriginal women, and also recommends a national and provincial clearing house model with 1-800 phone numbers; harmonized legislation to provide for better access to databases helpful to missing persons investigations; and consideration of the SisterWatch program for other communities.

INTRODUCTION

The number of missing and murdered Aboriginal women in Canada is a national tragedy. Despite making up only four percent of the Canadian female population, women of Aboriginal descent make up the majority of women who are missing and murdered. Aboriginal women between 25 and 44 are five times more likely to die a violent death than other women.¹ The issue of violence against women generally touches many; however, the Aboriginal community has obviously been impacted far more than the average Canadian family. The issue of violence against Aboriginal women is a complex one involving social, economic and cultural factors. These factors are also played out in the extraordinary number of Aboriginal women in Canada who go missing, and in some cases are murdered, each year. These stark statistics of the murdered and missing demand a national coordinated response.

Much credit must go to Amnesty International’s 2004 report, *Stolen Sisters - A Human Rights Response to Violence and Discrimination Against Indigenous Women* and the follow-




The Missing Women cases have affected me personally because I feel a lot of pain; I feel a lot of anger. I feel really impacted by the loss of these women. It’s very hard on our Nation as a whole.

MONA WOODWARD
SPARKLING FAST RISING RIVER WOMAN
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR
ABORIGINAL FRONT DOOR SOCIETY

up report, *No More Stolen Sisters* in 2009, and to the Native Women’s Association of Canada which have been catalysts to increasing attention to this issue by governments, police agencies and police associations.²

The purpose of this report is to summarize the nature and depth of the problem; identify actions that have been taken, have been proposed, or are in progress; and to recommend what more should be done at the local, provincial and national levels to ensure an evidence-based, best practice approach to addressing an unacceptable situation. Because solutions to social challenges such as this require cooperation and collaboration in the community, this report was written as a collaborative effort between the Vancouver Police Department (VPD) and the Vancouver Women’s Memorial March Committee (WMMC).³ This joint committee, called the “SisterWatch Committee,” was brought



together after the tragic death of a young Aboriginal woman in the Downtown Eastside in 2010 and the resulting community distress.

This committee serves to build relationships and opens doors to further collaboration. The VPD and the WMMC's SisterWatch Committee also share a sad history involving

the Missing Women of the Downtown Eastside of Vancouver and the subsequent arrest of serial killer Robert Pickton. But the SisterWatch Committee is something truly positive that came out of those sad events and now oversees a variety of initiatives to reduce violence against Aboriginal women in Vancouver, as described later in this report.

PART I: BACKGROUND CONTEXT

Aboriginals in Canada

According to the 2006 census, approximately 1.1 million people in Canada (or about 4% of the total population) identified themselves as an Aboriginal person (i.e., First Nations, Métis or Inuit). While only a small percentage of the Canadian population is Aboriginal, it is growing rapidly, with a 45% increase between 1996 and 2006. Aboriginal people are increasingly living in urban areas, with significant populations in Winnipeg, Edmonton, and Vancouver. With a population of slightly more than 40,000, Vancouver has the third largest urban Aboriginal population in Canada. Finally, the Aboriginal population is much younger than the non-Aboriginal population, with almost half being under 24, compared to only 31% of the non-Aboriginal population.⁴

Violence in Aboriginal Communities

In 1996, a Canadian Royal Commission on Aboriginal People found that, “[r]epeated assaults on the culture and collective identity of aboriginal people have weakened the foundations of aboriginal society and contributed to the alienation that drives some to self-destruction and anti-social behaviour.”⁵ Many researchers have found that, compared to non-Aboriginals, Aboriginals are more likely to live in poverty and substandard housing;⁶ have lower levels of educational achievement;⁷ have poorer health, including much higher rates of diabetes, HIV/AIDS and tuberculosis;⁸ have higher rates of alcohol and drug dependency;⁹ suffer higher rates of victimization by crime, particularly relationship violence;¹⁰ have higher youth suicide rates;¹¹ and are more likely to have negative contact with the criminal justice system, including over-representation in



All Aboriginal women are subjected to the racism and the sexualization that history has constructed around Aboriginal women as sexualized creatures of disposal...Aboriginal women have to have a reason to trust. Where there was developed a very strong feeling of distrust, police will have to do a lot more.

GLORIA LAROCQUE
ABORIGINAL FRONT DOOR BOARD MEMBER

federal and provincial prisons.¹² Notably, the homicide rate for Aboriginals is almost seven times higher than the rate for non-Aboriginals, and Aboriginals are accused of homicide at a rate 10 times that of non-Aboriginals.¹³

The reasons for Aboriginals’ over-representation in these negative contexts are many and complex, but certainly include a history of institutionalized racism and discrimination. Though there are many examples of this throughout history, the most visible manifestation of such discrimination was the federal government’s emphasis on assimilation and the residential school system it implemented in the 1870s. It took until the 1990s for this system to be completely

dismantled and the impacts of it will be felt for many generations to come.¹⁴ In 2008 Prime Minister Harper made a formal apology on behalf of all Canadians for the history and legacy of Aboriginal residential schools.¹⁵

The impacts of the injustices suffered by Canada’s Aboriginal peoples have been profound. One of the most troubling is that Aboriginal women are victimized at a much higher rate than the overall rate of violence against women in Canada. For example, as described earlier, a 1996 report from the federal government notes that Aboriginal women between the ages of 25 and 44 with status under the federal *Indian Act* are five times more likely than all other women in the same age range to die as the result of violence.¹⁶ Further, a 2004 government survey of Aboriginal women and a 2011 Statistics Canada report both revealed rates of violence (including domestic violence and sexual assault) up to 3.5 times higher than for non-Aboriginal women.¹⁷ Like most gendered violence, much of it is difficult to quantify, and underreporting occurs for complex reasons, including distrust of authorities and shame.¹⁸ A longstanding concern is that the criminal justice system fails to recognize the customs, values and traditions of Aboriginal people.

Also contributing to the level of victimization experienced by Aboriginal women is the high number that become involved in the sex trade. Many marginalized young Aboriginal women find themselves drawn into the street level sex industry and find themselves trapped in “survival sex work” because of illicit drug addictions. A 2004 survey in Vancouver of 183 women (30% of whom were Aboriginal) in the sex trade found that 65% began selling sexual services because they needed money, or because of their drug addiction.¹⁹ Sadly, drug addiction was cited as the reason for continuing in the sex trade by 60% of the women surveyed.



Missing women across this nation is a bigger issue that requires a lot more discussion to be able to get behind the underlying reasons, systemic reasons why women go missing or are murdered... Sometimes women are involved in sex trade work out of survival to be able to put food on the table for their families. It's not a choice that women easily make or want to.

MARLENE GEORGE
WOMEN'S MEMORIAL MARCH COMMITTEE

As described in the VPD’s “Missing Women Investigation Review,”²⁰ sex trade workers in Canada are frequent victims of violent attacks. They are particularly vulnerable to attacks from predatory customers, but also from pimps, boyfriends, or in drug-related incidents.²¹ The murder risk for sex trade workers is approximately 60 to 120 times that of the general female population.²² According to some research, sex trade workers are the most likely victims of a serial killer. Further, the most highly addicted and desperate sex trade workers are more likely than other sex trade workers to be the victims of a serial killer.²³ In Vancouver’s Downtown Eastside, one media report noted that:

...the truth is that there are numerous predators attacking sex trade workers on a regular basis. A review of *The Vancouver Sun* files shows at least 25 different men charged with killing prostitutes in BC over the last 17 years. In the past month alone, Vancouver city police arrested two men suspected in a series of sexual assaults against women in the sex trade.²⁴

CASE STUDY ► VANCOUVER'S MISSING WOMEN CASE

Since the late 1970s, very sporadically, women had gone missing from the Downtown Eastside area of Vancouver, but so infrequently that the cases didn't raise alarm with authorities. However, in the mid-1990s, the frequency with which poor, addicted sex trade workers were going missing began to provoke considerable community concern. Many believed a serial killer was responsible; however, some in the VPD did not support this theory and this contributed to an inadequate investigative response. In addition, the investigative challenges were enormous. There were no crime scenes, no witnesses, no physical evidence, and no victims; the only evidence was the absence of an increasing number of women.

This situation was further complicated by the fact that, as it turned out, the women were being lured to a property in the Vancouver suburb of Port Coquitlam, which is policed by a detachment of the RCMP. The Coquitlam RCMP received information about Robert Pickton from informants and witnesses in 1998 and 1999 but the investigations in Coquitlam and Vancouver operated independently for the most part. The resulting investigative silos contributed to many missed opportunities to solve the case sooner than it was. Eventually, a joint investigation of the RCMP and the VPD, the Missing Women Task Force (MWTF) was created in 2001.

In February of 2002, the serendipitous execution of an unrelated firearms search warrant by a member of the




Coquitlam RCMP broke the case. Fortunately, the MWTF was able to immediately assume control of the investigation and successfully concluded the largest serial murder investigation in Canadian history. Six convictions of murder against Robert Pickton were obtained in relation to remains, DNA and other evidence found on Pickton's property involving at least 33 women who had gone missing between 1995 and 2001, inclusive. This was the same period during which the notable increase in missing women from the Downtown Eastside occurred (although some of the victims were missing from other communities in BC). Pickton boasted to an undercover police officer that he had killed 49 women. In total, Pickton was charged with 27 counts of murder. He was subsequently tried and convicted of six murders; these convictions were upheld in 2010 by the Supreme Court of Canada. Since Pickton could not receive any sentence longer than the life sentence he had already received, the Crown in BC decided to enter a stay of proceedings on the remaining 20 charges, which had been severed by the Court from the first six. (The 27th charge had been previously stayed by the trial judge.)

The VPD committed to learning what went wrong and doing so in a transparent manner. The VPD released its comprehensive report, the “Missing Women Investigation Review” (MWIR),²⁵ shortly after the conclusion of the criminal matters in 2010. (The report had been written several years earlier, but could not be released until the criminal matters were concluded.) In addition, the VPD’s apology for its failings in the case was broadcast live on a national network²⁶ and received considerable media coverage.

The recommendations in the MWIR directed to the VPD have all been implemented, including the institutionalization of major case management training and protocols; changes to the criteria for the selection of staff for various affected areas; an increase in the number of provincially accredited major case management team commanders; significantly improved resources, systems, and analysis; and improved management accountability.²⁷

Furthermore, the research for the MWIR identified significant problems in the Missing Person’s Unit. As a result, a full-time sergeant’s position was created in 2003 and later a detailed external audit of the Unit was commissioned. This audit resulted in 50 recommendations, all of which were implemented. The Missing Persons Unit is now viewed as a best-practice unit in Canada, has a 99% solve rate, and has received accolades for its work.²⁸



The VPD regrets the mistakes made in this investigation and resolved to learn from them and improve current practices with the hope that other families and police agencies will benefit from these lessons in the future.

The final review of this notorious case will be conducted by the Honourable Wally Oppal, QC, in a Missing Women Commission of Inquiry that is underway as of the date of this report.

The National Picture Regarding Missing and Murdered Aboriginal Women

Based on 2005 data, in Canada over 100,000 persons are reported missing annually.²⁹ More than half are teenagers, most of them runaways,³⁰ and the vast majority are found within weeks. Unfortunately, 4,800 persons were still recorded as missing after a year, and approximately 270 new cases of long term missing persons are reported annually.³¹

Aboriginal women have been disproportionately represented in these statistics. For example, a 2007 joint committee of government, Aboriginal Peoples, police and community groups in Saskatchewan reported that 60 per cent of the long-term cases of missing women in the province are Aboriginal, although Aboriginal women make up only six per cent of the population in Saskatchewan.³²

Accurate numbers are difficult to obtain, particularly due to reporting issues, but a recent estimate by the Native Women's Association of Canada (March 31, 2010) suggests that there are 582 known cases of missing or murdered Aboriginal women and girls in Canada, more than half of them since 1990.³³ The fact that there is no official government source for such information is in itself evidence of the need for better national analysis and coordination.

The September 2010 report of the Federal/Provincial/Territorial Missing Women Working Group noted that many of the missing and murdered women in Canada were Aboriginal. The report also noted that the women had a number of characteristics in common, including living in poverty; being homeless, transient, and lacking in social networks; addicted to alcohol or drugs; involved in sex work or other

PROJECT KARE

In Alberta in 2003, the RCMP created an integrated investigative team called Project Kare. According to its website, Project Kare is an investigational unit originally created to examine the deaths of several "high risk missing persons" who were found in rural areas surrounding the City of Edmonton. Kare has since expanded its mandate to include cases of murdered or missing high risk persons from all parts of Alberta. Project Kare includes staff from the RCMP, Edmonton and Calgary police services.

high risk practices such as hitchhiking; and experiencing mental health issues.³⁴ Moreover, according to research by the Native Women's Association of Canada, urban areas are the most risky for women and girls, finding that "70 percent of women and girls disappeared from an urban area, and 60 percent were murdered in an urban area."³⁵ This may be related to the fact that urban centres tend to have more vulnerable women as well as more predators who can perpetuate their crimes in the anonymity of a big city.

While cases of known missing and murdered Aboriginal women are concentrated in the western provinces, no region of Canada is immune; only Prince Edward Island does not have any cases listed in the Native Women's Association of Canada website.³⁶

National and Provincial Initiatives

As a result of high profile cases, and pressure from the community, several police agencies and associations have made significant efforts to address the problem of missing and murdered Aboriginal women. Initiatives such as task forces have been set up in several jurisdictions and a variety of actions have been taken at the municipal, provincial and federal levels, as described earlier. Several of the task forces are described in textboxes throughout this report, and Appendix “A” describes in more detail some of the major initiatives in Canada that have been implemented to support investigations and to increase awareness in both the community and among police agencies.

One of the more promising initiatives underway is a project to create a National Police Support Centre for Missing Children/Missing Persons and Unidentified Human Remains Investigations (known as “NPSCMP”). NPSCMP will encompass National Missing Children Services (NMCS) and expand support to all missing persons investigations as well as all unidentified remains investigations. Using a consolidated database and new public web site, in cooperation with regional partners, the program will put in place a network of support centres for police and coroner/medical examiner investigators across Canada. NPSCMP will operate the infrastructure and the national centre, supporting Canadian and international cases with case analysis as well as conducting research and promoting best practices for these types of investigations.

A key component of this new national databank will be a publicly-accessible website where members of the community may both review missing persons cases, and submit information to the police and other investigative agencies.

The new system (and the corresponding changes to CPIC, the Canadian Police Information Centre) will ensure that this locally-reported data gets transferred to the

MANITOBA TASK FORCE

In 2009, Manitoba formed a murdered and missing women task force. It is comprised of experienced investigators from the RCMP and the Winnipeg Police Service. The Province of Manitoba is represented on the task force’s steering committee. The mandate of the task force is to review and investigate unsolved homicide files involving female victims, review missing person files involving female victims where foul play is suspected, and to determine if any links exist between the cases.

national MC/MPUR database, and out to (yet to be fully-established) regional missing persons centres. The regional centres will also conduct comprehensive analysis and correlation of reported data, and ensure that local police departments are informed of each missing persons case, as well as trends in their jurisdiction, region, and province.

According to NPSCMP project staff, analysis of missing persons data in the new databank will be comprehensive. Leading-edge mathematical and statistical techniques will be used to sift through all of Canada’s missing persons reports to identify patterns and commonalities. Spatial and temporal analyses will attempt to identify any cases which may be related, and therefore in need of focus by investigators. The NPSCMP team will communicate any significant analytical results to the appropriate regional missing persons centre.³⁷

On October 29, 2010, the Honourable Rona Ambrose, Minister of Public Works and Government Services and Minister for Status of Women, announced at Vancouver Police Department Headquarters many important initiatives, including the MC/MPUR project described above, to address the “disturbingly high number of missing and murdered Aboriginal Women in Canada.”³⁸

Minister Ambrose also announced:³⁹

- the investment of \$10 million over two years to improve community safety and to ensure that the justice system and law enforcement agencies can better respond to cases of missing and murdered Aboriginal women;
- a new National Police Support Centre for Missing Persons to help police forces across Canada by providing coordination and specialized support in missing persons investigations;
- a national website to encourage the public to provide tips and information on missing persons cases and unidentified human remains;
- enhancing the CPIC database to capture additional missing persons data;
- amendments to the *Criminal Code* to streamline the warrants application process where wiretaps are required in missing person cases; and
- a comprehensive list of best practices to help communities, law enforcement and justice partners in future work.

PART II: INVESTIGATIVE CHALLENGES

The Challenges to Investigations of Missing and Murdered Aboriginal Women

It is a tragic sign of the size and scope of the problem that there have been or continue to be multiple investigations in Canada into missing/murdered women, many of whom are Aboriginal, including cases of serial murder. BC, Alberta and Manitoba have all formed large task forces/ joint operations (e.g., Missing Women Task Force, EPANA regarding the Highway of Tears case,^{40, 41} Project Kare,⁴² and the Manitoba Task Force⁴³) to deal with the investigations of large numbers of women who have gone missing or been murdered.

However, there are many challenges unique to the investigation of murdered and missing Aboriginal women. These challenges are related to the lifestyle and characteristics of the victims, the nature of the crimes where foul play is involved, and the lack of adequate resourcing or expertise in some police agencies.

This report only outlines a few of the factors that impact this type of investigation. Those listed here tend to have the biggest impact on the investigation and thus are most relevant to any discussion about protection of these vulnerable women.

Lack of Police Investigative Expertise and Capacity

While larger police forces usually have missing persons units, there are many medium-size and small police agencies in Canada that do not. For small communities in particular, the critical mass may not exist to have a specialized unit or to develop the investigative proficiency desired. Further, an Amnesty International brief points out that most police agencies do not have policies and procedures specific to the issue of missing Aboriginal women.⁴⁴ This is particularly relevant for Aboriginal communities. Being sensitive to the community, particularly in small rural areas, will help build the community's trust in the police and encourage them to report people who are missing.

The numbers of missing and murdered women, and the number of investigations that are needed, emphasizes the need for specialized resources within all police agencies, either directly, or through participation in a regional unit, or through the development of protocols with nearby larger agencies. National or provincial standards for the investigations would be beneficial in ensuring that every agency follows best practices for the investigation of missing persons – particularly Aboriginal and marginalized people – and that staff are adequately trained, both in relevant investigative techniques and the unique aspects of missing person investigations. It is important that the affected communities should be consulted in developing these standards. As the ones most impacted by the police actions, it will ensure that the community's needs are respected. Further, having standards for this type of investigation, clear expectations of the officers, and sensitivity to the culture of the community will help to avoid situations of perceived apathy, ignorance, or neglect of those at risk.

It is noteworthy that the Canadian Association of Chiefs of Police (CACP) is advocating for such standards, they are a part of the new



I was an addict in the Downtown Eastside. There was this program about someone arresting this pig farmer and I was feeling sick because I had just been there. I could have been one of those women. Missing and murdered Aboriginal women is...a social issue. It's important for the police in Canada to step up and say..."this is not ok."

LISA YELLOW-QUILL
BLUE THUNDERBIRD WOMAN/STRONG
MEDICINE WOMAN STANDING
CO-MANAGER ABORIGINAL WOMEN'S
PROGRAM/STV COUNSELLOR
BATTERED WOMEN'S SUPPORT SERVICES

NPSCMP's mandate, and significant NPSCMP consultation with stakeholders is occurring.

The Mobility of Missing Persons

Investigations into missing persons are difficult when the person is known to be transient. Obviously, those who move frequently, or who do not have a consistent place to call home, can be challenging to find. Determination of when they were last seen and where they went missing from, as well as where they can be located, is more complicated than for those who are less mobile.

As a whole, Aboriginal people living off-reserve move more frequently than other people living in Canada. A 2001 report noted that "off-reserve Registered Indian women in all age groups were the most likely to report having moved in the past five years."⁴⁵ This may result in missing Aboriginal women having limited community connections, posing problems for reporting and police response.



Police in Canada need to ensure there is cross-jurisdictional communication about people who are missing... and they need to also set a standard for themselves in how to deal with marginalized people.

KATE GIBSON
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR
WISH DROP-IN CENTRE SOCIETY

Because this is a problem that is more frequent within Aboriginal communities, it is crucially important that police agencies build good relationships with Aboriginal communities in both urban and rural settings. This may be particularly relevant in urban settings given the increased risk of victimization that Aboriginal women face there. These relationships can be built in a variety of ways, both official and unofficial, but the key is for the police to be engaged with the vulnerable populations in their communities.

Lack of Coordination Among Police Agencies

The high level of mobility of Aboriginal women in Canada may result in weaker ties to community and family. Further, in many cases family members are in different jurisdictions from the missing person, complicating reporting to police. And while 81 percent of Canada's population lives in cities, only 54 percent of Aboriginals do.⁴⁶ This means a significant number live in small communities, in rural areas and on reserves, which may increase the challenges for effective investigations, because of a lack of specialized

resources. In addition, several different policing jurisdictions may be involved, which can create many problems. These include the potential for patterns of offending to be missed thus reducing the seriousness with which the problem is viewed, inadequate communication, and lack of policing capacity to address the problem, among others. These problems are compounded by the increased mobility of Aboriginals compared to Canadians overall. Consistent policing standards could help address these challenges, particularly in under-resourced areas.

Coordination is the most difficult to accomplish but is the most important because it has the greatest potential to impact this problem. A significant number of missing women come from small and under-resourced communities. Their police agencies (including First Nations police services) may be under-resourced as well and patterns across several communities may not be detected because the missing women are considered in isolation as "one-offs." This situation can contribute to an under-reaction by the community and by police agencies. For example, under current investigative practices, women may go missing from a number of isolated communities. These cases may be linked, and foul play may be a factor, yet this fact will not be recognized by the police community because of a lack of communication and coordination. As each case is currently reported separately to a different investigator at the victim's local police agency or detachment, the existence of multiple individual cases may not be noticed unless there is significant communication between the police agencies about cases in their areas. Potentially, a serial offender may be at work, and what may be the only evidence – an unexplained spike in the number of missing women – may not be readily apparent.

Complicating this scenario is the fact that these communities may be in different provinces, making the likelihood of the incidents being connected even lower.

Therefore, it is important that there is analysis on a regional, provincial and national level to identify anomalous patterns of missing Aboriginal women on an inter-jurisdictional basis, and to look for linkages between cases. BC and other provinces have made significant progress in this regard, as will be described later in this report. In addition, the NPSCMP is now mandated to assist with coordination. Finally, best practices developed by the NPSCMP and the CACP will also help improve the quality of analysis.

Delays in Reporting

As was the case in Vancouver’s Missing Women serial murder case, marginalized people are often not reported missing for lengthy periods of time – weeks, months, years and, in some cases, even decades after they were last seen. This time delay creates incredible challenges for police investigators, because of a lack of a clear timeline, witnesses, forensics or suspects when foul play is involved. Historically, police did not treat a missing persons case as one of foul play unless there was clear evidence of such. Some agencies’ policies have now changed to require that all missing persons cases be treated as “suspicious” until there is evidence to the contrary.⁴⁷ Further, police agencies have become more aware of the significance of spikes in the number of reported missing people, particularly when the missing persons are considered highly vulnerable to victimization.

Lack of Access to Useful Databases

An important investigative strategy for locating missing persons is accessing non-police databases, such as social assistance, health, employment, bank or utilities records. In Vancouver’s Missing Women case, difficulty accessing health records from other provinces was a significant barrier in the investigation, with privacy legislation often cited. With a missing persons investigation and no crime

HIGHWAY OF TEARS

According to the BC All Chiefs’ Task Force, BC’s “Highway of Tears,” Hwy 16 between Prince George and Prince Rupert, has seen 32 women missing or murdered since 1969, most of whom were young Aboriginal women. The RCMP’s investigation, “EPANA,” has a mandate to analyze each relevant file to determine if there is sufficient evidence to support the theory that a serial killer is responsible, and to develop and implement strategies that will advance the investigations. The cases span a time frame from 1969 to 2006 and cover an area from Prince Rupert to the north, Kamloops and Merritt to the south, and Hinton, Alberta to the east.

known to have occurred, no search warrant is available to overcome this problem. In the Vancouver case, persistent efforts, including written requests, assistance from the Provincial Coroner, and other appeals, helped police to overcome these barriers. Using a variety of databases, in particular provincial health records, Vancouver Police investigators were able to locate several missing women living in other provinces and the United States. These women would not have been located without police access to these databases.

One solution to this challenge would be for federal, provincial and territorial governments to develop harmonized legislation that would allow police access to personal information of persons reported missing, as has been recommended in several reports⁴⁸ and in a resolution by the Alberta Chiefs of Police.⁴⁹ In May 2011, Alberta passed the first such legislation in Canada and this could be used as a model for other provinces.⁵⁰ Not only would having such legislation allow police agencies access to important information to locate individuals, it would also mean that record holder agencies from different areas would

be operating from the same privacy framework thus allowing timely access to relevant information.

Lack of Data

Police-reported crime data in general is known to underestimate actual crime and this is particularly relevant in missing persons cases. There are likely more missing Aboriginal (and otherwise marginalized) women than have been reported because of a variety of barriers to reporting. According to the report of the Federal/Provincial/Territorial Missing Women Working Group, barriers include a lack of public understanding of when and how to make a report, as well as systemic problems with police taking reports and regularly entering them on appropriate databases, including the national Canadian Police Information Center (CPIC) computer network.⁵¹

As a result, the data that is known about missing women is often incomplete or out of date. In part, the issues stem from police policies and practices that are not conducive to these types of cases. Further, due to delays associated with manual data entry, police databases are not able to include up-to-the-minute information. CPIC, while a good resource in many cases, is not a sufficiently searchable national database and is therefore less valuable as an investigative tool for missing persons. Finally, there are consistency problems with the data (such as whether the person is known or just suspected to be missing, and whether they have any particular risk factors) which makes it difficult to link cases where there are commonalities.⁵²

PART III: SOLUTIONS AND NEXT STEPS

Closing the Gaps: What’s Still Needed

A great deal of work has occurred in government and police agencies at the municipal, provincial and national levels, and this is commendable. However, there is much more that can be done to reduce the number of missing and murdered Aboriginal women in Canada.

The majority of the efforts and improvements to date have focused on improving the police investigative response going forward, and in creating task forces for specific investigations. In addition, there have been improvements in information collection, but these efforts are inconsistent across jurisdictions, with great

variability in the level and sophistication of resources across Canada. Much more needs to be done to provide uniform systems for collecting, analyzing, coordinating and taking action on the information received. These are all areas that are currently within the power of governments and police agencies to significantly improve. More challenging, but most importantly, more needs to be done to reduce the likelihood of Aboriginal women going missing and being murdered in the first place; this will require more attention to the systemic causes of marginalization that occur among Aboriginal women. While this is a daunting, ongoing task, it must be a priority. Further, those tasks that can be accomplished in the shorter term must receive urgent attention.

Below are several proposals designed to reduce barriers to reporting, improve the response to reports of missing Aboriginal women, and improve relationships between police agencies and Aboriginal communities.

Provincial Centralized “Clearing Houses” With 1-800 Phone Numbers

There are two areas for improvement related to reporting. First, in some cases, people are unclear about to whom they should report a missing person. They may live in one community but the missing person may have disappeared from another community. Second, even if they do manage to report the person missing to a local police department, the information may or may not be received by the police jurisdiction responsible for the community where the person was last seen, thus delaying (or eliminating the possibility of) a proper investigation. As demonstrated in the Vancouver Missing Women investigation, a person could be reported missing in one community, but the information wouldn’t become known to the community from which the person had actually gone missing. For example, the person would be reported missing in community “A” because that’s where her family lived and the information would be placed on CPIC. But community “B,” the location from which the person went missing, wouldn’t be alerted and neither jurisdiction would be actively looking for her. Alternatively, a reportee in community “A” would be told they had to call the police in community “B” to make the report, but would be unable to get through to that jurisdiction’s report line, or might be dissuaded because of long distance charges, a misunderstanding about the process, or inconsistent police practices.⁵³

Obviously, it is impossible for police to investigate cases that they have no knowledge of and increasing the accessibility of reporting for missing persons would improve police

investigations and increase the probability of an earlier identification and subsequent arrest of an active serial killer. In the wake of Pickton’s arrest in the Vancouver Missing Women case in 2002, then-Vancouver Councillor Lynne Kennedy chaired a committee and facilitated six meetings that included sex trade workers and grassroots advocacy groups. The Committee’s goal was to identify ways to prevent such situations from occurring in the future. One of the recommendations of the committee’s report to Vancouver Council was that a 1-800 phone number should be created:

Over the past 20 years we have seen too many examples of how the process for reporting missing people is seriously flawed. From the victims of Clifford Olsen to the missing women from the Downtown Eastside...we are faced with the inadequacy of the current system. One of the most important recommendations to come out of the consultation sessions was that a 1-800 number needs to be set up to report missing people. It should provide up to date information on the case as well as what the concerned individuals can do to help in the search. This tip line should be a regional source for police, so that the missing person’s loved ones don’t have to make a report to individual municipalities.⁵⁴

In March 2005, Ms. Kennedy, by then a member of the Vancouver Police Board, made the same recommendation to a Parliamentary Subcommittee on Solicitation Laws.⁵⁵

While efforts to improve relationships between the community and police can potentially reduce barriers to reporting, they do not necessarily improve coordination between agencies, or improve access to police for families living outside of the jurisdiction where the missing person was last seen.

As a result, it is proposed that there should be a provincial 1-800 number to take reports of missing persons. The purpose would not be to replace existing intake processes in various jurisdictions; rather, it would be used to provide an additional point of access. Further, a centralized “clearing house” model would ensure that cases would not fall between the cracks, in that the clearing house could liaise with the appropriate police agency of jurisdiction to ensure an investigation is initiated and supported.

This could be accomplished in BC by increasing the capacity of the existing BC Police Missing Persons Centre. The BCPMPC currently has three authorized positions but is seeking approval for an additional three positions. Though they currently only provide services to the police community in BC, these additional resources would likely provide the capacity to develop and support an interactive website to serve the public as well. Further, a 1-800 phone number has been considered in the past by the Centre and new resources should provide the capacity to finally implement this important service. As well, increased service could be provided to reportees who are having difficulty accessing information about their cases.

By acting in this supplementary “clearing house” role, the level of analysis conducted by the BCPMPC could be enhanced to provide essentially an “early warning system” for anomalous patterns of missing persons. The BCPMPC, with appropriate software, could provide regional analysis of missing persons data, which would augment the Centre’s examination of provincial trends. In this regard, the VPD has developed a data-mining system for extracting and conducting complex analysis on the information contained within the Police Records Information Management Environment (PRIME), the records management system used by all police agencies



There has been a tremendous amount of social apathy, including the perception of apathy by law enforcement across the country. And things like jurisdictional issues where a woman has gone missing in an urban setting and then is found in a rural setting.

ANGELA MACDOUGALL
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR
BATTERED WOMEN’S SUPPORT SERVICES

in BC. The VPD’s Consolidated Records Intelligence Mining Environment (CRIME) system provides the capability to analyze multi-jurisdictional data from all three PRIME servers in the province. The Analysts are able to create complex queries to identify trends and quickly identify crime series in the early stages, such as predatory sex offences, using incident details and geo-spatial patterns with advanced software applications. This analysis capacity has evolved over several years and matured into a sophisticated system that has resulted in several notable successes and has been recognized as a best-practice.⁵⁶

Although PRIME is not used universally by police agencies in Canada, similar software could be used to data mine the appropriate police databases. This basic model could therefore likely be replicated in every province and formalized processes could be developed to provide for inter-provincial communication and cooperation, such as is already occurring to some extent between the RCMP in BC and Alberta, as described earlier.

National Clearing House with a 1-800 Phone Number

Thus far, Canadian agencies have not yet considered a national contact number with links to each province and territory. The improvements that have been suggested have largely focused on improving police coordination rather than public involvement and engagement. Despite the MC/MPUR initiative announced by Minister Ambrose in October 2010, no mention of a national 1-800 contact number has been made. Further, while the MC/MPUR project will have the capacity to take tips on its website, it is centered on local reporting of missing persons to the victim's (and in some cases the reportee's as well) police agency of jurisdiction. Thus, it is worthwhile to consider expanding the 1-800 program to a national level.

A national system has been implemented in Australia with some success. The Australia Federal Police operates a national website funded by the federal government devoted to, among other goals, reducing the incidence and impact of missing persons. While the national website doesn't include a 1-800 phone number, there are only seven state and territorial police services in Australia and each has a missing persons unit with their phone numbers and websites linked to the federal website. Australia is similar to Canada in several regards: it has a relatively small population (~22 million) in a very large country (the sixth largest in the world and more than three-quarters the area of Canada); it has a similar history of residential schools and failed assimilation of its Aboriginal population; and it has a federal police service. Its Aboriginal population has many similarities, despite the cultural differences, to those in Canada and research has shown that Aboriginal people in Canada and Australia face very similar challenges.

Based on what has been learned from experience in BC and elsewhere, and considering the very large number of police agencies in Canada, we propose that an additional component of the national MC/MPUR project be created that will focus on deployment of a new national "800 number" for reporting missing persons, tips, and related information. Such a service would augment the tip capabilities already being created on the NPSCMP public website.

Though the world is becoming a very Internet-based global community, it is important to recognize that many isolated (and often impoverished) communities lack reliable Internet access, and the depressed social environment in many of these communities is not supportive of incident reporting (or tip passing) via the Internet as the sole method of communication. If a small community does not have Internet access, then a website will be of no use whatsoever. Use of a contact phone number is necessary for those who do not have access to, are intimidated by, or are unaware of the public website. Cell phones have become very common and so a 1-800 number is often a more practical alternative.

This model already exists for other purposes, such as the National Child Exploitation Coordination Centre,⁵⁷ which has a mandate to be a centralized contact point for child exploitation files, ensuring that they are sent to the appropriate jurisdictional police agency for follow-up investigation. Further, the RCMP's "National Missing Children Services" includes the website "Our Missing Children,"⁵⁸ which features a toll-free phone number for inquiries (although it is currently intended for police use only). It may therefore be possible to utilize existing infrastructure to accommodate a national 1-800 phone number for missing Aboriginal women to complement the proposed national website. However accomplished, this would be an important addition to reduce barriers to reporting, assist police, and provide better service to the community.

CASE STUDY ► WHY WE MUST IMPROVE THE NATIONAL COORDINATION OF MISSING PERSONS INVESTIGATIONS

What exists today:

A 20-year-old Aboriginal woman leaves a reservation in northern Alberta. She tells her mother she is travelling to Vancouver, but might stop off in Prince George, BC. Her mother doesn't hear from her for one month. She visits the local police agency and files a police report with a young patrol officer. The case is not given any priority because:

- the incident did not occur in their jurisdiction of the police taking the missing persons report so it is not a priority;
- the local police do not have access to databases in Alberta and BC;
- the local police do not know which policing jurisdiction to contact to ask for further assistance and police in Prince George and Vancouver aren't aware she might have gone missing from one of their jurisdictions;
- the young police officer does not have any expertise in investigating missing persons cases; and
- the local police agency is not big enough to have a specialized missing persons unit.

What we need:

The mother of the missing northern Alberta woman phones the national toll-free phone number. She is asked for basic information to initiate a file and is instructed to visit her local police agency to file a report. The local police agency is familiar with the SisterWatch program and quickly assists the mother of the missing person, including offering culturally sensitive support to the family. Ideally, Victim Services personnel would have Aboriginal staff available, but at the least should be trained about and sensitive to Aboriginal cultural issues that may impact on the investigation. An investigator from the national or provincial centre contacts the local police agency and offers investigative assistance and advice including an offer to query various databases to determine if the missing person is accessing services. Initial queries show that the missing person is not accessing services and there is a determination that she may be the victim of foul play. If necessary, additional resources are offered to provincial or local missing persons units. An analyst in the national centre will also compare this new missing person report with other occurrences (including across provincial borders) to see if there is a trend. The national centre will further support the local police jurisdiction and may request that various police agencies (such as Prince George RCMP and Vancouver Police) conduct further inquiries. This same model could be replicated at the provincial level to create a network of provincial centres across Canada linked to the national centre. (There are many challenges to achieving such a conceptual model, and progress is being made, but gaps remain.)

THE SISTERWATCH PROJECT

COMMUNITY OUTREACH

One result of the problem of *missing* Aboriginal women is *murdered* Aboriginal women. Though police response is a significant piece of the puzzle, it is essential that efforts are put towards prevention. Communities and police need to work together to reduce the risk of victimization for women, find them quickly when they are missing (if they can be found), and finally, capture and incarcerate predators quickly so that they cannot continue to victimize.

By no means has this area been ignored at the local or national levels. The Government of Canada should be commended for its recognition of the importance of prevention efforts. In its announcement in October 2010, the Department of Justice committed to providing “\$1 million to support the development of school- and community-based pilot projects to help heal, move forward and provide alternatives to high-risk behaviour for young Aboriginal women, including young offenders.”⁵⁹

At the local level, the Vancouver Police Department implemented, in collaboration with a grassroots community organization called the Women’s Memorial March Committee, a program called “SisterWatch” in the fall of 2010.⁶⁰ SisterWatch came about because of the tragic September 2010 death of a young Aboriginal woman, Ashley Machiskinic, who fell from a window in the Downtown Eastside, leading many in the community to believe she had been murdered. Community activists occupied VPD offices demanding a meeting with the Chief Constable. A meeting with the Chief Constable occurred soon after, and as a result, a police/community partnership was born between the VPD and the “Women’s Memorial March Committee.” (The VPD originally called the program the “Guardian

The work we are doing [in SisterWatch] is ground breaking...We are moving forward despite the past and working towards lasting changes that will have ripple effects nationally. I am proud and happy to have the honor of working with all of you.

MONA WOODWARD
SPARKLING FAST RISING RIVER WOMAN
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR
ABORIGINAL FRONT DOOR SOCIETY

Project.” Community committee members expressed concern that this raised the negative connotation of government guardianship and the residential school system and proposed the name SisterWatch. It was unanimously agreed the name should be changed.)

A SisterWatch committee, comprised of representatives from the VPD and the Women’s Memorial March Committee, oversees the program. Initiatives of SisterWatch include the installation of ruggedized “911-only” phones in Vancouver’s Downtown Eastside neighborhood; Town Hall meetings; a speakers’ bureau; a SisterWatch telephone tip line; a SisterWatch website; a reward for information about the death of Ashley Machiskinic; and several major proactive investigations targeting predators in the DTES that proved highly successful, resulting in numerous arrests and serious charges.

TARGETING PREDATORS

One of the first major investigations flowing from the SisterWatch project was “Project Rescue.” Residents of the Downtown Eastside raised concerns through community forums and the SisterWatch Committee about violent drug dealers who were preying on addicted marginalized women and engaging in extreme violence against them. Beat officers had heard about these crimes, but

The SisterWatch program is significant because the program was through collaboration with women from the community. The [SisterWatch] arrests were significant because...it seemed like the police were listening. And instead of arresting the victims of the oppression, they were now after the perpetrators.

LISA YELLOW-QUILL
BLUE THUNDERBIRD WOMAN/STRONG
MEDICINE WOMAN STANDING
CO-MANAGER ABORIGINAL WOMEN'S
PROGRAM/STV COUNSELLOR
BATTERED WOMEN'S SUPPORT SERVICES

most had not been reported. As a result of this information, in September 2010, a major proactive investigation was created – “Project Rescue” – involving detectives from the VPD’s Gangs/Drugs and Major Crimes Sections. The team employed undercover operations, surveillance, and wiretaps, among other investigative strategies. The first phase of the investigation resulted in 60 serious charges against 17 individuals. Further, the VPD laid rare “criminal organization” charges for the first time in its history. The majority of the accused were held in custody resulting in more confidence in the VPD, less fear, and more victims coming forward to report serious, predatory crimes. Subsequent phases of the investigation were equally successful with arrests now totaling approximately 60 accused with 130 charges. The effect was reduced violence against marginalized women and increased community confidence in the VPD.

Law enforcement is all we have. In most regions of Canada, law enforcement is failing...So we’ve come a long way now where we’re sitting at the same table and don’t feel that hostility and we’re working collaboratively.

ANGELA MACDOUGALL
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR
BATTERED WOMEN'S SUPPORT SERVICES

SISTERWATCH TIP LINE

Another project of SisterWatch is a tip line. Initially it was to provide a mechanism to receive information about the death of Ashley Machiskinic, but it evolved into a service for women in the DTES to provide information about any non-emergency situations or crimes in the neighborhood, and also to seek assistance for challenges they are facing. Callers use a dedicated phone number and are connected with non-emergency police dispatch staff at “ECOMM” (the regional 911 centre) who have been specially trained to respond to calls to the SisterWatch line. The SisterWatch phones have also been used by parties wanting to report assaults on other women (who may be too afraid to make a report themselves), or by anyone wishing to provide information on victimizers in a completely safe, anonymous manner. Information collected through the tip line is relayed to the appropriate VPD unit and/or community service agency. Dedicated police staff vet any information received and correlate it with information from other sources to ensure that no case “falls through the cracks.”

DOWNTOWN EASTSIDE 911-ONLY PHONES



The community raised the concern that most pay phones had been removed from the Downtown Eastside (because of frequent malicious damage and their use by drug dealers). The VPD responded by having several strategically-placed “911-only” “ruggedized” telephones in this at-risk neighbourhood. The special telephones

CASE STUDY ► MARTIN TREMBLAY



At the SisterWatch meetings, the community raised concerns about a male from outside the Downtown Eastside who they believed was preying on young Aboriginal girls. After hearing community concerns, Tremblay was targeted in Project Rescue and was arrested for drug trafficking. When told about the charges, community members attended the bail hearing to support the prosecutor. The judge denied Tremblay bail, and he subsequently pleaded guilty and received an unusually high 12-month sentence for trafficking. As soon as he was sentenced, VPD Inspector Dean Robinson asked for victims and witnesses to come forward:

We don't usually tell you about a person's extensive criminal record or that we suspect their involvement in many unsolved crimes but this time is different. We believe that the danger and damage being done to vulnerable women and, in particular, young Aboriginal women, in the Downtown Eastside is so prevalent that we need to take extraordinary measures to safeguard the women who are at risk. As a result of SisterWatch, Martin Tremblay has been charged with four counts of trafficking cocaine and one charge of possession of cocaine for the purposes of trafficking. He is currently in jail. He's a convicted sex offender who in 2002 was found guilty of five counts of sexual assault. In those cases he used alcohol and drugs to lure and incapacitate his victims.

We know the community is very concerned about this criminal. Even though he is in

TIMOTHY BEITH CASE STUDY

A community member brought concerns about a sexual predator preying on marginalized and addicted Aboriginal to a patrol member. She worked tirelessly to confirm the information and then brought it to the SisterWatch investigative team which took over the investigation. As a result, Timothy Beith, 59, was arrested and charged with two counts of sexual assault and two counts of voyeurism. A SisterWatch committee member remarked, "To me, this is a great example of what we can accomplish together to make the community safer for women."

jail now, we believe the only way we can guarantee that he won't harm more women is if he stays in jail. In order for that to happen, we are taking this extraordinary measure of putting out his picture in hopes that other people who can give us information that will help our investigation will be able to recognize him and come forward. We are interested in hearing from anyone who has information about this man. We have resources available to offer support and reassurance to those who call or come forward. He is in jail now and can't hurt you.



deployed for this project were purchased by the VPD from a company in California and installed at VPD expense. As is the case for all 911 calls in the region, response dispatch staff are located at the regional 911 emergency services facility, “ECOMM,” so no additional costs were incurred. The hardware was a one-time only expense that the VPD could absorb, provided a needed service, and showed the VPD’s commitment to responding to community concerns, which is important to build confidence in the community with the police.

The Importance of Collaboration

As noted earlier, the relationships between the community and the police are integral to the success of investigations. If women don’t trust the police to properly investigate acts of violence against them, then reporting and cooperation by victims and witnesses will suffer. This will embolden the perpetrators and, overall, the women in the community will be less safe. This collaborative approach involving the police and the community is achieving far more than would be possible with unilateral efforts.

To reduce violence against Aboriginal women and respond better when they go

“VIVIAN HOUSE” CASE STUDY

A support worker called the SisterWatch tip line regarding a resident of Vivian House who had been assaulted. The reportee feared for the victim’s safety since she suffers from serious health issues, making it difficult to protect herself. Her drug addiction and involvement in the survival sex trade added to her vulnerability. The tip was forwarded to the SisterWatch investigative team for follow-up. The victim was reluctant to cooperate with police; however, that did not deter investigators from taking steps to interview a possible suspect and ensure that safety measures were in place at Vivian House to support and protect her.

The support worker was extremely pleased with the efforts of the investigators: “...the work you did to help protect [the victim] was really meaningful. There was no arrest, no case, no glory. Just really good work. This type of police work lets predators know that vulnerable people in this community are being watched over and that they can’t get away with murder. I want to thank you myself and extend the thanks of many women in the community for doing what you did.”

missing, the police must always strive to have positive relationships with marginalized communities. SisterWatch is one example of the VPD’s commitment to this goal, as are the assignment of police officers in Native Liaison, Sex Industry Liaison and Homeless Coordinator positions. There has been broad acknowledgement of the positive results of the VPD’s efforts to improve relationships with the DTES community, and in particular with Aboriginal women, and the program is now being expanded to serve marginalized women who live in other areas of Vancouver. This model could be used as a template for other police agencies facing similar challenges.

CONCLUSION

Aboriginal people in Canada face many challenges that are the product of complex social, economic and cultural factors. One of the most troubling manifestations of this situation is that Aboriginal women go missing and are murdered at a rate highly disproportionate to their population. Further, marginalized Aboriginal women, especially those working in the sex trade, have been prey in several provinces for known or suspected serial killers. This tragic situation demands a broad and multi-pronged response. More resources focused on prevention are required to reduce the risk created by the marginalization of Aboriginal women that makes them easy prey for offenders. Further, there must be an improved police response to reports of missing Aboriginal women to overcome the many challenges found in these investigations.

Commendably, much has been done in recent years. The RCMP, both provincially and nationally, have made significant contributions to improving the response to missing and murdered women in Canada, as have other police agencies and associations. Initiatives include well-resourced task forces, improved information sharing and coordination between police jurisdictions, and the development of specialized resources and improved policies. In addition, the continuing development of a national Missing Persons and Unidentified Remains project, which will include a tip website and sophisticated information analysis, is well underway. The federal government has committed to significant new resources to fund this initiative and complementary resources to support improved police investigations and to engage in increased prevention at the community level.

There remains, however, more to do.

Experience has shown that a variety of barriers to reporting and successful investigations still exist, but some of them can be remedied with relatively small allocations of resources.

First, a “clearing house” model with 1-800 phone numbers at the provincial and national levels would make it easier to report missing persons, especially for those in underprivileged communities without Internet access. It would also allow police to correlate information; improve information exchange between jurisdictions; and provide better service to the community. This model could likely be handled within existing provincial and national infrastructure at a relatively small incremental cost.

The SisterWatch tip line is an example of how a creative solution was reached at minimal cost by using existing infrastructure, since the capacity to answer the SisterWatch tip line already existed at ECOMM (the emergency 911 centre) and staff only required some additional training. Likewise, national and provincial 1-800 phone numbers could likely be absorbed into existing infrastructure.

Second, there needs to be harmonized legislation across Canada to provide a mechanism for police to quickly access various provincial and national non-police databases such as health and welfare records that are important to successful investigations.

Third, improved relationships between police and Aboriginal communities – particularly in urban centres – must remain a priority. More confidence in the police means improved reporting of violence against Aboriginal

women, more witnesses coming forward and more rapid reporting to police when Aboriginal women go missing or are victimized. Further, collaboration with affected communities can produce valuable suspect information allowing police to focus investigations on those predators who target Aboriginal women. The SisterWatch Program, a collaboration between the Vancouver Police Department and the Women’s Memorial March Committee, has made significant progress in this regard, and may be a model helpful to other communities.

SisterWatch is really a forward thinking initiative that can have great benefits for the future. It is ground breaking and I think people have to understand the fact that the regular meetings are a safe place to express frustrations, praise, hopes and fears is really important. While it is a collaboration, it is not a place where we all join to pat each other on the backs...but a place where there are difficult conversations...As in any other arena, this serves to build relationships...and opens doors to further collaboration. I think it’s an example that could be followed by all kinds of police forces.

KATE GIBSON
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR
WISH DROP-IN CENTRE SOCIETY

RECOMMENDATIONS

There have been several excellent reports written in Canada on the issue of missing and murdered Aboriginal women resulting in numerous recommendations. These reports include the Amnesty International reports “Stolen Sisters” report from 2004, and the follow-up report “No More Stolen Sisters” from 2009;⁶¹ the “Coordinating Committee of Senior Officials Missing Women Working Group’s Report;”⁶² and the “Final Report of the Provincial Partnership Committee on Missing Persons in Saskatchewan.”⁶³ Each of these reports have made very worthy recommendations, some of which have been described in this report and are reflected in recommendations 1 through 6 below. Recommendations 7 to 9 are recommendations offered by the joint Vancouver Police and Women’s Memorial March SisterWatch Committee based on recent experiences and discussions.

Summary of key existing recommendations:

1. To know the size and nature of the problem and so that resources can be effectively targeted, reliable and comprehensive statistics must be gathered. This starts with police agencies but must end with aggregation and analysis at the local, provincial and national level. A harmonized data collection scheme should be developed to accomplish this goal.
2. Police forces across Canada should implement best-practice protocols for responding to reports of missing Aboriginal women. There need to be standardized protocols for police handling of missing persons cases



including tools for fair and effective assessment of the risk to the missing individual.

3. There should be improved co-ordination of police investigations into long-term missing persons cases and unsolved murders involving Aboriginal women and other women at risk.
4. Police forces should provide specialized staffing to review and coordinate responses to missing persons cases.
5. Police should work closely with Aboriginal women's organizations and other front line groups to identify and implement appropriate and effective protocols for action on missing persons cases, with a view to developing standards for police response in keeping with the risks to Aboriginal women and girls.
6. Prevention is key to reducing victimization. There need to be more resources targeted at assisting Aboriginal women and girls to escape from dangerous circumstances, whether it involves specific circumstances such as violent domestic situations or the sex trade, or the more general danger created by poverty and addiction that results in marginalization.

New SisterWatch Committee Recommendations:

7. There should be a national 1-800 phone number in support of the MC/MPUR website and a "clearing house/centre for excellence" model that serves both the public and police agencies. There must be effective coordination with the provinces to ensure no case falls between the cracks.
8. Every province should have a 1-800 phone number and a missing persons website as part of a "clearing house/centre for excellence model" as described above. At the provincial level, in addition to supporting police agencies, there must be emphasis on ensuring reporting missing persons is simple and low-barrier, and that no report is missed or mishandled because of a lack of communication and/or coordination between jurisdictions.
9. There should be harmonized legislation in all provinces and territories, such as recently passed in Alberta, to provide rapid police access to government databases (e.g., health and social assistance) that would be useful in missing persons investigations.
10. Other police agencies facing similar challenges to Vancouver should consider using the SisterWatch program as a model for community collaboration and targeting of those engaged in predatory violence against marginalized Aboriginal women.

APPENDIX “A”

ORGANIZATION	DESCRIPTION OF INITIATIVES
CANADIAN ASSOCIATION OF CHIEFS OF POLICE (CACP)	<p>In 2006, the Canadian Association of Chiefs of Police passed a resolution recommending that all police services in Canada consider adopting the principles incorporated in the Ontario Provincial Police Lost/Missing Persons Manual specifically with respect to Aboriginal and marginalized people.⁶⁴ The resolution noted that the OPP had produced a “comprehensive and holistic policy manual for dealing with lost/missing persons cases that, with regard to Aboriginal and marginalized people, is based on principles of cultural sensitivity, respect, compassion and empathy.” It is unknown to what extent the resolution has been implemented in police agencies across Canada.</p>
THE FEDERAL/ PROVINCIAL/ TERRITORIAL MISSING WOMEN WORKING GROUP	<p>The BC and Alberta governments proposed a working group of federal, provincial and territorial deputy justice ministers in 2006 to examine issues associated with missing and murdered women in Canada. The goal of the working group was to determine the “extent it is possible to prevent serial sexual predation of women by identifying who is at risk of victimization or offending.”⁶⁵ In September 2010, the working group produced a “condensed” report⁶⁶ and noted it would be producing its full report to federal, provincial and territorial deputy justice ministers in 2011.</p>
MISSING CHILDREN/MISSING PERSONS AND UNIDENTIFIED REMAINS PROJECT (MC/MPUR)	<p>Since 2008, a joint initiative between the CACP, the RCMP, and victims’ advocacy groups to better collect and disseminate information on missing persons and unidentified human remains has grown into a well-funded project to address the problem. Concrete steps have been taken to better capture data on missing persons in CPIC, and to better communicate details of these incidents to provincial, regional, and local police forces.</p>
ALBERTA MISSING PERSONS AND UNIDENTIFIED HUMAN REMAINS JOINT PROJECT	<p>In Alberta, all police agencies and the Chief Medical Examiner have a joint website for Alberta Missing Persons and Unidentified Human Remains. Each police agency is responsible for providing information about its missing persons cases for the website, and staff can be contacted by email and by phone.⁶⁷ According to their website, the RCMP in Alberta began a pilot project with the RCMP in BC that has emphasized the benefits of participation by multiple jurisdictions. Discussions are being held with stakeholders in Saskatchewan and Manitoba with an objective of a “regional program/database” and website that will allow the public access to materials and information relating to Western Canadian missing person files. The project envisioned a national website, and noted the importance of protocols across police jurisdictions at the regional, provincial and national levels to provide for a consistent response.</p>

BC POLICE MISSING PERSON CENTRE (BCPMPC)

In British Columbia, in 2005, with the support of the BC Association of Chiefs of Police, the RCMP created the British Columbia Police Missing Persons Centre (BCPMPC). This is an integrated unit within the RCMP E Division Major Crime Section and is comprised of both RCMP and municipal police resources. There are currently three police positions: two RCMP investigators and one municipal police service investigator. The BCPMPC is committed to the interests of all police agencies in BC. The mandate of the Unit is to provide guidance and support to investigators during the course of missing persons investigations, and it is also responsible for provincial missing persons policy development and oversight of the provincial AMBER Alert program. The BCPMPC monitors and reviews current missing persons investigations, particularly those that are identified as high risk in nature. The Unit also responds to daily requests for assistance and guidance, conducts historical file reviews upon request, and provides training for missing persons investigations. The BCPMPC is an active participant in the Canadian strategy on Missing Persons and Unidentified Human Remains.⁶⁸

BC CORONER’S OFFICE

The BC Coroner’s Service has a website for those seeking information about unidentified human remains and has a toll-free phone number. They can also be contacted by email. However, they do not have any information on missing persons.⁶⁹

MANITOBA ASSOCIATION OF CHIEFS OF POLICE

The Manitoba Association of Chiefs of Police has a website with a missing persons portion.⁷⁰ There are multiple participating police agencies from Manitoba, including RCMP, municipal and Aboriginal police agencies and the Military Police that participate in this project. The site has a search capability for cases in its database. This site is maintained by the RCMP in Manitoba for “Project Disappear,” Manitoba’s Missing Persons/Cold Case project.

SASKATCHEWAN ASSOCIATION OF CHIEFS OF POLICE

The Saskatchewan Association of Chiefs of Police created a website which provides analysis of missing persons from 1940 to 2009 with race, gender and geographic location.⁷¹ The website also provides detailed statistics on missing persons.

ONTARIO PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT

Ontario and the Provincial Coroner have a joint website for their Missing Persons and Unidentified Bodies Unit.⁷² Citizens can provide information by email or they can phone a manned telephone line during business hours (with voice mail after business hours).⁷³

MUNICIPAL AGENCIES

Many municipal and regional police agencies in Canada have missing person’s websites, including the Halifax Regional Police;⁷⁴ the Ottawa Police Service;⁷⁵ the Peel Regional Police;⁷⁶ the Prince Albert Police Service;⁷⁷ the Regina Police Service;⁷⁸ the Saskatoon Police Service;⁷⁹ and the Vancouver Police Department.⁸⁰ Generally these sites contain information regarding current missing person cases with photographs, directions on how to make a report, contact information, links to other sites, and so on.

ENDNOTES

- ¹ Amnesty International, *Canada: Stolen Sisters – A human rights response to violence and discrimination against Indigenous women*, AI Index AMR 20/003/2004, October 4, 2004, available at www.amnesty.ca/stolensisters/amr2000304.pdf.
- ² These reports are available at <http://www.amnesty.ca/stolensisters/amr2000304.pdf> and www.amnesty.ca/amnestynews/upload/AMR200122009.pdf, respectively.
- ³ The Women's Memorial March came about as a result of a horrific January 1992 murder in Vancouver. The women in the community were mobilized into action and out of this sense of hopelessness, frustration, outrage and feeling like no one was listening to them about the increasing violence against women in the downtown eastside, they organized a march through the streets with the names and sometimes photographs of women in the community who had died or were murdered. Each year on February 14, women (and men) take to the streets to bring attention to those women who have been murdered or gone missing. The march aims to emphasize the work that is yet to be done to prevent and end violence against women in the downtown eastside. The Women's Memorial March Committee exists to organize this event, and to do advocacy work on related issues.
- ⁴ www12.statcan.ca/census-recensement/2006/as-sa/97-558/pdf/97-558-XIE2006001.pdf
- ⁵ Report of the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples (RCAP), 1996, downloaded April 26, 2011 from www.collectionscanada.gc.ca/webarchives/20071115053257/www.ainc-inac.gc.ca/ch/rcap/sg/sgmm_e.html.
- ⁶ Statistics Canada. Inuit, Metis and First Nations, 2006 Census Findings, downloaded April 26, 2011 from <http://www12.statcan.ca/census-recensement/2006/as-sa/97-558/index-eng.cfm>, p. 6. Also see www.hc-sc.gc.ca/fniah-spnia/alt_formats/fnihb-dgspni/pdf/pubs/aborig-autoch/2009-stats-profil-eng.pdf.
- ⁷ Jodi-Anne Brzozowski, Andrea Taylor-Butts and Sara Johnson, "Victimization and offending among the Aboriginal population in Canada", *Juristat*. Vol. 26, no. 3, Canadian Centre for Justice Statistics, 2006. Downloaded April 26, 2007 from www.statcan.gc.ca/pub/85-002-x/85-002-x2006003-eng.pdf, p. 3.
- ⁸ Health Canada. A Statistical Profile on the Health of First Nations in Canada – Self-rated Health and Selected Conditions, 2002 to 2005, downloaded from www.hc-sc.gc.ca/fniah-spnia/alt_formats/pdf/pubs/aborig-autoch/2009-stats-profil-vol3/2009-stats-profil-vol3-eng.pdf.
- ⁹ See, for example, www.hc-sc.gc.ca/fniah-spnia/alt_formats/fnihb-dgspni/pdf/pubs/aborig-autoch/2009-stats-profil-eng.pdf.
- ¹⁰ Ibid, note 7, p. 6.
- ¹¹ See, for example, www.hc-sc.gc.ca/fniah-spnia/promotion/suicide/index-eng.php, www.hc-sc.gc.ca/fniah-spnia/promotion/mental/index-eng.php and www.hc-sc.gc.ca/fniah-spnia/pubs/promotion/_suicide/prev_youth-jeunes/section2-eng.php#s212.
- ¹² Ibid, note 7, p. 13.
- ¹³ Ibid, p. 9.
- ¹⁴ See, for example, www.cbc.ca/news/canada/story/2008/05/16/f-faqs-residential-schools.html, downloaded April 27, 2011.
- ¹⁵ See www.cbc.ca/news/canada/story/2008/06/11/pm-statement.html, downloaded April 27, 2011.
- ¹⁶ Aboriginal Women: A Demographic, Social and Economic Profile, Indian and Northern Affairs Canada, Summer 1996. Downloaded on April 26, 2011 from www.ainc-inac.gc.ca/ai/rs/pubs/sts/awp/awp-eng.asp.
- ¹⁷ Ibid, note 7, and Samuel Perreault (2011) *Violent victimization of Aboriginal people in the Canadian provinces, 2009*, Juristat Article, Statistics Canada, catalogue no. 85-002-X. Available at www.statcan.gc.ca/pub/85-002-x/2011001/article/11415-eng.pdf.

- ¹⁸ It is difficult to know how many Aboriginal women and girls have been murdered or are missing in Canada. In 2005, the United Nations Human Rights Committee asked the federal government to provide statistics on this issue, but the government was apparently unable to do so. There are several reasons for the lack of data, but a significant one is the reluctance of police agencies to collect data on the race of victims; police have been criticized in the past for “racist” policies and not having a bona fide need for this information pursuant to protection of privacy legislation.
- ¹⁹ From the 2004 Stolen Sisters report, citing: PACE Society, *Violence against Women in the Vancouver’s Street Level Sex Trade and the Police Response*, Vancouver, 2000, p. 82, pp. 32-3, p. 6.
- ²⁰ Vancouver Police Department, “Missing Women Investigation Review,” September 2010, p. 54. Available at vancouver.ca/police/media/2010/MWInvestigationReview_final2.pdf.
- ²¹ Doreen Duchesne (1997). *Street Prostitution in Canada*. Juristat Vol. 17, no. 2, Canadian Centre for Justice Statistics, Statistics Canada, pp. 8-9.
- ²² John Lowman & L. Fraser (1995). *Violence against persons who prostitute: The experience in British Columbia*. Ottawa: Department of Justice.
- ²³ Jonathan Dudek (2001). *When Silenced Voices Speak: An Exploratory Study of Prostitute Homicide*, Doctoral dissertation, MCP Hahnemann University, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, p. 389.
- ²⁴ Lindsay Kines and David Hogben, “20 outstanding files: A group of prostitutes is convinced a serial killer is responsible for disappearances in Vancouver, but the police disagree,” *National Post Online*, March 3, 1999. (Binder 3, Tab 85.)
- ²⁵ Ibid, note 20.
- ²⁶ The video-recording of this apology is available at vancouver.ca/police/assets/pdf/pickton-decision-leopard-statement.pdf.
- ²⁷ See vancouver.ca/police/assets/pdf/lessons-learned-mw-investigation.pdf.
- ²⁸ See, for example, Lori Culbert, “Lost, Not Forgotten – After a scathing audit, investigators who track down the missing are winning accolades” in the *Vancouver Sun*, December 2, 2006, available at www.missingpeople.net/lost_not_forgotten.htm) and Stephanie Levitz, “Lessons from tragedy: how Vancouver’s missing women changed police,” *Canadian Press*, January 7, 2007, available at www.missingpeople.net/lessons_from_tragedy.htm
- ²⁹ Coordinating Committee of Senior Officials Missing Women Working Group Report: “Issues Related to the High Number of Murdered and Missing Women in Canada,” September 2010, p. 8 (available at www.scics.gc.ca/CMFiles/830992005_e1MAJ-2112011-6827.pdf).
- ³⁰ www.statcan.gc.ca/pub/85-002-x/85-002-x1998002-eng.pdf
- ³¹ Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness Canada, DNA Missing Persons Index (MPI), A Public Consultation Paper, March 2005, available at www.ulcc.ca/en/poam2/DNA_Missing_Persons_Index_CP_En.pdf
- ³² Final Report of the Provincial Partnership Committee on Missing Persons, October 2007, p. 19, www.justice.gov.sk.ca/adx/asp/adxGetMedia.aspx?DocID=3025,104,81,1,Documents&MediaID=1615&Filename=missing-persons-final.pdf
- ³³ Native Women’s Association of Canada. “What Their Stories Tell Us – Research findings from the Sisters in Spirit initiative”, 2010. Available at www.nwac.ca/sites/default/files/imce/2010_NWAC_SIS_Report_EN.pdf.
- ³⁴ Coordinating Committee of Senior Officials Missing Women Working Group Report: “Issues Related to the High Number of Murdered and Missing Women in Canada,” September 2010, p. 3 (available at www.scics.gc.ca/CMFiles/830992005_e1MAJ-2112011-6827.pdf)
- ³⁵ Ibid, note 33, p. ii.
- ³⁶ Ibid, note 33, p. 25.

- ³⁷ Information received in telephone conversation with Sgt. Lana Prosper, RCMP Missing Persons/Unidentified Human Remains Initiative, April 7, 2011.
- ³⁸ www.justice.gc.ca/eng/news-nouv/nr-cp/2010/doc_32560.html.
- ³⁹ www.justice.gc.ca/eng/news-nouv/nr-cp/2010/doc_32564.html.
- ⁴⁰ www.fns.bc.ca/pdf/ACTFMissingWomenFactSheet_02_2010.pdf, downloaded April 27, 2011.
- ⁴¹ Information regarding EPANA provided by Superintendent Jim Gresham, the Officer in Charge of the RCMP's E-Division Major Crime Section, in email correspondence on May 14, 2011.
- ⁴² www.kare.ca/
- ⁴³ www.cbc.ca/news/canada/manitoba/story/2009/08/26/mb-task-force-murdered-manitoba.html . Also see www.swc-cfc.gc.ca/med/sta-dec/2009/0827-eng.html.
- ⁴⁴ "How many more sisters and daughters do we have to lose?" – *Canada's continued failure to address discrimination and violence against Indigenous women*. Amnesty International Canada, Public Brief, October 24, 2005.
- ⁴⁵ Indian and Northern Affairs Canada. "Aboriginal Women: A Profile from the 1996 Census", December 2001, p. 7-2. Downloaded on April 26, 2011 from www.ainc-inac.gc.ca/ai/rs/pubs/sts/awp/awp-eng.asp.
- ⁴⁶ *Aboriginal peoples in Canada in 2006: Inuit, Métis and First Nations, 2006 Census*. Catalogue no. 97-558-XIE. Ottawa: Minister of Industry, p. 12.
- ⁴⁷ For example, both the E-Division RCMP and the Vancouver Police Department's policies. E-Division have such a requirement.
- ⁴⁸ See, for example, the Coordinating Committee of Senior Officials Missing Women Working Group Report: "Issues Related to the High Number of Murdered and Missing Women in Canada," September 2010, p. 13 (available at www.scics.gc.ca/CMFiles/830992005_e1MAJ-2112011-6827.pdf) and the Final Report of the Provincial Partnership Committee on Missing Persons, October 2007, p. 7, available at www.justice.gov.sk.ca/adx/adx/adxGetMedia.aspx?DocID=3025,104,81,1,Documents&MediaID=1615&Filename=missing-persons-final.pdf.
- ⁴⁹ www.aacp.ca/publicdocs/Resolution%2010-05%20Missing%20Person%20Legislation.pdf.
- ⁵⁰ Press release at alberta.ca/acn/201105/30377DF986C93-A941-B2D1-450BB423CC8BC6E5.html and legislation at www.assembly.ab.ca/net/index.aspx?p=bills_status&selectbill=008.
- ⁵¹ The Coordinating Committee of Senior Officials Missing Women Working Group Report: "Issues Related to the High Number of Murdered and Missing Women in Canada," September 2010, p. 8 (available at www.scics.gc.ca/CMFiles/830992005_e1MAJ-2112011-6827.pdf).
- ⁵² Ibid, p. 11.
- ⁵³ For a further description of the problem, see pp. 243-245 in the Vancouver Police Department's "Missing Women Investigation Review," published September 2010 and available at vancouver.ca/police/media/2010/MWInvestigationReview_final2.pdf.
- ⁵⁴ vancouver.ca/ctyclerk/cclerk/021128/rr1.htm
- ⁵⁵ www2.parl.gc.ca/HousePublications/Publication.aspx?DocId=1721695&Language=E
- ⁵⁶ In May 2010, Special Constable Ryan Prox of the Vancouver Police Department received the International Association of Law Enforcement Intelligence Analysts (IALEIA) Award of Excellence for both his roles in the development and implementation of the CRIME system to address technological, business model and analytical shortcomings that are commonly seen in police organizations. His nomination was supported by Mr. Alan Castle, Director, Criminal Analysis, Pacific Region RCMP.
- ⁵⁷ www.rcmp-grc.gc.ca/ncecc-cnccc/index-accueil-eng.htm
- ⁵⁸ www.rcmp-grc.gc.ca/omc-ned/contact-persress-eng.htm
- ⁵⁹ www.justice.gc.ca/eng/news-nouv/nr-cp/2010/doc_32564.html.

- ⁶⁰ vancouver.ca/police/organization/investigation/investigative-services/major-crime/sister-watch.html
- ⁶¹ Ibid, note 2.
- ⁶² Ibid, note 25.
- ⁶³ Ibid, note 28.
- ⁶⁴ Canadian Association of Chiefs of Police, Resolution #07-2006: Missing Persons Investigations Policies downloaded April 27, 2011 from www.cacp.ca/media/resolutions/efiles/38/PackageAdopted.pdf.
- ⁶⁵ Ibid, note 51.
- ⁶⁶ www.scics.gc.ca/CMFiles/830992005_e1MAJ-2112011-6827.pdf
- ⁶⁷ www.albertamissingpersons.ca/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=24&Itemid=1
- ⁶⁸ From email correspondence with Superintendent Jim Gresham, the Officer in Charge of the RCMP's E-Division Major Crime Section, April 21, 2011.
- ⁶⁹ www.missing-u.ca/britishcolumbia.htm
- ⁷⁰ www.macp.mb.ca/disappear.php
- ⁷¹ www.sacp.ca/missing/index.php
- ⁷² www.missing-u.ca/
- ⁷³ www.missing-u.ca/contact.aspx
- ⁷⁴ www.halifax.ca/Police/MissingPersons/index.asp
- ⁷⁵ www.ottawapolice.ca/en/crimefiles/people_identify_find/index.aspx
- ⁷⁶ www.peelpolice.on.ca/Crime%20Files/Missing%20Persons.aspx
- ⁷⁷ www.papolice.ca/papolice/MissingPerson.aspx
- ⁷⁸ www.reginapolice.ca/missingpersons.php
- ⁷⁹ police.saskatoon.sk.ca/index.php?loc=photos/missing.php
- ⁸⁰ vancouver.ca/police/organization/investigation/investigative-services/major-crime/missing-persons.html; also see cfapp.vancouver.ca/MissingPersons_wac/MissingPersons.exe

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VANCOUVER POLICE DEPARTMENT
Beyond the Call



THE THUNDERBIRD

The land on which the City of Vancouver is established has been the territory of the Coast Salish peoples for thousands of years. Over the last century-and-a-half others have come and built their homes and businesses on this land. This was done without a treaty or ceding of land by the Coast Salish. Today we share their land as the treaty process moves forward.

The Vancouver Police acknowledge the traditional ownership of this land and the history of colonization through displaying the Coast Salish thunderbird motif on marked police cars. This display is a statement of mutual respect and friendship.

The artwork by artist Susan Point is a gift from the Musqueam Band. It was presented to the Vancouver Police in a ceremony on National Aboriginal Day, June 21, 2006.

In Coast Salish lore, the thunderbird is a majestic supernatural creature. He has a huge curved beak and three tail feathers, representing change from past to present and then into the future. The thunderbird is a guardian spirit acting on behalf of those weaker. He is greatly respected as the hero in many legends of the Coast Salish. The thunderbird symbolizes strength, principle and courage. He is also a link to the spirit world of the creator.

The artist, Susan Point, states of the thunderbird, "Thunderbird, living high in the mountains, was the most powerful of all spirits. When the thunderbird flaps his wings, thunder crashes and lightning flashes from his eyes. The thunderbird is a protective figure, representing protection for the members of the Vancouver Police Force, and the protection that they offer to the citizens of Vancouver. The crescent behind the ear represents a watchful eye."

Proudly displayed on Vancouver police cars, the thunderbird inspires security and harmony for all those today who are on these traditional lands.



VANCOUVER POLICE DEPARTMENT

Beyond the Call

VPD.CA

APPENDIX I



VANCOUVER POLICE DEPARTMENT

ADMINISTRATIVE REPORT

REPORT DATE: 2012-03-02
BOARD MEETING: 2012-03-21
BOARD REPORT # 1230

Regular

TO: Police Board
FROM: Deputy Chief Constable Warren LEMCKE
SUBJECT: Draft - Sex Work Enforcement Guidelines

RECOMMENDATION(S):

These draft guidelines have been prepared for discussion by the board.

OBJECTIVE:

This document reflects the Vancouver Police Department's philosophy regarding violence against sex workers and the enforcement of sex work-related laws. It is also intended to provide police officers and the public with the rationale for VPD's guidelines for sex work enforcement. The response strategies outlined here are consistent with the VPD's overall strategic goals, and ensure a consistent, respectful message when VPD officers are dealing with anyone involved in the sex industry. At all times, the VPD officers will uphold the values of "IPAR": Integrity, Professionalism, Accountability, and Respect. As articulated in the VPD Strategic Plan, all actions taken by the VPD will be justifiable, proportional and minimally intrusive.

The VPD has engaged in a variety of strategies to reduce crime and improve the safety of all Vancouver residents. However, these strategies can sometimes come into conflict with each other. For example, enforcement action is sometimes at odds with relationship building, though both are necessary as part of a comprehensive approach to policing. These conflicts are particularly frequent when dealing with individuals involved in the sex industry as a result of inconsistent public attitudes, community complaints, and messaging from the courts on sex industry related cases. For example, indiscriminate enforcement of the prostitution laws can undermine sex workers' relationships with police and decrease their ability to reach out to police for help.

As a police agency, the VPD is obligated to enforce the laws of Canada, although police also have considerable discretion in deciding when and how to enforce laws¹. Given that some sections of the Criminal Code related to the sex industry are the subject of several constitutional challenges, the VPD recognizes that these guidelines may need to be amended when the courts issue their rulings.

¹ See, for example, the Supreme Court of Canada's discussion of police discretion in the 2007 case of *R v. Beaudry*.
<http://scc.lexum.org/en/2007/2007scc5.html>.

The VPD seeks to assertively promote the safety, dignity and well-being of those involved in the sex industry. In addition, in line with our goal to support partnerships and relationships with all members of our community, the VPD will continue to build trust, respect and promote evidence-based decision making in order to reduce exploitation and abuse within the sex industry.

We will focus on balancing the needs of the community and the safety of the sex workers. We will achieve this through investigating business and residence complaints regarding sex work using an appropriate, graduated and coordinated response while paying particular attention to the safety of the sex worker and ensuring proper resources are used to achieve that goal.

High-risk safety concerns will be a key priority for our enforcement efforts and will be the driving force of any level of enforcement by the Vancouver Police. We will continue to strategically focus, re-focus and prioritize identified enforcement efforts in keeping with the VPD's goals, objectives and policies.

GENERAL PHILOSOPHY:

The VPD values building relationships with those involved in the sex industry in order to increase the safety of the workers, reduce victimization and violence, and where appropriate (such as with children and teens) to assist with exit strategies. In all situations, VPD officers will treat those in the sex industry with respect and dignity. It is important to recognize that while some sex workers are involved as a matter of choice; many others are involved in sex work as a survival mechanism, as result of drug addiction or mental health issues, or are otherwise vulnerable and marginalized.

The VPD will respond to community complaints and will examine the need for enforcement action. Enforcement action will be consistent and proportional to the risk presented to the community or the sex worker(s) and will be the least intrusive strategy to both keep the sex worker(s) safe and mitigate the issue. The VPD will use the ICEEE (Investigate, Communicate, Educate, Enforcement and Exit) approach in dealing with complaints related to the sex industry, and will continue to apply this where appropriate. Enforcement action will be taken in situations deemed "high risk" due to the involvement of sexually exploited children/youth, gangs/organized crime, exploitation, sexual abuse, violence, and human trafficking. Police action may result in formal enforcement under any of the relevant legislation from the Safe Streets Act to the Criminal Code when necessary to address situations where the safety or security of any individual is threatened.

The VPD does not seek to increase the inherent dangers faced by sex workers, especially survival sex workers. Therefore, where there are nuisance related complaints against survival sex workers, alternative measures and assistance must be considered with enforcement a last resort.

REASONING:

Relationships

Historically, there has been little trust between sex workers and the police. Sex workers have often been hesitant to call police if they were in trouble because of a fear that they would be arrested or experience discrimination by police. As a result, the VPD has worked hard to build more positive relationships with the sex industry community, particularly those working on the street. Programs such as SisterWatch and the Sex Industry Liaison Officer within the VPD have been developed to increase communication between the VPD and the community to improve

the safety of vulnerable members of the community. Promoting open and honest communication on both sides can only serve to benefit the safety of the workers and the community at large. However, while it is important that the VPD continues working with those on the streets, those working indoors (e.g., escort agencies/brothels) cannot be ignored; the safety of indoor sex workers is equally important to the VPD.

There are several advantages to building positive working relationships with those in the sex industry. First, increased trust will result in sex workers being more likely to call the police when they are in trouble, leading to increased safety. Second, positive relationships make it more likely that when those in the sex industry are aware of serious criminal issues such as human trafficking and involvement of gangs or youth, they are more likely to alert the police because they will not fear personal repercussions for doing so as a result of the trust and understanding built with the police.

Higher Risk Situations

Often, the sex industry involves consenting adults who may never come to the attention of the community or the police. Sex work involving consenting adults is not an enforcement priority for the VPD. However, in many situations, sex workers are put into circumstances where there are increased risks to their safety or to those in the community. The VPD is cognizant of the dangers faced by those working in the sex industry and endeavours to reduce these threats. In particular, the VPD views situations involving violence, exploitation, youth, other criminal associations (e.g., street crimes or gang affiliations) or human trafficking as being high risk and therefore a priority for intervention for the safety of the workers and the community.

Prostitution is not illegal in Canada, but many activities associated with it are. Because of these laws, the nature of the work itself, and the prevalence of violence against women and LGBT communities, sex workers often find themselves in personally risky situations. Though generally under-reported, violent crimes against sex workers are common. It is well known that those working on the streets, particularly those who are gay, female or transgendered, are at high risk of physical and sexual violence up to and including abduction and homicide. Some research suggests that indoor work is generally safer than street work and some sex workers have experienced little to no violence as a result of their work, however, police remain attentive to the fact that indoor sex workers are also victims of crime up to and including homicide.

Desperation for money to survive can result in sex workers being forced to accept behaviour from a customer or pimp that otherwise would not be tolerated. For example, brothel owners or pimps may require their workers to do things that are dangerous or degrading, or charge them “fees” for any number of things, such as the use of supplies or a particular location, leaving the worker with little money or in fact owing money despite working.

Of particular concern is the safety and protection of exploited children and youth. They are vulnerable to being recruited into the sex industry or they may be forced into prostitution in order to survive if they have run away from home or have no support system in place. In other cases, children and youth have been trafficked or forced into prostitution by predatory adults. It is a priority for the VPD to remove children and youth who are involved in these situations to ensure their safety and prevent further victimization by whatever means necessary within the law. Children and youth in these situations require police and other government services to work in an effective and coordinated fashion to provide every available protection.

The VPD will treat human trafficking as an investigative priority. Human trafficking cases typically involve children or women who have no money and/or have limited English language skills. They are often unable to escape their situation and are forced to remain in the sex industry in order to survive.

THE VPD'S SEX WORK ENFORCEMENT GUIDELINES:

When responding to sex work-related calls or situations, the Vancouver Police Department's priority is to ensure the safety and security of sex workers. Police calls regarding violence against sex workers are a priority for assessment and response.

- 1) All cases of violence or abuse of sex workers are treated as serious criminal matters. When a sex worker speaks to a VPD officer or attends a police station in-person alleging violence, an officer should be assigned to investigate. The victim should not be directed to return at another time, or to complete a written statement and return it later. The timeliness of the victim's report (e.g., several days or weeks after the event) does not lessen the severity of the incident and must not affect the police response. If the incident occurred in another police jurisdiction, the member receiving the complaint must ensure a timely referral to the correct police agency. The member should inquire as to whether the sex worker is connected to any support services.
- 2) When responding to complaints about indoor and outdoor sex work, including complaints about "Micro Brothels" and "Independent Operators," the safety and rights of the sex worker(s) will be respected ensuring that police intervention is as nonintrusive and informal as possible in order to protect the safety, and privacy of those they are investigating. Officers shall consider the overall benefits of using discretion to resolve complaints.
- 3) When a sex-work related call or situation arises regarding indoor or street-based sex worker(s), it is expected that:
 - a. Both Patrol and Vice Unit will build rapport with sex workers by offering assistance, providing safety information and will discuss options regarding locations of work so as to avoid residential areas, parks and schools;
 - b. Officers will, where appropriate, involve the appropriate community policing centre and the neighbourhood policing officers to determine the extent of any community complaints and identify possible courses of action to resolve the complaint;
 - c. Where sex workers are the subject of complaints, officers will engage the Sex Industry Liaison Officer and/or an appropriate community outreach service to assist with resolving the situation;
 - d. In consultation with the Vice Unit, officers will consider implementing compliance checks for an indoor agency;
 - e. In consultation with the Vice Unit, officers will determine if more formal enforcement action is appropriate in cases that cannot be resolved informally or involve a high risk situation;
 - f. Where enforcement action is deemed necessary, all reasonable steps will be taken to show respect and dignity for those parties involved. (for example, at the

execution of a search warrant, officers should be prepared to supply sex industry workers with blankets or robes to wrap themselves in while in police presence or provide adequate time for the worker to dress); and,

- g. Officers will consistently use their professional judgement and discretion in determining the proportional and least intrusive response necessary to affect the desired outcome.
- 4) The VPD will investigate and enforce all relevant federal, provincial and municipal laws against those who abuse, exploit or sexually exploit children/youth. The VPD will identify, investigate and remove exploited children/teens (under the age of 18) involved in sex work. The VPD will use all enforcement options available to ensure the removal of youth from unsafe circumstances with the objective of introducing under-aged victims found working in the sex industry to supporting social agencies that can assist in placing them in a safe environment and who can assist with exit strategies.
- 5) The VPD will actively enforce the laws to target exploitive practices against those who engage in human trafficking, organized crime and financial exploitation/avoidance.
- 6) The Vice Unit will provide guidance, training and assistance to the Operations Division, in particular, an operational partnership with identified and targeted district priorities to assist in reducing public disorder issues specific to community complaints.
- 7) The VPD will monitor and maintain intelligence reports to identify and track potentially violent sex industry consumers/exploitive abusers, identify trends and assist in day to day operational planning, and
- 8) The VPD will utilize wherever appropriate the VPD Sex Industry Liaison Officer and participate in open dialog with local government committees, local community organizations and sex industry support groups to assist in the continuing development of providing support strategies for sex industry workers.

Citizens of Vancouver involved in sex work are entitled to the same level of safety and protection under the law as are all residents of the City. Many sex workers will never have occasion to interact with the VPD due to the discreet nature of their work, where others, particularly those who are involved in street-based sex work will likely have more interaction with police.

The VPD believes it is important to act in a manner that is proportional to the risk presented and use the least intrusive method possible to manage a problem. As such, officers should use discretion in dealing with a complaint, as formal enforcement action may not be required. However, the VPD expects that officers will escalate their response in higher risk situations (as outlined above), or where previous attempts with less intrusive tactics have failed.

Author:	Kristie McCann – Planning and Policy Advisor	Telephone:	604-717-3059	Date:	2012-03-12
	Sergeant Richard Akin – VICE		(Insp AIRTH)		
	Inspector Cita Airth – Special Investigation Section				
	<i>With the assistance of:</i>				
	WISH, PIVOT, BC Coalition of Experiential Communities, PEERS and PACE				

Submitting Executive Member (signature):

Date: _____

This report has been prepared in consultation with the sections/divisions listed below, and they concur with its contents.

Concurring:

_____	Date: _____
_____	Date: _____
_____	Date: _____

APPENDIX J



VANCOUVER POLICE DEPARTMENT

Statistics

March 26, 2012

POLICE OFFICERS	FEMALE	V.M FEMALE	MALE	V.M MALE	V.M POLICE OFFICERS
Total	318	51	1082	208	259
Total Police Officers	1400	1400	1400	1400	1400
Percentage	23%	4%	77%	15%	19%

COV (as of May 19, 2010) *Does not include Vancouver Police Board or Vancouver Public Library *Includes, RFT, TFT, REG PT – Benefits and REG PT – No Benefits *COV does not track ethnicity * 1 unknown gender	COV FEMALE		COV MALE	
Total	1171		2352	
Total COV Employees	3524		3524	
Percentage	33%		67%	

INSPECTORS	FEMALE INSPECTORS	V.M FEMALE INSPECTORS	MALE INSPECTORS	V.M MALE INSPECTORS	V.M INSPECTORS
Total	8	2	28	2	4
Total Inspectors	36	36	36	36	36
Percentage	22%	6%	81%	6%	11%

STAFF SERGEANTS	FEMALE S/SGT	V.M FEMALE S/SGT	MALE S/SGT	V.M MALE S/SGT	V.M S/SGT
Total	0	0	19	2	2
Total Staff Sergeants	19	19	19	19	19
Percentage	0%	0%	100%	10%	10%

SERGEANTS	FEMALE SGT	V.M FEMALE SGT	MALE SGT	V.M MALE SGT	V.M SGT
Total	17	1	149	20	21
Total Sergeants	166	166	166	166	166
Percentage	10%	0.6%	90%	12%	12.6%

ETHNICITY: Stats provided by: Det/Cst. Barb Bates – Recruiting Unit

**Note: Some members choose not to identify their ethnicity*

<u>ETHNICITY</u>	VPD TOTAL	VPD MALE	VPD FEMALE	TOTAL POLICE OFFICERS	VPD %	VAN. CITY POPULATION % AS OF 2006	VAN. METROPOLITAN AREA - POPULATION % AS OF 2006	CANADA POPULATION % AS OF 2006
Chinese	93	74	19	1400	7%	29.4%	18.2%	3.9%
South Asian	73	61	12	1400	5%	5.7%	9.9	4.0%
Aboriginal	22	13	9	1400	1.6%	1.9%	1.9%	3.8%
Japanese	21	16	5	1400	1.5%	1.7%	1.2%	0.3%
Filipino	15	15	-	1400	1.1%	5.0%	3.8%	1.3%
Hispanic	12	9	3	1400	0.9%	1.4%	1.1%	1.0%
Black	8	6	2	1400	0.6%	0.9%	1.0%	2.5%
Iranian	5	5	-	1400	0.4%	n/a	n/a	n/a
Vietnamese	5	5	-	1400	0.4%	1.0%	n/a	n/a
Thai	2	1	1	1400	0.1%	n/a	n/a	n/a
Burmese	1	1	-	1400	0.1%	n/a	n/a	n/a
Korean	2	2	-	1400	0.1%	1.5%	2.1%	0.5%
Malaysian	1	1	-	1400	0.1%	n/a	n/a	n/a

**Please note: Some members choose not to indicate their second language skills*

Language	Spoken	Read	Written
• Afrikaans	4	4	4
• Arabic	1	-	-
• Armenian	1	1	1
• Bicolano	1	1	1
• Bulgarian	1	1	1
• Burmese	1	-	-
• Cantonese (H.K)	2	-	-
• Cantonese (Hoi Ping)	1	-	-
• Cantonese	27	10	8
• Croatian	3	2	2
• Czech	2	2	2
• Danish	1	1	1
• Dutch	2	2	2
• Farsi	3	2	2
• Finnish	1	1	1
• Flemish	1	1	1
• French	89	81	77
• German	20	19	17
• Greek	4	3	3
• Hakka	2	-	-
• Hindi	19	5	5
• Hungarian	1	2	2
• Italian	12	11	10
• Japanese	9	6	6
• Korean	3	-	-
• Macedonian	1	1	1
• Mandarin	17	1	1
• Persian	2	2	2
• Polish	4	3	3
• Portuguese	5	5	3
• Punjabi	41	18	18
• Romanian	2	2	2
• Russian	5	5	4
• Serbo Croatian	1	1	1
• Shanghainese	1	-	-
• Slovak	1	1	1
• Spanish	36	38	33
• Swahili	1	1	1
• Swiss German	1	-	-
• Tagalog	5	3	3
• Urdu	1	1	1
• Vietnamese	2	-	-
• Sign Language	3	-	-

APPENDIX K



Options for Service Delivery in the Greater Vancouver Region:

A Discussion Paper of the Issues Surrounding the Regionalization of Police Services

**Prepared by the
Planning, Research and Audit Section**

For

**The Vancouver Police Board and
Chief Constable Jim Chu**

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Executive Summary

The creation of a regional police service in the Greater Vancouver Region (GVR) has been the subject of debate and discussion for several decades. A number of high profile incidents have served to re-focus attention on the increasingly complex challenges facing police services in the region and raised concerns with the current arrangements for the delivery of police services.

The present report was designed to provide the Chief Constable of the Vancouver Police Department and the Vancouver Police Board with an objective review of the issues and challenges confronting police services in the GVR. More specifically, the objectives of the project were 1) to identify the key issues and challenges that surround the current arrangements for police services in the GVR; 2) to consider the experiences of other jurisdictions with regional police services; and, 3) to identify implementation and integration considerations that would surround any change in the existing arrangements for police service delivery in the GVR.

The report considers the experiences of other jurisdictions with regional police services and identifies the challenges surrounding governance of a regional police service so as to ensure local accountability and input while also achieving economies of scale and a high standard of police service delivery. The issues surrounding policing in the GVR include service disparities, accountability, service gaps and economic disparities.

Three options for structuring policing in the GVR are set out and the potential strengths and limitations of each option are discussed:

1. Option 1: Maintain the Status Quo
 - Poses no threat to the current police agencies.
 - Would likely continue to function by utilizing integrated units and secondments.
 - However, the dysfunction within the system, including service disparities and funding inequalities, will continue, and will likely be exacerbated in the future due to the inevitable growth the GVR will see in coming years.
2. Option 2: Amalgamate and Regionalize Police Forces in the GVR
 - Essentially creates a 'blank slate' where the exact makeup and geographic territory of one (or several) regional forces would be created after careful analysis of regional needs.
 - Would allow for a unified system whereby priorities are set both locally, and regionally, and would reduce funding inequities and increase service levels to the region as a whole.
 - The difficulty with this approach lies primarily in the creation of a governance structure, which would require the cooperation of all agencies to come together in its development.
3. Option 3: Create a Hybrid Model
 - Would see a regional police force that would have responsibility for the policing priorities of the region, and local police forces that would continue the "everyday service" to that area.
 - This system would create a common governance model for all local police services, which would all support the regional service, allowing more effective and efficient policing.
 - There would be significant challenges to this approach, particularly in terms of the cooperation of the RCMP and municipal agencies, and the development of a governance and funding model for all agencies involved.

It is the assertion of the Vancouver Police Department that any deliberations on altering the status quo for police service delivery in the GVR must consider the unique needs of each community in the region, and that communities have a voice in any new structure that is proposed. As there are numerous competing interests and stakeholders within the current structure of the GVR, the VPD advocates that any discussions of regionalizing police services be led by the provincial government, with the participation and cooperation of municipal governments. With their leadership, a unique opportunity exists for the development of collaborative and creative solutions to the challenges that exist, and for providing the best possible policing service in the interests of public safety. The specific models of policing that are ultimately considered for the GVR and the model that is ultimately selected will rest on the outcomes of additional study and extensive discussions among all of the affected parties. The VPD is prepared to assume an active, collaborative role in any discussions surrounding options that would improve the effectiveness and efficiency of policing services in the GVR.

Introduction

The creation of a regional police service in the Greater Vancouver Region (GVR)¹ has been the subject of debate and discussion for several decades. In 1924, a local newspaper discussed the possibility of a regional police service in an article entitled, 'Regional Police Just Around the Corner' (Ministry of Attorney General, 1992: Tab A1). Between 1978 and 1994 there were eight regionalization studies conducted on police services in BC (Graham, 1994:35). More recently, the escalation of drug and gang-related violence in the GVR has led to a renewed focus on the increasingly complex challenges facing police services and how the capacities of the police in the GVR might be improved. One option that is frequently put forth is the creation of a GVR police service.

The regionalization of public sector services is a key feature of the British Columbia landscape, the most notable examples being health services and transit. To date, however, there has not been an informed public debate on possible options for policing the GVR generally, nor, specifically, the creation of a regional police service. Despite the extensive regionalization of police services in the eastern regions of the country, there has been little empirical analysis of the major issues surrounding regionalization premised on the best practices literature and the experiences of other jurisdictions. Rather, the discussions have remained primarily at a political level. As such, alternative models of police service delivery that hold considerable promise in increasing the effectiveness and efficiency of the police in the GVR have not been explored.

A close examination of the policing arrangements in the GVR would discover economic inefficiencies, service and funding disparities, separate complaint and accountability processes, and a lack of policies and procedures to facilitate collaboration and coordination among the myriad of police services in the region. An exception to this is the recently-created Greater Vancouver Regional Transit Authority Police Service (GVTAPS), a regional police service with responsibility for transit-focused policing services in 13 municipalities.²

In the early 21st century, it is recognized that the public sector, including policing, must demonstrate that resources are being utilized as effectively and efficiently as possible. Further, the structure for the delivery of public services, including policing, must serve to "maximize organizational, community, regional, and provincial policing capacities (Duda, 2003:7). Based on these premises, it is incumbent upon politicians and police practitioners to ensure that the model of police service delivery in the GVR provides the police with the highest level of effectiveness in crime prevention and crime response.

¹ For the purposes of this report, the Greater Vancouver Region is viewed as including Squamish, West Vancouver, North Vancouver, Vancouver, Burnaby, Coquitlam, Port Moody, Port Coquitlam, New Westminster, Richmond, Delta, Surrey, and Langley.

² GVTAPS: The regional transit police, Canada's first armed transit police, is a regional police service, providing transit-focused policing services to 13 municipalities. This police service is organized to reflect the reality that transit services, including the SeaBus, West Coast Express, SkyTrain, and buses, move across municipal boundaries. Similarly, criminal offenders move across municipal boundaries, calling into question the rationale for utilizing municipal boundaries as the basis for deploying policing services. The creation of GVTAPS was supported by provincial and municipal politicians. The fact that GVTAPS was a new police service that did not encroach on existing policing boundaries was likely a major reason for the widespread support for the creation of this police service.

This paper is designed to contribute to the discussions regarding options for the delivery of policing services in the GVR. It is assumed that these discussions, involving the provincial and municipal governments, the various police services in the GVR, and the affected communities, will address a wide range of issues. The intent of the authors has not been to conduct an exhaustive review of the literature and previous reports on regionalizing police services, but rather to identify a number of the key challenges that currently confront police services in the GVR, to consider the experiences of other jurisdictions with regional police services, to identify considerations for the GVR for integration and amalgamation and to consider options for the delivery of policing services in the GVR. This includes a discussion of the challenges surrounding governance of a regional police service so as to ensure local accountability and input while also achieving economies of scale and a high standard of police service delivery. To date, for a variety of reasons (including political considerations), discussions of alternative models for providing police services in the GVR have been limited and sporadic.

As a discussion paper, this document contains only a limited analysis of the issues that are raised. It is for governments, police services, and communities to take the deliberations to the next level.

It should also be noted that this discussion paper is designed to provide the Vancouver Police Board with an awareness of the issues surrounding the delivery of policing services in the GVR, the experience of regionalization in the Province of Ontario, and possible options for service delivery that might be considered in the GVR. As such, this paper is best viewed as a preliminary document that can inform and provide a catalyst for discussion among all interested parties, including the provincial government, the RCMP, and municipal governments in the GVR. To this end, there were no consultations with other municipal or RCMP police services in the region. Given that this paper was prepared for the Vancouver Police Board, the issues surrounding the delivery of policing services are, necessarily, presented from the position of the Vancouver Police Department, which is the largest municipal police service in the region. The specific models of policing that are ultimately considered for the GVR and the model that is ultimately selected will rest on the outcomes of additional study and extensive discussions among all of the affected parties. The VPD is prepared to assume an active, collaborative role in any discussions surrounding options that would improve the effectiveness and efficiency of policing services in the GVR.

Finally, it is not the intent of this paper to “advocate” for any one of the possible options for police service delivery in the GVR, nor to presuppose the components of such a model. Rather, this paper is best viewed as an “ideas and issues” paper that can contribute to discussions of effective service delivery in the region. These discussions would involve the RCMP, municipal governments, and other stakeholder groups throughout the region. It would also be important that the framework for considering the various options for service delivery in the GVR include a strong analytical component.

The experience in other Canadian jurisdictions suggests that there is a political dimension to any discussions of regionalizing police services. Municipal governments, for example, may understandably be reluctant to give up control over a local police service, particularly in situations where a “no call too small” policy exists. However, an examination of the “real costs” of “Cadillac” service and the extent to which such a model of police work is sustainable going forward remains to be conducted .

A major question that requires detailed further study is whether the current arrangements for the delivery of policing services in the GVR provide the best “value for service”, the most effective and efficient utilization of resources, and the most effective structure for responding to the challenges of crime in the region.

There are, for example, a number of “hidden” costs of the current structure for policing in the GVR that should be explored in any examination of the most effective model for policing the GVR. These include competition among police services for new recruits and in-service police personnel, and the issue of whether integrated police teams are the most effective use of police resources. There is little doubt that there will be increasing socio-demographic, economic, and crime challenges to police services in the GVR in the coming years and decades, and it is prudent to begin considering what model of police service will be best positioned to meet these challenges.

As well, discussions of the best model for police service delivery should be informed by best practices, the experiences of the jurisdictions where police services have been regionalized, and on which model of service delivery will be most effective in preventing and responding to crime and disorder in the region. The creation of a regionalized police service has the *potential* to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of police service delivery, police transparency and accountability, capacity for strategic planning, administration and operations, and public safety and security. Alternatives to the current arrangements for police service delivery provide the opportunity to reduce the existing duplication of services, to reduce administration overhead and to standardize policies and practice.

The extent to which the potential of any one option for police service delivery is realized would depend upon effective, visionary leadership, effective collaboration and cooperation among the affected municipalities and police services, and the effective organization and delivery of policing services. In addition, key core capacities would have to be developed including a strong policy, planning, and analytical capacity and the ability to incorporate best practices. The creation of this administrative and operational framework and the development of goals, objectives, and performance measures in each sector of operations should be guided by best practices and accompanied by the capacity to evaluate and monitor performance on an ongoing basis. The failure to develop these capacities would limit the potential of a regional police service and perpetuate the difficulties that currently exist.

Having some form of regional police arrangement would be conducive to a regional focus on crime, as well as provide an enhanced capacity to address crime “hot spots” across the region as well as to track offenders. Regardless of what model was ultimately selected, a key objective would be the provision of a high standard of police service.

Objectives of the Project

The project had a number of objectives:

- 1) to identify the key issues and challenges that surround the current arrangements for police services in the GVR;
- 2) to consider the experiences of other jurisdictions with regional police services;
- 3) to identify implementation and integration considerations that would surround any change in the existing arrangements for police service delivery in the GVR; and,
- 4) to identify potential options for the delivery of policing services in the GVR.

This discussion paper will identify the issues that surround the various dimensions of considering a regional police service for the GVR, including legislative, jurisdictional, governance, accountability, and operational issues as well as identifying the legislative, governance, and core capacities required for a “best practice” regional police service.

The Current Arrangements for Police Service Delivery in the GVR

The current arrangement for policing in the GVR, whereby the RCMP are involved in policing large municipalities under contract adjacent to independent municipal police departments, is unique in Canada. Further, this arrangement was not the result of a systematic examination of what model of police service delivery would be most effective and efficient for the region.

The Commission on Policing in British Columbia (Oppal, 1994) concluded that the current arrangements for the delivery of policing services across the GVR raise issues related to economics, equity and consistency in policing, investigative continuity, and a number of human resource concerns. Numerous reports (Oppal, 1994) have raised serious questions as to whether the current arrangements for the delivery of policing services are cost effective, provide for the effective and efficient deployment of resources, and whether these arrangements actually hinder effective crime prevention and crime response.

More specifically, concerns have been raised that the fragmentation of policing services hinders effective investigation of serious crimes, crime analysis, and deployment of patrol and investigative resources. Rather than decreasing the quality of police service delivery, it has been suggested that a regional police service would result in improved service delivery.

Project Method

For the present project, a “mixed method” was used to gather data. This included archival research (literature review), qualitative research (interviews), and an initial analysis of the economic costs associated with the current policing arrangements.

The regionalization of police services in Canada is most extensively developed in the province of Ontario. This regionalization took the form of amalgamation, i.e. existing police services were merged to form a new regional police service. To this end, members of the project team travelled to Ontario to gather information on the rationale, objectives, and experiences of the amalgamation in Ontario. This included speaking with the leadership of regional police services in Halton Regional Police, Durham Regional Police, Ottawa Police Service, Hamilton Police Service, Waterloo Regional Police, Niagara Regional

Police, and Toronto Police Services; members of regional police service boards; mayors and municipal and regional government officials, city councillors; sworn members; persons from the private sector; and provincial police services officials. Respondents were queried on a wide range of topics, including the origins and evolution of regional policing, the benefits, challenges, and experiences of regional policing, and the “lessons learned” from regionalizing policing in the province. Interviews were also conducted with senior police leaders from Halifax who were intimately familiar with not only an amalgamation of police services, but also the subsequent implementation of a “blended” municipal/RCMP policing model in that jurisdiction.

A caveat: Although the province of Ontario has the most extensive experience with regional police services, there was among the respondents considerable variability in their knowledge and understanding of policing arrangements in the GVR. While the senior police leaders who were interviewed had a good grasp of the major issues in the GVR, others, such as city councillors, based their responses entirely on experiences and observations in their specific jurisdictions. To this end, the information gathered from Ontario (and from Nova Scotia) should be taken as illustrative rather than as directive.

Issues Surrounding the Regionalization of Police Services

Arguments Offered in Support of Creating a Regional Police Service

There are a number of assertions that are generally offered to support the creation of a regional police service. Supporters of regionalization contend that a regional police service would result in improved levels of communication, standardized policies and practices across a region, improved ability to rationalize and monitor resource utilization, improved investigative and patrol capacities, reduced duplication of services, and the end of competition between police services for recruits, in-service police personnel, and civilians with specialized skills. It is important to note, however, that these assertions are generally made in the absence of supporting empirical documentation: to date, there have been no systemic evaluations of the impact of regionalization on costs, the effectiveness and efficiency of service delivery, or on any of the other above-noted assertions. Nor have controlled “before and after” studies been conducted that would facilitate a comparison of costs and policing outcomes prior to, and following, regionalization been conducted. This, however, does not detract from the viability of the arguments offered in support of regionalization, as it is equally incumbent upon supporters of the status quo to offer similar evidence in support of their position.

More specifically, proponents of regionalization contend that the creation of a regional police service would allow for enhanced:

1. Communication

There is potential for more structured information sharing among police agencies (Ministry of Attorney General, 1983:10). Currently, there is a limited ability for police services in the GVR to share information on a formal, strategic, ongoing basis and this compromises the effectiveness of the police and public safety. All agencies in the GVR currently use PRIME, which allows *access* to “general occurrence” reports submitted by every agency, but this is quite different than sharing strategic and tactical information. Many agencies also use the services of E-Comm. Both PRIME and E-Comm would facilitate coordinated communication in a regional police service. Examples of where GVR communication currently breaks down include sharing of information relating to crime patterns and analysis, and

operational, investigative and tactical priorities. Communication issues are discussed in more detail in the “Coordination Gaps” section of this report. The extent to which information-sharing could be improved with a regional police service, however, would depend upon a myriad of factors, including leadership and a sound organizational and operational structure.

2. Financial Benefits

It is generally acknowledged that regionalizing police services, in itself, does not decrease operating costs which are the most commonly measured cost of policing, (McDavid, 2002:4). However, regionalization does hold considerable potential to reduce some of the “hidden costs” associated with having separate police services policing in the same region, e.g., competition for applicants, separate recruiting units, etc.

There are also potential savings with a large regional police service having greater purchasing power and being able to acquire equipment and supplies in large quantities. Another example is having officers in regional police service using the same model of firearm. Currently among the municipal and RCMP detachments in the GVR, officers use a variety of handguns. There are even differences in the sidearms carried by Vancouver police officers and their independent municipal counterparts, resulting in increased training costs. There will also be the potential for “economies of scale”, the use of specialized resources and assistance in the purchasing and use of equipment (Ministry of Attorney General, 1992: Tab A4). There would also be potential cost savings in centralizing record systems, and regionalization has the potential to eliminate duplication in many other areas as well. Depending upon the organizational structure, a regional police service may have fewer senior police leaders and support staff (McCaffery, 1992:13). This would have the potential of reducing wage costs, as there would be fewer officers in the senior ranks (Ministry of Solicitor General, 1990:7). Perhaps most importantly, regionalization has the potential to create a more equitable distribution and sharing of resources and would enable consistent and equitable policing across the jurisdiction (Graham, 1994:6; Ministry of Attorney General, 1992: Tab A3).

3. Professional and Career Development

Regionalization has the potential to create a standardized recruitment and training process, create pay equity, and provide deployment and professional development opportunities (Graham, 1994).

4. Community Relations

A major concern that is often expressed about regionalization is that there will be reduced police contact with the community and that levels of service will decrease. There are a number of strategies that can be employed to address these concerns, including ensuring that patrol resources are allocated on an evidence-based model and that local precinct stations are maintained (Ross, 1978:182). Regionalization of police services provides an opportunity to give the community a more uniform view of police policies and procedures. For example, one jurisdiction may apprehend a suspect a particular way, but another jurisdiction will do it differently. Currently, citizens become confused with the differing policies that are in place (Sandrock, 2002:5).

5. Effectiveness in Providing Safety and Security

The provincial government has noted that a regional police service would, with sufficient resources, have the flexibility required to provide superior service to a greater extent than a smaller police service (Ministry of Solicitor General, 1990:5). Further, given that criminal activity is becoming more

sophisticated and, in some cases, more violent, there is a need to bring as many resources to bear on crime problems as possible. Concern has been expressed that smaller police services are not adequately equipped to effectively respond to more sophisticated types of criminal activity, including conducting investigations into violent crimes that are associated with multi-jurisdictional drug syndicates. For example, cyber crime is an emerging trend and unfortunately smaller agencies might not be equipped to deal with these new types of crimes (Tully, 2001:3). Observers have argued that regional police forces can provide better service for protecting citizens, by undertaking quality investigations, adequately deploying patrol resources to deal with emergency situations, and responding faster to emergency calls (see Tully, 2001:3).

In interviews conducted with provincial and municipal officials, members of regional police boards, and senior police leaders in Ontario, a number of benefits of a regional police service were identified:

- better equipment
- more staffing
- the ability to mount, and support, specialty squads, and the ability to maintain an interface between specialty squads and the service as a whole (something which is generally not possible with the province-wide integrated units)
- the ability to back-fill positions
- the ability to move people and expertise across the region in a seamless manner
- the ability to supplement staffing levels in one district from another, should levels fall below the mandated staffing minimums

Arguments Offered in Opposition to the Creation of Regional Police Services

A number of points have been raised about the efficacy of regional police services, including:

1. Start up Costs

A key question that surrounds discussions of creating a regional police service is the source of financial resources to set up the force and the unanticipated costs for any problems that might be encountered along the way (Ministry of Solicitor General, 1990:21).

2. Decline in Service Levels

Concerns are expressed, particularly in those municipalities where police have a “no call too small” policy, that there will be declines in service levels under a regional police service model. This would be accompanied by a loss of the more personal relationship that may exist between police and community residents.

3. Personnel Issues

Concerns are expressed about the impact of regionalization on collective agreements and benefits, the loss of senior positions and the impact on promotional opportunities.

4. Domination

There are concerns that a larger police service in the region might dominate the smaller forces in the region. This view is premised on the assumption that ‘regionalization’ would equate to ‘absorption’ of these services within into the largest agency.

5. Effectiveness

Opponents of regionalization point out that work produced in a large police organization will not necessarily be effective. There are always problems with miscommunication, isolation, lack of co-operation, and difficulty in communication between departments within the police department (Lithopoulos and Rigakos, 2005:342).

6. Loss of Control

Opponents of regionalization contend that the creation of regional police services results in a loss of community control over policing and a reduction in service levels, particularly in communities where a “no call too small” policy is in place.

Policing Services in the GVR: Current Arrangements and Concerns with Current Structure

I’m surprised that police services in Vancouver are not amalgamated.
Toronto City Councillor and Member, Toronto Police Services Commission

The GVR is policed by both municipal police services and RCMP under contract. There are a number of key issues that surround the current structure for the delivery of policing services in the GVR which may significantly impact the effectiveness and efficiency of policing in the region.

The current arrangements for policing in the GVR involve police forces that are subject to different legislation and have different governance structures. While the independent municipal police services are overseen by police boards and officers are accountable under the BC Police Act and to the BC Police Complaint Commissioner, RCMP officers policing under contract at the municipal level are accountable to the federal RCMP Act and to the federal RCMP Public Complaints Commissioner. Further, there are different operational policies for RCMP officers and municipal police officers. With respect to training, patrol officers receive different training regimens, with RCMP recruits being trained at Depot in Regina, and officers in the independent municipal police services receiving training at the JIBC Police Academy.

While a number of concerns have been raised with respect to municipal contract policing, a comparison of the effectiveness and efficiency of police services provided under contract and those provided by independent municipal police services has not been conducted (see Auditor General of Canada, 2005; Oppal, 1994; Bish and Clemens, 1999;).

There are a number of important questions that must be asked about the current arrangements for policing in the GVR, including:

- Do the current arrangements facilitate the delivery of effective and efficient police services?
- Do the current arrangements provide police services with the optimal ability to prevent and respond to crime?
- Would the adoption of a different model of police service delivery, including the creation of a new regional police service, address the significant issues and challenges that currently surround police service delivery?

The answers to these questions are far beyond the scope of this discussion paper. However, these questions should be part of any more detailed analysis and deliberations about creating a regional police service for the GVR.

Given the importance of the safety of the residents of the GVR and that the police have the support and confidence of the residents of the region, it is imperative that discussions surrounding the creation of a regional police service be informed by best practices and the experience of other jurisdictions, rather than by political considerations. Similarly, should a regional police service be created, it is equally imperative that this service have the capacity to respond to the demands of the region in a manner that ensures that resources are utilized effectively and efficiently. It is important that a regional police service be accountable and transparent in its operations and that the needs of specific areas in the region be incorporated into police policy and practice.

Given the questions noted above, some of the problems and issues with the current model that would have to be addressed include:

- The involvement of the RCMP in municipal contract policing presents a challenge, albeit not an insurmountable obstacle, to the creation of a regional police service in the GVR.
- The current arrangement for police services prevents the development of a comprehensive crime prevention and crime reduction strategies for the GVR.
- All else being equal, the delivery of policing services via a myriad of independent municipal and RCMP detachments hinders the effective use of problem-oriented policing, intelligence-led policing, and coordinated police initiatives to address crime hot spots, chronic offenders, transnational crimes such as human trafficking, and hinders effective intelligence collection and utilization. The current arrangements also present challenges in case investigation, information and intelligence-sharing, and in continuity of collaborative investigations. While the creation of a regional police service, in itself, would not guarantee effective police practice, it would provide a more comprehensive organizational and operational framework within which effective practices could take place, if the requisite capacities were present.
- The current arrangements for police service delivery result in a situation where the region's taxpayers do not share equally in the provision of police services. In the GVR there is a "core city" phenomenon, whereby large numbers of persons from the outlying municipalities travel into Vancouver for work, leisure, and entertainment. This creates situations where Vancouver taxpayer-supported police officers spend large amounts of time policing non-residents. This situation is exemplified by the challenges of policing the Granville Entertainment area and the escalating costs associated with policing this area, due in part to its late-hour bar closings. Many of the patrons that attend the Granville area are not residents of the city of Vancouver.
- The current arrangements for police services do not lend themselves to coordinated regional deployment in the event of a major incident or natural disaster. There is a lack of common standard procedures for consequence management for numerous types of major incidents which may occur, such as planned celebrations, riots, natural disasters, and terrorist attacks. The main issues surround how to deploy diverse groups, and whether the units from different

agencies will take direction from the central command of the jurisdiction where the event is occurring or deploy on their own initiative as per their command structure.

Service Disparities

The primary focus of most independent municipal police agencies is the delivery of frontline policing services. These uniformed officers focus on rapid response, community policing, traffic enforcement, and other functions associated with general patrol. These agencies provide services to jurisdictions that do not see it as their responsibility to work on more complex and organized crime targets. The reasons for this view include:

- A lack of expertise within their agency;
- The fact that these agencies do not police the central business district or the ports, which is where many organized criminals prefer to operate; and,
- Smaller agencies cannot build up the critical mass to have an effective unit to target organized crime (CFSEU is supposed to serve this function, but generally focuses on high-level targets, leaving limited resources to target mid-level organized crime groups.

Larger agencies such as the VPD are under pressure to reduce the number of officers in specialty units that would target these types of criminals in order to increase the number of patrol officers. The end result is that, since agencies want to only look after “their backyard”, the enforcement attention paid to more sophisticated and less visible criminals is insufficient.

Across the GVR there is considerable diversity in organizational core capacities. Smaller departments do not have the capacity to investigate homicides and rely upon the Vancouver Police Department or the RCMP’s Integrated Homicide Investigation Team, respectively. Mobilizing a critical mass of investigators to respond to serious incidents, such as the 2006 kidnapping of Graham McMynn, is costly and cannot be sustained for an extended period of time. An investigation of this size would still be a strain on a regional police service’s resources, but there would be more resources to draw on quickly in order to front-end load the investigation. A regional force would have the capacity to respond to major investigations more effectively on a consistent basis, with far fewer obstacles to acquiring and organizing an effective response.

Comparison of Police Services

The following are specialty squads which exist in the GVR. Not all agencies are able to provide these services and rely on the larger organizations to provide the service and expertise. The fact that smaller agencies rely on the services provided by larger agencies substantiates the case for regionalization.

Examples of services provided by larger agencies

There are numerous VPD units that provide specialty services when requested by smaller agencies. A number of these specialty units include investigative follow-up expertise for more serious or complicated offences including, Major Crimes (e.g., homicides), Sex Crimes Unit, Gangs and Drugs Sections, and the Dog Squad. These units have the investigative expertise and specialized training that smaller agencies are often not able to develop or support due to their size. A notable example is the VPD’s Strike Force (surveillance and arrest) teams, which conduct surveillance on serious criminals (e.g., homicide and robbery suspects). Not only do the Strike Force teams assist other agencies upon request, they also work on targets that are involved in crime across the GVR, providing a de facto regional surveillance service that smaller jurisdictions benefit from.

In addition to investigative expertise, the VPD provides the services of specialty units that necessitate advanced equipment or technology that may not be available in smaller agencies. These may include Forensic ID services, Polygraph services, wiretap services, the Marine Squad, and in particular, the Emergency Response Team (ERT) for their specialized weapons and tactics in highly volatile or dangerous situations.

The VPD, often due to their size, are also in a position to provide support in terms of crowd control, motorcade support, additional training seats for smaller agencies, and jail services.

Services that GVR agencies share

Some agencies within the GVR utilize the services of E-Comm to provide Computer-Aided Dispatch (CAD) and 9-1-1 call takers. This radio network is also utilized throughout Metro Vancouver by fire and ambulance personnel. In addition, E-Comm provides the records management environment (PRIME-BC) for all police agencies within the GVR, which allows for all agencies to share the same records environment and access information cross-jurisdictionally. The PRIME-BC environment, however, has only recently included all jurisdictions in the GVR, and as such, has certain data limitations for intelligence and information sharing. In 2007, the VPD's budget for E-Comm and PRIME-BC was over \$15 million.

All municipal agencies make use of the services of the JIBC for training – both recruit, and some in-service training. Additional training is provided by the Canadian Police College (under contract from the RCMP). GVR agencies also make use of other national police services, such as the Canadian Police Information Centre (CPIC), and the forensic crime laboratories and fingerprint identification services of the RCMP³. The Police Complaints Commissioner may request either municipal or RCMP investigators to conduct internal investigations for another agency.

Duplication of Services

Separate agencies have independent units that duplicate what can be done centrally. This includes planning and research to write individualized policies, financial analysis, procurement and stores, crime analysis and training.

An excellent example of this is the VPD's innovative approach to data mining and database creation for police information. In the later part of 2005, a VPD IT project team embarked on revamping the intelligence and crime analysis capabilities of the VPD. The project team, working with E-Comm, developed a "Data-Mart" extract process that captured police investigation details, dispatch information and aggregate incident data in an internal VPD database. The creation of a VPD Data-Mart containing PRIME information was the first of its kind in British Columbia and the first time this had been accomplished in North America using a Versadex Records Management System. The VPD project team accomplished what no other agency or the Versaterm vendor had been able to develop. PRIME Corp. is currently engaged in leveraging the VPD's accomplishments in the creation of a regional Data-Mart grounded in the technological achievements of the VPD system. A five agency test system, the initial component of a larger regional roll-out, is currently under construction. The result is the integration of information from a central database, thereby eliminating silos of information, which in turn helps guard against crucial data being overlooked during investigations and crime analysis. This initiative could have

³ Although the RCMP provides some fingerprint identification services, BCAFIS (Automatic Fingerprint Identification System) is a joint operation between the VPD and the RCMP, and is run by the VPD.

been developed for the entire region from the outset if the RCMP and municipal agencies were in a regional structure, avoiding duplication and delay.

Weak Regional Crime Voice

The (Census Metropolitan Area) CMA Phenomenon

The majority of demographic and social statistics are compiled at the CMA level. For many cities, the city core will encompass much of the CMA, and as well, one police department is responsible for the entire metro city, and therefore, a great deal of the CMA. Statistics Canada, recognizing the difficulties with comparing cities, uses statistics compiled according to the CMA, as this encompasses both inner city cores and surrounding suburban and rural areas. They directly recognize the difficulty in comparing crime rates among police services:

A CMA is a large urban area with a core population of at least 100,000 and includes the surrounding suburban and rural areas that are socially and economically integrated with the urban centre. *The areas that police services serve may differ in their mix of urban/suburban populations, and some inner-city police services are responsible for policing many more people than the resident population, as large numbers of people enter the urban core to work and shop during the day [emphasis added].* For these reasons, it is difficult to compare crime rates among police services. This lack of comparability is addressed by analyzing crime rates by CMA. In order to present data at the CMA level, the data from all police services providing services within the boundary of the CMA, including urban, suburban and rural areas, have been combined. However, expenditures (per capita costs) are not available at the CMA level due to the number of provincial policing detachments within the CMA for which detachment-specific costs are not available.⁴

However, Vancouver is unique among the major cities in Canada insofar as the population within the municipality is only slightly more than one quarter of the CMA population. Due to the recognition that many people travel in to Vancouver for work, leisure and entertainment, the actual population within the municipality may fluctuate widely from the City's residential population according to the day of the week, or time of day. What this may equate to is a weaker regional voice overall, and weaker advocacy for the region as a whole. Although Statistics Canada generally only publishes data regarding Vancouver CMA, it is left to individual municipal departments and individual RCMP detachments to make cases for funding or staffing increases, which is problematic with very little published on a municipal basis that is appropriate for comparison to other municipal agencies within the Vancouver CMA. Regionalization would remove this difficulty in assessing police services and the residential population that police serve, as the region would be considered as a whole and not the sum of its very different, yet interconnected, parts.

As is shown below, the Vancouver CMA has the lowest number of officers per 100,000 population out of the five largest CMAs in Canada, and thus has the highest population per officer. This is a fact that is frequently misunderstood by politicians and the media, who allude to Vancouver's "high" rate of police to population ratio and fail to acknowledge they are comparing an anomalous core city to other jurisdictions in which the majority of the metro population is policed by one agency. When compared

⁴ Catalogue no. 85-225-XIE, Statistics Canada; Police Resources in Canada 2006

on a CMA basis, the Vancouver CMA has relatively fewer officers than any major city in Canada, and has the challenge of being confronted with the highest crime rate of the largest five cities.

⁵ Census metropolitan areas (CMA)	Population 2006	# of Police Officers (’07)	Officers per 100,000 Pop	Pop per Officer	2006 Crime Rate	% change ’97 to ’07
Toronto	5,418,989	9,483	175	571	5,020	9.8
Montréal	3,706,698	6,837	184	542	6,912	5.5
Vancouver	2,181,591	3,236	148	674	10,609	4.8
Calgary	1,108,907	1,696	153	654	6,954	11.1
Edmonton	1,059,826	1,666	157	636	10,079	12

With a regional voice, national comparisons would be made possible for policing services. This is necessary not only in terms of police strength, but would allow for the region to bring forward characteristics of the GVR that are fairly disparate as compared to other CMAs in Canada, such as the temperate climate, which arguably affects crime rates in many ways due to offenders migrating west, and a greater homeless population. The GVR, and Vancouver in particular, are often left to support social programs without the requisite ability to pay:

Municipalities have little choice when it comes to such pressing social issues as homelessness, immigration, and settlement services, drug abuse and crime. When other orders of government fail to provide adequate funding or supports to assist municipalities with these social obligations, cities are left with both the social and economic consequences. (*Big City Mayor’s Caucus, 2006*)

Currently, the disparity exists not only on a national CMA-level, but also within the Vancouver CMA. As is shown below, the crime rate on average for RCMP detachments is 17% higher than the municipal detachments; however, the officers per 100,000 population in RCMP detachments is 37% below the average number of officers per 100,000 population in the municipal detachments. Such disparity in staffing and priorities would be alleviated by a regional structure.

⁵ Catalogue no. 85-225-XIE, Statistics Canada; Police Resources in Canada 2007

⁶		<i>2005 Crime Rate per 100,000</i>	<i>Population 2006</i>	<i>Officers 2006</i>	<i>Officers per 100,000 2006</i>
Municipal Police	Vancouver	11,719	584,701	1303 ⁷	223
	Delta	7,372	102,661	159	155
	New Westminster	16,162	57,480	112	195
	West Vancouver	6,003	46,595	82	176
	Port Moody	6,666	28,458	44	155
	Average Municipal	9,584			181
	Median Municipal	7,372			176
RCMP Detachments	Surrey	12,673	393,256	483	123
	Burnaby	12,334	204,320	221	108
	Coquitlam	9,988	121,989	120	98
	Richmond	9,411	173,429	173	100
	Langley Township	10,832	97,682	125	128
	North Vancouver District	6,661	88,461	90	102
	Maple Ridge	13,598	73,531	78	106
	Port Coquitlam	11,206	57,569	58	101
	North Vancouver	11,687	47,131	50	106
	Langley	17,639	25,716	40	156
	White Rock	8,428	19,577	24	123
	Pitt Meadows	10,112	16,673	18	108
	Average RCMP	11,214			113
	Median RCMP	11,019			107
	RCMP vs. Municipal Average	17%			-37%

Crime Analysis

Currently, the analysis of crime patterns and the use of statistical analysis to identify crime “hot spots” and chronic offenders is fragmented across a number of independent municipal and RCMP detachments. There is currently some capacity for a region-wide analysis of crime, crime trends, and those persons involved in criminal activity that may cross municipal boundaries; however, currently there is no “one brain” to direct the analysis and make decisions about how address crime issues on a regional basis.

Accountability

Officers in RCMP detachments policing under contract operate with a separate organizational and legislative framework. While police officers in the independent municipal police services are accountable under the BC Police Act and to the BC Office of the Police Complaints Commissioner, RCMP officers are policed under the federal RCMP Act and are accountable to the federal Commissioner for Public Complaints Against the RCMP.

⁶ Catalogue no. 85-225-XIE, Statistics Canada; Police Resources in Canada 2006

⁷ It is unclear why this number is incorrect as reported by Statistics Canada; the VPD’s authorized strength at this time was 1,214.

Inconsistent Public Complaint Process

In Metro Vancouver there exits two separate and distinct public complaints processes for police agencies.

The independent police agencies are under the complaint process of the *Police Act* of British Columbia. The *Act* establishes a process for the acceptance of complaints through the police agency or directly to the Police Complaints Commissioner.

Each police agency, through the authority of its Chief Constable, undertakes the investigation of the complaint. The nature of the *BC Police Act* is to be corrective in nature. Emphasis is put on informal resolution of complaints. Where a disciplinary default is proven, the *Act* emphasizes corrective discipline rather than punishment. Each Police Board has the responsibility for responding to all service and policy complaints made against their police agency.

The *Act* also establishes clear lines of authority for the investigation of complaints and the review of those investigations by the Complaint Commissioner. This includes a review of the investigation, ordering a new investigation and a review and acceptance of corrective discipline imposed against a police officer. The Police Complaint Commissioner is an independent appointment of the BC Legislature. The clear intent of this is to place the position beyond political interference.

The RCMP has a different system. The RCMP receives complaints directly from the public and investigates the complaints through their internal process. The findings of the investigation, if substantiated, are presented to a disciplinary board. The RCMP Act also establishes two separate agencies for handling complaints involving the RCMP.

The Commission for Public Complaints against the RCMP (CPC) can receive direct complaints from the public but forwards them to the relevant RCMP detachment for investigation and resolution. The CPC also has the responsibility to review RCMP handling of complaints made by a member of the public against an individual RCMP member. The CPC makes non-binding recommendations to the Commissioner with respect to their findings. The CPC can self initiate complaints and hold a public inquiry into complaints but this is rarely done. The RCMP External Review Committee (ERC) reviews and makes non-binding recommendations to the Commissioner with respect to certain types of grievances from members and appeals from disciplinary actions by management.

The existence of the two separate systems causes confusion within the public and leads to difficulties in dealing with complaints against members within integrated units. Team members are subject to different disciplinary procedures and complaint processes.

Liability

The Police Act contains a statutory requirement obligating a police agency to provide temporary assistance to another agency, if so requested. Section 68 of the Police Act states:

- 68 (1) The provincial police force, a municipal police department or designated unit must, on receiving a request for temporary assistance made by another police force, police department or designated policing unit, assign to the requesting police force, police department or designated policing unit the officers and equipment practicable to assign for the purpose.

- (2) A police force, police department or designated policing unit that requests and receives assistance under subsection (1) is responsible for all costs of that assistance.

These provisions act as insurance for residents in municipalities policed by smaller agencies, where the agency may not be able, or decide not to staff various specialized units itself. The Police Act directs that the agency requesting assistance is responsible for all “costs” of that assistance. The costs of assistance would clearly encompass the hourly wages and overtime of the officers assisting, as well as equipment consumed. Of course the true costs would further include wear and tear and depreciation of equipment used, a portion of the costs of the specialized training those officers had received, and various other incidentals.

The requesting agency, its police board and its municipal government commonly do not consider that the “costs” may also include liabilities incurred as a result of the actions by the assisting agency. If property is damaged or persons are injured, as a result of actions taken by assisting officers, the Police Act provides that the assisting officers’ home municipality (Police Act section 20) or the provincial government (Police Act section 11) are jointly and severally liable; however, the section 68 assignment of the costs, for the assistance, to the requesting agency, may transfer those liabilities. The result is that the requesting agency’s municipal government may be financially liable for the actions of officers from another agency, officers whose actions its own police board and appointed Chief Constable do not control.

Similar potentially problematic liability issues arise in relation to municipal officers seconded to integrated teams led by the RCMP. Where a plaintiff in a civil lawsuit is awarded damages arising out of the actions of a municipal officer, the home agency’s municipal government is financially liable (Police Act section 20). In the first instance, the home municipality will likely incur this liability, even when its officer was acting under the direction of the RCMP and working in another municipality. Section 11 of the Police Act may also make the provincial government liable to the plaintiff, but it is unclear how liability would be apportioned between the two levels of government. In any event, the home agency remains liable for the legal costs of defending their police officers (in accordance with provisions of collective agreements). To date, secondment agreements have not effectively dealt with the assignment of liabilities between the participants in integrated units, and the secondments present liability risk not being given full consideration, or factored in as potential costs, by municipal governments.

Coordination Gaps

At present, there are no formal protocols for information, crime analysis, and intelligence-sharing between the various police services in the GVR. Rather, such information sharing, when it does occur, is on a personal, ad hoc, and reciprocal basis. This arrangement is far from a best practices model for crime investigation and cannot be justified on the basis that there are a number of integrated investigative teams throughout the region. The presence of these teams does not guarantee information-sharing, as again, there are no protocols in place that require integrated teams to share information with the police services from which members of these teams are seconded, nor is there any indication that information feedback loops exist on other than an ad hoc basis. Any option designed to improve police service delivery in the GVR would have to address this issue.

Recently, the police agencies that comprise the GVR have come together to co-ordinate their efforts in order to combat significant crime problems. There is a realization that individual police agencies cannot combat multi-jurisdictional crime issues (such as gangs) on an individual basis. The municipalities realize there is a need to coordinate and pool resources for short-term initiatives in order to effectively address serious crime issues in a timely fashion. These agencies recognize that there is a need to be proactive rather than reactive, in these instances and that there is a need for a strategic plan for the region. Not only does the province need a provincial strategic policing plan; each region needs to develop a regional strategy based on the priorities set by the province.

Currently there are no over-arching strategic plans, strategies or set priorities to address the future of youth gangs, regional crime reduction, DARE programs, human resources, training, recruiting and retention, just to name a few.

Investigations

The current arrangements for policing the GVR present challenges in case investigation, information and intelligence-sharing, and in the continuity of collaborative investigations. The increasing complexity and costs of case investigations requires the adoption of one model of case management throughout the region. A recent example highlighting the difficulties associated with fragmented policing services is that the VPD is not involved in the investigation of the multiple, drug-related murders that occurred in Surrey in October 2007, despite the fact that this incident is likely related to the ongoing drug/gang violence that is occurring throughout the region. A number of recent, high profile cases, including the Missing Women's case, highlight the need for "seamless" patrol and investigative police services throughout the GVR.

When agencies do come together on an investigation whether through an integrated Unit or Joint Forces Operation, the investigators use the same command structure for investigating major files, but are trained on and use different software systems for managing information. This bifurcated approach is neither efficient nor effective and may hinder the provision of a high standard of policing services to the citizens of the GVR.

Priorities

Although there are between eight and ten strike force-type (surveillance) teams across the region, there is no procedure for prioritizing targets among the different police services. While one area may have numerous high-priority targets, another area may have relatively few. If both regions have a similar amount of officers assigned to this detail, there may be instances where insufficient resources are spent on high-priority targets (which in all likelihood should be priorities for the entire region), while other low-priority targets have a disproportionate number of resources dedicated due to the compartmentalization of targets, resources and priorities. Having a regional structure would also allow for more experienced officers to be assigned to more dangerous or "heat conscious" targets, while those with less experience could be assigned as appropriate for safety and effectiveness.

Human Resources

The current structure of policing the GVR presents significant challenges in the efforts of police services in the area of human resources. Among the more pressing human resource issues are:

Professional and Career Development

Under the current policing model, the professional and career development of members is the responsibility of each organization, and as such, is quite unequal due to varying budgets, needs, and rank structuring. Although recruit training for the independent police agencies is standardized through the JIBC, additional training depends on each agency's policies and budget. Opportunities for operational, administrative, investigational and supervisory roles, along with promotional opportunities, are also unequal. Often this is a direct result of the size of a police service, as smaller agencies do not have as much flexibility as large ones to transfer members for career development, nor are there as many senior positions available for junior members to be promoted into. In the case of an assignment to an integrated unit, operational experience may be gained, but there is no performance management system to measure or document the experience in order to properly inform the member's agency.

Development for the supervisory, management and executive ranks needs to be addressed, as opportunities to gain experience and knowledge for advancement through each of these ranks are necessary, but vary within each department. Many independent police agencies can provide only limited development opportunities within their respective organizations due to their size.

There may be options for police service delivery in the GVR that would facilitate the standardization of recruitment, training and professional and career development.⁸ A performance management system could be used to ensure that all members are receiving the necessary training and experience. The system would allow for the development and training of future leaders. In the United Kingdom, officers are transferred to positions of increasing responsibility in order to prepare them for higher rank.

Recruitment

There is intense competition among police services (independent municipal and the RCMP) in the GVR for new recruits and for in-service officers. This competition is costly, inefficient, and hinders both planning and operations. Smaller police services may have a much more difficult time attracting and retaining police recruits.

Retention

The cost associated with the loss of experienced, in-service officers to larger police services such as the RCMP and Vancouver Police Department are not included in a municipality's policing costs, yet these costs are extensive. Small police services in the GVR are being devastated by officers resigning to go to other departments, including the RCMP. The expertise and experience of officers cannot be replaced merely by hiring new officers. A separate issue concerns the recognition that in smaller agencies, younger, more energetic officers may find themselves serving areas with lower instances of crime, thereby decreasing their opportunity to learn and be challenged in the workplace. This may have the unfortunate effect of those officers leaving for larger, more "eventful" areas or agencies.

Secondments

The use of integrated policing teams, composed of municipal and RCMP officers seconded to address specific issues, might be viewed as a "band-aid" solution for the lack of a regional presence. The creation of integrated units to address regional issues suggests the need for a regional police agency.

⁸ Another issue that bears mentioning is the recognition that while many RCMP members and Executive Officers may come from other areas of the province or even the country, on the whole, VPD officers and members of the Executive have been born and raised in the GVR, and as such, are more cognizant of local concerns and issues.

In the absence of a comprehensive plan for maximizing police resources in the GVR, the rationalization and sharing of resources has developed on an ad-hoc basis through the use of integrated teams, task forces, and secondments. This is costly and the effectiveness of this approach has never been empirically assessed. Despite the extensive reliance on integrated teams to address such issues as traffic, gang violence, and drug-related violence, and the significant costs associated with this approach, there has been no evaluation to date of the effectiveness of this strategy. There is ongoing concern among many police services with the numbers of seconded officers who are assigned to these special task forces and teams. Major concerns include the absence of information “flowback” to the officers’ home departments and that officers may “disappear” into special police teams for years at a time. As well, these teams drain experienced officers from the individual police services, a significant concern given the retirement of experienced senior officers and the large number of police officers who are junior in rank throughout the GVR.

There is also concern that the police service’s investigative expertise is diminished. This is of particular concern given the high percentage of officers with less than five years of experience, making even more important the presence of seasoned officers in the police service. As well, concerns exist over officers being supervised and taking direction from another agency. Most integrated teams are headed by the RCMP, which will not be familiar with the regulations and procedures and collective agreements of the municipal members’ home department. Yet if a public complaint about the actions of a municipal officer is made, in part the rules and regulations of the officer’s home department regulate his or her actions, and not those of the RCMP may have in place for the team. A regional police service would decrease the need for integrated police task forces and units composed of officers from municipal department and RCMP detachments. This has been the experience of the regional police services in Ontario.

Economic Disparities

Introduction

At the present time there are insufficient data to develop a cost benefit analysis of the various options for regionalizing police services in the GVR. The available data and information relating to costs and levels of service provided to the municipalities are not sufficiently precise to make this exercise useful. This is an area that should be investigated as the discussions of options for policing the GVR move forward. What is presented below are some of the issues that arise due to the current structure, and the disparity of funding and services in police services in the GVR.

Economic Inefficiencies

Any analysis of the “costs” of policing the GVR must extend beyond the traditional measure of “costs per officer” and include the “costs” associated with failing to apprehend serious offenders in a timely fashion and the “costs” associated with not having sufficient coordination and resources to conduct an investigation at a level that ensures a conviction. One need only consider the “costs” associated with the Missing Women’s case to realize that any economic analysis must consider a wide range of factors.

The cost of policing services in Vancouver reflects both the actual policing on the ground and the use of police resources by other departments. Today, as documented elsewhere in this report, there is a wide disparity of services in different policing jurisdictions in the GVR. There are differences in philosophies⁹,

⁹ For example, the “no call too small” model of service delivery is not embraced by all police agencies.

there are differences in response times to similar calls for service,¹⁰ and there are differences in the number of officers responding to similar calls¹¹.

There are a variety of economic inefficiencies associated with the current regional structure in the GVR in which six are separate municipal agencies, while 12 municipalities are served by the RCMP. Broadly speaking, the current mixture of RCMP contract and multiple independent municipal police services would be appropriate if crime were isolated in each of the different districts. In such an environment, each of the agencies would have a crime stance appropriate to its own city or municipality. Each community would bear the resource costs necessary for the level of service determined by that city or municipality as appropriate. However, it is not the case that either crime or resource allocation currently takes place in single municipalities. As a consequence there are a myriad of inefficiencies associated with the current policing structure. These inefficiencies can be described as arising from free riding, inappropriate levels of specialization, failing to take advantage of economies of scale, inadequate characterization of levels of service and costs of service provision, and a mismatch of taxation and service provision.

Measuring Police Costs but not Police Service

The observation that Victoria and Vancouver have high per capita policing costs should come as no surprise. Both are the largest cities in their region, and consequently provide services outside their local communities. Vancouver is a qualitatively different policing environment than any other policing area in BC. The economic activity of the City is proportionately greater than its size as it is both a financial hub and a regional hub. It is the center for protests and the destination for tourists. Gangs are particularly active with access to both the port and the entertainment district.

The observation that Vancouver is a regional economic centre also means that the population that has to be policed may differ significantly from the population that is recorded by Statistics Canada. Estimates are that Vancouver supports a population that may be more than 40,000 higher than the resident population on average during a 24-hour period.¹² This leads to an increased cost of policing in the City of Vancouver in particular, as measured by the per capita cost (residential population only). What also results is that although outlying (or ambient) municipalities 'supply' much of this 40,000 person increase to Vancouver, they are in effect not paying the VPD for it, and rather, only pay their own municipal police force for their residential population (which may not be present most of the time in that municipality). Statistics Canada recognized several years ago the need to amalgamate the crime data for Metro Vancouver in order to report comparable data for other large urban areas in Canada.

Measuring policing costs is of interest to taxpayers, but equally important and generally unmeasured is the value of the service provided.¹³ This is not easily captured by our usual financial measures since the

¹⁰ VPD Planning, Research & Audit internal report

¹¹ The decision to respond with a single officer, multiple officers, and/or ERT, is not standardized across municipalities.

¹² These estimates are based on research provided by private communication from Professor Martin Andresen (SFU Criminology), June 27, 2007.

¹³ Policing services are hard to measure from the raw data provided by Statistics Canada. A police establishment's nominal size may not be its actual size.

underlying prevalence of crime is generally unmeasured.¹⁴ The City of Vancouver has a more complicated crime environment than most other municipalities. Just like a big city hospital may record a higher death rate than other hospitals, it would be foolish to conclude that the city medical staff is less competent than those in the rural areas. What may occur is that the most difficult cases come or are transferred to the city hospital, and while staff may be giving significantly better and more specialized service, their case outcomes are measured as worse if the per case yardstick gives no consideration to case complexity.

Consequently, per capita policing costs may have great appeal but they suffer from the important deficiency that they do not reflect the value of the service provided. Implicitly, comparisons of per capita costs of police services assume that the services provided are identical. This is clearly untrue.

Tax Collection and Subsidies

One feature of policing budgets is that they are dependent upon municipal lines. Above it was argued that the appropriate geographical extent of the police force is related to the geographical extent of the criminal activity. Similarly, police funding should be related to the location of the population whom the police are serving. Thus, if all policing were municipal because all crime was local, then it would be appropriate for the locus of budgeting to be local as well. Crimes that are regional need to be funded regionally as the regional taxpayer is the beneficiary. This is not simply a statement of philosophy, but a statement about efficiency.

To the extent that one city subsidizes the policing activities of another say, town, then a reasonable case can be made that the taxpayers of the city are supporting the taxpayers of the town who are not paying a share commensurate with the service they are receiving. Further, the level of the subsidized activity will be less than that which would be provided by the taxpayers acting in concert as a single source of financing. As it stands now, the city will tend to under-provide the service, since it is more costly than it should be to the city residents, and the town's residents will receive at least some benefit for which they do not pay. Citizens of the city will be paying more in city taxes and receiving less in city policing services than their taxes should support. This leads to an environment in which city police services are seen as delivering less service than the level of taxation should permit. Consequently, there will be constant pressure for increased city front line policing that will tend to diminish the resources for specialized police services.

Regionalization is just one of the ways to deal with this persistent problem. Other options may include charging out for services utilized by other agencies, special provincial grants, or other funding support. However, one of the key points for the present situation is the recognition that the VPD, although providing many specialty and support services to smaller agencies, does not charge out for these services on a regular basis.¹⁵ Even if these services were charged out consistently to other agencies, the benefit of this approach to alleviate cross-jurisdictional policing issues is not straightforward.¹⁶

¹⁴ Of course Crimes Known to the Police and the Social Survey provide some insight into part of the crime prevalence as they record some victimizations. But gang related, drugs, financial frauds and a host of other types of crimes are not necessarily reported or even recognized by the public except as individual cases make the press.

¹⁵ It is expensive to try to break down every cost for each operation. While it can be done, it is not likely to be done easily. One can imagine the entire process degenerating into a constant tussle across municipalities about what is being charged to whom. These costs are internalized in the course of normal single unit budgeting.

¹⁶ For example, a criminal may act criminally in the City of Vancouver yet not engage in offensive behaviour at 'home' in another municipality. Local police have no reason to be actively interested. However, City police need to

Although the VPD uses the services of the RCMP National Lab Service at no cost, the service is jointly funded by the Federal and Provincial Governments for service provision to all BC police agencies.

The Municipal governments in the Union of BC Municipalities (UBCM) identified that there is a fiscal imbalance between local government's reliance on property taxes as its major source of revenue versus ever increasing costs. This is especially true of increasing policing costs. This has been acknowledged for many large cities in Canada, although nowhere is this truer than in the GVR, as it is the last major metropolitan area without regionalized policing.

Canada's big cities, like all municipalities, are simply too dependent on only one tax source – the property tax. The lack of diversity in municipal tax tools is highly problematic. The property tax is inelastic – the revenue produced tends to grow slowly, often failing to keep pace with population growth, inflation, and economic expansion. Big city responsibilities have also expanded dramatically. Cities are finding themselves having to provide more and more services to 'people' as opposed to 'property', a task for which the property tax is ill-suited. *With more and more residents filling the beltways around our city-regions, big cities find themselves having to provide services and infrastructure to a growing population who pay their residential property taxes elsewhere [emphasis added].*¹⁷

The City of Abbotsford has undertaken an initiative to bring to the UBCM a call for equitable police funding. Their report points out that the Federal Municipal Policing Agreements provide for a contribution of federal funds towards policing services costs to municipalities with the RCMP. However, the independent police services costs are paid entirely by local municipal taxpayers. These taxpayers are required to pay twice for policing: once through federal/provincial tax and again through municipal property tax (City of Abbotsford, 2007). In January 2008, both the City of Saanich and the City of Vancouver have put forward similar initiatives.

The US Example

In the U.S. 16 states permit municipal governments to collect local income taxes. (Slack, 2005) Couple the access to these revenue sources with federal programs such as TEA-21 that provide U.S. cities with access to over \$100 billion for transportation infrastructure, and Canadian municipalities quickly lose any competitive advantage. (as cited in *Big City Mayor's Caucus, 2006*).

While most Canadian municipalities take the majority of income from property taxes, many cities in the US have a far more extensive tax sharing plan with the Federal Government. One such example is Seattle, Washington (Vander Ploeg, 2005b):

spend resources to monitor the criminal's activities in both locations leading to both coordination issues and resource allocation issues.

¹⁷ Casey G. Vander Ploeg, Senior Policy Analyst, Canada West Foundation

LOCAL TAXES IN PLAY:

General Retail Sales Tax
Sales Tax on Entertainment
Sales Tax on Gambling
Sales Tax on Restaurants
Sales Tax on Bars and Pubs
Sales Tax on Vehicle Rentals
Gross Receipts Tax
Franchise and Utility Taxes
Motor Vehicle Excise Tax
Real Estate Excise Tax

OTHER REVENUES

Federal and State Grants
User Fees
Interest, Licenses, Permits, Fines

TAX-SHARING

State Liquor Tax
State Fuel Tax
State Lodging Tax
State Insurance Premium Tax
State General Retail Sales Tax
State Leasehold Excise Tax
State Hazardous Waste Tax
State Utility Tax
State Timber Tax
State Solid Waste Tax

OTHER TAXES AVAILABLE

Employee Head Tax
Square Footage Business Tax
Head Tax or Poll Tax

Although a complete discussion of the federal-provincial-municipal funding arrangement is beyond the scope of this discussion document, it is an issue that should be considered in any discussion of the regionalization of police services.

Free Riding

As highlighted earlier, the Police Act directs that a municipal police agency must, on receiving a request for temporary assistance made by another police agency, assign to the requesting agency the officers and equipment practicable to assign for the purpose. As a result, smaller agencies can rely on receiving assistance in relation to specialized investigations (e.g., homicides) or particular policing duties (e.g., crowd control). While it has not been demonstrated that smaller agencies rely on the Police Act assistance requirement when deciding whether or not to staff their own specialized units, it is common practice for smaller agencies to make event-type-specific advance arrangements with larger agencies for the provision of services. The Police Act directs that the agency requesting assistance is responsible for all costs of that assistance; however, in practice police agencies have historically not consistently billed each other for services requested and provided, due to difficulty in assessing costs incurred and the collegial relationship among agencies. As such, there is no fixed cost associated with the level and type of service that is provided, and no consistency in whether agencies are billed or not on an ongoing basis.

Generally, larger police agencies have more specialized units than smaller agencies. These units are made available to smaller agencies, as the goal of apprehending offenders is paramount to both large and small agencies. But currently the smaller agencies do not have to pay the full cost of these standing units. The previous section on “Comparing Police Services” outlined those specialized units that larger agencies make available to other police agencies on a regular basis. Insofar as other municipalities do not bear the costs of these units, they function as a costless form of insurance for smaller units. Consequently, the size of these units is smaller than if they were funded by all the users of the services, since the taxpayer in the municipality of the larger agency sees only the municipality-related benefit, yet bears all the cost. Free riding on larger agencies as a resource both degrades service from a specialized unit of a given size, and reduces the appropriate size of the unit providing those services.

The free riding of the smaller municipalities leads to an overemphasis on the delivery of local frontline services. Community policing, rapid uniformed response and traffic enforcement (among other functions) are delivered in the smaller municipalities. With the insurance of specialized task forces – like those described in previous sections – provided by the larger forces, the smaller forces do not need to maintain specialized expertise within their personnel. This results in these agencies having little capacity to respond to complex environments, such as ports, or complex situations such as organized crime. This is problematic, and may become more so in the future as cities grow, as surely the ‘big city phenomenon’ of Vancouver and the related challenges will continually emerge in other municipalities that are far less prepared.

The VPD is subjected to two pressures: the need to provide front line policing in the City of Vancouver, and the need to provide expertise for specialized tasks for police services both within the city and to the region. The pressure within the City of Vancouver and on the VPD is to move more resources into patrol, as this is what is most visible to the taxpaying public in Vancouver. However, this can only be done at the expense of expert crime fighting services that currently provide for both Vancouver and the broader community.

Economies of Scale

Larger policing agencies have the potential advantage of scale and scope. The distinction is that economies of scale arise in the application of a single police activity to a larger number of cases. For example, a department may have a small number of officers devoted to policing a particular crime which occurs with modest frequency. With a large number of cases, the same number of officers may be able to use a helicopter, or other specialized equipment that would not be justifiable otherwise. Similarly, the specialization offered in a larger force may offer more opportunity for additional training and interesting assignments. This may draw officers from smaller municipalities on a regular basis adding to their costs of recruitment.

Economies of scope occur when there are the opportunities to pursue many different activities that would not be possible without some kind of central distribution of the initial fixed costs. Thus a city like Vancouver can have a number of specialized squads while a smaller policing agency, might at best have a few.

Benefits of Current Structure

Cost Benefits

With the current structure, municipalities who contract the services of the RCMP gain by way of federal subsidies comprised of 10% of salaries plus training, equipment, and some administrative costs. When the RCMP’s current contract with the Provincial Government expires in 2012, it is uncertain whether these subsidies would remain in the next contract (if renewed).

Many communities may reap the benefit from the current structure, particularly if they are in a small municipality where a police officer will respond to every 9-1-1 call, regardless of the seriousness of the incident. What the residents do not realize is that often their police agency relies heavily on larger agencies for major incidents, and would be unable to provide an acceptable level of service if a high-priority case arose and they were without outside assistance from the larger agencies.

Amalgamating and Regionalizing Police: The Canadian Experience

*The two major questions were: “Is regionalization going to cost more?” and,
“Is regionalization going to result in less service?”*
Chief, Waterloo Regional Police

I can’t think of any downside (to regionalization) other than the uncertainty at Day One.
Retired Deputy Chief, Waterloo Regional Police Service

Regional policing is good for the police and good for the public.
Officer, Halton Regional Police Service

*Regionalization has been a huge success. There is no question, from the very
beginning, that it was the right thing to do.*
Member, Halton Regional Police Service Board

*Since the regionalization of the [Hamilton] police in 1975,
the police service has worked well.*
Member, Hamilton Police Service Board

Regional police services have been a feature of the Canadian policing landscape for over four decades. Notably, regionalization has occurred in the eastern regions of the country, with the largest regional police services being created in the provinces of Quebec and Ontario. In the 1970s, there were over 120 municipal police departments in Ontario; as of 2006, there were 58.

The largest regional police forces in the country are found in Ontario: Durham Regional Police, Halton Regional Police, Ottawa Police Service, Toronto Police Service, Peel Regional Police, Niagara Regional Police, Hamilton Police Service and Waterloo Regional Police. A review of the evolution of regional policing in these jurisdictions suggests that a regional approach to police service delivery can provide effective, and efficient, service delivery that is premised on best practices, responsive to the needs of individual communities, and effective in the prevention and response to crime and disorder.

In 1953, 13 municipalities amalgamated into Metropolitan Toronto. It was the subsequent need to provide the citizens of the region with an effective and efficient police force that led to the amalgamation of 13 local police forces into the Metropolitan Toronto Police in 1957. This regional force was the first of its kind in Ontario and became a model for national and international agencies who wanted to improve their police service delivery in the same way. In 1998, Metropolitan Toronto merged into the City of Toronto and the police force became the Toronto Police Service.

Amalgamation and regionalization of police services have occurred in a number of other Canadian jurisdictions over the past several decades. In Eastern Canada, Bedford, Dartmouth and Halifax amalgamated into one police service in 1996 and subsequently integrated into the Halifax Regional Police. (McDavid, 2002:2).

The Service de Police de la Ville de Montreal (SPVM) was created in 1972, and included 25 smaller forces which police Montreal. SPVM is one of the largest police forces in Canada (Brodeur, 2005:256).

Regionalization took two phases in Montreal. The first was from 1987-93, the second was from 1994-2005 (Brodeur, 2005:259). Quebec felt that with regionalization there would be an optimum usage of resources, increased administration centralization, an improved structure of salaries, improved career plans, and a new structure for specialization of specific services (Commission de Police du Quebec, (No Year):19). A significant difference in the GVR is the presence of RCMP contract policing, a phenomenon that does not exist in the provinces of Ontario and Quebec. While these two jurisdictions have provincial police services, only in Ontario does the provincial police service, the OPP, engage in contract policing at the municipal level.

Significantly, provincial governments have been the primary driver of regionalization in those jurisdictions where it has occurred. As the Mayor of Milton, Ontario stated: "If the province hadn't forced us, we wouldn't have done it." Interviews with municipal mayors, municipal and regional councillors, police board members, police executives, sworn members, the private sector, provincial Police Services, and community residents relating to the performance of the regional police services resulted in the following feedback discussed below.

Policing Issues and Regionalization

The following discussion draws upon materials gathered in interviews with respondents in Ontario and Nova Scotia.

Recruiting and Retention - A major benefit of regional policing is the elimination of competition among the various police services for recruits and in-service officers. In the GVR, the competition is ferocious. Competing police services may promise in-service officers specialty unit opportunities, while larger police services highlight the greater opportunities for a variety of policing positions that smaller departments cannot offer. Although competition exists across Canada for new recruits and especially in-service officers, in the words of a Niagara Regional Police Service Inspector, "A regional police force is more attractive to recruits."

Growth and Crime - The 26-year mayor of Milton, Ontario noted: "The small police departments didn't have the resources. Regionalization brought expertise, at a cost, but it was spread over a large tax base. The smaller departments couldn't deal with the growth of specialized and sophisticated crimes."

A councillor for the City of Kitchener, Ontario observed that regionalizing police services was consistent with efforts to improve other areas of the public services sector: "The development of higher standards is a trend in all areas: policing, water treatment, transit; and smaller communities don't have the capacity to meet these."

Patrol and Investigative Deployment

"Policing in Delta [B.C.] will still exist. There will be more resources to draw from."
Mayor, Hamilton, Ontario

Regionalization appears to have a significant impact on investigative response, an Ottawa Police Service officer stated: “Communications have improved dramatically. From a policing perspective, there is huge improvement in the investigations. Especially with drugs, robberies and break and enters, where groups go from one border to the next”.

The Chief of Durham Regional Police Service identified a number of benefits of being a regional police service, including being able to mobilize and move resources around the region depending upon the need. He indicated the ability to move up to 70 officers into an area. This level of resourcing would not be available in most municipal departments.

A Niagara Regional Police Service Inspector noted, “There is an increase in operational readiness; NRPS can mobilize up to 200 officers (one third of the authorized strength) at a time; there aren’t those capacities in a small organization.”

Cost Issues

*Saving money is not a good pitch to make. Cost is not an issue that can be made.
The advantage is a higher level of service.
Councillor, City of Kitchener, Ontario*

*Don’t tie regionalization to cost-savings. There will be other types of efficiencies and a
regional police service can offer better customer service.
Deputy Chief, Niagara Regional Police Service*

In discussing the cost issues surrounding the delivery of policing services, a Toronto city councillor and member of the Toronto Police Services Board stated:

We can’t afford to waste people’s badges. We need to develop core capacities – how to make communities the priority and that the best and brightest are out there. Amalgamation requires that focus. We have to provide service for the taxpayer.

*“Citizens don’t know what the true costs of policing are.
Low call volume-labour intensive policing is very expensive.”
Inspector, Niagara Regional Police Service*

Although it appears that regionalization may not save money, there are other efficiencies to be gained, as well as the potential for improved police effectiveness in preventing crime and responding to criminal activity. As an Inspector in the Niagara Regional Police Service noted: “Regionalization will not save money. The operating budget will go up. The benefits are the economies of scale: more efficient recruiting, purchasing, and more flexible deployment.” The Mayor of Milton, Ontario stated: “It’s not cheaper, but it is better. It is not any cheaper for the taxpayer.”

The mayor of Hamilton, Ontario observed: “It is better to have a centralized approach to allocating resources. That makes it possible to move resources around to where they are needed.”

The budget for the Ottawa-Carleton Regional Police Service, however, showed that there was a cost benefit associated with the regionalization. The statistics show that Ottawa-Carleton Region called for a total budget of \$128.8 million dollars for 2001. The amalgamation of police services for Ottawa-Carleton produced a savings of more than \$5 million (Ottawa-Carleton Regional Police Service, 2000:2). Following regionalization in Halifax, there was a significant drop in policing costs (McDavid, 2002:13).

The Mayors

The mayor is still the middleman.
Mayor (26 years), Milton, Ontario

Historically, mayors have been a primary obstacle to the creation of regionalized police services. The mayor of Milton, Ontario observed: “The major issue for the mayors will be giving up control. It is hard to give it up for the unknown. We didn’t know how much more it was going to cost. But we had to ask the question, ‘Is bigger better?’ ‘Is smaller smarter?’” Interestingly, this mayor recalled that more than one mayor was happy to give up the “no call too small” policy.

Collective Agreements

In almost every case of regionalization in Ontario, the new collective agreements for the regional service were a result of the highest combination of benefits and wages from the amalgamated services. An Ottawa police member noted: “There should really be a consolidated collective agreement prior to amalgamation.” All agreed that consolidating collective agreements could be one of the significant, unanticipated costs of the process. In the event of a GVR regionalization, the issue of consolidating collective agreements among the independent municipal agencies would likely not be a factor; the current agreements’ wages and benefits are highly similar because of the sequence of negotiations and because the GVRD (now Metro Vancouver) represents the various municipalities in negotiations with the police unions.

The Community

*I don’t think people really care about the uniform a
police officer is wearing when they need help.*
Halifax Regional Police Superintendent

The public just wants a police officer when they call one.
Ottawa Police Service officer

*Any referendum to return to the pre-regionalization way of providing
police services would be defeated.*
Mayor, Milton, Ontario

*The challenge is to find a balance between local control and input
while getting the benefits of regional policing.*
Staff member, Ontario Police Services

The hesitancy of community residents to have their local police service amalgamate into a larger regional police service is often cited as a primary reason for maintaining the current arrangements for police service delivery. This counter-argument, however, has not been supported by public opinion survey data. A recent (November 10, 2007) Angus Reid survey found, for example, that 65 percent of residents surveyed in the GVR support creating a regional police service. This is a significant finding that should inform discussions of a regional police service going forward. It appears that public concern with the effectiveness of the police in responding to crime and violence in the region outweighs concerns related to the creation of a larger police service and the loss of “no call too small” policing.

It appears that there may be somewhat of a disconnect between the political leadership at the municipal level and the sentiments of community residents. While a number of mayors in the GVR have expressed outright opposition to regionalization or are on the record as supporting current policing arrangements, community residents appear interested in exploring alternatives that would increase the effectiveness of the police in preventing and responding to crime.

Reflecting on the experience of regionalization in the Waterloo region, a Kitchener, Ontario city Councillor observed: “If you have established community contact and that is something that you work at all of the time and every day, then there are no downsides [to regionalization].” A member of the Hamilton Police Service Board noted the importance of maintaining contact with communities once a regional police service had been established: “Don’t ignore any areas; make communities feel that their issues are important. Don’t walk away from small communities.”

It also appears that there is somewhat of a disconnect between the political leadership at the municipal level and the sentiments of community residents: while a number of mayors in the GVR have expressed outright opposition to regionalization or are on the record as supporting current policing arrangements, community residents appear interested in exploring alternatives that would increase the effectiveness of the police in preventing and responding to crime.

The concern of community residents over a reduction of service-delivery levels with the creation of a regional police service were addressed by a Halifax Regional Police Superintendent:

[Regionalization] was an issue for the public because there was a perceived loss of identity for the community of Dartmouth, so there was a lot of discussion over that; that everything would go to Halifax. For Bedford, they had a high level of policing, no call too small, and they were willing to pay more for it. So they were worried that once we amalgamated they’d get one car because everyone else would be pulled into Halifax. There are still references to the assertion that they had 13 officers on the street and they have less now. That’s been countered with ‘Yes, you may only have 12 now, but you have 16 across the bridge, and access to all these other units’.... There are those who say it’s worse, that we’ve lost the small town feeling, but with one police, one radio, it’s nice to know if we need them we’ve got 50 resources coming ‘like that’”.

With respect to levels of service, a Kitchener, Ontario City Councillor observed: “If the community wants access and the police to continue to respond to minor crimes, then they need to know the costs of this and the level of staffing that is required.”

Community Input

An Ottawa Police Service officer observed: "The communities do not have less input. They are very active with the Department, and there is a close working relationship with the Councillors (Ward System), that is better than it has ever been before. The policing issues we deal with now are more a matter of 'how we do business', and are not related to the amalgamation."

The mayor of Milton, Ontario noted that, prior to regionalization, his town had 15-17 officers to police a community of approximately 18,000 to 20,000 persons. The community is now 70,000 and growing rapidly. With respect to the benefits of a small, local police service, he observed: "Hominess can be good and bad. Citizens can be too close to the police and the police can be too close to the community. There can be a lot of pressures on a police officer in a small town."

The mayor noted that community input was important within the regional policing framework: "Community buy-in is important...Community consultation committees were set up. There is a dedicated police officer who attends these meetings and there are one or two elected people on it. These committees are a conduit between the community and the regional council."

The mayor further observed that: "It is important for communities to separate out their wants and needs and that they be able to demonstrate their needs."

The Chief of Waterloo Regional Police Service highlighted the importance of structuring the new regional police service so as to ensure continuity of the relationship between the police and the community:

When regionalization occurred, we lost community policing and lost touch with the communities. The communities lost the personal touch, the officers that they knew. This was due to the large number of transfers that occurred when the regional police service was created. We didn't want anyone connected with their former station. Movement was a problem.

Similarly, a Halton Regional Police Service officer stated:

Community identity and issues must be kept. The organization is regional but the police must remain committed to the needs of individual communities. It is necessary to reassure the community that they will either maintain, or gain, in the service that will be provided to them. That the communities' will not all be policed the same but that there will be community-focused districts.

Police Accountability to the Community

The experience in Ontario is that police accountability to the community is not lessened with the creation of a regional police service. The mayor of Milton, Ontario stated: "I can call the Inspector at any time and they will come to council. We can discuss where we have been and where we are going. The Inspector for the District generally comes to council twice a year."

Similarly, the mayor of Wilmott, Ontario (pop. 17,000, which originally had its own small town police force), who is also a member of the Waterloo Regional Police Services Board, noted that "It's been 10-15 years since we have heard a complaint about regional policing."

A staff member from Ontario Police Services noted: “Mayors must have communication and a working relationship with local commanders; public consultation is part of the business plan. In Hamilton, there is a Division Community Advisory Group.” A member of the Niagara Regional Police Service Board noted “It is also important to consider how you constitute the Board. “There must be equal representation on the Board by population.” A member of the Waterloo Regional Police Services Board stated that there were mechanisms in place to address any concerns that mayors and communities might have that the regional police are not meeting their needs:

The mechanisms are in place to deal with any concerns. The mayor can go to the Division Commander. If that doesn’t work, he can take it to the Regional Police Service Commission. We have never had these requests. Regionalization works well in a small municipality.

It is important to ensure that mayors and municipalities are kept apprised of policing issues and developments. The mayor of Hamilton, Ontario recalled:

When I was in the suburbs, our lament was that we never saw the police...and that they had taken away our police station. It was not necessarily an informed lament. As mayor, I am more informed about the operations of the police and the financial situation.

The mayor further noted, “[t]he regional police are very attuned to the community. The Business Plan (of the police) is based on lots of community input. The Plan represents the diversity of the region, which is changing.”

Planning

Respondents in Ontario noted the importance of planning should a jurisdiction decide to proceed with a regional police service. An Ottawa police officer recalled, “For the first two years we were on three completely different systems. This included radio networks, the CAD system and the records system. It was a nightmare. I don’t think they were prepared enough for all of the issues”.

The Chair of the Hamilton Regional Police Board recalled, “[i]t was two years from the time of the amalgamation in 1973 until the vision was realized. There were issues with regard to facilities, cars, and crests. There was a lot of prep time. Even two years was too short a time period.”

Lessons Learned

Respondents in Ontario, including police personnel, police services staff, and representatives from regional police boards and the municipal government level, identified a number of “lessons learned” with respect to the creation of a new regional police service.

The experience of regionalization in Ontario suggests that:

- Regionalizing police services does not result in a loss of community control over police services.
- The primary opposition to regionalizing police services has come from the political level, rather than from the police or the community.

- Regionalization has the potential to significantly improve the deployment of patrol and investigative resources.
- There is no movement toward decentralizing police services and returning to pre-regional policing arrangements.
- Concerns among municipalities that there would be a decrease in service levels and a reduced capacity for input into policing have not been realized.
- Regionalization is supported by municipal mayors and community residents and there is no indication that either stakeholder group would wish to return to pre-regionalization arrangements for the delivery of policing services.

The Halifax “Blended” Policing Model

*In the integration, I think you have to decide to use one set of policies and procedures
or the others, because blending takes too much time and energy.*

Superintendent, Halifax Regional Police

Police services in Halifax, Dartmouth, and Bedford Nova Scotia were amalgamated into the Halifax Regional Police in 1996. Subsequently, a “blended” model was developed involving the Halifax Regional Police (HRP) and the RCMP, which was involved in municipal contract policing in the areas surrounding the city.

Information on the experience of “blending” the RCMP and the HRP was provided in an interview with a Halifax Regional Police Superintendent. This experience is instructive, as one option for police services in the GVR is a “integrated” police service that would involve RCMP officers working alongside municipal police officers. For a variety of reasons, as documented in the comments of the Halifax Regional Police Superintendent, this model has proven to be less than effective and highlights the challenges, and limitations, of attempting to blend the RCMP and municipal police services into a regional police service.

The regionalization of policing services in Halifax was a provincially-driven initiative. Initially, there was good support from the RCMP and the HRP; however, difficulties were encountered in securing data from the RCMP and the data systems between the two police services were incompatible. One issue is span of control of the Police Board, since the RCMP are accountable to Ottawa and to federal legislation.

Although the officers are on a common radio channel, there is no integration of patrol in the HRP; rather, there are defined, and separate, patrol areas. There is however, integration in specialty units.

Difficulties with the “Blended” RCMP/Municipal Model

Numerous difficulties were encountered in attempting to “integrate” RCMP and municipal policies and procedures into a regional police service. Several of these were identified by a Halifax Regional Police Superintendent who was involved in the initiative to create the new “regional” police service:

In the investigative units, there were issues around what the standards and qualifications would be, municipal officers not meeting federal standards, etc. Communication centres and records management were big ticket items because to work together we needed to have common RMS....On the RMS/CAD issue, there was agreement that there should be one system. HRP wanted everyone on the new system.

The RCMP wanted us on theirs, but their system didn't have an integrated CAD system and didn't meet our needs...At the end of it they decided to come on and they're the only ones in Canada outside BC on Versaterm.

A review of the policing arrangements in Halifax (Perivale and Taylor, 2002) found that the HRP and the RCMP were "operating with different cultures, different pressures and different approaches to local policing...The presence of two agencies working in one jurisdiction also results in an element of competition."

Benefits of the "Blended" RCMP/Municipal Model

The benefits associated with the blended RCMP/Municipal model relate to regionalization in general, and not to the merging of the two diverse agencies. A Halifax Regional Police Superintendent stated, "We are more effective amalgamated than if we'd stayed apart." He also noted that there are more opportunities for police officers to move throughout the service, and take on different roles and challenges.

The experience with the "blended" model of regionalizing police services in Halifax suggest that adoption of this model for police service delivery requires close collaboration and cooperation between the municipal police services and the RCMP and that strategic planning assumes a very important role in this endeavour.

Implementation and Integration: Considerations for the GVR

Integration for the sake of integration doesn't wash. You need to look at what you want to achieve. If it's just to say politically that you're integrated, there's too much energy spent and you're better off keeping your agencies separate, or else amalgamate them and make them one agency.
Superintendent, Halifax Regional Police

Make sure you define WHY you're doing what you're going to do and decide what you want in the future, then decide how to get there. Don't do integration because it's the buzz word. Look at what you want to accomplish, then decide what's the best way to get there.
Superintendent, Halifax Regional Police

The experience of regionalizing police services in other Canadian jurisdictions suggests a number of key considerations that must be weighed by parties involved in a similar exercise in the GVR.

1) The Ontario experience suggests that the provincial government must assume the lead in initiating discussions and considering options for providing police services to the GVR.

Regionalization in British Columbia will never happen unless the province directs it... The province of British Columbia has to be committed and say that regionalization is going to happen. The province legislates and the municipalities make it work. It will never happen if it is left to the municipalities."
Member, Waterloo Regional Police Service Board

It is significant that in Ontario, where regionalization is most extensively developed, a key role was assumed by the provincial government which indicated that regionalization was to occur. A similar role was assumed by the provincial government in Nova Scotia with respect to the creation of the Halifax Regional Police. This requires the provincial government to facilitate a discussion of regionalization premised on the best practices police literature and on a determination of which model of police service delivery will be the most effective and efficient.

2. If the decision is to create a new regional police service, then this new service must have its own identity. A common theme from police and government personnel in Ontario was that a new regional police service must have its own identity. This requires that all vestiges of the individual police services, e.g., uniforms and patrol car markings, be replaced. A Superintendent from the Halifax Regional Police expressed the view that all of the major changes should be made at the outset, rather than being phased in over time:

We really just changed shirts at first and it was only after a while we got into standardized procedures across the board. In hindsight, it may have been better to have the pain up front rather than leaving them. People thought it might just go away, but here we are 10 years later.

An Ottawa Police Service member recalled, "It has been ten years now and we all just joke about it today. It is fine today, unlike what happened in Niagara. There has been talk of guys there wearing their old department uniforms ten years after regionalization."

Ontario police personnel identified the importance of ensuring that regionalization did not occur just "on paper" and that the specific policing cultures associated with each municipal police service involved in the amalgamation did not remain intact. In Canada, the model has been to create homogeneity in the new police service by creating a new crest, uniforms, and other identifiers. This has been the practice in the U.S. as well (McDavid, 2002:5).

The determination of policing boundaries is an important factor in creating the identity of the new regional police service. The policing districts in Waterloo Regional Police Service, for example, do not coincide with the municipality boundaries; this was done intentionally to prevent isolation. The city boundaries were not kept, and the policing districts were identified based on call load.

3. In any new arrangements for the delivery of police services, including creating a new regional police service, attention must be given to specific practices that are in place in the various police services. As an Ottawa Police Service officer noted, "One of the problems was with badge numbers. Rather than re-issue new badge numbers, they had everyone keep their existing number and put a different prefix on it, depending on which agency you were from. Gloucester members put a '10' in front of their old number and Nepean put a '20'. It creates more problems than necessary. In policing, we identify one another by badge numbers – seniority, experience, etc. This method of adding a prefix forever identifies people with their old police department."

4. The adoption of any new model for police service delivery in the GVR must recognize that there are different policing "cultures" that exist in the police services in the GVR. As a Halifax Regional Police Superintendent noted with respect to Dartmouth, Bedford, and Halifax police services,

There were three very different cultures. Halifax was a command/control agency; you didn't do anything without checking with a supervisor. Dartmouth was freer. Bedford was a very high level of service agency. Just bringing together the three cultures and having common operating procedures was a challenge. That took a few years to try to decide which procedures to adopt.

5. In any new model of policing service, core capacities must be established in order to ensure the effective delivery of police services. To realize the full potential of a regional police model or a new regional police service and to effectively address the challenges and shortcomings that surround the current arrangements for the delivery of policing services in the GVR, it is imperative that core capacities be developed. Best practice standards for all facets of administration, policy, and practice should be included in the provincial police act, or embodied in a new set of police standards. Several provinces, including Alberta and Ontario, use police standards to ensure a consistently high level of service delivery. This will ensure that the disparities that currently exist across the GVR, e.g., Delta Police Department (with approximately 145 police members) has three full-time use-of-force trainers, while the VPD (with an authorized strength of 1,231 police members, not including over 80 secondments) has one and half full-time use of force trainers.

Several respondents in Ontario indicated the importance of maintaining a focus on community policing and of structuring the delivery of policing services to enhance police-community relations. A member of the Halton Regional Police Service described how that police service attempted to accomplish this:

You have to maintain the community focus and this can be accomplished by creating districts and hav[ing] officers dedicated to that district. Instead of patrol zones we have communities. Each district has its own investigative unit, youth officer/social worker and senior crime investigator. There is also a street crime unit in each district on a two-year, competitive rotation. All of the district police stations are open 24 hours a day. There is a Staff Sgt. on duty, 2 patrol Sgts, and a complement of patrol officers. We also use mobile community stations - temporary buildings that can be moved around. We had a problem-premises apartment building and put a temporary station there for six months with a team of officers working to resolve the issues.

6. Any discussions of a new model of police service delivery, including the creation of a new regional police service, must include all stakeholders, including police officers. As a member of the executive of the Halton Regional Police Service Police Association noted, "It all depends on how you label it and how you market it. You have to tell your story. We hired a corporate communications person to market the idea of becoming a regional police service." This view was echoed by the President of the Halton Regional Police Association: "It is important to let everyone know what the rules are upfront."

Similarly, an officer with the Ottawa Police Service Officer's Association stated, "Do your homework twice over... Use focus groups to flesh out the issues. Have your association and department sit together on the committees. We had great communication with our members as amalgamation moved forward."

The Chief of Waterloo Regional Police Service identified the importance of communicating with patrol officers about all facets of the regionalization process: "The biggest issue for patrol officers was the unknown. 'Is it going to be better for us? For my career? Where am I going to end up?'"

7. There must be a strategic plan for adopting the new model of police service delivery in the GVR and transitioning from the current structure. This multi-faceted plan would include:

- A media and public education strategy;
- A political strategy;
- Provisions for recruitment and training;
- Provisions to ensure that a “best practices” police service is created, with the capacity for ensuring that resources are deployed as effectively and efficiently as possible. This includes leading edge analytical capacity for monitoring the performance of the police service and its officers as well as for analyzing crime trends, the effectiveness of patrol and investigative units, and of crime prevention efforts;
- The provision for “report-backs” to the regional police services board; and,
- Operational procedures to ensure that police officers are familiar with the communities they police and that there is ongoing communication and consultation with local residents and municipal councils.

A member of the Durham Regional Police Board observed, “The biggest obstacle to regionalization will be the lack of an explanation for doing regionalization. There is the need to have the facts at hand. Twenty-eight years in, people are still asking why they have regional government.” This Board member went on to stress that, “There is a need for communication and liaison; need to ensure that the public has information; there are two to three solid reasons for doing regionalization; there are police reasons and community reasons...there will be economies and efficiencies to be gained; attract world class people; it will not save money.”

A number of the respondents in Ontario, including police and regional government representatives, indicated that it was important that the regionalization of police services be implemented within a regional plan and that an incremental approach be taken. The Deputy Chief of Niagara Regional Police Service recalled, “There was no planning for amalgamation and no consideration of what form it would take. Policies still have a municipal flavour. There has not been significant buy-in to regionalization in terms of what form it would take; so, the focus remained local.”

A number of the respondents mentioned that “turf and egos” were two primary obstacles to regionalization (Deputy Chief of Niagara Regional Police Service). Similarly, the mayor of Milton, Ontario noted that “Egos were the toughest thing to deal with.”

8. There must be strong police leadership in the transition to the new model of police service delivery.

The front line people weren’t the problem. It was the police leadership.
Chief, Waterloo Regional Police Service

A strong leadership base needs to occur before any regionalization initiatives will be successfully executed. There must be effective leadership not only at the municipal level, but also at the provincial and federal levels of government. (Graham, 1994:84). Strong leadership is also mandatory for a successful amalgamation, as members need someone to look to for guidance. Leaders need to match their skill with those needs of the local community. When there is a separation between these two areas, amalgamation might be a more difficult transition for members, than if they were looking towards a leader with the same ideals as theirs (O’Donoghue, 1999:10).

9. To ensure that the concerns and priorities of individual communities are acknowledged and addressed it is important to establish community consultation committees.

The success of any regionalization is to focus on the neighbourhood.
Chief, Waterloo Regional Police Service

10. One objective of creating a new model of policing with a regional focus should be to reduce the reliance on integrated teams and secondments. As the Chief of Waterloo Regional Police noted, “Joint forces need to be time-limited and project oriented.”

11. Ensuring effective police service delivery. There are mechanisms that can be put in place to ensure that regionalization does not result in a decline in the levels of service delivery across the region. In Ontario, for example, the Adequacy Standards set out a structure for police service delivery and performance benchmarks.

12. Effective governance structures must be put into place. A member of the Durham Regional Police Board advised that there must be a strong police board that should not give in to the political demands of the various mayors and municipal councils.

Options for Police Service Delivery in the GVR

It is important to remember that crime rates in the GVR are already very high. Property crime, in particular, continues to be significantly higher than in most other Canadian cities. Metro Vancouver is the bank robbery capital of Canada. In the next 30 years, the population in the region is going to continue to grow, potentially by another 800,000 people. The complexity of the crime problems the region faces will also continue to increase. Organized criminals will continue to become more sophisticated in their operations and consequently more challenging and costly to interdict. Better transportation systems in the GVR will facilitate the movement of property criminals between communities. Technology and internet based financial crimes will be an increasing issue for police with troublesome cross-region and border enforcement issues. The current trends in case law flowing from Charter decisions are also adding to the complexity and cost of police investigations. Finally, police staffing and recruitment is projected to be a significant challenge in the next decade given the projected shortfall of young people entering the job market.

Given these significant challenges, the question is what structure should the delivery of police services have to ensure policing is best positioned to respond to these crime issues and keep our communities safe? There are a number of potential options to consider, including the following:

Option 1: Maintain the Status Quo

Retain the current arrangements for the delivery of policing services, utilizing a mix of municipal police departments and RCMP detachments. This would include continuing the practice of establishing integrated units as the need arises.

The advantage to this approach is that there is no threat to the policing styles being used in various communities. Each community is free to establish its own level of police resourcing. In communities with municipal departments, the mayor is the chair of the Police Board and Council sets the budget for policing.

This option is certainly workable, in that policing is functioning with some degree of success in the GVR and police agencies do strive to work together to be successful, although that can be a dynamic affected by the personalities of those involved in that it requires police leaders to adopt a cooperative approach. That there is a common radio system in the region and a common records management system in the Province are tremendous steps towards reducing operational barriers to policing across jurisdictions.

There are a number of potentially significant disadvantages to continuing on with the current mix of agencies. There will continue to be a lack of a strategic direction or “one brain” providing direction and focus to the problems we face and the obstacles to success. Responding both to long term issues and dynamically to an emerging crisis is far more difficult when the response requires building consensus and agreement (or not) on how to respond.

Maintaining the status quo will keep in place the significant funding inequities that exist due to the Federal Government policies around funding RCMP contracts. Inequities also exist due to the differences in communities that have different mixes of “bedroom” versus business and entertainment core compositions.

Specifically, the current situation does not favour the Vancouver Police Department. There are over 80 VPD members seconded to integrated teams primarily under RCMP control. The VPD polices a city that requires exceptional resources due to the level of visitors for business and entertainment, as well as political activism. The VPD must respond to the Downtown Eastside, which draws in homeless, mentally ill and addicted people from all over the region ,province, and from across the country. However, the City must fund the appropriate policing response from the taxpayer base within the City.

Option 2: Amalgamate and Regionalize Police Services in the GVR

Design and implement a regional police service or services. It might make sense to put in place two or three regional police services to best respond to the geography and current/projected community growth in Metro Vancouver. Under this model, no current police service would remain in place as is. This could be described as the “clean slate” approach to developing a policing model for the region.

Most of the advantages have been discussed above. Funding would be equalized between communities. This would address the problem of multiple agencies trying to respond to one regional problem in a number of ways that may not always be complementary. There would be “one brain”. It would require the development of both a governance model and an equitable funding formula. Once in place, it would position police to be the most successful in reducing crime and responding to staffing and resourcing issues to keep the region safe.

Many communities are understandably concerned that if they give up their local municipal department or RCMP detachment, they will lose control. How would they ensure they maintain current service levels or accountability to the community? How do they ensure that the police will maintain the close bond and connection to the community that is the basis of community policing? It would be essential to create a regional force that gives each community a “chief” who is accountable to that community and who controls the resources needed to respond to the community’s needs. The difference is that the chief, whose actual rank will depend on the size of the community, will report to a regional police service chief. This is similar to how communities with the RCMP function now; however, the accountability for that regional police chief will remain in the community answering to the board appointed by the community as a whole. Secondly, to ensure each community maintains the service

level it wants, each community would put in place a service agreement where it pays for the level of policing desired (as long as the base level is set and maintained at a safe level). Transfer policies within the regional service would ensure community continuity for police officers within communities.

There are two very significant challenges to moving towards complete regionalization. One is simply the current demographics. The majority of police officers in the entire region (i.e., the CMA) belong to the RCMP, although the majority of police officers in Greater Vancouver (i.e., Vancouver and the immediately adjacent police agencies) belong to independent municipal police departments. How would a new regional police service find the staffing it needs in the first instance? Implementation would have to address this issue and would likely require a staged approach.

Secondly, amalgamation would have to address issues of governance challenge. How would the large number of civic governments be able to work towards developing an agreeable model? The GVRD system of services or South Coast British Columbia Transportation Authority (formerly known as Translink) are examples of where this has been successfully done to take advantage of economies of scale and the need for integrated service. It would likely require strong leadership from the Provincial Government, along with key assurances that community needs for both accountability and service levels would be addressed.

Option 3: A Regional Police Service and Local Police Services

A hybrid option must also be considered. Could local police services be maintained that provide the patrol or uniform police response to each community and then create a police service that has a separate chief that provides all other services utilizing an integrated approach? There are numerous ways this could be configured. The principle behind the idea is that it acknowledges the GVR's history of a patchwork of police services with their various traditions and connections to the communities they serve. They would continue doing that, but the regional police service would be able to respond to those issues which are best addressed on a regional basis. Responding to gang violence and financial and organized crime are regional issues. Surveillance teams to deal with crime issues and emergency response teams are highly specialized and need economies of scale to be affordable to smaller communities. The GVR currently uses a patchwork of Provincial policing management, joint management teams and various memorandums of understanding to manage the integrated units that currently exist. The GVR has not analyzed what requires a regional response and then put together one governance model, one funding system and accountability system to deal with the various issues where integration has gone ahead.

Such a system would present a number of significant issues, including whether the RCMP would wish to participate. Each community would have their own Chief and patrol service and possibly other units, such as traffic or community policing officers. Each community would be required by formula to second experienced officers and provide funding to the regional police service. Police officers would move in and out of the regional service going back to their community when it was their turn to police the streets in uniform. As above, a funding formula and governance would be essential for the regional service. One issue that could remain would be the need for the various police agencies that would continue to exist to work cooperatively together. Staffing and resourcing issues would most likely continue to be ongoing issues between the agencies and some degree of competition for staffing resources might continue between them. This system would likely be more complex to manage on an ongoing basis.

Conclusion

The current policing structure in the GVR presents numerous challenges which are likely to intensify in the coming years. In addition to the difficulties associated with policing cross-jurisdictional criminals and offences, there are also inherent disparities in service levels, funding formulas, and specialized expertise. The GVR is the last major metropolitan area in Canada that does not have some type of regional police service.

The current situation also presents the provincial and municipal governments and police services in the GVR with a unique opportunity for the development of collaboration and creative solutions to the challenges that exist. There is a opportunity to incorporate lessons learned from other agencies across the country that have already gone through the process, as well as to fashion a distinctive “Made in the GVR” policing structure. As discussed in this document, there are serious questions as to whether the status quo is a viable option for ensuring that the GVR is policed in an effective and efficient manner. The extent to which the various options that have been set out will address the outstanding concerns remains to be determined and a more detailed analysis of all of the issues raised in this report are required.

Police officers across the GVR are committed to making their communities safe and to apprehending those who would cause harm. The challenge is to provide a structure within which police officers can carry out their tasks in the most effective and efficient manner possible. It is questionable as to whether the existing disparate policing structures can provide the level of service that residents of every municipality have come to expect. The smaller communities need to be aware of the consequences of ‘no call too small’ policing, and larger communities must recognize the inherent economic and logistic difficulty with balancing the pressure to provide patrol resources, while continuing to share expertise and specialized knowledge with smaller agencies.

It is important that any deliberations on altering the status quo for police service delivery in the GVR consider the unique needs of each community in the region and that communities have a voice in any new structure that is developed. The fact that there are numerous competing interests and stakeholders within the current structure of the GVR necessitates that any discussions of regionalizing police services will require the leadership and direction of the provincial government, along with the cooperation and willingness of municipal governments to participate. Providing the best possible policing service in the interests of public safety must be the overarching driver for future discussions.

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
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VANCOUVER POLICE DEPARTMENT



APPENDIX L

Municipal Policing in the Vancouver Census Metropolitan Area (CMA)

A Report for the Missing Women
Commission of Inquiry

September 27th, 2011

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Introduction

This paper describes briefly the municipal policing environment in the Vancouver Census Metropolitan Area (CMA) as defined by Statistics Canada.

Municipal Policing in BC

In BC, the Province is responsible for providing policing and law enforcement services to municipalities with a population of up to 5,000 persons. In accordance with the BC Provincial Police Service Agreement of 1992, provincial policing services are currently provided by the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP). The RCMP subsidizes 30% of all provincial policing costs. The Province pays the remaining share of 70%. Until 2007, municipalities with a population of less than 5,000 did not pay directly for the provincial police services they received. Since 2007, municipalities with a population of less than 5,000 have been required to pay a more equitable share of provincial policing costs based on a new financing model.

Under the BC Police Act, municipalities with a population of more than 5,000 people are responsible to provide municipal police services within their jurisdictions. These municipalities have three options: form their own independent police force, enter into an agreement with an existing municipal police force or contract the RCMP.

While municipalities with an independent municipal police department are responsible for 100% of their policing costs, the policing costs in municipalities policed by the RCMP are shared with and subsidized by the RCMP. In accordance with the BC Municipal Policing Agreement of 1992, municipalities with a population between 5,000 and 15,000 pay 70% of all RCMP policing costs. Municipalities of 15,000 or more policed by the RCMP are billed 90% of total costs.

Costs eligible to be shared and subsidized include all direct operational and maintenance costs such as salaries, benefits, overtime, transportation, travel, utilities, equipment, supplies, professional services and miscellaneous expenditures. They also include on a pro-rated basis fixed RCMP costs such as the cost of divisional headquarters, recruit training, the External Review Committee and the Public Complaints Commission. Office space and support staff costs remain the responsibility of each municipality. Building construction costs and legal claims are the responsibility of the federal government (on behalf of the RCMP).

In addition, there are also various types of First Nations policing agreements in place in Aboriginal communities. The First Nations Policing Policy was announced by the federal government in June 1991. It was introduced in order to provide dedicated, professional, effective, culturally appropriate, and accountable police services to First Nations. The policy is implemented across Canada through tripartite agreements negotiated between the Federal Government, the Provincial Government and the First Nation governing body. Under these agreements, costs are shared 52% by the Federal Government and

48% by the Province. Under such agreements, First Nations obtain their own dedicated contingent of officers from an existing police service (typically the RCMP). Efforts are made to staff these positions using Aboriginal police officers. In 2007, the Tsawwassen First Nation and the Corporation of Delta entered into a policing agreement. Under the agreement, the Delta Police Department committed to dedicate one full-time officer to deliver policing in Tsawwassen. Costs are shared 52% by the Federal Government and 48% by the Province. In Vancouver, the Musqueam Band is policed by the Vancouver Police Department (VPD) also in accordance with a formal agreement.

Independent municipal police services are overseen by Police Boards and municipal police officers are accountable under the BC Police Act and to the BC Police Complaint Commissioner. RCMP officers are accountable under the federal RCMP Act and to the federal Commission for Public Complaints Against the RCMP.

Municipal police officers are trained at the JIBC Police Academy in New Westminster. The Police Academy is responsible for training all municipal police recruits in BC and also offers courses for experienced officers. RCMP recruits are trained at the RCMP Training Academy ("Depot" Division) in Regina.

Policing in the Vancouver CMA

According to Statistics Canada, a census metropolitan area (CMA) consists of one or more neighboring municipalities located around a central core. A CMA must have a total population of at least 100,000 and the central core must have a population of at least 50,000. To be included in the CMA, other adjacent municipalities must have a high degree of integration with the central core, as determined by commuting flows derived from census data.

In 2009, 2,325,317 people lived in the Vancouver CMA according to Statistics Canada. The following table shows the police jurisdictions included by Statistics Canada within the Vancouver CMA, along with their authorized sworn strength as reported in the 2010 edition of Police Resources in Canada.

Jurisdiction	Type	2010 Authorized Strength
Delta	Municipal	165
New Westminster	Municipal	108
Port Moody	Municipal	50
Vancouver	Municipal	1,327
West Vancouver	Municipal	81
Bowen Island*	RCMP	3
Burnaby	RCMP	280
Coquitlam	RCMP	140
Langley City	RCMP	52
Langley Township	RCMP	127
Maple Ridge	RCMP	86

Jurisdiction	Type	2010 Authorized Strength
North Vancouver City	RCMP	64
North Vancouver District	RCMP	91
Pitt Meadows	RCMP	21
Port Coquitlam	RCMP	63
Richmond	RCMP	237
Squamish	RCMP	24
Surrey	RCMP	623
UBC*	RCMP	6
White Rock	RCMP	23
RCMP Lower Mainland Integrated Teams	Integrated	215
SCBCTAPS	Regional	170
Vancouver CMA		3,956

Source: Police Resources in Canada, 2010.

* Authorized strength for Bowen Island and UBC was extrapolated from Police Resources in BC because it was not provided in the 2010 edition of Police Resources in Canada.

The following map describes graphically the police jurisdictions in the Vancouver CMA. Independent municipal police jurisdictions are highlighted in purple. The rest of the Vancouver CMA is policed by the RCMP. Squamish is not represented on the map but it is part of the Vancouver CMA. Squamish RCMP is responsible to police Lions Bay. Coquitlam RCMP is responsible to police Anmore and Belcarra.



Source: Vancouver Foundation, Metro Vancouver's Vital Signs 2007.

In 2010, the authorized police strength in the Vancouver CMA was 3,956 officers. This count includes officers working for the South Coast British Columbia Transportation Authority Police Service (SCBCTAPS or Transit Police) and RCMP Lower Mainland Integrated Teams.

The Vancouver CMA defined by Statistics Canada is very similar to the Greater Vancouver Regional District (GVRD), a regional agency responsible for water treatment, sewer, land use, air quality, waste management and affordable housing at the regional level. The GVRD is also known as the Metro Vancouver area. Metro Vancouver is a nonpartisan entity operating as a regional district on behalf of 21 member municipalities, one Electoral Area and one First Nation. It is one of 29 regional districts that were created by the BC government between 1965 and 1968 to ensure that all residents had access to basic services such as drinking water, sewer, and waste disposal. Abbotsford is a member of Metro Vancouver with respect to the provision of regional park services only. Excluding Abbotsford, the Metro Vancouver area is the same as the Vancouver CMA.

The RCMP in BC has created a service delivery region called the RCMP Lower Mainland District. This region includes a much larger area than the Vancouver CMA or Metro Vancouver. The following RCMP jurisdictions fall outside the Vancouver CMA or Metro Vancouver area but are included within the RCMP Lower Mainland District

definition: Agassiz, Boston Bar, Chilliwack, Hope, Kent, Mission, Pemberton, Ridge Meadows, Sechelt, Sunshine Coast and Whistler.

Although the RCMP uses the term RCMP Lower Mainland District Regional Police Service, it is not a regional police service in the usual sense of the term. In fact, the Vancouver CMA is policed by a patchwork of municipal police agencies, RCMP detachments and integrated units. Within the Vancouver CMA, five municipalities have their own independent police departments: Delta, New Westminster, Port Moody, Vancouver and West Vancouver. In addition, Transit Police is an independent Designated Policing Unit intended to supplement jurisdictional police departments on Metro Vancouver's regional transit system. Bowen Island, Burnaby, Coquitlam, City of Langley, Township of Langley, Maple Ridge, City of North Vancouver, District of North Vancouver, Pitt Meadows, Port Coquitlam, Richmond, Squamish, Surrey, UBC and White Rock are policed by the RCMP.

Other BC municipalities with an independent police department include Abbotsford, Central Saanich, Nelson, Oak Bay, Saanich and Victoria. For its part, the Stl'atl'imx Tribal Police is a Designated Policing Unit modeled on the structure of independent municipal police department. Around the railway system, the Canadian National Railway Police Service (CN Police) is mandated to protect CN facilities, equipment, and property. Every other jurisdiction in BC is under the responsibility of the RCMP.

Cross-Jurisdictional Police Services

This section outlines what cross-jurisdictional police services are supplementing jurisdictional police (including municipal and RCMP) within the Vancouver CMA. This includes national services, regional services and integrated units.

National Police Services

National police services are specialized support services designed to assist jurisdictional police agencies throughout Canada.

The RCMP delivers a number of national police services to assist Canada's law enforcement community, many of which were implemented several decades ago. The RCMP is required by legislation to manage some national policing support services such as the Forensic Laboratory Services, National DNA Data Bank (DNA Identification Act), Canadian Firearms Program (Firearms Act) and National Sex Offender Registry (Sex Offender Information Registration Act). However, other national police services provided by the RCMP are not legislated. These include the Canadian Bomb Data Centre, Canadian Criminal Real Time Identification Services, Canadian Police College, Canadian Police Information Centre, Criminal Intelligence Service Canada and Violent Crime Linkage Analysis System.

The table in Appendix 1 outlines the main national police services provided by the RCMP. These national police services are intended to support public safety and the administration of justice, particularly where such services may not be within the resources of individual jurisdictions. These services facilitate the central collection and exchange of critical police information, intelligence and techniques beyond jurisdictional or provincial boundaries.

Regional Police Services

Regional police services are specialized support services designed to assist multiple jurisdictions within provincial or regional boundaries.

Within the Vancouver CMA, the following police services are provided on a provincial or regional basis:

1. **Emergency Communications for Southwest BC (E-Comm).** E-Comm provides 9-1-1 service for Metro Vancouver, the Sunshine Coast Regional District, Whistler, Squamish and the Squamish-Lillooet Regional District. It also owns and operates the wide-area radio network used by police, fire and ambulance personnel throughout the region. E-Comm provides radio dispatch service to 30 police and fire departments, including the following police jurisdictions: Bowen Island RCMP, Richmond RCMP, Ridge Meadows RCMP, Squamish RCMP, Sunshine Coast RCMP, UBC RCMP, RCMP Traffic Services (Freeway Patrol), Whistler RCMP, Pemberton RCMP, Vancouver Police Department and Stl'atl'imx Tribal Police. Member agencies are E-Comm shareholders. Under the Emergency Communications Corporations Act, E-Comm is governed by a Board of Directors nominated by E-Comm shareholders. It has an annual operating budget of approximately \$50 million. Funding is provided by member agencies through a Radio Levy (based on radios issued and traffic), a Dispatch Levy (based on direct staffing and overhead costs within the dispatch centre) and a 9-1-1 Levy (collected by Metro Vancouver region through property taxes).
2. **Police Records Information Management Environment for British Columbia (PRIME-BC).** PRIME-BC connects every BC municipal police department and RCMP detachment through a secure province-wide electronic police records management system. It provides access to information about criminals and crimes instantly to all BC police agencies. The VPD, Port Moody Police Department and Richmond RCMP were the first jurisdictional police departments to adopt the PRIME system in 2001. The system was subsequently rolled out to the other municipal police agencies within the Vancouver CMA and to the rest of the RCMP Lower Mainland District between May 2006 and April 2007.
3. **Justice Institute of BC (JIBC) Police Academy.** The JIBC Police Academy is responsible for training all municipal police recruits in BC. The Academy also offers advanced courses in the areas of investigation, patrol operations and leadership for experienced in-service municipal and RCMP police officers in BC.
4. **Lower Mainland Traffic Safety Helicopter Program (Air One and Air Two).** The Lower Mainland Traffic Safety Helicopter Program is the result of a partnership between the Province, RCMP, municipal police departments and the Insurance Corporation of BC (ICBC). Two helicopters (call signs Air One and Air Two) are tasked primarily to support police during traffic enforcement efforts.

They provide an aerial perspective to ground units during crimes in progress, police pursuits and search and rescue operations.

Integrated Units

Integrated units are specialized police units which are not bound geographically by individual jurisdictional boundaries, operate as centralized organizational units with a distinct command structure and are specifically mandated to assist, complement or supplement jurisdictional police agencies (including RCMP and/or independent municipal police).

The following table outlines what integrated units operate within the Vancouver CMA.

Unit	Description	Partner Agencies
BC Automated Fingerprint Identification System (BC AFIS)	Archives and searches for fingerprints. Established in 1989 as a joint forces operation. Funded and staffed by VPD and RCMP. Staffed by civilian employees who work out of VPD facilities.	RCMP VPD
BC Hate Crime Team (HCT)	Ensures the effective identification, investigation and prosecution of crimes motivated by hate. Created in 1996. The team includes representatives from the BC Ministry of Attorney General, Ministry of Public Safety and Solicitor General, the RCMP and the VPD. Two full-time police officers coordinate hate and bias-related investigations in the province by working with local police and communities.	Ministry of Attorney General Ministry of Public Safety and Solicitor General RCMP VPD
BC Municipal Undercover Program (BCMUP)	Oversees and coordinates all Level 2 undercover operations conducted by municipal police departments in BC. These include, but are not limited to, major crime undercover operations, cell mates and long term undercover projects.	Municipal Police
Combined Forces Special Enforcement Unit (CFSEU-BC) and Integrated Gang Task Force (IGTF)	Investigate, prosecute and disrupt criminal organizations. Assist other police agencies involved with organized and major crime investigations. Created to integrate the Organized Crime Agency of British Columbia (OCABC), municipal police departments and RCMP.	RCMP Municipal Police Transit Police
Criminal Intelligence Service BC and Yukon Territory (CISBC/YT)	Produces analytical products to assist in the detection and disruption of serious and organized crime in BC and Yukon. One of 10 provincial bureaus operating independently within the Criminal Intelligence Service Canada (CISC) umbrella. Staffed with seconded RCMP and VPD employees.	RCMP VPD

Unit	Description	Partner Agencies
Crisis Intervention Team (CIT)	Ensures that mentally ill persons in crisis receive continuity of care from all services involved. It is composed of representatives from health care, addiction centres, social workers, paramedics, RCMP and municipal police forces, and other first responder agencies. Piloted in 2004 and 2005 by Burnaby RCMP and Burnaby Fraser Health Authority.	RCMP Some Municipal Police Transit Police JIBC BC Ambulance Service Fraser Health Authority Vancouver Coastal Health
Integrated First Nations Unit (INFU)	Provides enhanced policing services that are culturally sensitive and responsive to the Squamish and Tsleil Waututh Nations. The joint policing unit was established between the RCMP and the West Vancouver Police Department. It includes six officers, is based in North Vancouver and operates on reserves in North Vancouver, West Vancouver and Squamish.	RCMP West Vancouver
Integrated Homicide Investigation Team (IHIT)	Investigates homicides, police-involved shootings and in-custody deaths within the RCMP Lower Mainland, Abbotsford and New Westminster. Established in 2003, IHIT has slightly more than 109 employees, including more than 80 police investigators or detectives. They have one office in Surrey and one in Chilliwack. In 2010-2011, the Abbotsford Police seconded four officers and the New Westminster Police seconded two officers. The Port Moody Police seconded one officer until April 2011 but then opted out of IHIT. The Province provides funding for 19 IHIT positions (17 police officers and two civilian employees). This contribution covers IHIT investigations that take place within the provincial policing jurisdiction.	RCMP Abbotsford New Westminster
Integrated Municipal Provincial Auto Crimes Team (IMPACT)	Develops and implements strategies to reduce auto crime in BC. Operates and manages the Bait Car program and Automated Licence Plate Recognition program. Created as part of a cooperative agreement between the BC Attorney General, RCMP, municipal police departments and ICBC. Staffed with 22 specialized investigators. VPD operates its own Bait Car program within the City of Vancouver but IMPACT provides bait cars for the surrounding 16 municipalities. Funding is provided by ICBC.	RCMP Transit Police Municipal Police
Integrated Road Safety Unit (IRSU)	Conducts strategic traffic enforcement in high collision areas. Formed in 2004 and comprised of up to 110 traffic enforcement officers from the RCMP and municipal police agencies across BC. Funding is provided by ICBC.	RCMP Municipal Police

Unit	Description	Partner Agencies
Integrated Sexual Predator Observation Team (ISPOT)	Intelligence-based surveillance project that targets high-risk sexual predators. Keeps recently-released sexual offenders under surveillance to ensure they comply with probation orders and bail conditions. Created to monitor sexual predators with the objective of reducing the risk of sexual assaults and other crimes.	RCMP Municipal Police
Lower Mainland Police Dog Service (PDS)	Provides police dog capabilities within the RCMP Lower Mainland and Abbotsford. All dogs are cross-trained for tracking and searching for suspects, evidence, drugs and explosives. Three dogs are training for avalanche search and rescue. On-duty units are deployed strategically around the Lower Mainland to ensure optimal coverage. Composed of 44 police-dog units: 41 from the RCMP and three from the Abbotsford Police Department. The Province provides funding for four dog units and the Federal government provides funding for one dog unit.	RCMP Abbotsford
Lower Mainland Tactical Troop	Assists with crime scene sweeps, search and rescue efforts and public order issues. Includes officers from RCMP, Delta, Abbotsford, New Westminster and Transit Police.	RCMP Abbotsford Delta New Westminster Transit Police
Municipal Integrated Emergency Response Team (MIERT)	Provides a specialized tactical response and advice in support of frontline officers within Abbotsford, Delta, New Westminster and Port Moody. Created in 2003. Composed of 12 Incident Commanders, 25 Tactical Officers and 12 Crisis Negotiators.	Abbotsford Delta New Westminster Port Moody Currently looking for opportunities to collaborate or integrate with VPD ERT.
National Weapons Enforcement Support Team (NWEST)	Provides investigative support to assist frontline police agencies with the gathering of evidence to prosecute persons or organizations involved in the illegal movement and criminal use of firearms. Members are seconded to NWEAST through a service level agreement with their home police service.	RCMP VPD
Provincial Integrated Witness Protection Section (IWPS)	Ensures federal protection and provincial funding applications and delivery standards are adhered to. Forms partnerships to ensure all witnesses have access to the same level of service.	RCMP
Provincial Unsolved Homicide Unit (PUHU)	Performs follow-up work in historical unsolved homicide cases. Reviews previously investigated homicides and look for new or untried investigative techniques with the objective of solving the case. Established in 1996 as a joint forces operation between the RCMP and the VPD.	RCMP VPD

Unit	Description	Partner Agencies
RCMP Integrated Child Exploitation (ICE) Team	Participates in child pornography investigations. In conjunction with the RCMP Tech Crime Unit, identifies and assists child victims of sexual abuse, identifies those responsible for the abuse and lays appropriate criminal charges.	RCMP
RCMP Integrated Collision Analyst Reconstruction Section (ICARS)	Investigates all vehicle collisions that result in serious injury or death within the RCMP Lower Mainland. Composed of two civilian support staff and 20 highly trained specialists who investigate collisions to determine the cause and the sequence of events.	RCMP
RCMP Integrated Forensic Identification Services (IFIS)	Collects, processes, analyzes and interprets forensic evidence found at crime scenes within the RCMP Lower Mainland. Includes 55 Forensic Identification specialists who are specially trained police officers, 12 Forensic Identification Assistants who are civilians with a scientific expertise, seven forensic video analysts and nine support staff. The identification officers, assistants and support staff are based out of eight different RCMP detachments.	RCMP
RCMP Lower Mainland Emergency Response Team (ERT)	Provides specialized tactical response and advice in support of frontline RCMP officers within the RCMP Lower Mainland. Composed of 65 full-time ERT members and two civilian support staff who are based out of different detachments. Created in 2006. Funding is shared: 50% municipal, 30% provincial and 20% federal.	RCMP

Source: RCMP, VPD, Delta Police Department.

All Vancouver CMA agencies do not necessarily participate in each integrated unit. For example:

1. The Vancouver Police Department, the Delta Police Department, the Port Moody Police Department and the West Vancouver Police Department are not part of IHIT. The Port Moody Police Department and West Vancouver Police Department were previously in IHIT but withdrew. In 2009, the West Vancouver Police Department entered into an agreement with the VPD making the VPD Homicide Unit responsible for investigating homicides or similarly serious cases that occur in West Vancouver. In 2011, the Port Moody Police Department entered into a similar agreement with the VPD.
2. The West Vancouver Police Department also does not participate in MIERT and instead relies on the VPD to obtain tactical emergency response services on a cost-recovery basis.
3. The Lower Mainland ERT, ICE, ICARS and IFIS only provide coverage within RCMP jurisdictions.

4. Within the City of Vancouver, IRSU's mandate is limited and traffic enforcement remains primarily the responsibility of VPD Traffic Enforcement Teams.

Other police units are also considered integrated units by the RCMP but they deal primarily with federal policing responsibilities or statutes. They are listed in the Appendix 2 for completeness but they are not included in the previous tables because they do not contribute specifically to municipal policing within the Vancouver CMA.

Informal Regional Policing Arrangements

Given the number of police agencies operating within the Vancouver CMA, collaboration and coordination of services is vital to reduce and solve crime. Although this need for collaboration and coordination has been partially met through the creation of formal integrated units, informal arrangements also contribute to enhance regional policing.

There is a strong spirit of cooperation in law enforcement because most situations involve the safety of the public. In fact, the BC Police Act contains a statutory requirement obligating a police agency to provide temporary assistance to another agency, if so requested. Section 68 of the Police Act states:

68 (1) The provincial police force, a municipal police department or designated unit must, on receiving a request for temporary assistance made by another police force, police department or designated policing unit, assign to the requesting police force, police department or designated policing unit the officers and equipment practicable to assign for the purpose.

(2) A police force, police department or designated policing unit that requests and receives assistance under subsection (1) is responsible for all costs of that assistance.

The Police Act directs that the agency requesting assistance is responsible for all costs but police agencies have historically not consistently billed each other for services requested and provided. This is because of the collegial relationship among agencies and difficulties in assessing the full price of each individual request for assistance.

The Regional Operational Police Managers Committee (ROPMC) illustrates the collegial relationship between Vancouver CMA police agencies. The ROPMC is an informal monthly meeting where senior operational police managers exchange information and ideas. There is no formal mandate for the group and member departments share hosting and meeting expenses.

Beyond the ROPMC, the VPD has worked collaboratively with other policing agencies, sharing resources and providing reciprocal assistance. This reflects the fact that the VPD has taken a leadership role and developed extensive capabilities in many operational areas. For instance, the VPD is home to a variety of highly specialized investigative and operational units that remain available to assist outside jurisdictions. At the VPD, informal regional policing arrangements take many forms. For example:

1. In accordance with a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with the RCMP ratified in 1998, the VPD is responsible to provide motorcade security escorts when Internationally Protected Persons (IPPs) visit Vancouver. Accordingly, the VPD Motorcycle Drill Team regularly trains with the RCMP Protective Services Section and provides VIP motorcycle escorts when designated national and international dignitaries visit the Vancouver region. Clients may include the Prime Minister, Governor General and international dignitaries such as royalty and heads of state. The VPD assumes most of the costs associated with VIP motorcycle escorts and typically do not recover costs from the RCMP Protective Services Section.
2. The VPD Training & Recruiting Section has assisted and supported other Metro Vancouver police agencies, including RCMP detachments, by supplying instructors, course seats, and coaching. Several members of other agencies have been invited to sit on various in-house VPD courses. The VPD often supplies the lead firearms instructor for the Provincial Undercover Operator's Course.
3. The VPD Strike Force is often requested by integrated units or other police agencies planning covert surveillance operations on high-level, potentially dangerous targets. Strike Force surveillance teams assist other agencies upon request but also work on targets that travel and are involved in crime across the entire Metro Vancouver area, providing a *de facto* regional surveillance service that all jurisdictions benefit from.
4. The VPD Emergency Response Team (ERT) is usually called upon when the risk associated with a critical incident is such that a safe and peaceful resolution is beyond the perceived capabilities of regular field units. ERT is occasionally asked to assist other jurisdictions with high-risk situations and major events. External agencies such as the RCMP, IGTF, CFSEU, IHIT, MIERT, and INSET regularly request the assistance of the VPD ERT. The tactical support provided by ERT ranges from basic building containment and warrant execution to full-scale hostage rescue and high-risk escorts.
5. At the end of 2008, the VPD initiated Project Rebellion. The objective of Project Rebellion was to proactively target some of the most dangerous gang members operating in the Metro Vancouver area by interceding before shootings and murders occur, arresting gangsters and proceeding with charges when possible.
6. The VPD Collision Investigation Unit is sometimes asked to investigate serious vehicle collisions in outside jurisdictions. These jurisdictions count on the VPD to assist them because they do not have the critical mass required to invest in all the specialized equipment and skills required by collision investigations. For example, the Port Moody Police Department, the Abbotsford Police Department and the Burnaby RCMP have all requested the assistance of the Collision Investigation Unit to investigate fatal collisions.

7. Other jurisdictional agencies also assist the VPD when needed. For example, during the 2011 Stanley Cup riot in Vancouver, hundreds of reinforcement officers came to Vancouver from outside jurisdictions. Post-riot, the Integrated Riot Investigation Team (IRIT) was created and it included members from the RCMP, Abbotsford Police Department, Delta Police Department, New Westminster Police Service, Port Moody Police Department, Transit Police and West Vancouver Police Department.

Conclusion

This report was intended to provide a snapshot of policing in the Vancouver CMA.

Policing in the Vancouver CMA consists of a patchwork of RCMP detachments and independent municipal police agencies. The work of these police jurisdictions is complemented by national police services provided by the RCMP, various regional services and several cross-jurisdictional integrated units. It is also enhanced by informal regional arrangements and regional policing initiatives.

Appendix 1 – National Police Services

Services	Description	Established
Canadian Criminal Real Time Identification Services (CCRTIS)	Maintains the national repository of fingerprint and criminal record information. National provider of biometric-based criminal record verifications for civil and criminal court purposes.	1908
Forensic Laboratory Services (FLS)	Provides forensic analysis services relating to criminal cases in biology, toxicology, firearms, trace evidence, and counterfeit and document examinations.	1937
National Anti-Counterfeiting Bureau (NACB)	Conducts forensic examinations of counterfeit banknotes, travel documents and payment cards. Disseminates information on counterfeiting activity and document security. Delivers services from its office in Ottawa.	1961
Canadian Police College (CPC)	Provides specialized and advanced police sciences and leadership training to foreign and Canadian senior police officers.	1966
Canadian Police Information Centre (CPIC)	Serves as a central repository that provides information on crimes and criminals.	1966
Criminal Intelligence Service Canada (CISC)	Facilitates the production and exchange of criminal information and intelligence. Delivers strategic intelligence products and services to address organized crime.	1970
Canadian Bomb Data Centre (CBDC)	Provides expertise, advice and information on illegal use of explosives, explosives disposal and post-blast investigation.	1972
Violent Crime Linkage Analysis System (ViCLAS)	National crime reporting system designed to collect information on violent offenses, identify violent crimes that may be serial in nature and track violent serial offenders.	1991
National DNA Data Bank	Serves as a central repository that captures and references DNA profiles from crime scenes and convicted offenders.	2000
National Firearms Tracing Centre (NFTC)	Helps law enforcement agencies trace where seized firearms originated from.	Transferred to RCMP in 2003
National Child Exploitation Centre (NCECC)	Investigates Internet-facilitated child sexual exploitation. Contact point for cases involving Canadian victims and suspects.	2004
National Missing Children Services (NMCS)	Assists law enforcement agencies with missing children investigations.	2004
National Sex Offender Registry (NSOR)	Serves as a central repository that provides current information about convicted sex offenders.	2004
Canadian Firearms Program	Provides operational support to the prevention and investigation of firearms crime and misuse.	Transferred to RCMP in 2006

Services	Description	Established
Police Information Portal (PIP)	National index of persons and vehicles submitted by Canadian partner agencies. Provides users with the ability to query data from multiple police jurisdictions in a single consolidated search.	2008

Source: RCMP and Status Report of the Auditor General of Canada, June 2011, Chapter 5—National Police Services.

Appendix 2 - Federal Integrated Units

Integrated Counterfeit Enforcement Teams (ICETs) conduct major counterfeiting investigations in Toronto, Montreal and Vancouver. They investigate organized counterfeit activity and criminal organizations or individuals involved in the production and mass distribution of counterfeit currency.

Integrated Market Enforcement Teams (IMETs) help detect, charge and prosecute those using capital markets fraudulently. The IMET investigative pool consists of RCMP investigators, legal advisors from the Department of Justice Canada, securities regulators, representatives from other federal enforcement agencies and forensic accountants.

The **Integrated Proceeds of Crime (IPOC) Unit** is to deter money laundering and terrorist financing by identifying, assessing, seizing, restraining and forfeiting illicit wealth. IPOC conducts joint forces investigations with jurisdictional police departments on a case by case basis.

Integrated National Security Enforcement Teams (INSETs) collect, share and analyze national security intelligence. They include representatives of the RCMP, federal partners such as Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA) and Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) as well as some municipal police services.

The **Waterfront Joint Forces Operation (WJFO)** at Port Metro Vancouver consists of partners from federal, provincial and municipal law enforcement agencies. It focuses on national security investigations, organized crime and other criminality around the port. The RCMP have also established **National Port Enforcement Teams (NPETs)** which are integrated teams that investigate federal statute offences at Canadian seaports. For its part, the **National Waterside Security Coordination Team (NWSCT)** conducts research to identify vulnerabilities and provide recommendations to improve security around the marine environment. It is staffed by seconded RCMP and municipal police members.

The **Integrated Border Enforcement Team (IBET)** protects Canada from terrorism, organized crime and other border-related criminality. It consists primarily of RCMP, CBSA, U.S. Border Patrol, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement and U.S. Coast Guard officers.

APPENDIX M

1.6.25 Missing Persons/Children

FOI Recommendation: For Public Release

POLICY

It is the policy of the Vancouver Police Department that all cases of missing persons reported to the VPD must be treated as suspicious until demonstrated otherwise, requiring a thorough response appropriate to the circumstances. This will provide the best chance of preserving perishable evidence and locating the missing person quickly, or determining if there has been foul play requiring a different investigative direction.

Aboriginal peoples, along with marginalized non-Aboriginal people, are more likely to face societal challenges that increase their risk of going missing and may act as barriers to reporting. The principles of respect, compassion and empathy must guide all missing person investigations.

Marginalized persons, including specifically Aboriginal women and children, are in a group who have a statistically higher risk of suffering violence. As a result, missing persons complaints must be properly evaluated to determine if persons belonging to any of these groups should be investigated as a high risk missing person.

Marginalized persons include the homeless, those with alcohol or drug addictions, mental disorders, sex trade workers or anyone who may be the subject of a cultural bias.

Missing Persons investigations fall under one of four categories:

- a. Curfew Breaches
- b. Non-high risk people or situations
- c. High risk people or situations
- d. Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal marginalized persons

People or situations that are to be considered high risk include, but are not limited to, children under 12 years of age, the elderly, or persons with mental or physical disabilities and those persons included in cultural or social groups, or whose lifestyle and the circumstances of the incident may result in increased risk of violence.

Missing persons determined to be high risk shall be investigated as soon as possible by Patrol members, and followed up by the Missing Persons Unit (MPU) where necessary.

The Department will investigate all missing person reports when the person was last seen in Vancouver, or if the person resides in Vancouver and it is not known where they were last seen. In the event of a jurisdictional dispute, the safety and welfare of the missing person shall be given paramount consideration; the Department will provide assistance to any agency as needed.

PROCEDURE

Curfew Breaches are categorized as a *Missing Person* incident by E-Comm. The following procedures apply.

1. Patrol Supervisors shall:
 - a. consider requesting that dispatch broadcast the information,
 - b. forward the information to the MPU, and
 - c. memo the CAD call.
2. Under extenuating circumstances such as comments regarding suicide made by the young person, other unusual behaviour, assign a member to investigate.

Non-high risk missing persons shall be reported via E-Comm or by patrol members and forwarded to the MPU for follow up.

Members assigned to investigate a high risk missing person report shall:

3. Notify a Patrol Supervisor;
4. Obtain a description of the person;
5. Also obtain the following information:
 - a. the location where they were last seen,
 - b. a possible destination,
 - c. any medical condition(s) and/or any required medication,
 - d. the identity and location of the complainant,
 - e. cell phone, credit card and bank account numbers, email accounts, Facebook and other social media access.
 - f. Employment and or school contact information and details.
 - g. a vehicle description and license plate number, if applicable, and
 - h. any history of similar incidents.
6. Search the premises where the person was last seen, including the residence or other applicable premises;
 - a. this must be done by a member, do not rely on the word of a complainant or citizen that a search has been conducted,
 - b. include small spaces where a child may hide (e.g. fridge),
 - c. consider attics, unused rooms, etc.,
 - d. look for notes, diaries,
 - e. consider examination of computers and other electronic communications devices, and,
 - f. for vehicles also check the backseat and trunk.

7. Exhaust all efforts to locate the missing person. Investigative techniques may include, but are not limited to:
 - a. conduct a PRIME search,
 - b. request EComm contact all area hospitals
 - c. attempt to contact associates, friends and family members,
 - d. send CPIC messages to all relevant jurisdictions, and,
 - e. where possible, attend the past and present residences of the person.
8. Complete the General Occurrence report (GO) as soon as practicable and before the end of shift.
9. Route the GO to the Sgt. i/c Missing Persons Unit (MPU).
10. Take the following steps when the missing person may have access to a vehicle:
 - a. contact all towing companies operating within the City of Vancouver and determine if the vehicle has been impounded since the missing person was last seen,
 - b. contact the City of Vancouver Parking Enforcement "police only line" (604-257-XXXX) to determine if the vehicle has been ticketed, the number is available via EComm, and,
 - c. enter the vehicle license plate number on CPIC if the vehicle has not been located, and,
 - d. if a vehicle is located conduct a search of the vehicle.
11. Submit photographs of the missing person if possible. Ensure the photographs are recent and a true likeness of the person. E-mail digital photographs or forward hard copies to the Sgt. i/c MPU.
12. Advise the complainant that the MPU will contact them as soon as practicable for a follow-up investigation, and to contact 9-11 should the missing person return home.
13. When a missing person has been located prior to the end of the assigned member's shift, the member shall:
 - a. ensure that the missing person and their vehicle (if applicable) are removed from CPIC;
 - b. submit a supplemental page to the original GO as soon as practicable and before the end of shift;
 - c. ensure the missing person and found person PRIME reports are cross referenced; and
 - d. notify the appropriate sections and/or other jurisdictions and agencies.

Patrol Supervisors advised of a missing person incident shall consider the specifics of the incident, including factors that may make the case high risk, including whether the missing person's status as an Aboriginal or non-Aboriginal marginalized person may alone warrant

treating the investigation as high risk. If determined that the incident is high risk, the Supervisor shall:

14. Ensure a priority one response and consider the following resources:

- a. Traffic Section;
- b. Dog Squad;
- c. Search and Canvass Team members;
- d. Marine Unit;
- e. Bicycle units;
- f. ERT;
- g. Victim Services Unit;
- h. Citizens Crime Watch;
- i. Assistance from other districts or nearby agencies.

15. In addition:

- a. notify the Duty Officer;
- b. notify the Sergeant i/c MPU. After hours, the Duty Officer will provide the phone number;

Duty Officer shall:

16. Consider if additional resources are required (e.g. Search and Canvass Team, Public Affairs Section);

17. Activate an *AMBER Alert* if the missing person is a child and the criteria are met as per [s.1.7.2 Abduction: AMBER Alert](#) ;

18. Consider an abduction or kidnapping and refer to [s.1.7.24 Child Kidnapping, Abduction or Attempted Abduction by Stranger](#); and,

19. Set up a command post if necessary.

APPENDIX N



Juristat

Canadian Centre for Justice Statistics

Statistics Canada – Catalogue no. 85-002-XIE, Vol. 23, no. 6



SEXUAL OFFENCES IN CANADA

by Rebecca Kong, Holly Johnson, Sara Beattie and Andrea Cardillo

Highlights

- The rate of sexual offences reported to the police declined by 36% between 1993 and 2002. Declines occurred for sexual assault as well as for other sexual offences such as sexual exploitation and invitation to sexual touching.
- In 2002, the highest rates of sexual offences were reported in the territories. Among provinces, rates were highest in Saskatchewan and Manitoba and lowest in Quebec.
- Among Census Metropolitan Areas, rates were highest in Saskatoon, Sudbury and Regina, and lowest in Ottawa.
- Over 80% of victims in sexual offences reported to a subset of police departments were female. Males made up 29% of child victims, 8% of adult and 12% of youth victims.
- Rates of victimization reported to the police were highest among female teenagers and young adults. Rates of sexual offending were highest among male teenagers.
- Victimization surveys have found that sexual offences are among the crimes least likely to be reported to the police. Once reported to police, sexual offences are also less likely than other violent offences to be considered by police to be “founded” and are less likely to result in charges laid against a suspect.
- Persons charged with sexual offences are less likely than other violent offenders to be found guilty in adult court. Sexual offenders found guilty in adult court are more likely than other violent offenders to receive a prison sentence.
- Sexual offenders appear before adult court with a higher percentage of multiple charges compared to other offenders, and therefore require a much longer time to be processed through court.
- In youth court, only those convicted of sexual assault level 1 were found guilty at the same rate as other violent offenders. Youth charged with levels 2 and 3 and other sexual offences had lower conviction rates. Sexual assault levels 2 and 3 were more likely to result in custodial sentences than were other types of sexual offences and other violent offences.



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INTRODUCTION

Over the past two decades, understanding and awareness of sexual offences, as well as responses to these behaviours, have undergone many changes. On the legislative front, this transition began with the 1983 amendments to the *Criminal Code* that replaced the crimes of rape and indecent assault with a three-tier structure of sexual assault. The goals of these amendments were to emphasize the violent rather than the sexual nature of such crimes, and to increase victims' confidence in the criminal justice system and willingness to report these crimes to the police (Department of Justice, 1985). Amendments also eliminated immunity for those accused of sexually assaulting a spouse, removed reference to the gender of victims and perpetrators, and restricted the admissibility of evidence about the complainant's prior sexual history. Further, in 1988, *Criminal Code* provisions specific to sexual offences against children were implemented (see *Developments in Sexual Offences and Related Legislation: A Chronology*, page 11).

More recently, with the evolution in technology and globalization, legislators and policy makers have had to react to emerging issues of child pornography, the luring of children over the Internet, and trafficking in persons for the purpose of sexual exploitation. Child prostitution is also an issue of concern. Child prostitutes are generally viewed as victims of exploitation and abuse who are in need of assistance, although they may still be charged with prostitution-related offences (Bittle, 2002).

This *Juristat* presents statistical data on the extent and nature of sexual offences, and provides qualitative information on related issues of child pornography, trafficking in persons for the purpose of sexual exploitation, and child prostitution. The data used in the report are from Statistics Canada and include police statistics from the Uniform Crime Reporting (UCR2) Survey¹ and the Homicide Survey, and court data from the Adult Criminal Court Survey and the Youth Court Survey. This *Juristat* also presents analysis from the 1999 General Social Survey on Victimization, which collected information from a representative sample of Canadians 15 years of age and older on their experiences as victims of crime.

TRENDS IN SEXUAL OFFENCES REPORTED TO THE POLICE


Sexual offences in this *Juristat* includes sexual assault levels 1, 2 and 3, as well as the category of "other sexual offences" which are a group of offences designed primarily to protect children from sexual abuse (see page 5, Box *Sexual Offences Defined* for *Criminal Code* definitions of these offences).

In 2002, 27,094 incidents involving sexual offences were reported to police in Canada (Table 1). Sexual assault level 1 (the category of least physical injury to the victim) accounted for 88% of these. Other sexual offences accounted for 10%, and sexual assault levels 2 and 3 accounted for the remaining 2%.

Among the 2.4 million *Criminal Code* incidents reported by police in 2002, sexual offences accounted for just 1%, a proportion that has not changed for the last 10 years. Among the 303,294 *violent* incidents reported by police, total sexual offences accounted for 9%, with sexual assaults (levels 1, 2 and 3) making up 8% and other sexual offences accounting for 1% (Figure 1).

¹ A subset of 154 police departments participated in the UCR2 representing 59% of the national volume of crime in Canada in 2002. For the purposes of this publication, Ontario Provincial Police rural divisions have been removed from the UCR2. This is due to an absence of accurate population estimates for those areas which are needed to calculate rates. The remaining police forces used for this analysis represent 56% of the national volume of reported crime in 2002.

Figure 1



Source: Uniform Crime Reporting Survey, Canadian Centre for Justice Statistics, Statistics Canada.


Recent decline in sexual offences reported to police

After the passage of the reform legislation in 1983, the rate of total sexual offences reported to police began to increase (see Figure 2). The increase continued until 1993, peaking at 136 incidents per 100,000 population. This trend has been driven by sexual assault level 1. Rates of sexual assault levels 2 and 3 declined between 1983 and 2002, while rates of other sexual offences fluctuated.

This dramatic rise in the overall rate of police-reported sexual offences following the introduction of the new legislation has been the subject of much analysis. In general, researchers have found insufficient evidence to attribute the rise solely to legislative reform, but suggest that other related social changes also encouraged victims to come forward (Roberts and Gebotys, 1992; Roberts and Grossman, 1994; Department of Justice, 1985). Examples of social changes during this period are: improvements to the social, economic and political status of women; a heightened focus on victims of crime and the growth in services and initiatives to support them, including sexual assault centres; special training of police officers to deal with victims, and; the growth of treatment teams in hospitals trained to respond to victims of sexual assault and gather evidence that could be used at trial (Clark and Hepworth, 1994).

After the peak in 1993, the rate of sexual offences reported to the police then declined, which parallels the overall downward trend for violent offences. Possible explanations for these declines are recent shifts in the age structure of the population and changing social values. Declines in rates of sexual offences

Figure 2



Source: Uniform Crime Reporting Survey, Canadian Centre for Justice Statistics, Statistics Canada.

coincided with a decrease in the proportion of the population aged 15-34. Since young adults have higher rates of criminal victimization and offending than other age groups, crime rates can be expected to decline as their share of the population declines. Changing social values related to sexual assault have also coincided with an aging population, and the combined effect may be more important than demographic shifts alone.


In 2002, the rate of reported sexual offences remained at 86 incidents per 100,000 population, virtually unchanged from the previous year. While the 2002 rate was 36% below the 1993 peak, it was still 47% higher than in 1983.

The rate for sexual assault level 1 has declined 35% from the peak figure in 1993 (Table 1) and has remained stable since 1999. Rates for sexual assault levels 2 and 3 are relatively low, so small changes in the rates can result in large changes in percentage terms. These offences declined steadily since 1993, by 60%. The rate of other sexual offences declined by 40% over this time period.

Rates across the provinces and territories vary widely

There is considerable regional variation in the rates of police-reported sexual offences across Canada. In 2002, as with other violent crimes, the rate of sexual offences was highest in Nunavut (1,017 per 100,000 population) followed by the other two territories (Figure 3). Among the provinces, Saskatchewan (160) and Manitoba (139) had the highest rates. The lowest rates were recorded in Quebec (71) and Ontario (74). Rates for these two provinces were below the national average of 86 sexual offences per 100,000 population.

Figure 3



Source: Uniform Crime Reporting Survey, Canadian Centre for Justice Statistics, Statistics Canada.

Prince Edward Island, Nova Scotia, Quebec, Manitoba, Saskatchewan and the territories all reported a rise in the rate of sexual offences between 2001 and 2002, with the largest increases in Yukon (36%) and Prince Edward Island (34%) (Table 2). Rates in the remaining provinces decreased. With a drop of 11%, New Brunswick registered the largest decline in the rate of sexual offences, closely followed by Newfoundland and Labrador (-10%). Over the last decade, provincial/territorial rates have generally been declining.


Rates among cities

Figure 4 shows rates of police-reported sexual offences among Census Metropolitan Areas (CMAs).² In 2002, CMAs with the highest rates were Saskatoon, Sudbury and Regina. Those with the lowest rates were the Ontario cities of Ottawa and Windsor.

The range in rates of sexual offences at the CMA level was very large, with the highest-rate CMA more than three times higher than the lowest-rate city.

In the absence of an extensive evaluation, it is difficult to pinpoint for certain the factors that contribute to the disparity in rates of sexual offences among the provinces, territories and CMAs. Possible contributing factors include variations in public attitudes toward sexual assault that may influence reporting rates among victims, police policies regarding the diversion of young offenders, police training, or services for victims in the community (examples include hospital-based programs for the collection of evidence, and sexual assault counseling centres).

Figure 4



¹ Includes the Gatineau portion of the Ottawa-Gatineau CMA.

² Includes the Ottawa portion of the Ottawa-Gatineau CMA.

Source: Uniform Crime Reporting Survey, Canadian Centre for Justice Statistics, Statistics Canada.

HOMICIDES INVOLVING SEXUAL VIOLENCE AND PROSTITUTION

Criminal incidents are classified in the Uniform Crime Reporting Survey according to the most serious in the incident (see Methodology section, page 12). Sexual assault levels 2 and 3 are classified as more serious than most other crimes, but sexual assault level 1 will be classified lower than the more serious forms of physical assault (levels 2 and 3) if they occurred in the same incident. Sexual assaults that precipitate a homicide will likewise be classified as homicides. However,

² A census metropolitan area (CMA) is a very large urban area (known as the urban core) together with adjacent urban and rural areas (known as urban and rural fringes) that have a high degree of social and economic integration with the urban core. A CMA has an urban core population of at least 100,000, based on the previous census. Once an area becomes a CMA, it is retained as a CMA even if the population of its urban core declines below 100,000. A CMA typically comprises more than one police force. The Oshawa CMA is excluded due to the incongruity between the police boundary and the CMA boundary.

Sexual offences defined

The term *sexual offences* encompasses a wide range of criminal acts in the *Criminal Code of Canada*. Such conduct ranges from unwanted sexual touching to sexual violence resulting in serious physical injury or disfigurement to the victim. It also includes special categories of offences designed to protect children from sexual abuse.

In this *Juristat*, the term *sexual assault* includes the following *Criminal Code* offences:

- (a) Sexual assault level 1 (s. 271) – an assault committed in circumstances of a sexual nature such that the sexual integrity of the victim is violated. Level 1 involves minor physical injuries or no injuries to the victim. This is a hybrid offence and may be prosecuted as an indictable offence (with a maximum sentence of 10 years imprisonment) or by way of summary conviction (with a maximum sentence of 18 months imprisonment or \$2,000 fine).³
- (b) Sexual assault level 2 (s. 272) – sexual assault with a weapon, threats or causing bodily harm. Level 2 is an indictable offence carrying a maximum sentence of 14 years imprisonment. A mandatory minimum sentence of 4 years in prison is imposed if a firearm is used.
- (c) Aggravated sexual assault (level 3) – sexual assault that results in wounding, maiming, disfiguring or endangering the life of the victim. Level 3 is an indictable offence carrying a maximum sentence of life imprisonment. A mandatory minimum sentence of 4 years in prison is imposed if a firearm is used.

The term *other sexual offences* includes a group of offences that are meant primarily to address incidents of sexual abuse directed at children. The *Criminal Code* offences included in this category are:

- (a) Sexual interference (s.151) – the direct or indirect touching (for a sexual purpose) of a person under the age of 14 years using a part of the body or an object. This is a hybrid offence and may be processed as an indictable offence (with a maximum sentence of 10 years imprisonment) or by way of summary conviction.³
- (b) Invitation to sexual touching (s. 152) – inviting, counseling, or inciting a person under the age of 14 years to touch (for a sexual purpose) the body of any person directly or indirectly with a part of the body or with an object. This is a hybrid offence and may be processed as an indictable offence (with a maximum sentence of 10 years imprisonment) or by way of summary conviction.
- (c) Sexual exploitation (s. 153) – a person in a position of trust or authority towards a young person or a person with whom the young person is in a relationship of dependency, commits sexual interference or invitation to sexual touching. “Young person” refers to a person between 14 and 18 years of age. This is a hybrid offence and may be processed as an indictable offence (with a maximum sentence of 5 years imprisonment) or by way of summary conviction.
- (d) Incest (s. 155) – sexual intercourse with a person that has a known defined blood relationship with them. This is an indictable offence carrying a maximum sentence of 14 years imprisonment.
- (e) Anal intercourse (s. 159) – with the exception of married couples and other persons over the age of 18 who consent and who engage in these acts in private. This is a hybrid offence and may be processed as an indictable offence (with a maximum sentence of 10 years imprisonment) or by way of summary conviction.⁴
- (f) Bestiality (s. 160) – Anyone who commits or compels another person to commit bestiality is guilty of a hybrid offence and may be processed as an indictable offence (with a maximum sentence of 10 years imprisonment) or by way of summary conviction.

Indecent Acts and Corrupting Morals

Two related offences, not included under the definition of sexual offences in this Juristat, are indecent acts and corrupting morals.

Indecent acts

Section 173(1) (b) states that anyone who commits an indecent act in any place with the intent to insult or offend anyone is guilty of an offence. Section 173(2) states every person who, in any place, for a sexual purpose, exposes one's genitals to a person under the age of 14 is guilty of an offence. These are punishable on summary conviction with maximum penalties of a \$2000 fine or 6 months in prison.

Corrupting morals

Section 163 of the *Criminal Code* states that it is an offence to produce, publish or distribute any obscene material, recordings, or pictures. It is an offence to knowingly and without lawful justification sell or expose to public view, any act which relates to obscenity or indecent objects. Material shall be deemed to be obscene if a dominant characteristic is the undue exploitation of sex, or the combination of sex and at least one of crime, horror, cruelty or violence. It is a hybrid offence and may be processed by way of summary or indictable conviction (maximum penalty as an indictable offence is two years in prison, as a summary conviction is a fine not exceeding \$2000 or imprisonment for 6 months).

Trend data on indecent acts and corrupting morals are available through a subset of 104 police agencies that have participated in the Incident-based Uniform Crime Reporting (UCR2) Survey consistently since 1995 and represent 42% of the national volume of crime in 2001. The number of indecent acts that came to the attention of this subset of police forces decreased by 27% between 1995 and 2002, from 3,308 incidents to 2,408. The number of corrupting moral incidents also decreased (8%) from 130 incidents to 120 over this period.

Of the police-reported incidents of indecent acts in 2002, a minority (27%) resulted in charges being laid by the police. Though incidents involving corrupting morals were fewer in number, charges were laid in a higher proportion of cases (32%).

the more detailed Homicide Survey shows that, between 1991 and 2001, 184 homicides out of a total of 6,714 (less than 3%) were preceded by sexual assault toward the victim. Most of these incidents had an identified accused (89%) and the vast majority of these accused (98%) were male (Table 3). The majority of sexual assault-related homicides (82%) involved female victims. About half of all victims were under age 25 and 14% were children under 15. In contrast, two-thirds of accused were 25 years of age or older.

Prostitutes are at a heightened risk of violence and homicide. Between 1991 and 2001, a total of 50 homicides in Canada were identified by police as occurring in the context of prostitution and victims were either clients or prostitutes.⁵ Two-thirds (33) of these victims were female and one-third (17) were male. Four-in-ten were under the age of 25. In only 33 cases was an accused identified, a rate for solved cases that is lower than for homicides overall (66% compared to 79%).

³ A hybrid offence may be processed as a summary or indictable offence. Except where otherwise stated by law, the maximum penalty for a summary conviction is a fine not exceeding two thousand dollars or imprisonment for 6 months or both.

⁴ The section has been found to be unconstitutional by the Ontario and Quebec Courts of Appeal (R. v M(C) (1995), 98 C.C.C. (3d) 481. (Ont. C.A.) and R. v Roy (1998), 125 C.C.C. (3d) 442 (Que. C.A.))

⁵ This excludes a large number of recent cases in British Columbia involving missing women. These will be coded in 2002, the year in which they became known to the police as homicides.

VICTIMIZATION SURVEY REPORTS OF SEXUAL ASSAULT

Victimization surveys provide an alternative to police statistics in that they interview victims directly about their experiences of crime and therefore include both incidents that were reported to the police and those that were not reported. This is an important source of information in the case of sexual assault since these crimes are among the least likely to be reported to police. Statistics Canada's 1999 General Social Survey (GSS) on Victimization found that victims 15 years of age and older did not report 78% of sexual assaults to the police that year.⁶ This is considerably higher than the unreported rate for robbery (51%), physical assault (61%), and break and enter (35%).

The 1999 GSS measures two aspects of sexual assault victimization: sexual attack and unwanted sexual touching. These are measured by the following two questions:⁷

Sexual attack: During the past 12 months, has anyone forced you or attempted to force you into any unwanted sexual activity by threatening you, holding you down or hurting you in some way?

Unwanted sexual touching: During the past 12 months, has anyone ever touched you against your will in any sexual way? By this I mean anything from unwanted touching or grabbing, to kissing or fondling.

According to the GSS definition, an estimated 502,000 Canadians 15 years and older living in the 10 provinces had experienced a sexual assault in the 12 months prior to the survey. This translates into a rate of 21 incidents per 1,000 population age 15 and older (33 per 1,000 women and 8 per 1,000 men). The change in the rate of sexual assault over the last GSS on Victimization in 1993 – 16 per 1,000 population – was not statistically significant (See Besserer and Trainor, 2000).⁸

These figures do not count sexual assaults perpetrated by spouses. An in-depth module in the 1999 GSS addressed the issue of spousal violence separately and found that, overall, 8% of women and 7% of men reported some type of violence by a common-law or marital partner in the 5 years preceding the survey. Among these victims, 20% of women and 3%⁹ of men reported experiencing at least one incident of sexual assault (defined as sexual attack only in the case of spouses). This amounts to an estimated 138,000 women and 14,000 men who were sexually assaulted by a spousal partner over the 5 year period.

Because they include a large number of incidents not reported to the police, victimization surveys produce estimates that are higher than rates derived from police statistics. This is the case even though sexual assaults recorded in victimization surveys exclude those committed against children under 15 years old, and the population residing in institutions or in Canada's three territories.

Most are unwanted sexual touching, most victims women

The majority of sexual assault victimizations reported to the 1999 GSS (involving perpetrators other than spouses) were unwanted sexual touching (77%) as opposed to sexual attack (23%). The vast majority of sexual assaults were perpetrated against women (82%), and half of all victims were 15-25 years of age.

The most common locations for sexual assaults to occur were bars and restaurants and other commercial locations (23% and 14%, respectively), public places (21%), the victim's own home (15%) or the home of someone else (19%).

Sexual assaults are unlikely to come to the attention of the police, and this is more often the case for unwanted sexual touching than for sexual attacks (81% and 69%, respectively).

Reasons for not reporting to police

Responses to questions about reasons for not reporting to police cannot be analyzed separately for victims of unwanted sexual touching and sexual attack due to small sample counts. Altogether, victims of sexual assault provided a range of reasons for not reporting incidents to police (Table 4). Many did not report because the incident was dealt with another way (61%), they felt it wasn't important enough (50%), they felt it was a personal matter (50%), or they didn't want the police involved (47%).¹⁰ While 33% did not report because they did not think the police could do anything, another 18% felt that the police would not help them. Other reasons were fear of revenge by the offender (19%), and wanting to avoid publicity over the incident (14%).¹¹

Reasons for not reporting to police that stand out for sexual assault victims, as compared to the other violent crimes measured by the GSS, relate to the sensitive nature of these events: higher proportions avoided calling the police because they considered it a personal matter that did not concern the police, or because they feared publicity.

Use of other supports

Just as sexual assault victims were less likely than victims of other violent crimes to report to the police, they were less likely to seek help from formal or informal supports. Smaller percentages, as compared to robbery or assault victims, said they spoke about the incident with family, friends or neighbours, or co-workers (Table 5).

⁶ Eight percent of incidents were reported to police, but this estimate is based on small counts and therefore has a high coefficient of variation (greater than 33.3%). In 14% of cases, victims did not know if the incident was reported or refused to answer.

⁷ These questions were designed to closely resemble the Criminal Code definition of sexual assault.

⁸ Due to the relatively low counts of sexual assaults reported to each of these surveys, these estimates have large and overlapping coefficients of variation. The difference is therefore not statistically significant.

⁹ Coefficient of variation for this figure is between 16.6% and 33.3%. Use with caution.

¹⁰ Percentages exceed 100% due to multiple responses.

¹¹ Coefficient of variation for this figure is between 16.6% and 33.3%. Use with caution.

VICTIM CHARACTERISTICS

A common pattern shown in both police and victimization survey data is that young women and girls are at the highest risk of sexual assault victimization.

Young women and girls at highest risk


Compared to other violent crimes, females are much more likely to be victims of sexual assault than are males. Females accounted for 85% of victims of sexual offences who reported to a sample of police services reporting to the Incident-based Uniform Crime Reporting Survey (UCR2) in 2002,¹² compared to 48% of victims of all other violent crimes. Females also represented 82% of the population 15 years and older who reported a sexual assault victimization to the 1999 GSS, compared to 43% of victims of all other violent victimizations.

Victims of sexual offences also tend to be young. In 2002, over half (61%) of all victims of sexual offences reported to the police were children and youth under 18 years of age. Controlling for populations served by this sample of police services, rates of sexual offences known to the police were highest among girls aged 11 to 19, with the highest rate at age 13 (781 per 100,000 population) (Figure 5). Among male victims, rates were highest for boys 3 to 14 years of age.

Figure 5



Rate per 100,000 population



Data are based on 154 police agencies (excluding OPP Rural) participating in the UCR2 Survey, representing 56% of the national volume of reported crime.

Source: Incident-based Uniform Crime Reporting Survey (UCR2), Canadian Centre for Justice Statistics, Statistics Canada.

While males make up a small proportion of victims of sexual offences overall (15%), this proportion is higher for younger victims. In incidents involving children under 12, boys made up 29% of victims compared to 12% of youth aged 12-18 and 8% of adults.

Among adults (aged 15 and older) interviewed for the 1999 GSS, rates of sexual assault were highest among women, those 15 to 24 years of age, those who were single, separated or divorced, as well as students, those who participated in at least 30 evening activities outside the home per month, and those who had a household income of less than \$15,000 or who lived in urban areas (Table 6).

PROFILE OF ACCUSED PERSONS


According to the UCR2, in 2002, 97% of persons accused of sexual offences were male, higher than the representation of males among persons accused of all other types of violent offences (82%).

Overall, compared to other violent offenders, sexual offenders are somewhat older. In 2002, the mean age of persons charged by police with sexual offences was 33 years as compared to 31 for those charged with other violent offences. However, rates of sexual offending were highest among the youngest males, those aged 13 to 17 (Figure 6), and peaked for 13 and 14-year-olds (221 and 230 per 100,000). The wide difference in rates of victimization and offending shown in Figures 5 and 6 is due to the fact that a relatively small percentage of reported sexual offences have a suspect identified.

Figure 6



Rate per 100,000 population



Data are based on 154 police agencies (excluding OPP Rural) participating in the UCR2 Survey, representing 56% of the national volume of reported crime.

Source: Incident-based Uniform Crime Reporting Survey (UCR2), Canadian Centre for Justice Statistics, Statistics Canada.

¹² The incident-based Uniform Crime Reporting (UCR2) survey captures detailed information on individual criminal incidents reported to police, including characteristics of victims, accused persons and incidents. In 2002, 154 police services in 9 provinces participated in this survey representing 59% of the national volume of reported crime. Other than Ontario and Québec, the data are primarily from urban police departments. The reader is cautioned that these data are not nationally representative.

This peak among 13 and 14-year-olds applies to sexual assault level 1 and other sexual offences, but not to sexual assault levels 2 or 3, where there is no discernable age-related pattern among accused. Compared to their older counterparts, sexual offences involving these young teens more often involve young victims their own age, family members or casual acquaintances, and are more likely to take place in single homes or in or around schools. They are also somewhat more likely to be dealt with informally by police.

The National Longitudinal Survey of Children and Youth can shed some light on the prevalence of sexual offending among teenagers. This survey asks teenagers how often they have committed certain acts of delinquency. In the 3rd cycle in 1998/99, 3.9% of boys 12 to 15 years of age reported that they had either "sexually touched someone who was unwilling" (3.3%) or "forced someone to have sex" (1.3%).¹³ This represents an estimated 26,800 boys who have engaged in sexual offences. The numbers of girls reporting these behaviours was too small to make statistically reliable estimates. The proportion of boys who reported involvement in sexual offences is similar to the proportion who reported selling drugs (4.8%) but lower than the proportion who had engaged in property-related offences (38.3%) or other violent offences (29.7%).

The percentage of 12 to 15 year-old girls who reported selling drugs or engaging in property-related offences was comparable to boys (4.8% and 35.9%, respectively), but fewer girls reported engaging in other violent offences (10.9%).¹⁴

Accused most often known to victims

About half of sexual assault victims who reported to the sample of police services represented in UCR2 were assaulted by a friend or acquaintance (10% and 41%, respectively), 28% by a family member, and 20% by a stranger (Table 7). Children under 12 were most often victimized by family members, especially in the case of girls (51%). Parents (20%) were less likely than other relatives (29%) to be identified as suspects. In comparison, youth aged 12 to 17 and adults were most frequently victimized by acquaintances (47% and 40%, respectively).

Dating violence

Rates of dating violence reported to the police suggest that girls under the age of 16 have the highest rates of sexual violence by a dating partner, but that women aged 18 to 20 have the highest rates of physical assaults by dates (Figures 7 and 8). Males reported few cases of sexual violence by dating partners and lower rates of physical assault. These data include incidents involving all ages of victims, but only those who report to the police.¹⁵

¹³ Coefficients of variation for this figure are between 16.6% and 33.3%. Use with caution. These figures do not add to the total of 3.9% due to multiple responses.


¹⁴ For further information on the topic of self-reported delinquency see Fitzgerald, R. (2003) An examination of sex differences in delinquency. Crime and Justice Research Paper Series.

¹⁵ According to Statistics Canada's 1993 Violence Against Women Survey, 16% of women 18 years of age and over (an estimated 1.7 million women) had been assaulted or sexually assaulted by a male dating partner since the age of 16. Twelve percent of women reported being sexually assaulted and 7% reported being physically assaulted (many women reported both).

Figure 7

Females under 16 years of age have highest rates of sexual violence by a dating partner/close friend, 2002

Rate per 100,000 population




Data are based on 154 police agencies (excluding OPP Rural) participating in the UCR2 Survey, representing 56% of the national volume of reported crime. For the purpose of this analysis, dating partner was derived from the UCR2 category "close friends" and only opposite sex relationships with a single victim and single accused were included in order to exclude close non-intimate relationships. Males reported no sexual assaults in this relationship category in 2002.

Source: Incident-based Uniform Crime Reporting Survey (UCR2), Canadian Centre for Justice Statistics, Statistics Canada.

Figure 8

Young adult women have highest rates of physical assault by a dating partner/close friend, 2002

Rate per 100,000 population



Data are based on 154 police agencies (excluding OPP Rural) participating in the UCR2 Survey, representing 56% of the national volume of reported crime.

Source: Incident-based Uniform Crime Reporting Survey (UCR2), Canadian Centre for Justice Statistics, Statistics Canada.

Police statistics show that children are the least likely to fall prey to strangers (9%) and that the group most likely to be sexually assaulted by strangers was adult females (31%).

Most offences take place in a residence

The majority of sexual offences reported to police in 2002 took place in a residence (64%), followed by public and open areas (26%), and commercial places (11%).¹⁶ Sexual assault level 2 was least likely to take place in a residence (52% compared to 64% of sexual assault level 1, 65% of sexual assault level 3, and 65% of other sexual offences). Sexual assault level 2 was more likely to take place in a public or open area (38%), as compared to other sexual offences (27%), sexual assault level 1 (25%), and level 3 (23%).

Alcohol a factor

It is not uncommon for violent crimes to be committed within the context of alcohol or drug use by offenders and sometimes victims. Among adult victims of sexual assault responding to the 1999 GSS, 48% were of the opinion that the incident was related to the perpetrator's alcohol or drug use, similar to the percentage of assault and robbery victims who felt the same way (51% of both). The percentage of victims who felt that the incident was related to their *own* alcohol or drug use was considerably smaller for all victims of violence (less than 10%).¹⁷

CRIMINAL JUSTICE PROCESSING OF SEXUAL OFFENCES

Police response

Approximately one-in-six sexual offences reported to the police in 2002 were declared "unfounded" by the authorities meaning that after an initial investigation took place, police concluded that no violation of the law took place nor was attempted. Overall, 16% of sexual offences were unfounded, and the rate varied by type of offence: 16% of sexual assault level 1 cases, 11% of level 2 sexual assaults, 11% of level 3 sexual assaults, and 15% of other sexual offences.

Since 1991, the rate of unfounded offences has remained relatively stable for the three levels of sexual assault, but has increased fairly steadily for other sexual offences, from 8% in 1991 to 15% in 2002. Other types of violent crimes were unfounded by police in 7% of reported incidents between 1991 and 2002.

Sexual offences are also cleared by police at a lower rate than other types of violent offences. Of the 27,094 sexual offences declared "founded" by police in 2002, 44% were cleared by the laying of a charge against an accused person, an additional 19% were cleared otherwise, meaning an accused was identified but was not charged for a variety of reasons,¹⁸ and 37% were not cleared. Other types of violent offences were cleared by a charge in 50% of cases, while 22% were cleared otherwise and 28% were not cleared.

The clearance rate for sexual offences (including cleared through a charge being laid and cleared otherwise) has been decreasing since 1995. Between 1991 and 1995, the clearance rate ranged between 70% and 74%, but dropped to 63% in

2002. Among types of sexual offences, clearance rates in 2002 were highest in the most serious case of sexual assault level 3 (80%) and were lower for other sexual offences (63%) and sexual assault levels 1 and 2 (62% each). By comparison, the clearance rate for other violent offences stood at about 75% over the decade 1991 to 2002.

Response of Adult Criminal Courts

Convictions were more frequent in adult court cases involving sexual assault level 1 and other sexual offences than in sexual assault levels 2 and 3. However, conviction rates for sexual offences were lower as compared to other violent offences (Table 8).¹⁹ Conviction rates have risen for all types of sexual offences, but have remained steady for other violent offences since 1995/96. Sexual and non-sexual violent offences had similar proportions of cases stayed/withdrawn or acquitted.

Sexual offences with a finding of guilt were treated more harshly by adult court judges than were convictions for other types of violent offences (Table 9). The most common sentence given for all types of sexual offences in 2001/02 was a prison term, followed by probation or conditional sentence. Prison was given as a sentence more frequently in the case of sexual assault levels 2 and 3 than for level 1 or other sexual offences. Prison sentences have been used less frequently in recent years while the use of conditional sentences has risen.²⁰

By comparison, sentences for other types of violent offences in 2001/02 were probation in 49% of cases, prison in 36%, fines in 5% and conditional sentences in 4%. These percentages have remained stable in recent years.

Response of Youth Courts

In Youth Court, convictions were more frequent in cases involving level 1 sexual assault than other types of sexual offences. The 2001/02 figure of 61% is comparable to the conviction rate for other violent offences (62%). The percentages found guilty have remained relatively stable since 1994/95 in the case of all types of sexual offenders and other violent offenders (Table 10).

Similar to adults, the percentage of youth sentenced to open or secure custody was highest for convictions for sexual assault levels 2 and 3. The percentage sentenced to custody declined for sexual assault and was stable for other sexual offences. Unlike adult offenders, similar proportions of youth convicted

¹⁶ Public places include street, roads and open areas such as parks.

Commercial places include office buildings, stores, bars, restaurants and other business locations.

¹⁷ The coefficient of variation for the estimates for sexual assault and robbery were between 16.6% and 33.3%. Use with caution.

¹⁸ These include cases where the complainant requests that charges not be laid against the accused, the accused has died, the accused has diplomatic immunity, the accused is referred to a diversionary program, police discretion, or for a reason beyond the control of the police.

¹⁹ Figures from the Adult Criminal Court Survey and the Youth Court Survey represent the most serious offence in the case and the most serious sentence.

²⁰ In 1996, the Sentencing Reform Bill (C-41) was enacted creating a new sentencing option for adult offenders, the conditional sentence of imprisonment, which is a term of imprisonment served in the community. Data on conditional sentences are not available for Quebec.

of sexual offences and those convicted of other violent offences were sentenced to a period of secure or open custody (Table 11).

Repeat Sex Offenders

In a recent study on recidivism linking youth and adult court records for a sample of 18 to 25 year olds convicted in adult court in 1999/00, the overall rate of repeat convictions was 60% (Thomas, Hurley and Grimes, 2002).²¹ This is the percentage of convicted offenders in that age group who had at least one previous conviction for any offence type in adult or youth court.

Among offence groups, property offenders were most likely to "specialize" as indicated by the fact that 50% had at least one prior conviction for property offences. Persons convicted of sexual offences were least likely to have had previous convictions within the same offence group. In 1999/00, only 11% of this sample of 18 to 25 year olds had been convicted previously of a sexual offence while 32% of other violent

offenders had at least one prior conviction within the same offence group (Table 12). Previous convictions fell within a different offence group for 40% of sexual offenders.

However, sexual offenders (particularly those charged with other sexual offences) appear before adult court with a higher percentage of multiple charges per case, indicating a higher tendency toward repeat offending prior to being reported to police. In 2001/02, 33% of persons appearing in Adult Criminal Court with sexual offences as the most serious charge had three or more charges (26% of those charged with sexual assault and 46% of those charged with other sexual offences) (Table 13).²² This is higher than for those convicted of other types of violent offences (27%) or property offences (27%). Eighteen percent of persons appearing before adult court charged with other sexual offences appeared with five or more charges compared with one-in-ten of those charged with other violent offences or property offences.

Multiple charge cases take more court time

Due in part to the fact that multiple charge cases take longer to resolve, the elapsed time from first appearance in adult court until sentencing, in cases with a finding of guilt, was a median of 226 days for sexual assaults and 259 days for other sexual offences. This was higher than for homicides (median of 166 days) or attempted murder (186), and almost twice as high as robbery or major assault (both 120 days), and more than twice as high as common assault (97 days).

Sexual Exploitation of Children through Prostitution

Sections 212(2) & (2.1) of the *Criminal Code* set out the indictable offences related to the exploitation of children through prostitution. The maximum penalty for living off the avails of prostitution of a person under the age of 18 is 14 years imprisonment. Compelling a person under 18 to engage in prostitution through the use of violence attracts a minimum penalty of five years imprisonment.

Section 212(4) makes it an offence to communicate for the purposes of obtaining the sexual services of a person under the age of 18. The maximum penalty for this indictable offence is five years imprisonment.

Some provinces such as Alberta, Saskatchewan and Ontario have enacted their own legislation to protect children from prostitution.

The Alberta legislation, *Protection of Children Involved in Prostitution Act*, passed in March 2001, toughened existing laws allowing for the detention of youths suspected of engaging in prostitution whose safety is at risk, but who will not voluntarily end their involvement in prostitution. Youths suspected of engaging in prostitution are detained in protective confinement for a 5-day assessment where they receive emergency care and treatment. The act also permits authorities to apply for a maximum two additional detainment periods up to 21 days each. The additional time is aimed at helping the child stabilize, break the cycle of abuse and begin the recovery process.

The Saskatchewan legislation, the *Emergency Protection for Victims of Child Sexual Abuse and Exploitation Act*, was proclaimed in force on October 1, 2002. The Act allows police, child protection staff and other designated persons to apply, on an emergency basis, to a Justice of the Peace for an Emergency Protection Intervention Order. These orders are directed at those who place a child under 18 years of age at risk of sexual exploitation, and can contain conditions prohibiting contact with the child and keeping the person from entering areas where street prostitution is taking place. It also expands police search powers in cases of child sexual abuse. It is an offence under section 127 of the *Criminal Code* to breach an order. As well an *Act to Amend the Highway Traffic Act* was proclaimed in force on April 1, 2002, permitting police to seize vehicles used in the commission of a prostitution offence, and the province to suspend the licenses of those convicted of offences, including offences involving children. A second set of amendments to the *Highway Traffic Act* was proclaimed in force on October 1, 2002, creating an offence of repeatedly driving or parking a vehicle, without lawful excuse, in an area that is frequented by sex trade workers.

The province of Ontario has passed, but not yet proclaimed the *Rescuing Children from Sexual Exploitation Act*. The Act will permit police and child welfare workers to assist children who are being exploited by street prostitution. The legislation also allows them to enter a range of locations where commercial sexual victimization of children occurs and to remove a child under 18 and to sue pimps to recover the costs of treatment and services required by victims.

Child Pornography

Laws prohibiting the possession, production and distribution of child pornography have been in place in Canada since 1993 (see *Developments in Sexual Offences and related Legislation: A chronology*, p. 11). Between 1997 and 2002, police laid charges against 226 men and 11 women for production or distribution of child pornography.

Sex Offender Registry

The Solicitor General introduced legislation in December, 2002 to implement a national sex offender registry. The system will require anyone convicted of a sexual offence to provide police with up-to-date addresses, telephone numbers, aliases and identifying marks. This information will be entered in a new sex offender database on the Canadian Police Information Centre (CPIC) system maintained by the RCMP. It is designed to aid police in solving sex-related crime by identifying possible suspects known to live near the site of an offence.

Cybertip.ca

Cybertip.ca is an internet tip line operated by Child Find Manitoba and funded in part by the federal government that is designed to receive and respond to reports from the public regarding the online sexual exploitation of children, including child pornography, luring, child sex-tourism, and the prostitution of children. Cybertip.ca helps prevent the sexual exploitation of children by bridging the gap between individuals who want to report online victimization and the law enforcement agencies who conduct the investigations, as well as by providing information and referral services to the public. This service is available through the web site www.cybertip.ca and tipline 1-866-658-9022.

²¹ Prior convictions for recidivists are not necessarily of the same offence type as the current conviction. Analysis was limited to this age group because of limited time series data available from the Adult Criminal Court Survey.

²² The other charges are not necessarily sexual offences.

Trafficking in persons for sexual exploitation

Trafficking in human beings for sexual exploitation has become a worldwide phenomenon, considered by the United Nations to be one of the fastest-growing illicit activities in the world. According to the International Organization for Migration, as many as 2 million women and children were trafficked across international borders in 2001 (www.undp.org/unifem).

The United Nations defines the commercial sexual exploitation of children as the use of a child for sexual purposes in exchange for cash or favours between the customer, intermediary or agent and those who profit from the trade in children for these purposes.

In May 2002, Canada ratified the UN *Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children*, supplementing the UN *Convention against Transnational Organized Crime*, which commits state parties to take measures to criminalize and prevent trafficking and protect trafficking victims. On June 28, 2002, a new trafficking in persons offence came into force in Canadian immigration law. The offence, section 118 of the new *Immigration and Refugee Protection Act*, provides for very severe penalties: fines of up to \$1 million and imprisonment for up to life. Moreover, it lists specific aggravating factors that a court can take into account when determining the appropriate penalty, such as subjecting the victim to sexual exploitation.

The *Optional Protocol to the Convention of the Rights of the Child on the sale of children, child prostitution and child pornography* (signed by Canada in November, 2001) requires state parties to prohibit the sale of children, child prostitution and child pornography and take measures to enhance international co-operation, seize and confiscate goods used in these offences, develop public awareness measures and introduce measure to rehabilitate child victims.

sexual touching, sexual exploitation of persons between 14 and 18 years by persons in a position of trust or authority, and exposure of genitals for a sexual purpose to a person under 14 (see *Sexual Offences Defined*). Bill C-15 also included measures to improve the treatment and experience of sexual assault complainants under 18 by allowing them to testify outside of court or behind screens and allowing the use of their videotaped testimony in certain cases.

1991 In *R. v. Seaboyer*, [1991] 2 S.C.R. 577, the Supreme Court of Canada struck down provisions of the 1983 sexual assault legislation that prevented a defendant from introducing evidence regarding the complainant's sexual history (sections 276 and 277 of the *Criminal Code*).

1992 Subsequent to this decision, new "rape shield" legislation, Bill C-49 provided a test to determine whether evidence of a complainant's sexual activity could be admitted at trial, and in addition, provided a definition of consent for the purpose of the sexual assault provisions. It also restricted the circumstances under which accused persons could say they "mistakenly believed" the victim was consenting. The law clearly set out that the defence of mistaken belief could not be used if the belief stemmed from the accused's drunkenness, recklessness, or willful blindness, or if the accused did not take reasonable steps to determine whether the victim was, in fact, consenting.

1993 Bill C-126 authorized courts to order specific prohibitions for convicted sex offenders, and resulted in changes to protective orders and other administrative processes involved in sexual assault cases involving children. Examples include ordering convicted sex offenders to stay away from parks and schools and prohibiting them from working in positions of trust with children. A judge can also prohibit accused sex offenders from personally cross-examining child victims.

1993 Bill C-128 introduced child pornography legislation, s.163.1 of the *Criminal Code*, which made it an offence to make, print, publish, import, distribute, sell, or possess for the purpose of publication, sale or distribution, any child pornography. Simple possession is also prohibited. This also covers such offences occurring through the use of the Internet.

1995 In *R. v. O'Connor*, [1995] 4 S.C.R. 411, the Supreme Court of Canada ruled that counselling or other personal records of sexual assault victims could be ordered to be produced for the accused's defence in criminal court proceedings.

1997 Following the *O'Connor* decision, Parliament proclaimed into force Bill C-46, which set out the circumstances under which records could be produced to the accused.

1997 Bill C-27 included provisions to facilitate the testimony of young victims and witnesses of sexual offences, to strengthen penalties for those who exploit youth involved in prostitution, and to clarify that female genital mutilation

DEVELOPMENTS IN SEXUAL OFFENCES AND RELATED LEGISLATION:

A CHRONOLOGY

1983 In Bill C-127, the crimes of rape and indecent assault were replaced by a three-tier structure of sexual offences, now sections 271, 272 and 273 of the *Criminal Code*. The aim of the new structure was to reduce the stigma associated with reporting sexual assault by focusing on the violent rather than the sexual nature of the offence, as well as to create a gender-neutral definition. The new legislation also eliminated spousal immunity and restricted the admissibility of evidence about the complainant's prior sexual history.

1987 In the case of *R. v. Chase*, [1987] 2 S.C.R. 293, the Supreme Court of Canada provided a definition of sexual assault. The court ruled that sexual assault does not focus solely on the part of the body part touched. It also deals with the nature of the contact, the situation in which it occurred, the words and gestures accompanying the act, and all other circumstances surrounding the conduct, including threats, which may or may not be accompanied by force.

1988 Although the sexual assault legislation outlined in Bill C-127 applies to victims of all ages, Bill C-15 created several new offences to deal specifically with incidents of sexual abuse involving victims under the age of 18. The offences included sexual interference, invitation to

is a crime. In addition, the Bill allowed Canadian officials to prosecute Canadian citizens and permanent residents who commit sexual offences against children in foreign countries.

- 1999** Bill C-51 contained an amendment to the *Criminal Code* to make it an offence to communicate for the purposes of obtaining a child prostitute, thus allowing police decoys to be used in laying charges.
- 1999** In *R. v. Mills*, [1999] 3 S.C.R. 668, the Supreme Court of Canada upheld the constitutionality of Bill C-46 to govern production of records to the accused.
- 2000** In *R. v. Darrach*, [2000] 2 S.C.R. 443, the Supreme Court of Canada upheld the constitutional validity of the "rape shield" legislation (Bill C-49).
- 2000** Bill C-7 provided amendments to the *Criminal Records Act* to enhance the ability of police to thoroughly explore the criminal background of persons seeking to work with children, including the criminal records for designated sex offences where a pardon has been granted.
- 2001** In *R. v. Sharpe*, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 45, the Supreme Court of Canada upheld the constitutionality of the possession of child pornography offence under s. 163.1(3) of the *Criminal Code*. The court, however, held that "child pornography" should be read as though it created an exception for (1) written or visual works of the imagination created by the accused (such as personal journals and drawings) and held for personal use only; and (2) visual recordings created by or depicting the accused that do not depict unlawful sexual activity and that are held by the accused for personal use only. The Court also held that the defences, such as artistic merit, should be interpreted liberally to avoid violating the right to freedom of expression.
- 2002** Bill C-15A included new offences and amendments to existing legislation regarding the sexual exploitation of children through the Internet and child sex tourism. Offences include: knowingly accessing child pornography sites, making child pornography available on the Internet (including web sites that have links to child pornography sites), and possession for the purposes of transmitting or exporting child pornography over the Internet, and luring children over the Internet for the purpose of sexual exploitation. This legislation also included an amendment to facilitate the prosecution of Canadian citizens and permanent residents who commit sexual offences against children in foreign countries. Also, the new Immigration and Refugee Protection Act includes a specific offence of trafficking in people (s.118).
- 2002** Bill C-20, which was introduced into the House of Commons December 5, 2002, aims to strengthen child pornography provisions of the *Criminal Code* by restricting defences to a single defence of "public good" and expanding the definition of written child pornography. The Bill also creates a new category of sexual exploitation that protects young persons between 14 and

18 years of age; increases maximum sentences for child-related offences (sexual offences, failure to provide the necessities of life, and child abandonment); introduces measures to facilitate the testimony of child victims and witnesses; and, introduces a new offence of voyeurism.

METHODOLOGY

Uniform Crime Reporting Survey

The Uniform Crime Reporting (UCR) Survey was developed by Statistics Canada with the co-operation and assistance of the Canadian Association of Chiefs of Police. The survey, which became operational in 1962, collects crime and traffic statistics reported by all police agencies in Canada. UCR survey data reflect reported crime that has been substantiated through police investigation.

This is an aggregate survey that classifies incidents according to the most serious offence in the incident (generally the offence that carries the longest maximum sentence under the *Criminal Code*). As a result, less serious offences are under-represented by the UCR survey. In the case of violent crime, a separate incident is recorded for each victim. The exception is robbery for which one incident is counted for every distinct or separate occurrence (in order to avoid inflating the number of robberies in cases with large numbers of victims, eg. a bank robbery). In the case of non-violent crimes, one incident (categorized according to the most serious offence) is counted for every distinct occurrence.

The incident-based Uniform Crime Reporting (UCR2) survey captures detailed information on individual criminal incidents reported to police, including characteristics of victims, accused persons and incidents. In 2001, detailed data were collected through the UCR2 survey from 154 police services in 9 provinces. These data represent 59% of the national volume of reported actual *Criminal Code* incidents. Other than Ontario and Québec, the data are primarily from urban police departments. The reader is cautioned that these data are not geographically representative at the national or provincial level.

The UCR2 Trend Database contains historical data, which permits the analysis of trends in the characteristics of incidents, accused and victims, such as weapon use and victim/accused relationship. This database currently includes 104 police services who have reported to the UCR2 survey constantly since 1995. These police services accounted for 42% of the national volume of crime in 2001.

Homicide Survey

The Homicide Survey began collecting detailed data provided by police on homicide incidents, victims and accused persons in 1974. Summary counts are available back to 1961. Whenever a homicide (murder, manslaughter or infanticide) becomes known to the police, the investigating police department completes a survey questionnaire which is then forwarded to the Canadian Centre for Justice Statistics. This questionnaire remained virtually unchanged from 1974 to 1990. In 1991 and later in 1997, in an effort to respond to changing information needs, the survey was revised and expanded. Every effort is

made to count homicides in the year in which they occurred. However, in some circumstances, homicides are counted in the year in which they were known to police, which may not be the year in which they actually occurred.

General Social Survey on Victimization

The General Social Survey (GSS) is an annual survey that monitors changes in Canadian society and provides information on specific policy issues of current or emerging interest. Each year, the GSS has a particular focus. In 1988, 1993 and 1999, the focus of the GSS was on crime and victimization.

In 1999, approximately 26,000 Canadians aged 15 years and older residing in households were interviewed by telephone about their experiences of victimization. As with previous cycles, the response rate was quite high – 81.3%. Responses were weighted to represent the approximately 24.3 million non-institutionalized persons 15 years of age and older in the Canadian population. Given this sample size, an estimate of a proportion of the population, expressed as a percentage, is expected to be within approximately 0.8% of the true proportion 19 times out of 20. Estimates for sub-samples of the population will have wider confidence intervals.

Adult Criminal Court Survey

The Adult Criminal Court Survey (ACCS) provides statistical information on the processing of cases through provincial/territorial adult criminal court systems. Coverage in 2001/02 stood at 90% of all adult criminal court cases. One province and two territories (Manitoba, Nunavut, and N.W.T) are not included in the survey at this time. British Columbia and New Brunswick began participating in 2001/02 and have been excluded from the trend analysis.

Some court locations in Québec are not included. Information from Québec's 140 municipal courts (which account for approximately 20% of federal statue charges in that province) are not yet collected. Superior Court data from British Columbia, Alberta, New Brunswick, Prince Edward Island and Yukon are also included.

A case is defined in the ACCS as one or more charges against an accused person or corporation that receive a final decision on the same day. Charges in each case are ranked according to the type of final decision and the charge with the most serious decision is used to represent the case.

Youth Court Survey

The Youth Court Survey (YCS) is a census of cases heard in youth court for persons aged 12-17 at the time of the offences.

Though every effort is made by respondents and the Canadian Centre for Justice Statistics to ensure complete survey coverage, slight under-coverage may occur in some jurisdictions. A case is defined by the YCS as one or more charges laid against a young person that is completed in youth court on the same day. Charges in each case are ranked according to the type of final decision and the charge with the most serious decision is used to represent the case.

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Table 1

Sexual offences reported to police, Canada, 1983-2002													
Year	Population	Total Sexual Offences		Total Sexual Assault		Sexual assault level 1		Sexual assault level 2		Sexual assault level 3		Other sexual offences	
		Number	Rate ¹	Number	Rate ¹	Number	Rate ¹	Number	Rate ¹	Number	Rate ¹	Number	Rate ¹
1983	25,366,965	14,872	59	11,932	47	10,542	42	840	3.3	550	2.2	2,940	11.6
1984	25,607,555	18,535	72	14,793	58	13,472	53	795	3.1	526	2.1	3,742	14.6
1985	25,842,590	21,467	83	18,248	71	16,990	66	805	3.1	453	1.8	3,219	12.5
1986	26,100,587	23,533	90	20,530	79	19,191	74	910	3.5	429	1.6	3,003	11.5
1987	26,449,888	25,008	95	22,369	85	21,021	79	936	3.5	412	1.6	2,639	10.0
1988	26,798,303	28,048	105	24,898	93	23,564	88	961	3.6	373	1.4	3,150	11.8
1989	27,286,239	30,364	111	26,795	98	25,551	94	856	3.1	388	1.4	3,569	13.1
1990	27,700,856	31,456	114	27,843	101	26,540	96	918	3.3	385	1.4	3,613	13.0
1991	28,030,864	34,282	122	30,351	108	28,916	103	971	3.5	464	1.7	3,931	14.0
1992	28,376,550	38,395	135	34,355	121	33,022	116	935	3.3	398	1.4	4,040	14.2
1993	28,703,142	38,925	136	34,754	121	33,536	117	860	3.0	358	1.2	4,171	14.5
1994	29,035,981	35,524	122	31,706	109	30,572	105	769	2.6	365	1.3	3,818	13.1
1995	29,353,854	31,728	108	28,234	96	27,278	93	659	2.2	297	1.0	3,494	11.9
1996	29,671,892	30,369	102	27,026	91	26,076	88	653	2.2	297	1.0	3,343	11.3
1997	29,987,214	30,663	102	27,013	90	26,142	87	602	2.0	269	0.9	3,650	12.2
1998	30,248,412	28,998	96	25,553	84	24,805	82	529	1.7	219	0.7	3,445	11.4
1999	30,509,323	27,159	89	23,859	78	23,185	76	461	1.5	213	0.7	3,300	10.8
2000	30,790,834	27,115	88	24,001	78	23,428	76	391	1.3	182	0.6	3,114	10.1
2001	31,110,565	26,733	86	24,044	77	23,563	76	320	1.0	161	0.5	2,689	8.6
2002	31,413,990	27,094	86	24,350	78	23,813	76	381	1.2	156	0.5	2,744	8.7
% change 1993-2002		-30	-36	-30	-36	-29	-35	-56	-60	-56	-60	-34	-40
% change 1983-2002		82	47	104	65	126	82	-55	-63	-72	-77	-7	-25

¹ Rates are calculated based on 100,000 population. The population estimates are provided by Statistics Canada, Census and Demography Statistics, Demography Division. Populations as of July 1st: Revised intercensal estimates, adjusted for net undercoverage for 1983 to 1990; final intercensal estimates for 1991 to 1995; final postcensal estimates for 1996 to 1999; updated postcensal estimates for 2000 and 2001, and; preliminary postcensal estimates for 2002.

Source: Uniform Crime Reporting Survey, Canadian Centre for Justice Statistics, Statistics Canada.

Table 2

	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002
Police reported sexual offences by province and territory, 1991-2002												
Newfoundland and Labrador												
Number	1,230	1,368	1,353	1,113	957	842	902	664	600	599	650	584
Rate ¹	212	235	233	194	169	150	163	122	111	112	122	110
% rate change		11	-1	-17	-13	-11	9	-25	-9	1	9	-10
Prince Edward Island												
Number	176	205	160	195	174	172	155	170	116	112	120	162
Rate ¹	135	157	121	145	129	127	113	124	84	81	86	116
% rate change		16	-23	20	-11	-2	-11	10	-32	-4	7	34
Nova Scotia												
Number	1,182	1,453	1,479	1,361	1,309	1,218	1,264	1,023	947	823	912	948
Rate ¹	129	158	160	147	141	131	135	109	101	87	97	100
% rate change		22	1	-8	-4	-7	3	-19	-7	-14	11	4
New Brunswick												
Number	1,098	1,286	1,352	1,252	1,249	1,057	989	955	878	826	953	851
Rate ¹	147	172	181	167	166	140	131	127	116	109	126	112
% rate change		17	5	-8	-1	-16	-6	-3	-9	-6	16	-11
Quebec												
Number	4,674	5,266	4,975	4,648	4,248	4,291	4,214	4,252	4,503	4,507	4,601	5,274
Rate ¹	66	74	70	65	59	59	58	58	61	61	62	71
% rate change		12	-5	-7	-9	0	-2	0	5	0	2	14
Ontario												
Number	11,963	12,870	13,731	12,631	10,889	10,320	10,158	9,942	9,157	9,840	9,078	8,877
Rate ¹	115	121	128	116	99	93	90	87	79	84	76	74
% rate change		5	6	-9	-15	-6	-3	-3	-9	6	-9	-4
Manitoba												
Number	1,999	2,543	2,425	2,095	1,776	1,887	1,826	1,607	1,572	1,462	1,460	1,602
Rate ¹	180	228	217	186	157	166	161	141	138	127	127	139
% rate change		27	-5	-14	-16	6	-3	-12	-2	-8	0	10
Saskatchewan												
Number	1,774	1,992	1,917	1,770	1,721	1,601	1,866	1,672	1,525	1,650	1,571	1,618
Rate ¹	177	198	191	175	170	157	182	163	149	162	154	160
% rate change		12	-4	-8	-3	-8	16	-10	-9	9	-5	4
Alberta												
Number	4,136	4,415	4,272	3,868	3,434	3,330	3,341	3,212	2,936	2,711	2,854	2,806
Rate ¹	160	168	160	143	125	120	118	110	99	90	93	90
% rate change		5	-5	-11	-13	-4	-2	-7	-10	-9	4	-3
British Columbia												
Number	5,451	6,348	6,494	5,866	5,382	5,098	5,176	4,911	4,402	4,075	4,059	3,776
Rate ¹	161	183	182	160	143	132	131	123	109	100	99	91
% rate change		14	-1	-12	-11	-8	-1	-6	-11	-8	-1	-8
Yukon												
Number	120	107	135	108	133	93	133	111	94	98	80	108
Rate ¹	415	354	441	359	431	292	412	352	303	320	265	361
% rate change		-15	25	-19	20	-32	41	-15	-14	6	-17	36
Northwest Territories²												
Number	474	542	632	617	456	460	639	479	213	189	154	196
Rate ¹	778	869	994	947	685	681	943	710	520	463	374	473
% rate change		12	14	-5	-28	-1	39	-25	-27	-11	-19	27
Nunavut²												
Number	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	216	223	241	292
Rate ¹	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	804	811	857	1,017
% rate change										1	6	19
Canada												
Number	34,282	38,395	38,925	35,524	31,728	30,369	30,663	28,998	27,159	27,115	26,733	27,094
Rate	122	135	136	122	108	102	102	96	89	88	86	86
% rate change		11	1	-10	-11	-6	0	-6	-7	-1	-2	0


¹ The population estimates used to calculate rates are provided by Statistics Canada, Census and Demography Statistics, Demography Division. Populations as of July 1st: final intercensal estimates for 1991 to 1995; final postcensal estimates for 1996 to 1999; updated postcensal estimates for 2000 and 2001, and; preliminary postcensal estimates for 2002.

² In 1999, Nunavut, which comprises the eastern part of the old Northwest Territories, officially became a Canadian territory. Data for 1999 onward for the Northwest Territories cannot be compared to data prior to 1999.

Note: Includes sexual assault levels 1, 2 and 3 and other sexual offences.

Source: Uniform Crime Reporting Survey, Canadian Centre for Justice Statistics, Statistics Canada.

Table 3

 Homicides precipitated by sexual offences, 1991-2001		
	Number	Percent
Accused identified	163	89
Not cleared	21	11
Total	184	100
Sex of accused		
Male	159	98
Female	4	2
Total	163	100
Age of accused		
<25	52	32
25 and over	111	68
Total	163	100
Sex of victim		
Male	33	18
Female	151	82
Total	184	100
Age of victim		
<15	25	14
15-24	61	33
25 and over	98	53
Total	184	100

Source: Homicide Survey, Canadian Centre for Justice Statistics, Statistics Canada.

Table 4

Reasons for not reporting violent crimes to the police, 1999						
Reasons for not reporting	Sexual assault		Robbery		Assault	
	No. (000s)	%	No. (000s)	%	No. (000s)	%
Total incidents not reported to police	391	100	116	100	754	100
Dealt with in another way						
Yes	237	61	56	49	432	57
No	153	39	60	51	320	42
Don't know/Not stated	0	0	0	0	0	0
Not important enough						
Yes	195	50	48	41	392	52
No	194	50	69	59	361	48
Don't know/Not stated	0	0	0	0	0	0
Personal matter and did not concern the police						
Yes	194	50	44	38	226	30
No	195	50	72	62	527	70
Don't know/Not stated	0	0	0	0	0	0
Did not want to get involved with the police						
Yes	182	47	58	50	268	36
No	207	53	59	50	484	64
Don't know/Not stated	0	0	0	0	0	0
Police couldn't do anything about it						
Yes	130	33	55	48	244	32
No	260	66	61	52	509	68
Don't know/Not stated	0	0	0	0	0	0
Fear of revenge						
Yes	73	19	32	27	74	10
No	317	73	85	73	678	90
Don't know/Not stated	0	0	0	0	0	0
Police wouldn't help						
Yes	70	18	15	6	127	17
No	319	82	102	87	625	83
Don't know/Not stated	0	0	0	0	0	0
Fear of publicity/news coverage						
Yes	56	14	9	8	29	4
No	333	85	108	92	723	96
Don't know/Not stated	0	0	0	0	0	0
Other reason						
Yes	36	9	8	7	58	8
No	355	91	109	93	695	92
Don't know/Not stated	0	0	0	0	0	0

Figures may not add to totals due to rounding.

Source: 1999 General Social Survey, Statistics Canada.

Table 5

Percent of victims of violence who sought support, 1999						
Source of support	Sexual assault		Robbery		Assault	
	No. (000s)	%	No. (000s)	%	No. (000s)	%
Family	207	42	172	76	844	68
Friend/neighbour	302	61	191	84	928	74
Co-worker	132	26	94	41	649	52
Doctor/nurse	F	F	F	F	118	9
Lawyer	F	F	F	F	72 ^E	6 ^E

^E use with caution

^F too unreliable to be published

Source: 1999 General Social Survey, Statistics Canada.

Table 6

Rates of sexual assault by victim characteristics, 1999 ¹		
Victim characteristics	Number (000s)	Rate per 1,000 population 15+
Total	502	21
Sex		
Females	410	33
Males	92	8
Age group		
15-24	248	61
25-34	126	28
35-44	74 ^E	14 ^E
45-54	43 ^E	10 ^E
55-64	0	0
65 +	0	0
Marital status		
Married	78 ^E	6 ^E
Common law	0	0
Single	291	48
Widow or widower	0	0
Separated or divorced	68 ^E	43 ^E
Don't know/Not stated	0	0
Main activity		
Working at a job	235	18
Looking for work	0	0
A student	145	49
Household work ²	58 ^E	28 ^E
Retired	0	0
Other ³	0	0
Don't know/Not stated	0	0
Evening activities (# per month)		
Less than 10	42 ^E	8 ^E
10 - 19	61 ^E	12 ^E
20 - 29	92	19
30 +	307	37
Don't know/Not stated	0	0
Household income (\$)		
0-14,999	61 ^E	43 ^E
15,000-29,999	70 ^E	24 ^E
30,000-39,999	46 ^E	20 ^E
40,000-59,999	82 ^E	20 ^E
60,000 +	92	14
Don't know/Not stated	151	
Location of home		
Urban	409	21
Rural	94	18

^E use with caution

¹ Includes all incidents of spousal sexual and physical assault.

² Includes taking care of children and maternity/paternity leave.

³ Includes long-term illness and volunteering.

Source: 1999 General Social Survey, Statistics Canada.

Table 7



Victim-accused relationship by age and sex of victims, 2002


Relationship of accused to victim	Age and sex of victim							
	Children <12							
	Total victims		Female		Male		Total	
	Number	%	Number	%	Number	%	Number	%
Family (total)	4,025	28	1,432	51	530	46	1,962	49
Spouse/ex-spouse	555	4		0		0	0	0
Parent	1,439	10	606	21	195	17	801	20
Other family	2,031	14	826	29	335	29	1,161	29
Close friend ¹	1,481	10	172	6	95	8	267	7
Acquaintance	5,842	41	977	35	418	37	1,395	35
Stranger	2,921	20	243	9	97	9	340	9
Total	14,269	100	2,824	100	1,140	100	3,964	100

	Age and sex of victim											
	Youths 12-17						Adults 18+					
	Female		Male		Total		Female		Male		Total	
	Number	%	Number	%	Number	%	Number	%	Number	%	Number	%
Family (total)	985	23	132	23	1,117	23	882	17	64	15	946	17
Spouse/ex-spouse	34	1	1	0	35	1	513	10	7	2	520	9
Parent	454	11	41	7	495	10	125	2	18	4	143	3
Other family	497	12	90	16	587	12	244	5	39	9	283	5
Close friend ¹	478	11	61	11	539	11	630	12	45	10	675	12
Acquaintance	1,942	46	297	53	2,239	47	1,984	39	224	52	2,208	40
Stranger	809	19	75	13	884	18	1,596	31	101	23	1,697	31
Total	4,214	100	565	100	4,779	100	5,092	100	434	100	5,526	100

¹ Close friend is defined as long-term and/or close (or intimate) relationship to the victim. It also includes ex-friends.

Source: Incident-based Uniform Crime Reporting Survey (UCR2), Canadian Centre for Justice Statistics, Statistics Canada.

Table 8

 Decisions in Adult Criminal Court for cases involving sexual offences and other violent offences, 1994/95 to 2001/02²											
		Total		Guilty		Acquitted		Stay/Withdrawn		Other ¹	
		Number	%	Number	%	Number	%	Number	%	Number	%
Sexual assault (level 1)	1994/95	4,469	100	1,495	33	170	4	1,644	37	1,160	26
	1995/96	4,247	100	1,566	37	235	6	1,528	36	918	22
	1996/97	3,900	100	1,650	42	183	5	1,435	37	632	16
	1997/98	4,137	100	1,671	40	199	5	1,596	39	671	16
	1998/99	4,033	100	1,718	43	277	7	1,570	39	468	12
	1999/00	3,629	100	1,668	46	198	5	1,332	37	431	12
	2000/01	3,279	100	1,444	44	217	7	1,245	38	373	11
	2001/02	4,354	100	1,879	43	335	8	1,746	40	394	9
Sexual assault (level 2)	1994/95	780	100	173	22	8	1	272	35	327	42
	1995/96	692	100	196	28	31	4	229	33	236	34
	1996/97	572	100	166	29	24	4	196	34	186	33
	1997/98	548	100	140	26	17	3	211	39	180	33
	1998/99	507	100	163	32	20	4	192	38	132	26
	1999/00	375	100	120	32	23	6	158	42	74	20
	2000/01	333	100	102	31	23	7	129	39	79	24
	2001/02	417	100	137	33	29	7	167	40	84	20
Sexual assault (level 3)	1994/95	279	100	52	19	2	1	109	39	116	42
	1995/96	213	100	35	16	12	6	92	43	74	35
	1996/97	164	100	41	25	2	1	63	38	58	35
	1997/98	182	100	47	26	6	3	75	41	54	30
	1998/99	177	100	46	26	5	3	82	46	44	25
	1999/00	151	100	45	30	11	7	69	46	26	17
	2000/01	112	100	33	29	6	5	47	42	26	23
	2001/02	146	100	39	27	10	7	65	45	32	22
Other sexual offences	1994/95	2,776	100	890	32	100	4	1,036	37	750	27
	1995/96	2,730	100	943	35	167	6	1,004	37	616	23
	1996/97	2,374	100	854	36	127	5	898	38	495	21
	1997/98	2,541	100	905	36	150	6	991	39	495	19
	1998/99	2,440	100	894	37	177	7	1,020	42	349	14
	1999/00	2,182	100	843	39	158	7	906	42	275	13
	2000/01	2,098	100	840	40	133	6	849	40	276	13
	2001/02	2,383	100	927	39	182	8	1,008	42	266	11
Total sexual offences	1994/95	8,304	100	2,610	31	280	3	3,061	37	2,353	28
	1995/96	7,882	100	2,740	35	445	6	2,853	36	1,844	23
	1996/97	7,010	100	2,711	39	336	5	2,592	37	1,371	20
	1997/98	7,408	100	2,763	37	372	5	2,873	39	1,400	19
	1998/99	7,157	100	2,821	39	479	7	2,864	40	993	14
	1999/00	6,337	100	2,676	42	390	6	2,465	39	806	13
	2000/01	5,822	100	2,419	42	379	7	2,270	39	754	13
	2001/02	7,300	100	2,982	41	556	8	2,986	41	776	11
Other violent offences	1994/95	94,323	100	42,953	46	2,685	3	39,334	42	9,351	10
	1995/96	94,172	100	46,736	50	4,418	5	36,972	39	6,046	6
	1996/97	90,097	100	45,891	51	4,686	5	34,711	39	4,809	5
	1997/98	93,538	100	47,405	51	5,118	5	36,600	39	4,415	5
	1998/99	91,664	100	47,308	52	5,020	5	35,676	39	3,660	4
	1999/00	88,111	100	45,047	51	5,084	6	34,488	39	3,492	4
	2000/01	89,583	100	46,416	52	5,203	6	34,262	38	3,702	4
	2001/02	113,212	100	57,506	51	6,986	6	44,288	39	4,432	4

¹ Other decisions include final decisions of found not criminally responsible, waived in province/territory, and waived out of province/territory. This order also includes any order where a conviction was not recorded, the court's acceptance of a special plea, cases which raise Charter arguments and cases where the accused was found unfit to stand trial. In jurisdictions not providing superior court data (i.e., Newfoundland and Labrador, Nova Scotia, Quebec, Ontario, Saskatchewan), the other decision category includes charges having a committal for trial in superior court as the decision on the final appearance in provincial court.


² Manitoba and Nunavut do not participate in this survey. British Columbia and New Brunswick began participating in 2001/02 and so have been excluded from this analysis for all years. Northwest Territories is excluded in 1996/97, 2000/01 and 2001/02. In 1999/00, cases in Northwest Territories accounted for 0.4% of the total caseload.

Note: Represents most serious offence in the case.

Revised figures for 1994/95 to 2000/01. Revisions were made to the ACCS counting procedures and offence classifications, and applications under CCC s.810, s.810.01, s.810.1, and s.810.2 (peace bond applications) were excluded. The definition of violent offences has been expanded to include criminal harassment, uttering threats and other violent offences. Previously they were captured under Other Criminal Code.

Source: Adult Criminal Court Survey, Canadian Centre for Justice Statistics, Statistics Canada.

Table 9

 Sentences in Adult Criminal Court for cases involving sexual offences and other violence offences, 1994/95 to 2001/02 ²															
		Total		Prison		Conditional sentence ¹		Probation		Fine		Other		Unknown	
		Number	%	Number	%	Number	%	Number	%	Number	%	Number	%	Number	%
Sexual assault (level 1)	1994/95	1,495	100	884	59	537	36	53	4	6	0	15	1
	1995/96	1,566	100	968	62	509	33	50	3	15	1	24	2
	1996/97	1,650	100	912	55	645	39	54	3	24	1	15	1
	1997/98	1,671	100	849	51	716	43	61	4	21	1	24	1
	1998/99	1,718	100	915	53	150	9	574	33	36	2	19	1	24	1
	1999/00	1,668	100	875	52	173	10	540	32	34	2	18	1	28	2
	2000/01	1,444	100	693	48	200	14	483	33	30	2	27	2	11	1
	2001/02	1,879	100	866	46	306	16	568	30	30	2	37	2	72	4
Sexual assault (level 2)	1994/95	173	100	146	84	22	13	2	1	1	1	2	1
	1995/96	196	100	164	84	28	14	1	1	1	1	2	1
	1996/97	166	100	143	86	20	12	0	0	1	1	2	1
	1997/98	140	100	104	74	28	20	0	0	4	3	4	3
	1998/99	163	100	125	77	13	8	21	13	0	0	1	1	3	2
	1999/00	120	100	78	65	15	13	16	13	0	0	5	4	6	5
	2000/01	102	100	74	73	14	14	11	11	0	0	2	2	1	1
	2001/02	137	100	101	74	20	15	6	4	0	0	3	2	7	5
Sexual assault (level 3)	1994/95	52	100	41	79	9	17	2	4	0	0	0	0
	1995/96	35	100	27	77	4	11	4	11	0	0	0	0
	1996/97	41	100	29	71	5	12	3	7	2	5	2	5
	1997/98	47	100	35	74	5	11	1	2	2	4	4	9
	1998/99	46	100	29	63	7	15	3	7	2	4	1	2	4	9
	1999/00	45	100	33	73	8	18	1	2	0	0	0	0	3	7
	2000/01	33	100	26	79	1	3	3	9	2	6	1	3	0	0
	2001/02	39	100	27	69	2	5	4	10	1	3	0	0	5	13
Other sexual offences	1994/95	890	100	585	66	286	32	8	1	1	0	10	1
	1995/96	943	100	595	63	327	35	6	1	4	0	11	1
	1996/97	854	100	558	65	270	32	9	1	14	2	3	0
	1997/98	905	100	560	62	319	35	5	1	12	1	9	1
	1998/99	894	100	559	63	96	11	218	24	9	1	10	1	2	0
	1999/00	843	100	487	58	110	13	224	27	9	1	5	1	8	1
	2000/01	840	100	498	59	104	12	225	27	4	0	8	1	1	0
	2001/02	927	100	478	52	178	19	232	25	3	0	14	2	22	2
Total sexual offences	1994/95	2,610	100	1,656	63	854	33	65	2	8	0	27	
	1995/96	2,740	100	1,754	64	868	32	61	2	20	1	37	
	1996/97	2,711	100	1,642	61	940	35	66	2	41	2	22	
	1997/98	2,763	100	1,548	56	1,068	39	67	2	39	1	41	
	1998/99	2,821	100	1,628	58	266	9	816	29	47	2	31	1	33	1
	1999/00	2,676	100	1,473	55	306	11	781	29	43	2	28	1	45	2
	2000/01	2,419	100	1,291	53	319	13	722	30	36	1	38	2	13	1
	2001/02	2,982	100	1,472	49	506	17	810	27	34	1	54	2	106	4
Other violent offences	1994/95	42,953	100	15,959	37	20,319	47	4,961	12	633	1	1,081	3
	1995/96	46,736	100	17,444	37	22,273	48	4,664	10	724	2	1,631	3
	1996/97	45,891	100	17,030	37	23,278	51	4,088	9	1,103	2	392	1
	1997/98	47,405	100	17,064	36	24,740	52	3,753	8	1,222	3	626	1
	1998/99	47,308	100	17,703	37	1,051	2	23,506	50	3,513	7	1,092	2	443	1
	1999/00	45,047	100	16,356	36	1,327	3	22,520	50	3,073	7	1,166	3	605	1
	2000/01	46,416	100	17,066	37	1,312	3	23,688	51	2,675	6	1,262	3	413	1
	2001/02	57,506	100	20,366	35	2,528	4	28,432	49	2,847	5	1,710	3	1,623	3

... not applicable

¹ Data on conditional sentences are not available for Quebec.


² Manitoba and Nunavut do not participate in this survey. British Columbia and New Brunswick began participating in 2001/02 and so have been excluded from this analysis for all years. Northwest Territories is excluded in 1996/97, 2000/01 and 2001/02. In 1999/00, cases in Northwest Territories accounted for 0.4% of the total caseload.

Note: Represents most serious offence in the case and most serious sentence.

Revised figures for 1994/95 to 2000/01. Revisions were made to the ACCS counting procedures and offence classifications, and applications under CCC s.810, s.810.01, s.810.1, and s.810.2 (peace bond applications) were excluded. The definition of violent offences has been expanded to include criminal harassment, uttering threats and other violent offences. Previously they were captured under Other Criminal Code.

Source: Adult Criminal Court Survey, Canadian Centre for Justice Statistics, Statistics Canada.

Table 10

 Decisions in Youth Court for cases involving sexual offences and other violent offences, 1994/95 to 2001/02																			
		Total		Guilty		Transfer to adult court		Transfer jurisdiction		Withdrawn		Dismissed		Stayed		Acquitted		Other	
		Number	%	Number	%	Number	%	Number	%	Number	%	Number	%	Number	%	Number	%	Number	%
Sexual assault (level 1)	1994/95	1,408	100	821	58	11	1	3	0	233	17	116	8	133	9	88	6	3	0
	1995/96	1,197	100	654	55	9	1	3	0	209	17	106	9	125	10	88	7	3	0
	1996/97	1,104	100	620	56	6	1	1	0	195	18	73	7	136	12	70	6	3	0
	1997/98	1,128	100	622	55	6	1	3	0	191	17	96	9	134	12	73	6	3	0
	1998/99	1,184	100	719	61	4	0	3	0	190	16	78	7	121	10	65	5	4	0
	1999/00	1,071	100	624	58	1	0	5	0	184	17	60	6	133	12	56	5	8	1
	2000/01	1,097	100	637	58	4	0	3	0	197	18	82	7	110	10	60	5	4	0
	2001/02	1,052	100	639	61	5	0	2	0	174	17	82	8	101	10	48	5	1	0
Sexual assault (level 2&3) ¹	1994/95	71	100	33	46	1	1	1	1	14	20	5	7	5	7	12	17	0	0
	1995/96	51	100	21	41	0	0	0	0	14	27	7	14	3	6	5	10	1	2
	1996/97	34	100	17	50	0	0	0	0	3	9	4	12	3	9	6	18	1	3
	1997/98	74	100	29	39	1	1	0	0	15	20	14	19	8	11	7	9	0	0
	1998/99	56	100	23	41	0	0	0	0	13	23	5	9	3	5	8	14	4	7
	1999/00	52	100	18	35	1	2	0	0	18	35	10	19	1	2	4	8	0	0
	2000/01	50	100	17	34	0	0	0	0	17	34	5	10	9	18	2	4	0	0
	2001/02	44	100	19	43	1	2	2	5	12	27	2	5	7	16	1	2	0	0
Other sexual offences	1994/95	739	100	371	50	4	1	1	0	138	19	68	9	119	16	37	5	1	0
	1995/96	640	100	327	51	0	0	1	0	142	22	50	8	89	14	30	5	1	0
	1996/97	597	100	278	47	5	1	3	1	141	24	58	10	82	14	30	5	0	0
	1997/98	629	100	285	45	3	0	2	0	166	26	53	8	94	15	24	4	2	0
	1998/99	563	100	256	45	0	0	2	0	167	30	47	8	64	11	26	5	1	0
	1999/00	530	100	249	47	2	0	5	1	127	24	38	7	81	15	23	4	5	1
	2000/01	615	100	285	46	1	0	2	0	172	28	25	4	94	15	29	5	7	1
	2001/02	603	100	293	49	3	0	5	1	153	25	37	6	72	12	38	6	2	0
Total sexual offences	1994/95	2,218	100	1,225	55	16	1	5	0	385	17	189	9	257	12	137	6	4	0
	1995/96	1,888	100	1,002	53	9	0	4	0	365	19	163	9	217	11	123	7	5	0
	1996/97	1,735	100	915	53	11	1	4	0	339	20	135	8	221	13	106	6	4	0
	1997/98	1,831	100	936	51	10	1	5	0	372	20	163	9	236	13	104	6	5	0
	1998/99	1,803	100	998	55	4	0	5	0	370	21	130	7	188	10	99	5	9	0
	1999/00	1,653	100	891	54	4	0	10	1	329	20	108	7	215	13	83	5	13	1
	2000/01	1,762	100	939	53	5	0	5	0	386	22	112	6	213	12	91	5	11	1
	2001/02	1,699	100	951	56	9	1	9	1	339	20	121	7	180	11	87	5	3	0
Other violent offences	1994/95	18,829	100	11,821	63	54	0	12	0	3,904	21	741	4	1,729	9	565	3	3	0
	1995/96	19,195	100	11,879	62	26	0	17	0	4,019	21	767	4	1,989	10	478	2	20	0
	1996/97	19,753	100	12,516	63	31	0	24	0	3,861	20	807	4	1,961	10	523	3	30	0
	1997/98	21,104	100	13,104	62	27	0	29	0	4,410	21	818	4	2,142	10	522	2	52	0
	1998/99	21,403	100	13,677	64	39	0	27	0	4,499	21	755	4	1,799	8	513	2	94	0
	1999/00	20,779	100	13,048	63	21	0	37	0	4,464	21	743	4	1,904	9	480	2	82	0
	2000/01	20,913	100	12,790	61	33	0	52	0	4,813	23	720	3	2,002	10	473	2	30	0
	2001/02	20,812	100	12,848	62	21	0	66	0	4,618	22	772	4	2,017	10	449	2	21	0

¹ Sexual assault levels 2 and 3 have been grouped together due to very low counts.

Note: Represents most serious offence in the case.

Source: Youth Court Survey, Canadian Centre for Justice Statistics, Statistics Canada.

Table 11

Sentences in Youth Court for cases involving sexual offences and other violent offences, 1994/95 to 2001/02													
		Total		Secure custody		Open custody		Probation		Fine		Other	
		Number	%	Number	%	Number	%	Number	%	Number	%	Number	%
Sexual assault (level 1)	1994/95	821	100	144	18	154	19	497	61	3	0	23	3
	1995/96	654	100	96	15	135	21	395	60	7	1	21	3
	1996/97	620	100	87	14	114	18	402	65	2	0	15	2
	1997/98	622	100	78	13	99	16	408	66	2	0	35	6
	1998/99	719	100	86	12	98	14	476	66	3	0	56	8
	1999/00	624	100	72	12	85	14	439	70	1	0	27	4
	2000/01	637	100	88	14	72	11	432	68	0	0	45	7
	2001/02	639	100	64	10	85	13	440	69	1	0	49	8
Sexual assault (level 2&3) ¹	1994/95	33	100	12	36	9	27	11	33	1	3	0	0
	1995/96	21	100	10	48	5	24	4	19	0	0	2	10
	1996/97	18	100	8	44	3	17	6	33	0	0	1	6
	1997/98	29	100	13	45	10	34	4	14	0	0	2	7
	1998/99	23	100	10	43	4	17	9	39	0	0	0	0
	1999/00	18	100	4	22	8	44	5	28	0	0	1	6
	2000/01	17	100	6	35	6	35	4	24	0	0	1	6
	2001/02	19	100	11	58	3	16	5	26	0	0	0	0
Other sexual offences	1994/95	371	100	49	13	73	20	240	65	0	0	9	2
	1995/96	327	100	36	11	49	15	237	72	0	0	5	2
	1996/97	278	100	33	12	39	14	196	71	2	1	8	3
	1997/98	285	100	31	11	38	13	195	68	1	0	20	7
	1998/99	256	100	24	9	39	15	177	69	0	0	16	6
	1999/00	249	100	28	11	21	8	188	76	0	0	12	5
	2000/01	285	100	30	11	37	13	201	71	0	0	17	6
	2001/02	293	100	25	9	38	13	213	73	1	0	16	5
Total sexual offences	1994/95	1,225	100	205	17	236	19	748	61	4	0	32	3
	1995/96	1,002	100	142	14	189	19	636	63	7	1	28	3
	1996/97	916	100	128	14	156	17	604	66	4	0	24	3
	1997/98	936	100	122	13	147	16	607	65	3	0	57	6
	1998/99	998	100	120	12	141	14	662	66	3	0	72	7
	1999/00	891	100	104	12	114	13	632	71	1	0	40	4
	2000/01	939	100	124	13	115	12	637	68	0	0	63	7
	2001/02	951	100	100	11	126	13	658	69	2	0	65	7
Other violent offences	1994/95	11,821	100	1,710	14	1,917	16	6,901	58	317	3	976	8
	1995/96	11,879	100	1,616	14	1,937	16	7,079	60	242	2	1,005	8
	1996/97	12,516	100	1,838	15	1,906	15	7,643	61	213	2	916	7
	1997/98	13,104	100	1,902	15	2,100	16	7,710	59	246	2	1,146	9
	1998/99	13,677	100	2,101	15	2,093	15	8,106	59	226	2	1,151	8
	1999/00	13,048	100	1,867	14	1,837	14	7,989	61	222	2	1,133	9
	2000/01	12,790	100	1,886	15	1,863	15	7,792	61	172	1	1,077	8
	2001/02	12,848	100	1,869	15	1,656	13	8,036	63	158	1	1,129	9

¹ Sexual assault levels 2 and 3 have been grouped together due to very low counts.

Note: Represents most serious offence in the case and most serious sentence.

Source: Youth Court Survey, Canadian Centre for Justice Statistics, Statistics Canada.


Table 12

Repeat convictions for sex offenders and other offenders, 1999/2000										
	Total cases	%	First time offenders	%	One previous conviction within the same offence group	%	More than one previous conviction within the same offence group	%	Previous convictions within a different offence group	%
Total sexual offences	443	100	217	49	45	10	6	1	175	40
Other violent offences	8,659	100	3,398	39	1,632	19	1,115	13	2,514	29
Crimes against property	16,967	100	6,456	38	3,032	18	5,422	32	2,057	12
Other offences	29,977	100	12,833	43	5,701	19	6,716	22	4,727	16

Note: Represents most serious offence in the case.

Source: Adult Criminal Court Survey, Canadian Centre for Justice Statistics, Statistics Canada.

Table 13

 Cases appearing before Adult Criminal Court in 2001/02 by number of charges per case														
	Total	%	One charge	%	Two charges	%	Three+ charges	%	Three charges	%	Four charges	%	Five+ charges	%
Total sexual offences	7,300	100	3,185	44	1,740	24	2,375	33	874	12	552	8	949	13
Sexual assault	4,917	100	2,660	54	971	20	1,286	26	492	10	274	6	520	11
Other sexual offences	2,383	100	525	22	769	32	1,089	46	382	16	278	12	429	18
Other violent offences	113,212	100	55,361	49	26,895	24	30,956	27	12,843	11	6,931	6	11,182	10
Crimes against property	104,764	100	52,584	50	23,639	23	28,541	27	10,623	10	5,914	6	12,004	11

Note: Represents most serious offence in the case. Multiple charges are not necessarily of the same type.

Source: Adult Criminal Court Survey, Canadian Centre for Justice Statistics, Statistics Canada.

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